On 07 Sep 2012, at 16:06, Roger Clough wrote:
Theres is some duplication in the propositions below which I have
not bothered
to clear up, sorry.
1) Mind, being inextended, is "outside" of the brain, which is
extended.
Mind (shared and the general, Platonia) is the subjective realm.
Brain (personal, private, the particular, materialistic) is in
the objective realm.
Mind does not even belong to the category of things capable of being
extended or not extended.
2) So Mind is beyond spacetime (Platonic) , but each brain is in
spacetime
(materialistic), and only brains can access the Platonic*.
Only persons, using brains.
3) Brains are in time, as are all materialistic things, including
computers.
Mind is timeless*.
OK.
4) Objective time is in spacetime, so can be measured.
OK. Note that "objective" = "capable of being doubted", or "capable of
being an illusion or a dream".
5) Subjective time is outside of spacetime, so only sensible by the
brain.
By the person. My brain does no more thinking than my stomach do
tasting. The brain is just a local tool.
* So I think of our brains as racing through Mind in an auto
while looking at the passing landscape of Mind.
Except that eventually, the brain is only a construct of the mind too.
The persons are in Platonia.
Bruno
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
9/7/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
- Receiving the following content -
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-09-06, 15:25:14
Subject: Re: Sane2004 Step One
On Thursday, September 6, 2012 2:02:02 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 05 Sep 2012, at 17:27, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Wednesday, September 5, 2012 10:50:02 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
wrote:
On 05 Sep 2012, at 03:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:
Taking another look at Sane2004. This isn't so much as a challenge
to Bruno, just sharing my notes of why I disagree. Not sure how
far I will get this time, but here are my objections to the first
step and the stipulated assumptions of comp. I understand that the
point is to accept the given definition of comp, and in that
respect, I have no reason to doubt that Bruno has accomplished
what he sets out to as far as making a good theory within comp,
and if he has not, I wouldn't be qualified to comment on it
anyhow. From my perspective however, this is all beside the point,
since the only point that matters is the actual truth of what
consciousness actually is, and what is it's actual relation to
physics and information. Given the fragile and precious nature of
our own survival, I think that implications for teleportation and
AI simulation/personhood which are derived from pure theory rather
than thorough consideration of realism would be reckless to say
the least.
Step one talks about teleportation in terms of being reconstructed
with ambient organic materials. If comp were true though, no
organic materials or reconstructions would be necessary.
The scanning into a universal machine would be sufficient.
That is step 6.
I haven't even gotten to step 2 yet. I'm reading "In the figure the
teleported individual is represented by a black box. Its
annihilation is
represented by a white box appearing at the left of the arrow" from
1.
Taking this to the China Brain level, the universal machine could
be a trillion people with notebooks, pencils, paper, and erasers,
talking to each other over cell phones. This activity would have
to collectively result in the teleported person now being conjured
as if by incantation as a consequence of...what? The writing and
erasing on paper? The calling and speaking on cell phones? Where
does the experience of the now disembodied person come in?
As you illustrate here, plausibly not on the physical means used by
the brain. Step 8 shows that indeed the physical has nothing to do
with consciousness, except as a content of consciousness. Keeping
comp here, we associate consciousness with the logical abstract
computations.
So the person's consciousness arises spontaneously through the
overall effort-ness behind the writing, erasing, and calling, or
does it gradually constellate from lesser fragments of disconnected
effort-ness?
Consciousness does not arise. It is not in space, nor in time. Its
local content, obtained by differentiation, internally can refer to
time and space, but that's particular content of an atemporal
consciousness. I would say (no need of this in UDA).
If you exclude space and time, what kind of locality do you refer
to? In my example, a quintillion people call each other on the phone
and write down numbers that they get from each other and perform
arithmetic functions on them (which in turn may inform them on how
to process subsequent arithmetic instructions, etc). Ok. So where
does