Re: In Bruno's Terms
On Sunday, October 13, 2013 11:26:49 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Oct 2013, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > > On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> >> Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses >> which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR. >> * >> Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of >> absolute uniqueness, >> >> >> ? >> 0, s(0), ... are unique. >> > > By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly > inconceivable before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way > thereafter. Numbers cannot be created from scratch, they can only be > recycled from the pool of combinatory possiblities. To be unique is to be > immune from precedent or repetition - inherently non-emulable by definition. > > > Like the first person experience of here and now. That is non repeatable, > as it supervenes on *all* its 3p repetition. > So, thanks to comp and the FPI, I can make sense of what you say. But that > is first person experience only. > An interesting point. I would say that first person experience of here and now supervenes on all of its 3p repetition but it also supervenes on the masking of all 3p repetition. As private persons, we are latecomers to the universe so for us, we have many sub-personal and super-personal experiences which we have joined 'already in progress' as it were. When we add a new moment to our experience, we are continuing the weaving of these sub and super personal stories (through their insistence as sub-personal urges and super-personal coincidences/intuitions I might add), but we are also pushing our own personal agenda outward. The sum of all outward pushing is what the sum of all 3p originally supervenes on. The 3p impersonal is the dry husk of the alienated past, and the compost for the 1p future, but all 3p is only a reflection of all 1p (well, just p at that point, since the 1p-3p distinction is a reflection of the underlying p reflector/Reflektor http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7E0fVfectDo). > > > > >> >> comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a >> Platonic template rather than true originals. >> >> >> "true original" is too much fuzzy. >> > > I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no possible > precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all other integers > represent multiple copies of one. All rational numbers are partial copies > of one. All prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly prime. A > true original must be indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be > 'new' again, but the novelty. > > > OK, OK. In comp, it is probably given by the experiences themselves. Even > in a rotating Gödelian universe with cylclic time, the first person > experience don't repeat. > Cool. > > > > The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other > variables duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which cannot be > duplicated or divided). What I am trying to say is that to access awareness > mathematically I suggest that we would have to begin with the opposite of > cardinality rather than cardinality. Each moment is neither repeatable nor > unrepeatable, quantifiable or unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for > a leaky primitive, or primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not > digital or fluid, but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected > back as echoes. > > > No problem. To be short that what the machines explains when you listen to > them. > Are these machines that are correct or are they machines whose delusions you are saying match mine? > > > > > >> >> This contradicts our intuitions >> >> >> And? >> > > And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default, be > treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth. > > > We start from intutions, yes, but then we face the counter-intuitive, a > bit like we start from the self, but then meet the others. > So far so good, but I think that we must then face the meta-counter-intuitive and see that the difference between self-other and intuitive-counter-intuitive constitutes a dipole within a boundaryless continuum of sense. It's the dipole-ness that is the interesting part. Symmetry and juxtaposition. That is more primitive than arithmetic, but still not as primitive as the aesthetic appreciation/expectation of it. > > > >> >> >> >> about the proprietary nature of identity >> >> >> No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are >> unique, and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective. >> > > If you believe in comp maybe. > > > Believing in the classical theory of knowledge is enough. > > Classical logic + > Kp -> p > K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq) > + (for reflexive enough machine) Kp -> K
Re: In Bruno's Terms
On 13 October 2013 19:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: > * > Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of > absolute uniqueness, comp must conceive of all events as locally documented > stereotypes of a Platonic template rather than true originals. This > contradicts our intuitions about the proprietary nature of identity and > would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in qualities > such as individuality and originality, and identification with trivial > personal preferences. Of course, what we see the precise opposite, as all > celebrity it propelled by some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine > tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the most prolific and successful > feature of consumerism. > I think the answer to this is that most people don't know about comp, and have no idea that their experiences are the product of an infinite sheaf of identical computations. (Also, since the computations are identical, they are experienced as a single unique moment, giving the appearance that every moment we experience is unique - cue "tears in the rain" speech). Hence even if comp does imply that one shouldn't value originality (which I can't see myself) there is no reason *within most people's knowledge* that would lead them not to do so. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: In Bruno's Terms
On 13 Oct 2013, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR. Presumption of repeatability (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of absolute uniqueness, ? 0, s(0), ... are unique. By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly inconceivable before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way thereafter. Numbers cannot be created from scratch, they can only be recycled from the pool of combinatory possiblities. To be unique is to be immune from precedent or repetition - inherently non-emulable by definition. Like the first person experience of here and now. That is non repeatable, as it supervenes on *all* its 3p repetition. So, thanks to comp and the FPI, I can make sense of what you say. But that is first person experience only. comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a Platonic template rather than true originals. "true original" is too much fuzzy. I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no possible precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all other integers represent multiple copies of one. All rational numbers are partial copies of one. All prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly prime. A true original must be indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be 'new' again, but the novelty. OK, OK. In comp, it is probably given by the experiences themselves. Even in a rotating Gödelian universe with cylclic time, the first person experience don't repeat. The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other variables duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which cannot be duplicated or divided). What I am trying to say is that to access awareness mathematically I suggest that we would have to begin with the opposite of cardinality rather than cardinality. Each moment is neither repeatable nor unrepeatable, quantifiable or unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for a leaky primitive, or primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not digital or fluid, but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected back as echoes. No problem. To be short that what the machines explains when you listen to them. This contradicts our intuitions And? And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default, be treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth. We start from intutions, yes, but then we face the counter-intuitive, a bit like we start from the self, but then meet the others. about the proprietary nature of identity No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are unique, and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective. If you believe in comp maybe. Believing in the classical theory of knowledge is enough. Classical logic + Kp -> p K(p->q) -> (Kp -> Kq) + (for reflexive enough machine) Kp -> KKp When Kp is defined by Bp & p (Theaetetus in arithmetic) we get such a theory (extended by the knowledge version of Löb's formula, the Grzegorczyk formula B(B(p->Bp)->p)->p. It entails an abstract asymmetry. That assumes that numbers can conjure non-numerical results. No. Comp assumes that. But arithmetic confirms. Beliefs predicate obeys modal laws. There is nothing that I can see that supports the idea that computation can generate new ontologies. That is not an argument for saying there are none. and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in qualities such as individuality and originality, Gratuitous opportunistic assertion. How so? Why would 1p experience value novelty if it is just an outcropping of a machine that by definition can create only trivially 'new' combinations of copies? That is not the case. Machine looking inward, in the standard Gödel sense, get creative, and and only more surprised when digging deeper. 456098209093457976534 is different from 45609420909345797353, but why does that difference seem insignificant to us, but the difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that belt to be demonstrably significant to many people. Sure. and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the most prolific and successful feature of consumerism. That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me. That's not a counter-argument. Looks like you're defensive to me. Sure I am. I defend the right of my sun in law to get his steak. Presumption of finite simplicities - Because comp provides uni
Re: In Bruno's Terms
On Sunday, October 13, 2013 6:04:53 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses > which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR. > * > Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of > absolute uniqueness, > > > ? > 0, s(0), ... are unique. > By absolute uniqueness I mean that something could be utterly inconceivable before its appearance, and unrepeatable in any way thereafter. Numbers cannot be created from scratch, they can only be recycled from the pool of combinatory possiblities. To be unique is to be immune from precedent or repetition - inherently non-emulable by definition. > > comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a > Platonic template rather than true originals. > > > "true original" is too much fuzzy. > I think it could not be more clear? An original which has no possible precedent. The number one would be a true original, but all other integers represent multiple copies of one. All rational numbers are partial copies of one. All prime numbers are still divisible by one, so not truly prime. A true original must be indivisible and unrepeatable, i.e. one can never be 'new' again, but the novelty. The first variable (lets call Alpha-X) is original, but all other variables duplicate the idea of Alpha-X (yellow is an idea which cannot be duplicated or divided). What I am trying to say is that to access awareness mathematically I suggest that we would have to begin with the opposite of cardinality rather than cardinality. Each moment is neither repeatable nor unrepeatable, quantifiable or unquantifiable. Transcardinality provides for a leaky primitive, or primitive of self-modulating leakiness. It is not digital or fluid, but intimations of waving and granularity are reflected back as echoes. > > This contradicts our intuitions > > > And? > And deserves to be investigated. Our intuitions should, by default, be treated as the most locally relevant branch of arithmetic truth. > > > > about the proprietary nature of identity > > > No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are unique, > and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective. > If you believe in comp maybe. That assumes that numbers can conjure non-numerical results. There is nothing that I can see that supports the idea that computation can generate new ontologies. > > > > and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in > qualities such as individuality and originality, > > > Gratuitous opportunistic assertion. > How so? Why would 1p experience value novelty if it is just an outcropping of a machine that by definition can create only trivially 'new' combinations of copies? 456098209093457976534 is different from 45609420909345797353, but why does that difference seem insignificant to us, but the difference between a belt worn by Elvis and a copy of that belt to be demonstrably significant to many people. > > > and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we > see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion > unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the > most prolific and successful feature of consumerism. > > > That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me. > That's not a counter-argument. Looks like you're defensive to me. > > > > *Presumption of finite simplicities* - Because comp provides uniqueness > only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly complex numbers, it can > be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one direction; that > of more quantity. New qualities, by comp, must arise on the event horizons > of the UD, > > > Which is were we live here and now. > That would be true under comp, sure. > > > yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity instead of > cumbersome computables. > > > That is not an argument. > No, it's a factual observation. The smell of oranges is rich and simple without any experienced computation, other than in connecting the smell with the rest of our associations with oranges. > > > > With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human experience > is exactly that. > > Hypothesis: > > *Diagonalization of the unique* - Because computation lags behind > experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural person > *can be*, > > > ? > > > > since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and > unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique, > > > ? > > > so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all novelty > exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a relatively new > complexity, such that the continuum of novelty extends in both directions. > > The false dichotomy posed by comp in which
Re: In Bruno's Terms
On 13 Oct 2013, at 08:35, Craig Weinberg wrote: Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR. Presumption of repeatability (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of absolute uniqueness, ? 0, s(0), ... are unique. comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a Platonic template rather than true originals. "true original" is too much fuzzy. This contradicts our intuitions And? about the proprietary nature of identity No, this is confirmed, nit contradicted. The first persons too are unique, and non divisible, necessarily so from their perspective. and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in qualities such as individuality and originality, Gratuitous opportunistic assertion. and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the most prolific and successful feature of consumerism. That is not argument. Looks like propaganda to me. Presumption of finite simplicities - Because comp provides uniqueness only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly complex numbers, it can be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one direction; that of more quantity. New qualities, by comp, must arise on the event horizons of the UD, Which is were we live here and now. yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity instead of cumbersome computables. That is not an argument. With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human experience is exactly that. Hypothesis: Diagonalization of the unique - Because computation lags behind experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural person can be, ? since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique, ? so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all novelty exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a relatively new complexity, such that the continuum of novelty extends in both directions. The false dichotomy posed by comp in which we are forced to choose between the truth of Church-Turing and the existence of an infinitely low level of substitution for human personhood is exposed because under PIP, computation is a public repetition of what is irreducibly unrepeatable and private. Computation can never get ahead of experience, because computation is an a posteriori measurement of it. The computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that is based on their past performance will always fail to account for the possibility that the next performance will be the first time that athlete does something that they never have done before. Natural identities are not only self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself is self-diagonalization. The emergence of the unique always cheats prediction, since all prediction belongs to the measurements of an expired world which did not yet contain the next novelty. ? Pushing UD - My admittedly limited understanding of UDA gives me a picture of the UD as a program which pulls the experienced universe behind it as it extends the computed realm ahead of local appearances. It assumes a priori arithmetic truth which simply 'is' which produces the future from a fixed past. ? All phenomena are built bottom up from generic, interchangeable bits. The hypothesis under PIP is that awareness is pushing the UD, not being pulled by it. Each new number is the residue of an unprecedented experience as it decays from immeasurable private qualia into quantifiable public reflections. Every measure requires a ruler. Some example which is presented as an index for comparison. A "new Michael Jordan". A third world war. The uniqueness comes first, and the computability follows - fudging and filling as necessary, including ways which could be interpreted as supernatural (retrocausational discontinuities, mysterious lucky coincidences, etc). ? Hmm... You write too well, and that does not help you. It looks like bad politics. Your approach avoids the problems by deeming them as not solvable at any level. This kills at the start all possibility of progressing. *all* your sentences needs a lot of clarification and justification. Bruno -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit http
In Bruno's Terms
Maybe this will help. Here are two criticisms of comp, and two hypotheses which aim for a more mathematical treatment of PIP principles under MSR. * Presumption of repeatability* (PR) - By overlooking the possibility of absolute uniqueness, comp must conceive of all events as locally documented stereotypes of a Platonic template rather than true originals. This contradicts our intuitions about the proprietary nature of identity and would seem to counterfactually predict a very low interest in qualities such as individuality and originality, and identification with trivial personal preferences. Of course, what we see the precise opposite, as all celebrity it propelled by some suggestion unrepeatability and the fine tuning of lifestyle choices is arguably the most prolific and successful feature of consumerism. *Presumption of finite simplicities* - Because comp provides uniqueness only in the form of the relative scarcity of vastly complex numbers, it can be said to allow for the possibility of novelty only in one direction; that of more quantity. New qualities, by comp, must arise on the event horizons of the UD, yet qualia inherently speaks in a language of rich simplicity instead of cumbersome computables. With comp, there is no new 'one', but in reality, every human experience is exactly that. Hypothesis: *Diagonalization of the unique* - Because computation lags behind experience, no simulation of a brain can catch up to what a natural person *can be*, since the potential for their uniqueness is immeasurable and unprecedented. Also, nothing can be copied before it is unique, so PIP flips the presumption of repeatability (PR) so that all novelty exists as an absolutely new simplicity as well as a relatively new complexity, such that the continuum of novelty extends in both directions. The false dichotomy posed by comp in which we are forced to choose between the truth of Church-Turing and the existence of an infinitely low level of substitution for human personhood is exposed because under PIP, computation is a public repetition of what is irreducibly unrepeatable and private. Computation can never get ahead of experience, because computation is an a posteriori measurement of it. The computer model of what an athlete will do on the field that is based on their past performance will always fail to account for the possibility that the next performance will be the first time that athlete does something that they never have done before. Natural identities are not only self-diagonalizing, natural identity itself is self-diagonalization. The emergence of the unique always cheats prediction, since all prediction belongs to the measurements of an expired world which did not yet contain the next novelty. *Pushing UD* - My admittedly limited understanding of UDA gives me a picture of the UD as a program which pulls the experienced universe behind it as it extends the computed realm ahead of local appearances. It assumes a priori arithmetic truth which simply 'is' which produces the future from a fixed past. All phenomena are built bottom up from generic, interchangeable bits. The hypothesis under PIP is that awareness is pushing the UD, not being pulled by it. Each new number is the residue of an unprecedented experience as it decays from immeasurable private qualia into quantifiable public reflections. Every measure requires a ruler. Some example which is presented as an index for comparison. A "new Michael Jordan". A third world war. The uniqueness comes first, and the computability follows - fudging and filling as necessary, including ways which could be interpreted as supernatural (retrocausational discontinuities, mysterious lucky coincidences, etc). -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
