Re: Born Rule in MWI
On 2/22/2013 9:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: A problem: physicists don't try to define what is a (primary or not) physical universe. That's not a bug. It's a feature. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On 22 Feb 2013, at 04:10, Joseph Knight wrote: Question: Why is the derivation* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not considered satisfactory**? Good question. I asked it myself very often. *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity condition. And that was shown by Paulette Destouches-Février some decade before. My study of Gleason's theorem (in Richard Hugues's book, Harvard press) convinced me, at that time, that the Born rule follows indeed from the formalism + a version of comp first person indeterminacy (implicit in Everett, I think). Given the time made by some people to grasp that first person indeterminacy, or even just the notion of first person in the comp setting, maybe the problem relies there. Wallace is close to this, though. **It is apparently not satisfactory because there have been multiple later attempts to derive the Born Rule from certain other (e.g., decision-theoretic) assumptions in an Everett framework (Deutsch, Wallace). I have not yet studied these later works so cannot yet comment on them (but would appreciate any remarks/opinions that Everything-listers have to offer). I did study them, but I think I miss something as I think that Everett, in his long paper (thesis) is more convincing, especially in quantum computing where high dimensional Hilbert Space is required. Gleason theorem requires three dimension at least. Now comp requires an arithmetical quantum logic on which a Gleason theorem should be working, and up to now, it looks like this is quite plausible, and then we got both the wave and the Born rule from arithmetic alone. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On Fri, Feb 22, 2013 at 4:57 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Feb 2013, at 04:10, Joseph Knight wrote: Question: Why is the derivation* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not considered satisfactory**? Good question. I asked it myself very often. *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity condition. And that was shown by Paulette Destouches-Février some decade before. My study of Gleason's theorem (in Richard Hugues's book, Harvard press) convinced me, at that time, that the Born rule follows indeed from the formalism + a version of comp first person indeterminacy (implicit in Everett, I think). Given the time made by some people to grasp that first person indeterminacy, or even just the notion of first person in the comp setting, maybe the problem relies there. Wallace is close to this, though. **It is apparently not satisfactory because there have been multiple later attempts to derive the Born Rule from certain other (e.g., decision-theoretic) assumptions in an Everett framework (Deutsch, Wallace). I have not yet studied these later works so cannot yet comment on them (but would appreciate any remarks/opinions that Everything-listers have to offer). I did study them, but I think I miss something as I think that Everett, in his long paper (thesis) is more convincing, especially in quantum computing where high dimensional Hilbert Space is required. Gleason theorem requires three dimension at least. Now comp requires an arithmetical quantum logic on which a Gleason theorem should be working, and up to now, it looks like this is quite plausible, and then we got both the wave and the Born rule from arithmetic alone. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Do you get separate universes from comp alone? Richard -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On 22 Feb 2013, at 11:55, Richard Ruquist wrote: On Fri, Feb 22, 2013 at 4:57 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 22 Feb 2013, at 04:10, Joseph Knight wrote: Question: Why is the derivation* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not considered satisfactory**? Good question. I asked it myself very often. *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity condition. And that was shown by Paulette Destouches-Février some decade before. My study of Gleason's theorem (in Richard Hugues's book, Harvard press) convinced me, at that time, that the Born rule follows indeed from the formalism + a version of comp first person indeterminacy (implicit in Everett, I think). Given the time made by some people to grasp that first person indeterminacy, or even just the notion of first person in the comp setting, maybe the problem relies there. Wallace is close to this, though. **It is apparently not satisfactory because there have been multiple later attempts to derive the Born Rule from certain other (e.g., decision-theoretic) assumptions in an Everett framework (Deutsch, Wallace). I have not yet studied these later works so cannot yet comment on them (but would appreciate any remarks/opinions that Everything-listers have to offer). I did study them, but I think I miss something as I think that Everett, in his long paper (thesis) is more convincing, especially in quantum computing where high dimensional Hilbert Space is required. Gleason theorem requires three dimension at least. Now comp requires an arithmetical quantum logic on which a Gleason theorem should be working, and up to now, it looks like this is quite plausible, and then we got both the wave and the Born rule from arithmetic alone. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Do you get separate universes from comp alone? We get many separate dreams. It is an open question if some collections of sharable dreams define an unique complete physical reality. The laws of physics are the same for all Turing machines, as they emerge from all computations, but they still can have non isomorphic solutions. My feeling is that an unique complete physical reality is not quite plausible. I don't think this is compatible with the SWE+comp. If the SWE is correct, then the SWE is an epistemological consequence of comp, including the MWI; and if QM is not correct, with comp, this could lead to multiverses but also to multi-multiverses, or multi- multiverses, etc. Even them might be only local, without any definite global physical reality. If the zero of the Riemann function corresponds to the eigenvalue of some hermitian operator, like some hope to show for solving Riemann conjecture, reality could emerge from a quantum chaos, which would implement a quantum universal dovetailing. To solve the mind body problem with this would still need to extract this from the (quantified) arithmetical hypostases. I mean this quantum chaos should be prove the win the measure competition among all universal systems. Let us be clear. If computationalism is correct, we are really only at the very start of getting the comp physics. We have only the logic of the observable, and a tuns of open mathematical problems, which does not interest anyone, by lack of motivation on the mind-body problem. To use the comp-physics to do cosmology or particle physics is like using superstring theory to do a coffee. It is the weakness of comp, it leads to complex mathematics, very quickly, and cannot have direct applications (unlike most of physics). The main non direct but important, in my sight, application is in the understanding that machine's theology is a science, indeed a branch of computer science, and so with comp (usually believed even if unconsciously) theology can be approached with the modest attitude of science. That can help the understanding that science has not decided between the two quite opposite conceptions of reality developed by Plato and Aristotle. Comp provides a lot of jobs for the futures. Even without comp, biotechnologies will develop into theotechnologies, we might get artificial brains because some doctor might not ask you, and just consider it is the best treatment for you. We, here and now, might get consistent extensions in computers build by our descendents, etc. It is not a luxe to dig on what that could mean. To sum up, computationalism leads to the many separate physical universes, in any large sense of physical universes. With a too much strict definition of physical universe, it is possible that comp leads to just 0 universes. Just a web of dreams, defining no global sharable physical realities. A problem: physicists don't try to define what is a (primary or not) physical universe. Bruno Richard -- You received
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On 2/22/2013 12:10 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 22 Feb 2013, at 11:55, Richard Ruquist wrote: Do you get separate universes from comp alone? We get many separate dreams. It is an open question if some collections of sharable dreams define an unique complete physical reality. Hi, If we consider that a 'reality' is that which is incontrovertible for some collection of intercommunicating observers the answer is obvious. Consider an observer as having a set of observables that mutually commute and are mutually consistent (form a Boolean algebra). For some arbitrarily large collection of such, communications (that carry actual signals and not just noise) will only occur between members of the collection that involve some subset of the observables of the collection. Completeness is not necessary and might even be counter-productive as the problem of solving satisfiability for an arbitrarily large collection of propositions is NP-complete. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boolean_satisfiability_problem The laws of physics are the same for all Turing machines, as they emerge from all computations, but they still can have non isomorphic solutions. I disagree. This claim is sound iff the laws of physics are 'the same' for all Turing machines only if one has a universal equivalence class of Turing machines and one can show that only one set of physical laws can exist. My feeling is that an unique complete physical reality is not quite plausible. I agree. I don't think this is compatible with the SWE+comp. I agree. If the SWE is correct, then the SWE is an epistemological consequence of comp, including the MWI; and if QM is not correct, with comp, this could lead to multiverses but also to multi-multiverses, or multi-multiverses, etc. Even them might be only local, without any definite global physical reality. ISTM that comp requires some form of MWI via the indeterminacy argument. If the zero of the Riemann function corresponds to the eigenvalue of some hermitian operator, like some hope to show for solving Riemann conjecture, reality could emerge from a quantum chaos, which would implement a quantum universal dovetailing. To solve the mind body problem with this would still need to extract this from the (quantified) arithmetical hypostases. I mean this quantum chaos should be prove the win the measure competition among all universal systems. I think that this is a quixotic request as proving the Riemann conjecture requires the inspection of all primes. This is asuper task http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supertask... Let us be clear. If computationalism is correct, we are really only at the very start of getting the comp physics. We have only the logic of the observable, and a tuns of open mathematical problems, which does not interest anyone, by lack of motivation on the mind-body problem. To use the comp-physics to do cosmology or particle physics is like using superstring theory to do a coffee. It is the weakness of comp, it leads to complex mathematics, very quickly, and cannot have direct applications (unlike most of physics). The main non direct but important, in my sight, application is in the understanding that machine's theology is a science, indeed a branch of computer science, and so with comp (usually believed even if unconsciously) theology can be approached with the modest attitude of science. That can help the understanding that science has not decided between the two quite opposite conceptions of reality developed by Plato and Aristotle. Comp provides a lot of jobs for the futures. Even without comp, biotechnologies will develop into theotechnologies, we might get artificial brains because some doctor might not ask you, and just consider it is the best treatment for you. We, here and now, might get consistent extensions in computers build by our descendents, etc. It is not a luxe to dig on what that could mean. To sum up, computationalism leads to the many separate physical universes, in any large sense of physical universes. With a too much strict definition of physical universe, it is possible that comp leads to just 0 universes. Just a web of dreams, defining no global sharable physical realities. A problem: physicists don't try to define what is a (primary or not) physical universe. Bruno Richard -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On 2/21/2013 7:10 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: Question: Why is the derivation* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not considered satisfactory**? *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity condition. Gleason's theorem is to the same effect. But both start with the assumption that the wave-function amplitude determines the probability - and then they show it must be via the Born rule. Brent **It is apparently not satisfactory because there have been multiple later attempts to derive the Born Rule from certain other (e.g., decision-theoretic) assumptions in an Everett framework (Deutsch, Wallace). I have not yet studied these later works so cannot yet comment on them (but would appreciate any remarks/opinions that Everything-listers have to offer). -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com http://www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6117 - Release Date: 02/19/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:56 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2013 7:10 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: Question: Why is the derivation* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not considered satisfactory**? *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity condition. Gleason's theorem is to the same effect. But both start with the assumption that the wave-function amplitude determines the probability - and then they show it must be via the Born rule. OK, I see, thanks. I suppose then that the decision-theory derivation drops this assumption? Brent **It is apparently not satisfactory because there have been multiple later attempts to derive the Born Rule from certain other (e.g., decision-theoretic) assumptions in an Everett framework (Deutsch, Wallace). I have not yet studied these later works so cannot yet comment on them (but would appreciate any remarks/opinions that Everything-listers have to offer). -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. No virus found in this message. Checked by AVG - www.avg.com Version: 2013.0.2899 / Virus Database: 2639/6117 - Release Date: 02/19/13 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out. -- Joseph Knight -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
Re: Born Rule in MWI
On 2/21/2013 9:06 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at 10:56 PM, meekerdb meeke...@verizon.net mailto:meeke...@verizon.net wrote: On 2/21/2013 7:10 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: Question: Why is the derivation* of the Born Rule in (Everett, 1957) not considered satisfactory**? *Everett shows that the amplitude-squared rule for subjective probability is the only measure consistent with an agreeable additivity condition. Gleason's theorem is to the same effect. But both start with the assumption that the wave-function amplitude determines the probability - and then they show it must be via the Born rule. OK, I see, thanks. I suppose then that the decision-theory derivation drops this assumption? It doesn't make it explicitly, but I think it makes an equivalent assumption which is why the problem isn't regarded as solved. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/groups/opt_out.
