subject:"Re\: Epiphenomenalism"


On 9/27/2012 4:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:

in which case, how are they really arithmetic.


They are not. Arithmetical truth is already not arithmetical.
Arithmetic seen from inside is *vastly* bigger than arithmetic. This 
needs a bit of "model theory" to be explained formally.

Hi Bruno,

Is this not just the direct implication of the Löwenheim--Skolem 
theorems ? 
What is missing? The discussion here is wonderful! 
http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/low-skol.htm#review 
 It 
seems to run parallel to what I have been trying to discuss with you 
regarding the possibility that non-standard models allow for a "true" 
plurality of 1p in extensions of modal logic.


http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/low-skol.htm#skolem 


*Skolem's Paradox*

" LST has bite because we believe that there are/un/countably many real 
numbers (more than_0 ). Indeed, let's insist that we/know/it; Cantor 
proved it in 1873, and we don't want to open the question again. What is 
remarkable about LST is the assertion that even if the intended 
interpretation of S is a system of arithmetic about the real numbers, 
and even if the system is consistent and has a model that makes its 
theorems true, its theorems (under a different interpretation) will be 
true for a domain too small to contain all the real numbers. Systems 
about uncountable infinities can be given a model whose domain is only 
countable. Systems about the reals can be interpreted as if they were 
about some set of objects no more numerous than the natural numbers. It 
is as if a syntactical version of "One-Thousand and One Arabian Nights" 
could be interpreted as "One Night in Centerville".


This strange situation is not hypothetical. There are systems of set 
theory (or number theory or predicate logic) that contain a theorem 
which asserts in the intended interpretation that the cardinality of the 
real numbers exceeds the cardinality of the naturals. That's good, 
because it's true. Such systems therefore say that the cardinality of 
the reals is uncountable. So the cardinality of the reals must 
really/be/uncountable in all the/models/of the system, for a model is an 
interpretation in which the theorems come out/true/(for that 
interpretation). Now one would think that if theorems about uncountable 
cardinalities are true for a model, then the domain of the model must 
have uncountably many members. But LST says this is not so. Even these 
systems, if they have models at all, have at least one countable model.


Insofar as this is a paradox it is called Skolem's paradox. It is at 
least a paradox in the ancient sense: an astonishing and implausible 
result. Is it a paradox in the modern sense, making contradiction 
apparently unavoidable? We know from history all too many cases of 
shocking results initially misperceived as contradictions. Think about 
the existence of pairs of numbers with no common divisor, no matter how 
small, or the property of every infinite set that it can be put into 
one-to-one correspondence with some of its proper subsets."


What broke the Skolem prison for me was a remark by Louis Kauffman 
that self-referencing systems allows for finite models of infinities as 
they can capture the mereology of infinite sets ( the property that 
there is a one-to-one correspondence between whole and proper subsets). 
We get stuck on what is "proper"


From: http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/courses/logsys/low-skol.htm#amb1 



"To talk about incurable ambiguity suggests calamity, and this is how it 
seems to some logicians. LST shows that the real numbers cannot be 
specified uniquely by any first order theory. If that is so, then one of 
the most important domains in mathematics cannot be reached with the 
precision and finality we thought formal systems permitted us to attain.
But this is not a calamity from another point of view. If formal 
languages were not ambiguous or capable of many interpretations, they 
would not be formal. From this standpoint, LST is less about deficiences 
in our ability to express meanings univocally, or about deficiencies in 
our ability to understand the real numbers, than it is about the gap 
between form and content (syntax and semantics).
Other metatheorems prove this ambiguity for statements and systems 
in general. LST proves this ambiguity for any system attempting to 
describe uncountable infinities: even if they succeed on one 
interpretation, there will always be other interpretations of the same 
underlying syntax by which they describe only countably many objects.
LST has this similarity to Gödel's first incompleteness theorem. 
While Gödel's theorem only

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-24 Thread Jason Resch

On Mon, Sep 24, 2012 at 10:45 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
> > Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able to
> talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia. By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
> entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
> some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
> property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
> causal efficacy of its own.
>

If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?

I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it
were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it.
If consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and
the resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and
non-shareable.  In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness
with all its intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.
So then who is it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain
the mystery of conscious experience?  It can't be the causally
inefficacious experiencer.  The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can
offer is that the theory of epiphenominalism comes from a causally
efficacious entity which in no way is effected by experiences.  It might as
well be a considered a non-experiencer, for it would behave the same
regardless of whether it experienced something or if it were a zombie.

Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that
epiphenominalism (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by
things that have never experienced consciousness.  Perhaps instead, its
core assumption is wrong.  The reason for all these books and discussion
threads about consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are
causally efficacious.  If they weren't then why is anyone talking about
them?

Jason

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-25 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
wrote:

Pain is anything but epiphenomenal. The fact that someone is able
to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.

The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
qualia.

With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.

Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which
makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial
relations).

If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)
inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self-
accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of
all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by
infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural
personal) self-selection.

Bruno

By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or
some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without
causal efficacy of its own.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-25 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>
> > On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> > > 
>   
> > wrote: 
> > 
> >> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able   
> >> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. 
> > 
> > The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely 
> > as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying 
> > qualia. 
>
> With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and   
> machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication   
> way). 
> Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made   
> on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). 
> We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,   
> is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. 
>
> Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the   
> physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is   
> the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which   
> makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the   
> physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as   
> the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal   
> reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial   
> relations). 
>

We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness is 
the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see 
arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into physical realism? I can 
easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to organize 
itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical realities would 
possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would mean. Why execute 
a program if all possible outcomes are already computable?

Craig


> If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)   
> inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- 
> accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of   
> all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by   
> infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural   
> personal) self-selection. 
>
> Bruno 
>
>
>
> > By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball 
> > entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or 
> > some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this 
> > property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without 
> > causal efficacy of its own. 
> > 
> > 
> > -- 
> > Stathis Papaioannou 
> > 
> > -- 
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google   
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> > . 
> > 
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>
>
>
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-26 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
>> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able
>> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely
> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia.

With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.

Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which
makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial
relations).

We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if  
consciousness is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make  
more sense to see arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into  
physical realism?

It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to  
computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.

I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to  
organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical  
realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that  
would mean.

This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.

Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable?

To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done,  
relatively to the situation you are in.
Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that I  
can pay it?".

Bruno

Craig

If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)
inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self-
accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of
all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by
infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural
personal) self-selection.

Bruno

> By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball
> entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has  
qualia or

> some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this
> property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal,  
without

> causal efficacy of its own.
>
>
> --
> Stathis Papaioannou
>
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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-26 Thread Craig Weinberg



On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: 
>>
>> > On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch
>> > wrote: 
>> > 
>> >> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able   
>> >> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon. 
>> > 
>> > The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained entirely 
>> > as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying 
>> > qualia. 
>>
>> With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and   
>> machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication   
>> way). 
>> Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made   
>> on coherent computations (arithmetical relations). 
>> We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,   
>> is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia. 
>>
>> Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the   
>> physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is   
>> the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number which   
>> makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the   
>> physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as   
>> the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal   
>> reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial   
>> relations). 
>>
>
> We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if consciousness 
> is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make more sense to see 
> arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into physical realism? 
>
>
> It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to 
> computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.
>

Are you saying that arithmetic guarantees consciousness because it 
obviously supervenes on awareness, or do you say that consciousness is 
specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth. If the latter, then it 
sounds like you are saying that some arithmetic functions can only be 
expressed as pain or blue...in which case, how are they really arithmetic. 
Besides, we have never seen a computation turn blue or create blueness.
 

>
>
> I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to 
> organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or physical 
> realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even what that would 
> mean. 
>
>
> This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.
>

If it does, then I don't understand it. If you can explain it with a common 
sense example as a metaphor, then I might be able to get more of it.
 

>
>
> Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already computable?
>
>
> To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done, 
> relatively to the situation you are in.
> Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that I can 
> pay it?".
>

Yes, why should I pay for the beer if it's arithmetically inevitable that I 
have paid for the beer in the future?

Craig
;' 

>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>
> Craig
>
>
>> If you associate consciousness with the unconscious (automated)   
>> inference in self-consistency, you can explain formally that self- 
>> accelerating relative processes. It makes consciousness the "cause" of   
>> all motions in the physical universe, even if the "cause" are given by   
>> infinities of arithmetical relations + the (apparently plural   
>> personal) self-selection. 
>>
>> Bruno 
>>
>>
>>
>> > By analogy, we can explain the behaviour of a billiard ball 
>> > entirely in physical terms, without any idea if the ball has qualia or 
>> > some other ineffable non-quale property. In the ball's case this 
>> > property, like the experience of pain, would be epiphenomenal, without 
>> > causal efficacy of its own. 
>> > 
>> > 
>> > -- 
>> > Stathis Papaioannou 
>> > 
>> > -- 
>> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google   
>> > Groups "Everything List" group. 
>> > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. 
>> > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com 
>> > . 
>> > For more options, visit this group at 
>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en 
>> > . 
>> > 
>>
>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 
>>
>>
>>
>>
> -- 
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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-26 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
> they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?

There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
completely explains the observable behaviour. We can't observe the
experience itself. If the experience had separate causal powers we
would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
immaterial soul affecting the physical world.

> I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it
> were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it.  If
> consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and the
> resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable.
> In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its
> intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So then who is
> it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of
> conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious experiencer.
> The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory of
> epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no way is
> effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
> non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it
> experienced something or if it were a zombie.

The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
is the definition of a zombie. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.

> Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that epiphenominalism
> (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that have
> never experienced consciousness.  Perhaps instead, its core assumption is
> wrong.  The reason for all these books and discussion threads about
> consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally
> efficacious.  If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them?

The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
conscious, because consciousness is not causally efficacious. It is
emergent, at a higher level of description, supervenient or
epiphenomenal - but not separately causally efficacious, or the
problem of other minds and zombies would not exist.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-26 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
> > they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?
>
> There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
> painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
> completely explains the observable behaviour.

But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be
missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like
saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock
market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic
interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon,
which are real and do make a difference.

> We can't observe the
> experience itself.

I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even
defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of
minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process
implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a
mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know
what it is and isn't aware of.

Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
scans what people are seeing:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html

> If the experience had separate causal powers we
> would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
> miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
> immaterial soul affecting the physical world.
>

It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or
interactionism is true (
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation
).
 Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.

Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have effects.
 After all, no violations of physics are required for human psychology to
have effects on stock prices.

>
> > I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if it
> > were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed it.
>  If
> > consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and
> the
> > resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-shareable.
> > In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its
> > intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So then
> who is
> > it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery of
> > conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious
> experiencer.
> > The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the theory
> of
> > epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no
> way is
> > effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
> > non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it
> > experienced something or if it were a zombie.
>
> The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
> is the definition of a zombie.

Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that
zombies are logically consistent.  I don't think zombies make any sense.
 Do you?

> I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
> that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.
>

If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie, and
still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could not be
sure.

This follows because the notion of knowing, which I define as possessing
information, applies equally to zombie and non-zombie brains.  Both brains
have identical information content, so they both know exactly the same
things.  They both know what red is like, they both know what pain is like.
  It's just there is some magical notion of there being a difference
between them which is completely illogical.  Zombies don't make sense, and
therefore neither do dualist theories such as epihenominalism.

>
> > Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that
> epiphenominalism
> > (and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things that
> have
> > never experienced consciousness.  Perhaps instead, its core assumption is
> > wrong.  The reason for all these books and discussion threads about
> > consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally
> > efficacious.  If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them?
>
> The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
> any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
> conscious,

Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as "awareness of sensation

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-26 Thread Stephen P. King

On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
mailto:stath...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote:

> If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about
the pain
> they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?

There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
completely explains the observable behaviour.

But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical 
events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be 
missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms. 
 Saying the consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain 
may be like saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves 
of the stock market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in 
terms of atomic interactions, but you are missing the effects of 
higher-level phenomenon, which are real and do make a difference.

We can't observe the
experience itself.

I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even 
defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding 
of minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain 
process implements the right combination of processes to have what we 
would call a mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, 
we might even know what it is and isn't aware of.

Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from 
brain scans what people are seeing:
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html 

If the experience had separate causal powers we
would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
immaterial soul affecting the physical world.

It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or 
interactionism is true ( 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation 
 ). 
 Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.

Because they assume a substantive and thus separable substrate, the 
y are false.

Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have 
effects.  After all, no violations of physics are required for human 
psychology to have effects on stock prices.

Demonstrating that minds are not epiphenomena!

> I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be
self-defeating: if it
> were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have
proposed it.  If
> consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of
it and the
> resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and
non-shareable.
> In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with
all its
> intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So
then who is
> it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the
mystery of
> conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious
experiencer.
> The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that
the theory of
> epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which
in no way is
> effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
> non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of
whether it
> experienced something or if it were a zombie.

The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
is the definition of a zombie.

Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that 
zombies are logically consistent.  I don't think zombies make any 
sense.  Do you?

These dualisms consider mind and body to be separable, this is 
where they fail. If Mind and body are merely distinct aspect of the same 
basic primitive then we get a prediction that zombies are not possible. 
Every mind must have an embodiment and every body must have (some kind 
of) a mind.

I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.

If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie, 
and still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could 
not be sure.

How does this follow the definition of a zombie? They have no 
qualia thus no ability to reason about qualia!

This follows because the notion of knowing, which I define as 
possessing information, applies equally to zombie and non-zombie 
brains.  Both brains have identical information content, so they both 
know exactly the same things.

Then what makes a zombie a zombie???

 They both know what red

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-26 Thread Jason Resch

On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:

>  On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
> wrote:
>
>> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch 
>> wrote:
>>
>> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the pain
>> > they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?
>>
>>  There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
>> painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
>> completely explains the observable behaviour.
>
>
>  But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
> events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be
> missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
> consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like
> saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock
> market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic
> interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon,
> which are real and do make a difference.
>
>
>> We can't observe the
>> experience itself.
>
>
>  I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even
> defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of
> minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process
> implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a
> mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know
> what it is and isn't aware of.
>
>  Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
> scans what people are seeing:
>
> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html
>
>
>> If the experience had separate causal powers we
>> would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
>> miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
>> immaterial soul affecting the physical world.
>>
>
>  It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or
> interactionism is true (
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation
>  ).
>  Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.
>
>
> Because they assume a substantive and thus separable substrate, the y
> are false.
>
>
>
>  Violations of physics are not required for consciousness to have
> effects.  After all, no violations of physics are required for human
> psychology to have effects on stock prices.
>
>
> Demonstrating that minds are not epiphenomena!
>
>
>
Well, it at least shows emergent things can have effects.  A truck is an
emergent phenomenon, but it can still run you over.  So though
consciousness might be emergent we can't plainly rule out that it can have
no effects.


>
>
>>
>> > I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating: if
>> it
>> > were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have proposed
>> it.  If
>> > consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it and
>> the
>> > resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and
>> non-shareable.
>> > In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all its
>> > intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world.  So then
>> who is
>> > it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the mystery
>> of
>> > conscious experience?  It can't be the causally inefficacious
>> experiencer.
>> > The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the
>> theory of
>> > epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in no
>> way is
>> > effected by experiences.  It might as well be a considered a
>> > non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether it
>> > experienced something or if it were a zombie.
>>
>>  The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
>> is the definition of a zombie.
>
>
>  Dualist theories, including epiphenominalism, lead to the notion that
> zombies are logically consistent.  I don't think zombies make any sense.
>  Do you?
>
>
> These dualisms consider mind and body to be separable, this is where
> they fail. If Mind and body are merely distinct aspect of the same basic
> primitive then we get a prediction that zombies are not possible.
>

Right, and I think the converse is also true.  If zombies are not possible,
then dualism must be wrong.


> Every mind must have an embodiment and every body must have (some kind of)
> a mind.
>
>
>
>
>> I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
>> that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.
>>
>
>  If you were a zombie, you would still know that you were not a zombie,
> and still believe other people are not zombies either, but you could not be
> sure.
>
>
> How does this follow the definition of a zombie? They have no qualia
> thus no ability to reason about qu

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 26 Sep 2012, at 19:37, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Wednesday, September 26, 2012 3:45:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

On 25 Sep 2012, at 19:03, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Tuesday, September 25, 2012 4:43:29 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 25 Sep 2012, at 05:45, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Wed, Sep 19, 2012 at 12:00 AM, Jason Resch 
> wrote:
>
>> Pain is anything but epiphenomenal.  The fact that someone is able
>> to talk about it rules out it being an epiphenomenon.
>
> The behaviour - talking about the pain - could be explained  
entirely

> as a sequence of physical events, without any hint of underlying
> qualia.

With comp a physical events is explained in term of measure and
machine/number relative consciousness selection (à la WM-duplication
way).
Physics is phenomenal. It is an internal consciousness selection made
on coherent computations (arithmetical relations).
We can't explain physics without a theory of quanta, which, in comp,
is a sub-theory of a theory of consciousness/qualia.

Consciousness is not epiphenomenal: it is the "extractor" of the
physical realities in arithmetic. We could say that consciousness is
the universal self-accelerating property of the universal number  
which

makes possible the differentiation of the experience, and then the
physical reality is a projection. I could consider consciousness as
the main "force" in the universe, even if it is also a phenomenal
reality (the ontology being only arithmetic, or finite combinatorial
relations).

We are on the same page here then. My only question is, if  
consciousness is the main "force" in the universe, doesn't it make  
more sense to see arithmetic as the "condenser" of experiences into  
physical realism?

It makes sense once we assume comp, as we attach consciousness to  
computations, whose existence is guarantied by arithmetic.

Are you saying that arithmetic guarantees consciousness because it  
obviously supervenes on awareness, or do you say that consciousness  
is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth.

Consciousness is specifically inevitable from arithmetic truth, "seen  
from inside".

If the latter, then it sounds like you are saying that some  
arithmetic functions can only be expressed as pain or blue...

No. You confuse "Turing emulable", and "first person indeterminacy  
recoverable". Pain and blue have no arithmetical representations.

in which case, how are they really arithmetic.

They are not. Arithmetical truth is already not arithmetical.
Arithmetic seen from inside is *vastly* bigger than arithmetic. This  
needs a bit of "model theory" to be explained formally.

Besides, we have never seen a computation turn blue or create  
blueness.

It would not lake sense to "see" that. Brain and electromagnetic  
fields or any 3p notion cannot turn blue. "Blue" is a singular  
informative global experienced by first person.

I can easily see why experience would need semiotic compressions to  
organize itself, but I can see no reason that arithmetic or  
physical realities would possibly need to be 'extracted', or even  
what that would mean.

This is what the Universal Dovetailer Argument explains.

If it does, then I don't understand it. If you can explain it with a  
common sense example as a metaphor, then I might be able to get more  
of it.

Did you understand the first person indeterminacy? Tell me if you  
understand the seven first steps of the UDA, in

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html

Why execute a program if all possible outcomes are already  
computable?

To be computable is not enough, if the computations are not done,  
relatively to the situation you are in.
Your question is like "why should I pay this beer if I can show that  
I can pay it?".

Yes, why should I pay for the beer if it's arithmetically inevitable  
that I have paid for the beer in the future?

It is not arithmetically inevitable. In some stories you don't pay.  
Comp, like QM, leads to a continuum of futures, and your decisions and  
acts "here-and-now" determine the general features of your normal  
(majority) futures. That is why life and discussion forums have some  
sense.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Sep 2012, at 04:24, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch
wrote:

If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the
pain

they are experiencing? Is it all coincidental?

There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
completely explains the observable behaviour. We can't observe the
experience itself. If the experience had separate causal powers we
would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
immaterial soul affecting the physical world.

I find the entire concept of epiphenominalism to be self-defeating:
if it
were true, there is no reason to expect anyone to ever have
proposed it. If
consciousness were truly an epiphenomenon then the experience of it
and the
resulting wonder about it would necessarily be private and non-
shareable.
In other words, whoever is experiencing the consciousness with all
its
intrigue can in no way effect changes in the physical world. So
then who is
it that proposes the theory of epiphenominalism to explain the
mystery of
conscious experience? It can't be the causally inefficacious
experiencer.
The only consistent answer epiphenominalism can offer is that the
theory of
epiphenominalism comes from a causally efficacious entity which in
no way is

effected by experiences. It might as well be a considered a
non-experiencer, for it would behave the same regardless of whether
it

experienced something or if it were a zombie.

The experiencer would behave the same if he were a zombie, since that
is the definition of a zombie. I know I'm not a zombie and I believe
that other people aren't zombies either, but I can't be sure.

Epiphenominalism is forced to defend the absurd notion that
epiphenominalism
(and all other theories of consciousness) are proposed by things
that have
never experienced consciousness. Perhaps instead, its core
assumption is

wrong. The reason for all these books and discussion threads about
consciousness is that experiences and consciousness are causally
efficacious. If they weren't then why is anyone talking about them?

The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
conscious, because consciousness is not causally efficacious.

You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency".
This has already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding
ability (by Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-
consistency" is pure 3p, and is not consciousness, you get
consciousness because the machine will confuse the belief in self-
consistency with the truth of its self-consistency, and this will
introduce a quale. The machine can be aware of it, and (with enough
cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its non
communicability, making it into a personal quale.

I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and
consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you
did understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of
brain and matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives
another role for consciousness: the bringing of physical realities
through number relations being selected (non causally, here).
Consciousness is what makes notions of causal efficacy meaningful to
start with.

I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will.
This would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level,
but we are not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level
where we live, and unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns
only the "outer god", not the "inner one" which can *know* a part of
its local self-consistency, and cannot know its local future.

Bruno

It is
emergent, at a higher level of description, supervenient or
epiphenomenal - but not separately causally efficacious, or the
problem of other minds and zombies would not exist.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:

> But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical events
> or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing the
> forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
> consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like saying
> human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market.  Of
> course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic interactions,
> but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are real
> and do make a difference.

The higher level description is not an entity with *separate* causal
power. Was the stock market movement caused by physics, chemistry,
biochemistry or psychology? In a manner of speaking, it's correct to
say any of them; but we know that all the chemical, biochemical and
psychological properties are ultimately traceable to the physics, even
if it isn't practically useful to attempt stock market prediction by
analysing brain physics. What I object to is the idea of strong
emergence, that higher level properties are not merely surprising but
fundamentally unable to be deduced from lower level properties.

>> We can't observe the
>> experience itself.
>
>
> I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even defining
> the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and
> consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process implements
> the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind.  By
> tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it is
> and isn't aware of.
>
> Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
> scans what people are seeing:
> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html

We still can't observe the experience. Advanced aliens may be able to
read our thoughts very accurately in this way but still have no idea
what we actually experience or whether we are conscious at all.

>> The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
>> any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
>> conscious,
>
>
> Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as "awareness of sensations,
> thoughts, surrounds, etc."  Awareness is defined as "having knowledge".  So
> we can say consciousness is merely having knowledge of sensations, thoughts,
> surroundings, etc.

The "merely" makes it an epiphenomenon. I think this is Daniel
Dennett's potion. Dennett argues that zombies are logically impossible
as consciousness is nothing but the sort of information processing
that goes on in brains.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This has
> already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability (by
> Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" is pure
> 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine will
> confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its
> self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be aware
> of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of its
> non communicability, making it into a personal quale.
>
> I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and
> consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did
> understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain and
> matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for
> consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number relations
> being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions of
> causal efficacy meaningful to start with.

I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the
whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is
at the level of the simulation.

> I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. This
> would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we are
> not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, and
> unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer god", not
> the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, and
> cannot know its local future.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)



On Thursday, September 27, 2012 1:01:12 AM UTC-4, Jason wrote:
>
>
>
> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 11:09 PM, Stephen P. King 
> 
> > wrote:
>
>>  On 9/26/2012 11:29 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>  
>>
>>
>> On Wed, Sep 26, 2012 at 9:24 PM, Stathis Papaioannou 
>> 
>> > wrote:
>>
>>> On Tue, Sep 25, 2012 at 3:34 PM, Jason Resch 
>>> > 
>>> wrote:
>>>
>>> > If it has no causal efficacy, what causes someone to talk about the 
>>> pain
>>> > they are experiencing?  Is it all coincidental?
>>>
>>>  There is a sequence of physical events from the application of the
>>> painful stimulus to the subject saying "that hurts", and this
>>> completely explains the observable behaviour.
>>
>>
>>  But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical 
>> events or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be 
>> missing the forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the 
>> consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like 
>> saying human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock 
>> market.  Of course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic 
>> interactions, but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, 
>> which are real and do make a difference.
>>
>>
Exactly Jason. The moment we conflate  "physical events" with "painful 
stimulus" we have lost the war. If we assume that physical events can 
possibly be defined as full of 'pain', or that they stimulate (i.e. are 
received and responded to as a signifying experience - which is causally 
efficacious in changing observed behavior), then we are already begging the 
question of the explanatory gap. To assume that there can be a such thing 
as a purely physical event which nonetheless is full of pain and power to 
influence behavior takes the entirety of sense and awareness for granted 
but then fails to acknowledge that it was necessary in the first place. 
Once you have the affect of pain and the effect of behavioral stimulation, 
you don't need a brain as far as explaining consciousness - you already 
have consciousness on the sub-personal level.

>  
>>
>>> We can't observe the
>>> experience itself.
>>
>>
>>  I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even 
>> defining the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of 
>> minds and consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process 
>> implements the right combination of processes to have what we would call a 
>> mind.  By tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know 
>> what it is and isn't aware of.
>>
>>  Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from 
>> brain scans what people are seeing:
>>
>> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html
>>
>>
This may not be what we are seeing at all, but rather what we are looking 
at. There was a recent study on the visual cortex which showed the same 
activity whether the subject actually saw something or not. There may be no 
activity in the brain at all which directly translates into any conscious 
experience that we have, only the event horizon where we interface with our 
body and the body's world. We aren't in there...we're in here. We are not 
extended across public spaces, we are intended within private times.  They 
are orthogonal sense modalities of the same essential process on multiple 
levels, each of which are cross-juxtaposed with ever other. (This means One 
group of cells in my body can get my full attention, or that I can think 
abstractly without consciously considering any cells or bodies or 
conditions in the world).

  
>>
>>> If the experience had separate causal powers we
>>> would be able to observe its effects: we would see that neurons were
>>> miraculously firing contrary to physical law, and explain this as the
>>> immaterial soul affecting the physical world.
>>>
>>
>>  It sounds like you are saying either epiphenomenalism is true or 
>> interactionism is true ( 
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dualism_(philosophy_of_mind)#Dualist_views_of_mental_causation
>>  ). 
>>  Both of these are forms of dualism, and I think both are false.
>>
>>
Yes, I agree they are both because they both fail to recognize the symmetry 
of extended public space and intended private time. It's understandable 
because we are inherently biased as being completely steeped in our privacy 
to the point that it seems largely transparent to us. Our ability to make 
sense of public space phenomena is so powerful and clear that we are, at 
least in the West, seduced into believing that the interior too surely must 
be nothing but a clever arrangement of exteriors. It isn't. The symmetry is 
the thing. Levels and symmetry are the answer, not linear functions. There 
is no magic required at all, unless you deny your own private experience 
from the start, which of course 'saws off the branch that you are sitting 
on' and logically disqualifies

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)



On Thursday, September 27, 2012 9:09:12 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> > You can approximate consciousness by "belief in self-consistency". This 
> has 
> > already a "causal efficacy", notably a relative self-speeding ability 
> (by 
> > Gödel "length of proof" theorem). But "belief in self-consistency" is 
> pure 
> > 3p, and is not consciousness, you get consciousness because the machine 
> will 
> > confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its 
> > self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can be 
> aware 
> > of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be aware of 
> its 
> > non communicability, making it into a personal quale. 
> > 
> > I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and 
> > consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago you did 
> > understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of brain 
> and 
> > matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another role for 
> > consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number 
> relations 
> > being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes notions 
> of 
> > causal efficacy meaningful to start with. 
>
> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other 
> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. 
> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is 
> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the 
> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is 
> at the level of the simulation. 
>

That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this 
many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the 
brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has 
nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin 
firing in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can 
neurons fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and 
intentions directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. 
Obviously. Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than 
we would a wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is 
that experience is part of physics, and physics is part of experience.

Craig
 

>
> > I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-will. 
> This 
> > would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level, but we 
> are 
> > not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we live, 
> and 
> > unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer god", 
> not 
> > the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self-consistency, 
> and 
> > cannot know its local future. 
>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-27 Thread Jason Resch

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 7:49 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 1:29 PM, Jason Resch  wrote:
>
> > But can you separate the consciousness from that sequence of physical
> events
> > or not?  There are multiple levels involved here and you may be missing
> the
> > forest for the trees by focusing only on the atoms.  Saying the
> > consciousness is irrelevant in the processes of the brain may be like
> saying
> > human psychology is irrelevant in the price moves of the stock market.
>  Of
> > course, you might explain the price moves in terms of atomic
> interactions,
> > but you are missing the effects of higher-level phenomenon, which are
> real
> > and do make a difference.
>
> The higher level description is not an entity with *separate* causal
> power. Was the stock market movement caused by physics, chemistry,
> biochemistry or psychology? In a manner of speaking, it's correct to
> say any of them; but we know that all the chemical, biochemical and
> psychological properties are ultimately traceable to the physics, even
> if it isn't practically useful to attempt stock market prediction by
> analysing brain physics. What I object to is the idea of strong
> emergence, that higher level properties are not merely surprising but
> fundamentally unable to be deduced from lower level properties.
>

I agree with your distaste for strong emergence, but I think that you can
no more take the consciousness out of the brain, then you could take out
the chemical reactions.  Each is a fundamental part of what it is and does.



>
> >> We can't observe the
> >> experience itself.
> >
> >
> > I'm not convinced of this.  While today, we have difficulty in even
> defining
> > the term, in the future, with better tools and understanding of minds and
> > consciousness, we may indeed be able to tell if a certain process
> implements
> > the right combination of processes to have what we would call a mind.  By
> > tracing the flows of information in its mind, we might even know what it
> is
> > and isn't aware of.
> >
> > Albeit at a low resolution, scientists have already extracted from brain
> > scans what people are seeing:
> >
> http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16267-mindreading-software-could-record-your-dreams.html
>
> We still can't observe the experience. Advanced aliens may be able to
> read our thoughts very accurately in this way but still have no idea
> what we actually experience or whether we are conscious at all.
>
>
Maybe they could know what we experience.  If they moved their minds to
alternate substrates they might have much greater neural plasticity and
this could allow them to alter their own minds and know what we experience.
 Perhaps with enough practice doing this with different creatures from all
over the galaxy they could develop some pretty accurate theories about
what processing patterns of information lead to what first person
experiences.



> >> The people talking about them could be zombies. There is nothing in
> >> any observation of peoples' behaviour that *proves* they are
> >> conscious,
> >
> >
> > Consciousness is defined on dictionary.com as "awareness of sensations,
> > thoughts, surrounds, etc."  Awareness is defined as "having knowledge".
>  So
> > we can say consciousness is merely having knowledge of sensations,
> thoughts,
> > surroundings, etc.
>
> The "merely" makes it an epiphenomenon. I think this is Daniel
> Dennett's potion. Dennett argues that zombies are logically impossible
> as consciousness is nothing but the sort of information processing
> that goes on in brains.


Zombies are logically impossible precisely because consciousness is not an
epiphenomenon.

Dennett explains his position on epiphenomenalism here:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gxqXdzMv7Io&feature=BFa&list=PL9D673C673BC85C3E&t=7m10s

He is "flabbergasted that anyone takes this view seriously"

Jason

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)


On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


This is to equate reasoning to automatically following an
algorithm. This implies perfect predictability at some level and
thus the absence of any 1p only aspects. Additionally, the recipe
is some thng that needs explanation. How was it found...?
This kind of zombie reasoning is an oxymoron as it assumes the
possibility of evaluations and yet disallows the very possibility.
Zombies have no qualia and thus cannot represent anything to
itself. It has no "self" and thus lacks the capacity to impress
anything upon that non-existent self.


Here, I disagree.  If a you ask a zombie to solve a riddle, and it 
ponders it for several minutes and then gives you the correct answer, 
how can you say it was not reasoning?  It is like saying a computer is 
not multiplying when you ask it what 4*4 is and it gives you 16.


Note that I think we agree (some forms of reasoning probably require 
consciousness), which only provides another reason to doubt the 
consistency of the definition of zombies.  I don't think reasoning is 
normally assumed to require consciousness, which is why someone who 
defines zombies as non-conscious may still hold that they have a 
reasoning ability.


Hi Jason,

OK, but isn't that the point I made? Automaton behavior is 
per-scripted. It is not the result from an internal self-model. Is there 
some point where the two are identical in the 3p sense. Certainly! But 
only in that special case does your claim follow, but it does not follow 
generally as we need to take into account "novel" behavior.


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Stephen

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)


On 9/27/2012 10:22 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
I think the only difference in what you are saying and what I am 
saying, is I say look the zombies can do these things (by their 
definition), so they must be conscious and there is the inconsistency, 
whereas you say zombies cannot do these things since they are 
not conscious (by their definition), so then zombie behavior cannot be 
indistinguishable to a third party.


It works out to the same conclusion, either zombies are conscious, or 
zombies can't behave indistinguishably, and hence the definition of a 
zombie that is non-conscious but has identical behavior is flawed.



Hi Jason,

I am fine with identity of the two if and only if there is no 
distinguishable difference in behavior, as this gives us a 3p 
definition, but to only see that case as the whole of the gamut of 
possibilities is a mistake. My claim is that the zombie idea can cause 
as much confusion as it's proponents intended to solve. Ideas are two 
edged things Otherwise they are just meaningless noise.


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Stephen

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

2012-09-27 Thread Bruno Marchal

On 27 Sep 2012, at 15:08, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 6:06 PM, Bruno Marchal
wrote:

confuse the belief in self-consistency with the truth of its
self-consistency, and this will introduce a quale. The machine can
be aware
of it, and (with enough cognitive ability) the machine will be
aware of its

non communicability, making it into a personal quale.

I think you are doing a confusion level, like if matter was real, and
consciousness only emerging on it. I thought that some times ago
you did
understand the movie graph argument, so that it is the illusion of
brain and
matter which emerges from consciousness, and this gives another
role for
consciousness: the bringing of physical realities through number
relations
being selected (non causally, here). Consciousness is what makes
notions of

causal efficacy meaningful to start with.

I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.

Of course, you will argue that this is what physics already describes,
with QM. In that sense I am OK, but consciousness is still playing a
role, even if it is not necessarily the seemingly magical role invoked
by Craig.

Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
possible but it is contrary to all science.

I agree with you on this. As an argument against mechanism, your point
is valid. My point is that the way you talk might been misleading as
it looks like it is bearing on some notion of primitively causal
matter, but it does not. That plays some role when comparing the "comp
matter" and the QM matter.

This applies even if the
whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is
at the level of the simulation.

Not if we observe ourselves or our neighborhood below our substitution
level. In that case we can see only the trace of all infinitely many
possible simulations, or computations, leading to our actual current
computational states. Again we can say that QM confirms this a
posteriori.
In that case an observation will determine a brain state, in the same
way a self-localization after duplication determines a self-localized
state (like I am in this well defined city).

Bruno

I think it is the same error as using determinacy to refute free-
will. This
would be correct if we were living at the determinist base level,
but we are
not. Consciousness and free-will are real at the level where we
live, and
unreal, in the big 3p picture, but this concerns only the "outer
god", not
the "inner one" which can *know* a part of its local self-
consistency, and

cannot know its local future.

--
Stathis Papaioannou

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other
>> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws.
>> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
>> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the
>> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is
>> at the level of the simulation.
>
>
> That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on this
> many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the
> brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics has
> nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin firing
> in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can neurons
> fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions
> directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously.
> Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would a
> wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that experience
> is part of physics, and physics is part of experience.

If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)



On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:
>
> On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg 
> > 
> wrote: 
>
> >> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or other 
> >> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical laws. 
> >> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is 
> >> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even if the 
> >> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we observe is 
> >> at the level of the simulation. 
> > 
> > 
> > That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and others on 
> this 
> > many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to happen in the 
> > brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that physics 
> has 
> > nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly begin 
> firing 
> > in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care. Can 
> neurons 
> > fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and intentions 
> > directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course. Obviously. 
> > Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than we would 
> a 
> > wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is that 
> experience 
> > is part of physics, and physics is part of experience. 
>
> If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire 
> then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics. 
>

If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in 
response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them 
without predicting a person's entire life? 

Craig
 

>
>
> -- 
> Stathis Papaioannou 
>

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)

On Fri, Sep 28, 2012 at 12:52 PM, Craig Weinberg  wrote:

>> If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
>> then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.
>
>
> If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity in
> response to events in a person's life, then how could physics predict them
> without predicting a person's entire life?

When you replace the spark plugs in your car you don't need to know
everywhere the car is going to go for the duration of its existence.
You just need to know how the spark plugs respond to voltage, current,
temperature and so on. If you can't predict this even in theory then
your car has magical spark plugs and you won't be able to replace
them. Same with your brain.

-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)


On 9/27/2012 10:52 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote:



On Thursday, September 27, 2012 7:45:07 PM UTC-4, stathisp wrote:

On Thu, Sep 27, 2012 at 11:30 PM, Craig Weinberg
> wrote:

>> I object to the idea that consciousness will cause a brain or
other
>> machine to behave in a way not predictable by purely physical
laws.
>> Some people, like Craig Weinberg, seem to believe that this is
>> possible but it is contrary to all science. This applies even
if the
>> whole universe is really just a simulation, because what we
observe is
>> at the level of the simulation.
>
>
> That is not what I believe at all. I have corrected you and
others on this
> many times but you won't hear it. Nothing unusual needs to
happen in the
> brain for ordinary consciousness to take place, it's just that
physics has
> nothing to say about whether billions of synapses will suddenly
begin firing
> in complex synchronized patterns or not. Physics doesn't care.
Can neurons
> fire when conditions are right? Yes. Can our thoughts and
intentions
> directly control conditions in the brain? YES. Of course.
Obviously.
> Otherwise we wouldn't care any more about the human brain than
we would a
> wasps nest. It's not that physics needs to be amended, it is
that experience
> is part of physics, and physics is part of experience.

If physics cannot predict even in theory when the neurons will fire
then *by definition* the neurons behave contrary to physics.


If the neurons fire based on the participation of a personal identity 
in response to events in a person's life, then how could physics 
predict them without predicting a person's entire life?


Craig


Good point! Physical systems are completely blind to their history, 
or so we are told...


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Stephen

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Re: Epiphenomenalism (was: Re: Bruno's Restaurant)