Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP

[Bruno Marchal]

On 15 Jan 2012, at 00:17, Russell Standish wrote:


On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 07:02:52AM +0200, acw wrote:

On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote:


Thanks for replying. I was worried my post was too big and few
people will bother reading it due to size. I hope to read your
opinion on the viability of the experiment I presented in my
original post.


Any chance you could break it up into smaller digestible pieces?


That would be good idea. read it twice, and generate too much comments  
in my head, and none seems to address the point. Now i am more busy,  
so acw will need to be patient I grasp his idea.












To Bruno Marchal:

Do you plan on ever publishing your thesis in english? My french  
is a

bit rusty and it would take a rather long time to walk through it,
however I did read the SANE and CC&Q papers, as well as a few  
others.


I think that SANE is enough, although some people pushes me to  
submit to
some more public journal. It is not yet clear if physicist or  
logician
will understand. Physicists asks the good questions but don't have  
the

logical tools. Logicians have the right tools, but are not really
interested in the applied question. By tradition modern logicians
despise their philosophical origin. Some personal contingent  
problems

slow me down, too. Don't want to bore you with this.


If it's sufficient, I'll just have to read the right books to better
understand AUDA, as it is now, I understood some parts, but also had
trouble connecting some ideas in the AUDA.

Maybe I should write a book. There is, on my url, a long version  
of the
thesis in french: "conscience et mécanisme", with all details, but  
then
it is 700 pages long, and even there, non-logician does not grasp  
the

logic. It is a pity but such kind of work reveals the abyssal gap
between logicians and physicists, and the Penrose misunderstanding  
of

Gödel's theorem has frightened the physicists to even take any look
further. To defend the thesis it took me more time to explain  
elementary

logic and computer science than philosophy of mind.



A book would surely appeal to a larger audience, but a paper which
only mentions the required reading could also be enough, although in
the latter case fewer people would be willing to spend the time to
understand it.


There is a project underway to translate "Secret de l'amibe" into
English, which IMHO is an even better introduction to the topic than
Bruno's theses (a lot of technical detail has been supressed to make
the central ideas digestible). We're about half way through at present
- its a volunteer project though, so it will probably be another year
or so before it is done/


Thanks to Russell and Kim.









Does anyone have a complete downloadable archive of this mailing  
list,

besides the web-accessible google groups or nabble one?
Google groups seems to badly group posts together and generates  
some

duplicates for older posts.


I agree. Google groups are not practical. The first old archive were
very nice (Escribe); but like with all software, archiving get worst
with time. nabble is already better, and I don't know if there are  
other

one. Note also that the everything list, maintained by Wei Dai, is a
list lasting since a long time, so that the total archive must be  
rather
huge. Thanks to Wei Dai to maintain the list, despite the ASSA  
people
(Hal Finney, Wei Dai in some post, Schmidhuber, ...) seems to have  
quit
after losing the argument with the RSSA people. Well, to be sure  
Russell
Standish still use ASSA, it seems to me, and I have always  
defended the

idea that ASSA is indeed not completely non sensical, although it
concerns more the geography than the physics, in the comp frame.


If someone from those early times still has the posts, it might be
nice if they decided to post an archive (such as a mailer spool).
For large Usenet groups, it's not unusual for people to have
personal archives, even from 1980's and earlier.



I have often thought this would be a very useful resource - sadly I
never kept my own archive. It would probably be a good idea to webbot
/ spider to download the contents of the archives as they currently  
exist.


That might be useful. Especially with things like NDAA, SOPA, etc.
Looks like deeper threats than usual accumulate on the free world.





I had no idea that was the reason I don't seem them post
anymore(when I was looking at older posts, I saw they used to post
here).



For most people, the everything list is a side interest, and other
priorities and interests will interfere with particpation. Bruno is
one of the few people who has dedicated his life to this topic, so one
shouldn't be too surprised if other people leave the list out of  
exhaustion :).


In cognitive science, many confuse science and philosophy. I like  
philosophy but it is not my job. I don't defend any truth, but only  
attempt to criticize invalid arguments.






As for losing the  "R

Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, Jan 07, 2012 at 07:02:52AM +0200, acw wrote:
> On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >
> >On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote:
> 
> Thanks for replying. I was worried my post was too big and few
> people will bother reading it due to size. I hope to read your
> opinion on the viability of the experiment I presented in my
> original post.

Any chance you could break it up into smaller digestible pieces?

> 
> >
> >>
> >>
> >>To Bruno Marchal:
> >>
> >>Do you plan on ever publishing your thesis in english? My french is a
> >>bit rusty and it would take a rather long time to walk through it,
> >>however I did read the SANE and CC&Q papers, as well as a few others.
> >
> >I think that SANE is enough, although some people pushes me to submit to
> >some more public journal. It is not yet clear if physicist or logician
> >will understand. Physicists asks the good questions but don't have the
> >logical tools. Logicians have the right tools, but are not really
> >interested in the applied question. By tradition modern logicians
> >despise their philosophical origin. Some personal contingent problems
> >slow me down, too. Don't want to bore you with this.
> 
> If it's sufficient, I'll just have to read the right books to better
> understand AUDA, as it is now, I understood some parts, but also had
> trouble connecting some ideas in the AUDA.
> 
> >Maybe I should write a book. There is, on my url, a long version of the
> >thesis in french: "conscience et mécanisme", with all details, but then
> >it is 700 pages long, and even there, non-logician does not grasp the
> >logic. It is a pity but such kind of work reveals the abyssal gap
> >between logicians and physicists, and the Penrose misunderstanding of
> >Gödel's theorem has frightened the physicists to even take any look
> >further. To defend the thesis it took me more time to explain elementary
> >logic and computer science than philosophy of mind.
> >
> 
> A book would surely appeal to a larger audience, but a paper which
> only mentions the required reading could also be enough, although in
> the latter case fewer people would be willing to spend the time to
> understand it.

There is a project underway to translate "Secret de l'amibe" into
English, which IMHO is an even better introduction to the topic than
Bruno's theses (a lot of technical detail has been supressed to make
the central ideas digestible). We're about half way through at present
- its a volunteer project though, so it will probably be another year
or so before it is done/

> 
> >>
> >>Does anyone have a complete downloadable archive of this mailing list,
> >>besides the web-accessible google groups or nabble one?
> >>Google groups seems to badly group posts together and generates some
> >>duplicates for older posts.
> >
> >I agree. Google groups are not practical. The first old archive were
> >very nice (Escribe); but like with all software, archiving get worst
> >with time. nabble is already better, and I don't know if there are other
> >one. Note also that the everything list, maintained by Wei Dai, is a
> >list lasting since a long time, so that the total archive must be rather
> >huge. Thanks to Wei Dai to maintain the list, despite the ASSA people
> >(Hal Finney, Wei Dai in some post, Schmidhuber, ...) seems to have quit
> >after losing the argument with the RSSA people. Well, to be sure Russell
> >Standish still use ASSA, it seems to me, and I have always defended the
> >idea that ASSA is indeed not completely non sensical, although it
> >concerns more the geography than the physics, in the comp frame.
> >
> If someone from those early times still has the posts, it might be
> nice if they decided to post an archive (such as a mailer spool).
> For large Usenet groups, it's not unusual for people to have
> personal archives, even from 1980's and earlier.
> 

I have often thought this would be a very useful resource - sadly I
never kept my own archive. It would probably be a good idea to webbot
/ spider to download the contents of the archives as they currently exist.

> I had no idea that was the reason I don't seem them post
> anymore(when I was looking at older posts, I saw they used to post
> here).
> 

For most people, the everything list is a side interest, and other
priorities and interests will interfere with particpation. Bruno is
one of the few people who has dedicated his life to this topic, so one
shouldn't be too surprised if other people leave the list out of exhaustion :).

> As for losing the  "RSSA vs ASSA" debate, what was the conclusive
> argument that tilts the favor toward RSSA (if it's too long, linking
> to the thread will do)? In my personal opinion, I used to initially
> consider ASSA as generally true, because assuming continuity of
> consciousness is a stronger hypothesis, despite being 'felt' from
> the inside, but then I realized that if I'm assuming
> consciousness/mind, I might as well assume continuity as well (from
> the perspective of the observe

Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jan 2012, at 18:07, Jason Resch wrote:




On Fri, Jan 6, 2012 at 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:




Assuming all possible (consistent mathematical) structures is the
simplest possible hypothesis. The problem with this is that this
'whole' might be a bit too large or inconsistent in itself (like
Russell's Paradox), and like I've said before, there is no way for us
finite humans to know an oracle when we see it. If we're a bit more
modest, we can use the only mathematical notion that we know to be
truly universal - computation as by CTT.


OK. The main problem also is in the self-localization in the  
possible math structure. Comp entails a first person indeterminacy  
which distribute us in the mathematical reality, and what we  
perceive might NOT be a purely mathematical structure, but something  
"supervening" on it from the inside view. This is a point missed by  
people like Chalmers, Tegmark, Schmidhuber, etc.




Bruno, would you say that Tegmark has still missed the point, given  
this article he co-authored:


http://lesswrong.com/lw/3pg/aguirre_tegmark_layzer_cosmological/
http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066

Thanks,





Tegmark uses comp +swe, when comp makes it necessary to derive swe  
from universal number self-reference (which then gives both the quanta  
and the qualia (frely from the classical theory of knowledge).


For the physical reality you can say that he is very close to comp,  
with Everett and Deutsch, but he missed the comp reversal between  
physics and number's 'theology'. He does not address the mind body  
problem, and seems unaware that comp reduces it in justifying swe (or  
the 'correct physical laws') from the math of self-observing universal  
machine.  It is still an Aristotelian. He still infer (from  
observation) the unitary evolution. But he uses comp, so by UDA the  
unitary evolution must be derived from elementary arithmetic. From a  
platonist view, he is still cheating. He is still trying to copy on  
nature.


He missed, following a long tradition, the mind-body problem, despite  
his physics, and even his metaphysics (mathematicalism) is very close  
to the comp needed physics. Yet UDA explains (or is supposed to  
explain)  that physics *has to* be justified by universal  
introspection (and so based on G, G* and the intensional variants, to  
get that measure on the UD*, or on the sigma_1 propositions).


It is very good physics, from a comp view. But he misses that physical  
realities are a first person sharable numbers' dreams.
Like Everett explains the phenomenology of the collapse, comp asks for  
a phenomenological account of the swe in arithmetic.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP

[Jason Resch]

On Fri, Jan 6, 2012 at 10:57 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
>
> Assuming all possible (consistent mathematical) structures is the
> simplest possible hypothesis. The problem with this is that this
> 'whole' might be a bit too large or inconsistent in itself (like
> Russell's Paradox), and like I've said before, there is no way for us
> finite humans to know an oracle when we see it. If we're a bit more
> modest, we can use the only mathematical notion that we know to be
> truly universal - computation as by CTT.
>
>
> OK. The main problem also is in the self-localization in the possible math
> structure. Comp entails a first person indeterminacy which distribute us in
> the mathematical reality, and what we perceive might NOT be a purely
> mathematical structure, but something "supervening" on it from the inside
> view. This is a point missed by people like Chalmers, Tegmark, Schmidhuber,
> etc.
>
>
>
Bruno, would you say that Tegmark has still missed the point, given this
article he co-authored:

http://lesswrong.com/lw/3pg/aguirre_tegmark_layzer_cosmological/
http://arxiv.org/abs/1008.1066

Thanks,

Jason

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Re: JOINING Post and On measure alteration mechanisms and other practical tests for COMP

[acw]

On 1/6/2012 18:57, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 05 Jan 2012, at 11:02, acw wrote:


Hello everything-list, this is my first post here, but I've been
reading this list for at least half a year, and I'm afraid this post
will be a bit long as it contains many thoughts I've had on my mind
for quite some time now.


Welcome acw. It looks like you wrote an interesting post. But it is very
long, as are most sentences in it.
I will make some easy comments. I will come back on it later, when I
have more time.


Thanks, I look forward to the full response.



A bit about me: I'm mostly self-taught in the matters concerning the
topics of 'everything-list' (Multiverse hypotheses, philosophy of
science, 'rationalism', theory of computation, cognitive science, AI,
models of computation, logic, physics), and I greatly enjoy reading
books and papers on the related subjects. My main activities center
mostly around software development and a various other fields directly
related to it.


OK. Self-teaching is often of better quality than listening to others.



It's fine and allows one to better study some matters, but it also may 
lead to gaps in knowledge if one isn't aware of the gaps.




I will give my positions/assumptions first before talking about the
actual topic I mentioned in the subject.

One of my positions (what I'm betting on, but cannot know) is that of
computationalism, that is, that one would survive a digital
substitution.


OK. As you know that is my working hypothesis. As a scientist I don't
know the truth. I certainly find it plausible, given our current
knowledge, and my main goal is to show that it leads to testable
consequences. Mainly, it reduces the mind body problem into an
arithmetical pure body problem.



Neither do I claim to know the truth, or should anyone else, if someone 
claims to know it, they may be telling a lie, voluntarily or not. Our 
senses aren't that reliable to claim absolute knowledge about the world 
and even when talking about mathematical truth, the incompleteness 
theorem applies to everyone.


Instead of truth, I tend to assign a theory a high confidence value, or 
to consider it more probable than others, but the only thing that we can 
really do beyond that is testing, falsification or verification of our 
expectations/theories.


It sort of was the main goal of my post - to show that there are some 
practical ways to test COMP that one might be able to do some day.





There are however many details regarding this that would have to be
made more precise and topic's goal is to elucidate some of these
uncertainties and invite others to give their ideas on the subject.


Why computationalism?

Chalmers' "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" thought
experiment/argument shows that one can be forced to believe some
seemingly absurd things about the nature of consciousness if
functionalism is false (that is, if one assumes that conscious nature
depends on more than just functional organization, such as some
"magical" properties of matter).

Taking it from functionalism to computationalism isn't very hard
either, all it takes is assuming no concrete infinities are involved
in the brain's implementation and the CTT(Church Turing Thesis) does
the rest.


OK. And if you make explicit that COMP assumes only the existence of a
level, then you see that COMP, as discussed on this list, is a weaker
hypothesis that all the comp discussed in the literature. That is why I
refer to the generalized brain. The level can be so low that the
"generalized brain" is an entire galaxy or even a multiverse quantum
state. This does not make the assumption trivial, the main reversal,
between Aristotle theology and Plato theology still follows.


Too low a level and functionalism is no longer very practically 
testable, but the consequences of COMP (reversal) would still apply if 
it's true.
In my example (the experiment) from the previous post, I tried to assume 
a reasonable (mid(atomic)/high(neurons or higher)) substitution level, 
in that it could be tested someday. Such a mid/high-substitution level 
allows for the mind's implementation to become substrate independent 
(SIM), but if the new implementation isn't too exact, would the 
continuation likely or not: it should be conscious, but would it be 
likely to experience a continuation into a SIM after saying 'yes' to the 
doctor? Would it be more likely to end up "amnesiac" and just choose not 
to become a SIM?


I've discussed the matter of errors or inexact 'copies' in the previous 
post and will wait for your response on that part before going into more 
details again. In a way, I think it might be more reasonable to consider 
the mind's implementation and the environment's implementation 
separately (even if environment+mind are at least one (and infinity of) 
TM in COMP) as the environment has more chance to vary and only 
indirectly leads to conscious experience, or that it might be more of a 
wildcard.



While I cannot ever know i

Re: Joining Post

[Bruno Marchal]

Jon,  (nihil0)

On 28 Sep 2011, at 01:18, nihil0 wrote:


On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb  wrote:

I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense  
of compatibilist free

will and why it is the only kind worth having.


Great suggestion. The wikipedia page was fairly informative, but I'll
probably buy the book anyway. From what I gather, he believes the kind
of free will worth wanting is the appearance (or illusion) that we can
control our behavior to a large extent. I agree with him that we don't
want to be uncaused causes (or uninfluenced influences) of events,
which is how quantum particles appear to behave (i.e.,
stochastically).

"Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.   
And in any case it
doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible  
must happen infinitely
many times.  For example it might be that almost all universes are  
uninteresting and

barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours.


Technically I think you are right. However, I was only talking about
an infinite universe likes ours that operates in accordance with the
laws of quantum physics. Let me explain by using what I've read of
Victor Stenger and Brian Greene. There are three ingredients in the
argument that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe
happen infinitely many times. 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the
theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter
and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as
a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.

I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me
to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely
many times.

Bruno you say, "To have everything happening, you need the universe
being infinitely big, but also homogenous, and robust enough for
making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc."
I thought that physicists have observed our universe to be homogenous
on very large scales, but perhaps I'm mistaken. See the Cosmological
Principal  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_principle.


I don't assume physics.
But, although it is not relevant for my point, it is not clear for me  
that the cosmological principle makes a UD possibly running in the  
universe. Such a physical UD has to be *very* demanding in physical  
space and time. But a concrete universe with a UD is an hypothesis  
which is used for pedagogical purpose only. The step 8  (MGA)  
eliminates that assumption.


MGA = the Movie graph argument. I explained it in this list:
http://www.nabble.com/MGA-1-td20566948.html#a20566948



I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "robust enough for making
possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc."


Imagine a program with 10^(10^(10^ . < repeated a billion  
times> ...) instructions. And this, for a logician, is still a very  
tiny little number. yet to store it in a machine in such a way that  
the program will do what it is supposed to do, you need more than a  
homogenous universe, you need a way to avoid systematically black  
holes, star explosion, etc.





but
perhaps the following explanation will be helpful. During the
inflation right before the Big Bang, all of the now disconnected
Hubble volumes were squeezed together and could affect each other.
Brian Greene says they conducted a variety of cosmic handshakes,
establishing, for example, a uniform temperature.


The UD argument does not presuppose any physical laws. Just a minimal  
amount of physical reality (but not that such a physical reality is  
primitive).


Best,

Bruno





Cheers,

Jon

On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb  wrote:

On 9/26/2011 10:35 PM, nihil0 wrote:


It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3
things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself.


I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however  
I'm

studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4.



The main questions I've been researching are the following:


1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it,  
despite

the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation?


I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense  
of compatibilist free

will and why it is the only kind worth having.




2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is
infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens  
an

infinite number of times.


"Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.   
And in any case it
doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible  
must happen infinitely
many times.  For example it might be that almost all universes are  
uninteresting and

barren and 

Re: Joining Post

[Jason Resch]

On Sep 28, 2011, at 1:28 AM, meekerdb  wrote:


On 9/27/2011 10:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 11:52 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



I don't think that.  I just noted it's logically possible,  
contrary to assertions that our universe must be duplicated  
infinitely many times.


If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then  
quantum computers would not work.  They rely on huge numbers of  
universes different from ours aside from a few entangled  
particles.  Even normal interference patterns are explained by  
there existing a huge number of very similar universes.


Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime.  Don't become to  
enamored of an interpretation.



If you assume there is a single photon interfering with itself,  
how  is it that this one particle can evaluate a problem whose  
computational complexity would exceed that of any conventional  
computer using all the matter in the universe?


Has such a problem been solved?


Quantum computers have been built, but last I checked it was only 7  
qubits.  There is no known principle which would forbid quantum  
computers having more qubits.  Even one with a few thousand could  
solve problems we could not otherwise.


Anyway, the answer is by the one particle cycling back thru time, so  
it appears to us as many particles.




If this is a possible answer you should write David deutsch, since he  
says he has never received an explanation in a non many worlds  
framework.


Then again, if every partical is going backwards in time to cover  
every possibility, is that really any different? Would not all  
possibilities be realized infinitely often?











However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and
Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that  
there

is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling
universes).  Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical
possibilities are realized infinitely many times "the hypothesis of
Cosmic Repetition". Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite
persuasively. He says, "In an infinitely big universe, there are
infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only  
finitely

many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles
within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times." (The
Hidden Reality, pg. 33)
It's plausible - but not logically required.  Suppose all the  
infinite universes are number 1, 2, ...  Number 1 is ours.  Number  
2 something different.  Numbers  3,4, ...inf are exact copies of  
number 2.  So there are only two arrangements of particles; in  
spite of there being infinitely many universes.


Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with  
our current theories and observations.





As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll
let Tegmark do the explaining:

"Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions
than those in our Hubble volume.

This is questionable.  Most theories of the universe starting from  
a quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume  
that the universe must start very small - no more than a few  
Planck volumes.


The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation.  It  
leads to an exponentially growing volume which expands forever.


 This limits the amount of information that can possibly be  
provided as initial conditions.  So where does all the information  
come from?


I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the  
information content for this universe set by the big bang.


In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit.  That's the  
holographic principle.



Yet our universe appears to take more than 1 bit to describe, and  
it seems to have a possibly infinite volume.



That's why I provided the (possible) explanation below.





As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist,  
the total information content may be zero, and the appearance of a  
large amount of information is a local illusion.


 QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one  
possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and  
the apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble  
horizon.



The currently favored theory is that
the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types
of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the
inflation
epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial
conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing
density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an  
ergodic
random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an  
ensemble

of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the
probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is  
identical to

Re: Joining Post

[meekerdb]

On 9/27/2011 10:40 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 11:52 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



I don't think that.  I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to
assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times.


If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum 
computers
would not work.  They rely on huge numbers of universes different from ours 
aside
from a few entangled particles.  Even normal interference patterns are 
explained by
there existing a huge number of very similar universes.


Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime.  Don't become to enamored of 
an
interpretation.


If you assume there is a single photon interfering with itself, how  is it that this one 
particle can evaluate a problem whose computational complexity would exceed that of any 
conventional computer using all the matter in the universe?


Has such a problem been solved?  Anyway, the answer is by the one particle cycling back 
thru time, so it appears to us as many particles.







However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and
Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that 
there
is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling
universes).  Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical
possibilities are realized infinitely many times "the hypothesis of
Cosmic Repetition". Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite
persuasively. He says, "In an infinitely big universe, there are
infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only 
finitely
many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles
within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times." (The
Hidden Reality, pg. 33)

It's plausible - but not logically required.  Suppose all the infinite
universes are number 1, 2, ...  Number 1 is ours.  Number 2 something
different.  Numbers  3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2.  So 
there are
only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely 
many
universes.


Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our 
current
theories and observations.




As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll
let Tegmark do the explaining:

"Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions
than those in our Hubble volume.


This is questionable.  Most theories of the universe starting from a 
quantum
fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe 
must
start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes.


The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation.  It leads to an
exponentially growing volume which expands forever.

 This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as 
initial
conditions.  So where does all the information come from?


I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information 
content
for this universe set by the big bang.


In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit.  That's the 
holographic principle.


Yet our universe appears to take more than 1 bit to describe, and it seems to have a 
possibly infinite volume.



That's why I provided the (possible) explanation below.





As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total
information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of
information is a local illusion.

 QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one 
possibility
is that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent 
information
is created by the existence of the hubble horizon.


The currently favored theory is that
the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types
of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the
inflation
epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial
conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing
density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an 
ergodic
random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an 
ensemble
of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the
probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical 
to
the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a
single universe. 



That's not what ergodic means.  In the theo

Re: Joining Post

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 11:52 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>>  I don't think that.  I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to
>> assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times.
>
>
>  If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum
> computers would not work.  They rely on huge numbers of universes different
> from ours aside from a few entangled particles.  Even normal interference
> patterns are explained by there existing a huge number of very similar
> universes.
>
>
> Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime.  Don't become to enamored of
> an interpretation.
>
>
If you assume there is a single photon interfering with itself, how  is it
that this one particle can evaluate a problem whose computational complexity
would exceed that of any conventional computer using all the matter in the
universe?


>
>
>
>>
>>
>>  However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and
>>> Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there
>>> is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling
>>> universes).  Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical
>>> possibilities are realized infinitely many times "the hypothesis of
>>> Cosmic Repetition". Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite
>>> persuasively. He says, "In an infinitely big universe, there are
>>> infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely
>>> many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles
>>> within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times." (The
>>> Hidden Reality, pg. 33)
>>>
>>  It's plausible - but not logically required.  Suppose all the infinite
>> universes are number 1, 2, ...  Number 1 is ours.  Number 2 something
>> different.  Numbers  3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2.  So there are
>> only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many
>> universes.
>
>
>  Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our
> current theories and observations.
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>> As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll
>>> let Tegmark do the explaining:
>>>
>>> "Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
>>> same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions
>>> than those in our Hubble volume.
>>>
>>
>>  This is questionable.  Most theories of the universe starting from a
>> quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the
>> universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes.
>
>
>  The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation.  It leads to an
> exponentially growing volume which expands forever.
>
>
>>  This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as
>> initial conditions.  So where does all the information come from?
>
>
>  I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the
> information content for this universe set by the big bang.
>
>
> In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit.  That's the
> holographic principle.
>
>
Yet our universe appears to take more than 1 bit to describe, and it seems
to have a possibly infinite volume.


>
>
>  As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total
> information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of
> information is a local illusion.
>
>
>>  QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one
>> possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the
>> apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble horizon.
>>
>>
>>  The currently favored theory is that
>>> the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types
>>> of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the
>>> inflation
>>> epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial
>>> conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing
>>> density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic
>>> random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble
>>> of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the
>>> probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to
>>> the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a
>>> single universe.
>>
>>
> That's not what ergodic means.  In the theory of stochastic processes it
> means that ensemble statistics are the same as temporal statistics.  In the
> eternal expansion theory it is not assumed that the physics is the same in
> each bubble universe.
>

This one "bubble" is infinitely big according to eternal inflation.


>   It is hypothesized that the spontaneous symmetry breaking that results in
> different coupling constants for the weak, strong, EM, and gravity forces is
> random.  That's how it provides and anthropic explanation for "fine-tuning"
> - we're in the one where the random symmetry 

Re: Joining Post

[meekerdb]

On 9/27/2011 9:13 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 10:52 PM, meekerdb > wrote:


On 9/27/2011 8:07 PM, nihil0 wrote:

On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote:

1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected 
(as the
theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much 
matter
and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, 
such as
a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.
I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd 
like me
to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized 
infinitely
many times.

On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdbmailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
 wrote:

No they don't.   There's an implicit assumption that what happens 
in these
other universes
has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in 
ours.  A
reasonable
assumption, but not a logically necessary one.  I think it's what 
Bruno means by
"homogeneous".  It's logically possible that all but a finite 
number of
these universes
are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for 
example.

Brent

You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite
number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think
few will resemble ours.


I don't think that.  I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to 
assertions
that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times.


If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum computers would 
not work.  They rely on huge numbers of universes different from ours aside from a few 
entangled particles.  Even normal interference patterns are explained by there existing 
a huge number of very similar universes.


Or by Feynmann paths that zigzag in spacetime.  Don't become to enamored of an 
interpretation.






However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and
Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there
is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling
universes).  Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical
possibilities are realized infinitely many times "the hypothesis of
Cosmic Repetition". Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite
persuasively. He says, "In an infinitely big universe, there are
infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely
many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles
within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times." (The
Hidden Reality, pg. 33)

It's plausible - but not logically required.  Suppose all the infinite 
universes are
number 1, 2, ...  Number 1 is ours.  Number 2 something different.  Numbers 
 3,4,
...inf are exact copies of number 2.  So there are only two arrangements of
particles; in spite of there being infinitely many universes.


Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our current theories 
and observations.





As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll
let Tegmark do the explaining:

"Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions
than those in our Hubble volume.


This is questionable.  Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum
fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe 
must start
very small - no more than a few Planck volumes.


The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation.  It leads to an exponentially 
growing volume which expands forever.


 This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as 
initial
conditions.  So where does all the information come from?


I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information content for 
this universe set by the big bang.


In one Planck volume there is only room for one bit.  That's the holographic 
principle.



As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total information 
content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of information is a local 
illusion.


 QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one 
possibility is
that the net information is zero or very small and the apparent information 
is
created by the existence of the hubble horizon.


The cu

Re: Joining Post

[Jason Resch]

On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 10:52 PM, meekerdb  wrote:

> On 9/27/2011 8:07 PM, nihil0 wrote:
>
>> On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote:
>>
>>  1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
 volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the
 theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter
 and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as
 a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
 configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.
 I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me
 to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
 quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely
 many times.

>>> On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>  No they don't.   There's an implicit assumption that what happens in
>>> these other universes
>>> has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours.
>>>  A reasonable
>>> assumption, but not a logically necessary one.  I think it's what Bruno
>>> means by
>>> "homogeneous".  It's logically possible that all but a finite number of
>>> these universes
>>> are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>> You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite
>> number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think
>> few will resemble ours.
>>
>
> I don't think that.  I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to
> assertions that our universe must be duplicated infinitely many times.


If our universe is not duplicated a huge number of times, then quantum
computers would not work.  They rely on huge numbers of universes different
from ours aside from a few entangled particles.  Even normal interference
patterns are explained by there existing a huge number of very similar
universes.


>
>
>  However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and
>> Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there
>> is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling
>> universes).  Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical
>> possibilities are realized infinitely many times "the hypothesis of
>> Cosmic Repetition". Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite
>> persuasively. He says, "In an infinitely big universe, there are
>> infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely
>> many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles
>> within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times." (The
>> Hidden Reality, pg. 33)
>>
> It's plausible - but not logically required.  Suppose all the infinite
> universes are number 1, 2, ...  Number 1 is ours.  Number 2 something
> different.  Numbers  3,4, ...inf are exact copies of number 2.  So there are
> only two arrangements of particles; in spite of there being infinitely many
> universes.


Not logically required, but I would say it is not consistent with our
current theories and observations.


>
>
>
>> As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll
>> let Tegmark do the explaining:
>>
>> "Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
>> same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions
>> than those in our Hubble volume.
>>
>
> This is questionable.  Most theories of the universe starting from a
> quantum fluctuation or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the
> universe must start very small - no more than a few Planck volumes.


The generalized theory of inflation is eternal inflation.  It leads to an
exponentially growing volume which expands forever.


>  This limits the amount of information that can possibly be provided as
> initial conditions.  So where does all the information come from?


I haven't heard the theory that there is an upper bound on the information
content for this universe set by the big bang.

As to where information comes from, if all possibilities exist, the total
information content may be zero, and the appearance of a large amount of
information is a local illusion.


>  QM allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one
> possibility is that the net information is zero or very small and the
> apparent information is created by the existence of the hubble horizon.
>
>
>  The currently favored theory is that
>> the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types
>> of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the
>> inflation
>> epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial
>> conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing
>> density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic
>> random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble
>> of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the
>> probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to
>

Re: Joining Post

[meekerdb]

On 9/27/2011 8:07 PM, nihil0 wrote:

On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote:


1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the
theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter
and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as
a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.
I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me
to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely
many times.

On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdb  wrote:


No they don't.   There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these 
other universes
has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours.  A 
reasonable
assumption, but not a logically necessary one.  I think it's what Bruno means by
"homogeneous".  It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these 
universes
are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example.

Brent

You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite
number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think
few will resemble ours.


I don't think that.  I just noted it's logically possible, contrary to assertions that our 
universe must be duplicated infinitely many times.



However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and
Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there
is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling
universes).  Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical
possibilities are realized infinitely many times "the hypothesis of
Cosmic Repetition". Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite
persuasively. He says, "In an infinitely big universe, there are
infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely
many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles
within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times." (The
Hidden Reality, pg. 33)
It's plausible - but not logically required.  Suppose all the infinite universes are 
number 1, 2, ...  Number 1 is ours.  Number 2 something different.  Numbers  3,4, ...inf 
are exact copies of number 2.  So there are only two arrangements of particles; in spite 
of there being infinitely many universes.




As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll
let Tegmark do the explaining:

"Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions
than those in our Hubble volume.


This is questionable.  Most theories of the universe starting from a quantum fluctuation 
or tunneling from a prior universe assume that the universe must start very small - no 
more than a few Planck volumes.  This limits the amount of information that can possibly 
be provided as initial conditions.  So where does all the information come from?  QM 
allows negative information (hidden correlations) so that one possibility is that the net 
information is zero or very small and the apparent information is created by the existence 
of the hubble horizon.



The currently favored theory is that
the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types
of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the
inflation
epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial
conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing
density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic
random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble
of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the
probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to
the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a
single universe. In other words, it means that everything that could
in principle have happened here did in fact happen somewhere else.
Inflation in fact generates all possible initial conditions
with non-zero probability, the most likely ones being almost uniform
with fluctuations at the 10^5 level that are amplified by
gravitational clustering to form galaxies,
stars, planets and other structures. This means both that pretty much
all imaginable matter configurations occur in some Hubble volume far
away, and also that we should
expect our own Hubble volume to be a fairly typical one — at least
typical among those that contain observers. A crude estimate suggests
that the closest identical copy
of you is about ∼ 10^(10^29)m away. . ." (The Multiverse Hierarchy,
section 1B, http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283)

Do you still disagree with the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition? Which
parts of the argument do you accept or deny?


See above.

Brent


Best regards,

Jon



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Re: Joining Post

[nihil0]

On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote:

> > 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
> > volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the
> > theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter
> > and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as
> > a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
> > configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.
>
> > I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me
> > to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
> > quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely
> > many times.

On Sep 27, 7:47 pm, meekerdb  wrote:

> No they don't.   There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these 
> other universes
> has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours.  A 
> reasonable
> assumption, but not a logically necessary one.  I think it's what Bruno means 
> by
> "homogeneous".  It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these 
> universes
> are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example.
>
> Brent

You imply that it's logically possible that there is only a finite
number of universes that are filled with matter, and you seem to think
few will resemble ours. However, according to Vilenkin, Greene, and
Tegmark, a generic prediction of the theory of inflation is that there
is an *infinite* number of Hubble volumes (what you are calling
universes).  Let's call the hypothesis that all quantum-physical
possibilities are realized infinitely many times "the hypothesis of
Cosmic Repetition". Brian Greene argues for this hypothesis quite
persuasively. He says, "In an infinitely big universe, there are
infinitely many patches [i.e., Hubble volumes]; so, with only finitely
many different particles arrangements, the arrangements of particles
within patches must be duplicated an infinite number of times." (The
Hidden Reality, pg. 33)

As for the probability distribution of matter and/or outcomes, I'll
let Tegmark do the explaining:

"Observers living in parallel universes at Level I observe the exact
same laws of physics as we do, but with different initial conditions
than those in our Hubble volume. The currently favored theory is that
the initial conditions (the densities and motions of different types
of matter early on) were created by quantum fluctuations during the
inflation
epoch (see section 3). This quantum mechanism generates initial
conditions that are for all practical purposes random, producing
density fluctuations described by what mathematicians call an ergodic
random field. Ergodic means that if you imagine generating an ensemble
of universes, each with its own random initial conditions, then the
probability distribution of outcomes in a given volume is identical to
the distribution that you get by sampling different volumes in a
single universe. In other words, it means that everything that could
in principle have happened here did in fact happen somewhere else.
Inflation in fact generates all possible initial conditions
with non-zero probability, the most likely ones being almost uniform
with fluctuations at the 10^5 level that are amplified by
gravitational clustering to form galaxies,
stars, planets and other structures. This means both that pretty much
all imaginable matter configurations occur in some Hubble volume far
away, and also that we should
expect our own Hubble volume to be a fairly typical one — at least
typical among those that contain observers. A crude estimate suggests
that the closest identical copy
of you is about ∼ 10^(10^29)m away. . ." (The Multiverse Hierarchy,
section 1B, http://arxiv.org/abs/0905.1283)

Do you still disagree with the hypothesis of Cosmic Repetition? Which
parts of the argument do you accept or deny?

Best regards,

Jon

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Re: Joining Post

[meekerdb]

On 9/27/2011 4:18 PM, nihil0 wrote:

On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb  wrote:


I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense of 
compatibilist free
will and why it is the only kind worth having.

Great suggestion. The wikipedia page was fairly informative, but I'll
probably buy the book anyway. From what I gather, he believes the kind
of free will worth wanting is the appearance (or illusion) that we can
control our behavior to a large extent. I agree with him that we don't
want to be uncaused causes (or uninfluenced influences) of events,
which is how quantum particles appear to behave (i.e.,
stochastically).


"Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.  And in any 
case it
doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen 
infinitely
many times.  For example it might be that almost all universes are 
uninteresting and
barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours.

Technically I think you are right. However, I was only talking about
an infinite universe likes ours that operates in accordance with the
laws of quantum physics. Let me explain by using what I've read of
Victor Stenger and Brian Greene. There are three ingredients in the
argument that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe
happen infinitely many times. 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the
theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter
and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as
a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.

I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me
to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely
many times.


No they don't.   There's an implicit assumption that what happens in these other universes 
has the same or similar probability distribution as we observe in ours.  A reasonable 
assumption, but not a logically necessary one.  I think it's what Bruno means by 
"homogeneous".  It's logically possible that all but a finite number of these universes 
are just exact copies of the same completely empty universe, for example.


Brent

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Re: Joining Post

[nihil0]

On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb  wrote:

> I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense of 
> compatibilist free
> will and why it is the only kind worth having.

Great suggestion. The wikipedia page was fairly informative, but I'll
probably buy the book anyway. From what I gather, he believes the kind
of free will worth wanting is the appearance (or illusion) that we can
control our behavior to a large extent. I agree with him that we don't
want to be uncaused causes (or uninfluenced influences) of events,
which is how quantum particles appear to behave (i.e.,
stochastically).

> "Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.  And in 
> any case it
> doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen 
> infinitely
> many times.  For example it might be that almost all universes are 
> uninteresting and
> barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours.

Technically I think you are right. However, I was only talking about
an infinite universe likes ours that operates in accordance with the
laws of quantum physics. Let me explain by using what I've read of
Victor Stenger and Brian Greene. There are three ingredients in the
argument that all quantum-physical possibilities in our universe
happen infinitely many times. 1) There is an infinite number of Hubble
volumes in our universe, which are all casually disconnected (as the
theory of inflation implies). 2) There is a limit on how much matter
and energy can exist within a region of space of a given size, such as
a Hubble volume. 3) There is only a finite number of possible
configurations of matter, due to the Uncertainty Principle.

I can explain any of these ingredients in more depth if you'd like me
to, but I hope you see that they lead to the conclusion that all
quantum-physical possibilities in our universe are realized infinitely
many times.

Bruno you say, "To have everything happening, you need the universe
being infinitely big, but also homogenous, and robust enough for
making possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc."
I thought that physicists have observed our universe to be homogenous
on very large scales, but perhaps I'm mistaken. See the Cosmological
Principal  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmological_principle.

I'm not exactly sure what you mean by "robust enough for making
possible gigantic connections and gigantic computations, etc." but
perhaps the following explanation will be helpful. During the
inflation right before the Big Bang, all of the now disconnected
Hubble volumes were squeezed together and could affect each other.
Brian Greene says they conducted a variety of cosmic handshakes,
establishing, for example, a uniform temperature.

Cheers,

Jon

On Sep 27, 2:46 am, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 9/26/2011 10:35 PM, nihil0 wrote:
>
> > It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3
> > things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself.
>
> > I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm
> > studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4.
>
> > The main questions I've been researching are the following:
>
> > 1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite
> > the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation?
>
> I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense of 
> compatibilist free
> will and why it is the only kind worth having.
>
>
>
> > 2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is
> > infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an
> > infinite number of times.
>
> "Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.  And in 
> any case it
> doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen 
> infinitely
> many times.  For example it might be that almost all universes are 
> uninteresting and
> barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours.
>
> > Does this imply that I can't make a
> > difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the
> > world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper
> > "The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics."
>
> Dunno.
>
>
>
> > 3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? Can you know
> > something without knowing it for certain?
>
> Sure.  In fact I'm not so sure mathematical truths can always be known for 
> certain.  For
> example the four-color theorem has a proof so long that it is hard to be sure 
> it is
> complete and has no errors.  I think it has only been checked by computer.  
> And we know
> computer programs can have bugs.
>
>
>
> > 4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do they
> > merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed?
>
> It must be the latter, since we change the laws of physics as we get new 
> information.  But
> I wouldn't say "merely".  It's quite a feat to have predictively successful 
> theor

Re: Joining Post

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Jon, welcome,

On 27 Sep 2011, at 07:35, nihil0 wrote:


It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3
things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself.

I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm
studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4.

The main questions I've been researching are the following:

1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite
the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation?


Non determinism is useless to explain free will. You can illustrate  
this with iterated self-duplication, or with the use of random coin.  
It seems to me that adding randomness can only restrict free will.
free will is more of the type of partial self-determination. It might  
be explained by the ability of some entities (machines) to be  
partially aware of some ignorance spectrum on the way to achieve some  
goal. For example your goal is "to be happy tonight", but you ignore  
if this will be realize through going to the movie or to the  
restaurant. Free-will might correspond to your conscious ability to  
make a choice despite you have not all information at your disposition.
It generates a genuine feeling of responsibility, and dterminism does  
not eliminate it. A lawyer cannot defend a murderer by saying to the  
member of the jury that the murderer has only obey to to the  
deterministic equation of the universe. That defence will be nullified  
by the jury and judge who will condemn it to jail, arguing that they  
are also just obeying the same deterministic law.






2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is
infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an
infinite number of times.


Actually this is never justified. To have everything happening, you  
need the universe being infinitely big, but also homogenous, and  
robust enough for making possible gigantic connections and gigantic  
computations, etc.





Does this imply that I can't make a
difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the
world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper
"The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics."


You can act on your own proportion of well-being, of you and the  
people you care about in some neighborhood, in your common future. I  
would say.






3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain?


Is there any mathematical truth that we can known for certain? I  
really doubt so.
A case can be made for arithmetical truth, but even here, I would say  
personally that I "believe them" only with a very high plausibility  
coefficient. We can do dream in which the feeling of certainty is  
associated with what we realize, after awakening, to be blatant non  
sensical idea. I thought, one feverish night, that the color of the  
curtains did refute the use of the modus ponens rule in classical  
propositional logic.
What is clear is that arithmetic is the most lesser doubtful part of  
math, and with fever or drugs, seems to be shared by everyone, with  
the exception of the ultrafinitists, which are rare (and I think  
inconsistent). I have never meet someone doubting the excluded middle  
use in arithmetic. It makes sense for intuitionist people too, even if  
they interpret it differently.
Above arithmetic and finitist thinking things are more doubtful, and  
all mathematicians are glad when analytical proofs are replaced by  
elementary first order reasoning, which certainty is amenable to  
finitist or arithmetical reasoning.
The mathematical reality is globally not much more certain than  
physics, and is full of surprises and mysteries.





Can you know
something without knowing it for certain?


yes, and I can prove to you that if we are machine, and if you accept  
Theaetetus' theory of knowledge, it is even the general rule. In that  
theory knwoledge is true opinion, and with only once exception, true  
opinion is subjectively like an opinion and cannot be made certain.  
The only certainty exception is the fact that you are conscious and now>. All the rest can be doubted.





4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do they
merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed?


The second one. I might argue from the mechanist hypothesis, but many  
things should be explained first.
In fact I doubt very much about the existence of a primary physical  
universe. I am willing to think that this is epistemologically  
incoherent once we assume that the brain works like a machine.
The laws of physics need, in that case, to be themselves complex  
pattern emerging statistically from infinitely many arithmetical  
relations. This cannot be explained shortly, but if you are patient,  
opportunities will appear to dig on this issue.


Best,

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Joining Post

[Jason Resch]

Jon,

Welcome to the list.

On Tue, Sep 27, 2011 at 12:35 AM, nihil0  wrote:

> It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3
> things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself.
>

Its never too late ;-)


>
> I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm
> studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4.
>
>
I'm not sure if you were looking for people's input regarding these
questions below or not, but I thought I would offer my take.


> The main questions I've been researching are the following:
>
> 1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite
> the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation?
>

The opposite of determinism is indeterminism (randomness) meaning the
outcome is not determined by anything as far as we can tell.  Let me explain
the story of two artificial intelligences, and you tell me which one you
believe to have a more free (less restricted) will:

Robot A is programmed to have a certain personality, one in which it takes
risks to aquire new experiences.  It evaluates two competing needs before
making a decision, the need to get out of the house and experience novel
things (such as skiing, riding a bike, jumping out of a plane, etc.) vs. the
need to stay alive to such that it can continue to have new experiences.
It's will function evaluates these competing goals, taking into account
every factor its algorithms can to make the best decision for itself.  The
outcome of these algorithms determine what it will do.

Robot B is similarly programmed, to have more or less the same personality,
but it's risk taking function is a lot simpler.  When it decides whether or
not to execute a certain plan, it takes the previous closing price of the
S&P 500 index, multiplies it by the number of nanoseconds since 1970, then
divides by 1,000 and takes the remainder.  If the remainder is less than 853
it takes the risk, otherwise it does not.  What the robot decides do is the
robot's own decision, and it obviously favors risk, but the only real input
the robot's own algorithms is the risk factor 853 times out of 1,000 it
takes the risk.  It has no control over the other two inputs which
ultimately make the determination as to what it does.

One thing is clear from looking at these two robots.  The behavior of robot
A can be much more nuanced, intelligent, adaptive, etc.  It's personality
and will are all to itself.  Just because we cannot predict what robot B
will do in advance does not make its will more free.  I will repeat what
another on this list asked a while ago, when we say "free will", "free from
what?".  Robot A's will is self-determined, and the only way to determine it
in advance is to implement all the algorithms and decision making functions
that constitute it and evaluate them.  In a sense, we are re-implementing,
or duplicating its will in order to see what it decides, rather than
predicting it.

As to your question of what kind of free will is worth having, I will ask
you, in what additional ways can Robot A's will be made free?



>
> 2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is
> infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an
> infinite number of times. Does this imply that I can't make a
> difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the
> world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper
> "The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics."
>

What Bostom's paper does not seem consider (I only looked at the abstract)
is that if the universe is infinitely big, you also exist an infinite number
of times and places, (as does everyone else) so I would ignore his paper's
conclusion that no one can make any meaningful changes in the amount of good
or bad.  Even if you say "everything happens", we can change the relative
measure, or the frequency of the things that happen by virtue of the type of
people we are.

Has anyone ever helped you and have you been glad for it?  I think a single
affirmative answer to this question disproves Bostrom's conclusion, which is
based on some tricks we can mathematically play with infinity.  You can use
these same tricks to prove there are as many numbers that end in 0 as there
are numbers, but would you rather have something happen to you on every Nth
day of your life, or only every Nth day that was evenly divisible by 10?

After living an infinite number of days, an infinite number of bad things
will have happened to you, sure, but in which of those lives will you have
suffered more?


>
> 3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain?


We cannot even know mathematical truths for certain.  Can you trust 100%
your math teacher, your reasoning, your eyes, when following a proof, or
that of someone else?  Perhaps we can be .9 certain of some
mathematicians reasoning, and the fact that no one else has yet caught an
error, and we are not currently delusional, but there is still 

Re: Joining Post

[meekerdb]

On 9/26/2011 10:35 PM, nihil0 wrote:

It's a little late for this post since I've already posted 2 or 3
things, but I figured I might as well introduce myself.

I'm majoring at philosophy at the University of Michigan, however I'm
studying abroad for a trimester at Oxford. I turn 21 on Oct. 4.

The main questions I've been researching are the following:

1. What kind of free will is worth wanting, and do we have it, despite
the deterministic evolution of the Schrodinger Equation?


I think Daniel Dennett's book "Elbow Room" is an excellent defense of compatibilist free 
will and why it is the only kind worth having.




2. Recent cosmological evidence indicates that our universe is
infinitely big, and everything that is physically possible happens an
infinite number of times.


"Everything that is physically possible" is not very well defined.  And in any case it 
doesn't follow that in an infinite universe everything possible must happen infinitely 
many times.  For example it might be that almost all universes are uninteresting and 
barren and only a finite number are interesting like ours.



Does this imply that I can't make a
difference to the total (or per capita) amount of well-being in the
world? I used to be a utilitarian until I read Nick Bostrom's paper
"The Infinitarian Challenge to Aggretive Ethics."


Dunno.



3. Can only mathematical truths be known for certain? Can you know
something without knowing it for certain?


Sure.  In fact I'm not so sure mathematical truths can always be known for certain.  For 
example the four-color theorem has a proof so long that it is hard to be sure it is 
complete and has no errors.  I think it has only been checked by computer.  And we know 
computer programs can have bugs.




4. Do the laws of physics determine (i.e., enforce) events, or do they
merely describe patterns and regularities that we have observed?


It must be the latter, since we change the laws of physics as we get new information.  But 
I wouldn't say "merely".  It's quite a feat to have predictively successful theories.




I would be grateful if anyone could shed some light on any of these
questions. I'm very impressed with what I've read so far from people.

Glad to be here,

Jon


Welcome aboard.

Brent
Each philosopher knows a lot but, as a whole, philosophers don't know
anything. If they did, they would be scientists.
  --- Ludwig Krippahl   :-)

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Re: Joining Post

[Gevin Giorbran]

Brent Meeker wrote:

> Actually it collapses before, see quant-ph/0402146 v1.  It is shown that
> in a Young's slit experiment with C70 buckyballs, the interference
> fringes disappear when the buckyballs are sufficiently heated to radiate
> some IR photons.  No observer is needed, only the interaction with the
> environment.

Decoherence doesn't defeat quantum uncertainty, it partially hides the
multiplicity of other worlds due to thermal connections of the
environment. It results inevitably in tracing any single history.
Decoherence is why Schrödinger placed the cat in a box, to isolate the
experiment from the external observer. The colleague walking in after
I have opened the box to observe the cat is also disconnected from the
experiment in my description. For them the room is the box.
Decoherence still applies to each history. It helps to remember that
where Schrödinger's cat paradox shows how the uncertainty of a single
electron can be amplified to produce widely diverse timelines,
normally the uncertainty of trillions upon trillions of microscopic
events entangle to construct a path of history. Decoherence is like
placing a mirror in with the cat, the cat doesn't see its own phase
space, each branching time line observes a near classical history,
while the global superposition of worlds exists beyond the realm of
measurement.

> "Puppet" implies you are pulling the strings.  So can you bend the
> universe to your will?

I had previously implied a hand puppet, and I was considering the
implications of sampling the whole set of many worlds, as if they all
exist simultaneously, and in each proceeding moment we find ourselves
in one particular universe. This places in question the individuality
and will of "observed others" apart from the probabilistic selection
of the experienced world. The hand in the puppet is the universe
itself. I am undecided on if the observer can bend reality. I don't
rule such things out based on skepticism. An individual's will would
largely be a product of their personal history, and thus physical
events or states, so I do expect a considerable measure of
entanglement between the mind/brain and the environment.

I will be un-subscribing from this list.


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Re: Joining Post

[Brent Meeker]

Gevin Giorbran wrote:
> On Jan 3, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
>   
>> Hi,
>>  Is hurting or make the puppet suffer morally correct with your position ?
>> If it is not, then this is strange since they are only puppets and you
>> *are*...(means you can't hurt them because they aren't) This is simply
>> sollipsism and (un)fortunately completely circular.
>>
>> Also as you acknowledge other "pilots" existence in "other" universe, how is
>> this different than acknowledging simply the existence of other people ?
>> 
>
> Günther Greindl wrote:
>   
>> This is the question of why _I_ experience the world as I do and not the
>> other worlds.
>> 
>
>
> This is not the identity crisis question of why am I not that person
> over there, nor is it circular, or solipsism (although if true it
> could lead to a philosophy of solipsism).
>
> This is basic quantum theory applied to the macro-world. Ever since
> Schrödinger disapprovingly amplified the uncertainty of atomic decay
> and showed that quantum uncertainty extends to the macro-world, this
> issue has been apparent. I am certain this "observer over observed"
> issue has been discussed before. Someone has mentioned that John
> Wheeler described this, describing a "free floating" observer that
> dictates reality all the way back to the big bang. He just didn't
> discuss the issue of pilots and puppets.
>
> In the instant I observe the contents of the box the uncertainty
> collapses, 

Actually it collapses before, see quant-ph/0402146 v1.  It is shown that 
in a Young's slit experiment with C70 buckyballs, the interference 
fringes disappear when the buckyballs are sufficiently heated to radiate 
some IR photons.  No observer is needed, only the interaction with the 
environment.

> however, the colleague who walks in the room one second
> later in pilot form is not subject to my observation, for them the
> outcome of the event is still uncertain until they open the lab door
> and look in, at which point they branch into two futures defined by
> different pasts, me in tears (I love cats) or the cat alive and me
> happy. Their observation of me (tears or jeers) will correspond to
> their observation of the cat. HOWEVER, the colleague I observe (their
> observation) is predetermined (made measurably deterministic) by my
> earlier observation. Their observation will correspond to my
> observation, in a sense making them a puppet of the universe I
> observe.
>   

"Puppet" implies you are pulling the strings.  So can you bend the 
universe to your will?

Brent Meeker



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Re: Joining Post

[Gevin Giorbran]

On Jan 3, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
> Hi,
>  Is hurting or make the puppet suffer morally correct with your position ?
> If it is not, then this is strange since they are only puppets and you
> *are*...(means you can't hurt them because they aren't) This is simply
> sollipsism and (un)fortunately completely circular.
>
> Also as you acknowledge other "pilots" existence in "other" universe, how is
> this different than acknowledging simply the existence of other people ?

Günther Greindl wrote:
>
> This is the question of why _I_ experience the world as I do and not the
> other worlds.


This is not the identity crisis question of why am I not that person
over there, nor is it circular, or solipsism (although if true it
could lead to a philosophy of solipsism).

This is basic quantum theory applied to the macro-world. Ever since
Schrödinger disapprovingly amplified the uncertainty of atomic decay
and showed that quantum uncertainty extends to the macro-world, this
issue has been apparent. I am certain this "observer over observed"
issue has been discussed before. Someone has mentioned that John
Wheeler described this, describing a "free floating" observer that
dictates reality all the way back to the big bang. He just didn't
discuss the issue of pilots and puppets.

In the instant I observe the contents of the box the uncertainty
collapses, however, the colleague who walks in the room one second
later in pilot form is not subject to my observation, for them the
outcome of the event is still uncertain until they open the lab door
and look in, at which point they branch into two futures defined by
different pasts, me in tears (I love cats) or the cat alive and me
happy. Their observation of me (tears or jeers) will correspond to
their observation of the cat. HOWEVER, the colleague I observe (their
observation) is predetermined (made measurably deterministic) by my
earlier observation. Their observation will correspond to my
observation, in a sense making them a puppet of the universe I
observe.

It helps to imagine a person inside the box wearing a gas mask
watching the cat. They don't see a quantum uncertainty or a
probability cloud. But from your perspective outside the box the
indeterminacy of the cat as dead or alive now extends to what the
person in the mask observes. There are necessarily two copies of the
observer inside the box. When you open the box you connect to one of
them.

Also, the cat experiment box can have two doors and be placed in
between two rooms, so that two observers in different rooms open their
own door at the same time to see the outcome of the event. The outcome
of one observer in one room has no influence on the outcome of the
other. But having observed an outcome, each observer interacts with
the colleague who observes the same outcome. This is a more
complicated example of the EPR paradox, i.e., spooky action at a
distance, or one outcome effecting a remote other outcome.

The floating observer is constantly sampling a probability landscape
governed by the whole of what is possible for a given event or
situation. Each observation rules the entire scope of their o-region
by turning the uncertainty of infinite possibilities into a finite
observation. If lab personnel walk in every ten minutes each branches
into both dead-cat / live-cat time lines as they learn of the cats
demise. Same applies to what's behind every door in the macro-world.
Sub-atomic decisions add up and trace forward to extremely varied
possible worlds. Until we pick up and read the newspaper there is no
definite news. We still live with the uncertainty of history back to
the big bang every time we view deeper into the universe, or discover
other planets around stars. There isn't just one world out there, or
one history to select from, just as there isn't one future.

Observations of what are naturally assumed to be other observers (how
they response to stimuli, behavior, belief systems, intelligence,
individual spontaneity) are inevitably subject to the same sampling
process which decides if the cyanide canister has been broken. There
of course might be a great deal of selection bias for various reasons,
in the same way what is observed corresponds to the laws of nature.
There is certainly room for Karma based upon the same symmetries that
dictate conservations, forces, laws and constants.

So suppose we do put a colleague in Schrödinger's box instead of the
cat without the gas mask. The first sampling decides if they are dead
or alive when we open the box. A second sampling is of how they react
to having been put in the box and experimented on in a life or death
situation. For the survivor, there is a very wide but definite range
of possible reactions, anger, horror, crying, nervous breakdown,
hidden resentment, disinterest, objectivity, laughter, excitement,
exhilaration, enlightenment. Considering how a thousand different
colleagues would react, there are distinct probabilities, let's say
25% anger, 15% horror,

Re: Joining Post

[Quentin Anciaux]

Hi,

Is hurting or make the puppet suffer morally correct with your position ?

If it is not, then this is strange since they are only puppets and you 
*are*...(means you can't hurt them because they aren't) This is simply 
sollipsism and (un)fortunately completely circular.

Also as you acknowledge other "pilots" existence in "other" universe, how is 
this different than acknowledging simply the existence of other people ? 
(same existence as your)

Quentin Anciaux

Le Thursday 03 January 2008 05:47:40 Gevin Giorbran, vous avez écrit :
> Three years of college, no degrees, no status. Left school and started
> writing, and authored three books about the existence and structure of
> all possible universes, including "Exploring A Many Worlds Universe"
> in 1997, arguing as the main theme in each book that our universe ends
> in finite time (est. 120 billion years in '94) as expansion stretches
> space perfectly flat, this causing time to end at a ground state of
> absolute zero. The books were legally copyrighted in '94, '96, and
> '97, all prior to 1998 when we discovered the expansion of the
> universe is in fact accelerating us towards absolute zero. When I
> wrote my first three books the mainstream of science considered a
> finite end of time at zero to be impossible, and today the third law
> still states it cannot happen, but old science often gets in the way
> of new science. The recent measurements of acceleration indicate the
> (phantom) dark energy density causing acceleration is increasing,
> which makes the big rip scenario the leading future candidate.
> Caldwell describes the possibility of time as ending at the "ultimate
> singularity" and Sean Carroll is stating "our universe ends as empty
> space" as if this is now obvious. I agree, but further state there is
> no zero or a beginning from nothing in our past, the ultimate zero
> exists only in our future. The universe has pronouncedly been
> expanding at zero since time began because zero is the ultimate "great
> attractor", the very cause of time. My prediction that time ends at
> zero was based upon a bounded model of all possible states, which also
> predicts structure or limitations of the greater multiverse. My fourth
> book, "Everything Forever: Learning to See Timelessness", explains the
> governing role a cosmic zero plays in the evolution of all universes
> and all life.
>
> Thoughts of late:
>
> I believe there necessarily is only one "pilot" observer in each
> universe or O-region. All third party observers in each pilot's
> experience are subject to quantum mechanical sampling. The members of
> this Everything-list from my particular experience are a probabilistic
> sampling of the ultimate whole of what is possible considering this
> scenario. Any feedback I receive will correspond to that same spectrum
> of what is possible, therein reflecting a sampling of personalities,
> knowledge, beliefs, responses, in accordance with what are most
> probably found in a scientific discussion group about many worlds. So
> am I the only real observer in this universe?
>
> The name of the movie escapes me where Dustin Hoffman uses a bed sheet
> to portray parts of a single unified universe. His hand moves from one
> place to another under the sheet, as he says this is the Eiffel tower,
> this is you, this is me, this is a tree. It is all just one universe
> he says, which suggests we are all just puppets of that universe. True
> at least until you consider how quantum mechanics breaks the universe
> up into discreet states, and even divides apart observers into
> separate universes.
>
> We can only converse with the puppets of a quantum mechanical
> universe. Pilots cannot communicate with one another, since observers
> cannot communicate independent of governing probabilities. The only
> saving grace is if all possible pilots and their O-regions exist, so
> real pilots at least correspond to the quantum puppets of an observers
> experience.
>
> Sorry, yes you are a puppet, well perhaps the reader of this post
> isn't a puppet, but the responses I observe will be from puppets,
> while only real pilots are left to question if the set of possible
> pilots is more or less restricted than the spectrum of people a pilot
> experiences in the quantum world adjacent one's consciousness.
>
> Are pilots and puppets identical and thus existentially the same?
>
> 


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All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain.

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Re: Joining Post

[Günther Greindl]

Hi,

> Sorry, yes you are a puppet, well perhaps the reader of this post
> isn't a puppet, but the responses I observe will be from puppets,
> while only real pilots are left to question if the set of possible
> pilots is more or less restricted than the spectrum of people a pilot
> experiences in the quantum world adjacent one's consciousness.

This is the question of why _I_ experience the world as I do and not the 
other worlds.

If one assumes MWI - or better (Bill's wording): Many Objects 
Interpretation, of course every person will split into many persons (as 
the quantum states in his body decohere).

So, we are all pilots _and_ puppets (I guess that was what you were 
saying) - depending from the point of view.

And that leads to the "measure" question: you will more likely 
experience worlds which have greater measure.

Is that what you are asking?

Regards,
Günther


-- 
Günther Greindl
Department of Philosophy of Science
University of Vienna
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.univie.ac.at/Wissenschaftstheorie/

Blog: http://dao.complexitystudies.org/
Site: http://www.complexitystudies.org

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Re: Joining Post

[Tom Caylor]

On Jan 2, 9:47 pm, "Gevin Giorbran" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Three years of college, no degrees, no status. Left school and started
> writing, and authored three books about the existence and structure of
> all possible universes, including "Exploring A Many Worlds Universe"
> in 1997, arguing as the main theme in each book that our universe ends
> in finite time (est. 120 billion years in '94) as expansion stretches
> space perfectly flat, this causing time to end at a ground state of
> absolute zero. The books were legally copyrighted in '94, '96, and
> '97, all prior to 1998 when we discovered the expansion of the
> universe is in fact accelerating us towards absolute zero. When I
> wrote my first three books the mainstream of science considered a
> finite end of time at zero to be impossible, and today the third law
> still states it cannot happen, but old science often gets in the way
> of new science. The recent measurements of acceleration indicate the
> (phantom) dark energy density causing acceleration is increasing,
> which makes the big rip scenario the leading future candidate.
> Caldwell describes the possibility of time as ending at the "ultimate
> singularity" and Sean Carroll is stating "our universe ends as empty
> space" as if this is now obvious. I agree, but further state there is
> no zero or a beginning from nothing in our past, the ultimate zero
> exists only in our future. The universe has pronouncedly been
> expanding at zero since time began because zero is the ultimate "great
> attractor", the very cause of time. My prediction that time ends at
> zero was based upon a bounded model of all possible states, which also
> predicts structure or limitations of the greater multiverse. My fourth
> book, "Everything Forever: Learning to See Timelessness", explains the
> governing role a cosmic zero plays in the evolution of all universes
> and all life.
>
> Thoughts of late:
>
> I believe there necessarily is only one "pilot" observer in each
> universe or O-region. All third party observers in each pilot's
> experience are subject to quantum mechanical sampling. The members of
> this Everything-list from my particular experience are a probabilistic
> sampling of the ultimate whole of what is possible considering this
> scenario. Any feedback I receive will correspond to that same spectrum
> of what is possible, therein reflecting a sampling of personalities,
> knowledge, beliefs, responses, in accordance with what are most
> probably found in a scientific discussion group about many worlds. So
> am I the only real observer in this universe?
>
> The name of the movie escapes me where Dustin Hoffman uses a bed sheet
> to portray parts of a single unified universe. His hand moves from one
> place to another under the sheet, as he says this is the Eiffel tower,
> this is you, this is me, this is a tree. It is all just one universe
> he says, which suggests we are all just puppets of that universe. True
> at least until you consider how quantum mechanics breaks the universe
> up into discreet states, and even divides apart observers into
> separate universes.
>
> We can only converse with the puppets of a quantum mechanical
> universe. Pilots cannot communicate with one another, since observers
> cannot communicate independent of governing probabilities. The only
> saving grace is if all possible pilots and their O-regions exist, so
> real pilots at least correspond to the quantum puppets of an observers
> experience.
>
> Sorry, yes you are a puppet, well perhaps the reader of this post
> isn't a puppet, but the responses I observe will be from puppets,
> while only real pilots are left to question if the set of possible
> pilots is more or less restricted than the spectrum of people a pilot
> experiences in the quantum world adjacent one's consciousness.
>
> Are pilots and puppets identical and thus existentially the same?


Am I a pilot or a puppet?

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Re: JOINING post

[Youness Ayaita]

Thanks for your answers to my joining post! Dear Russell, your book
"Theory of Nothing" has overwhelmed me, it's a fantastic work. Several
months ago, I slowly began writing a book on the theory that
everything exists (in German) -- but I will not go on because your
book seems to be so great and complete, dealing with so many different
aspects, that my project would have never been able to compare with
it.

I do not know into which direction my thinking will evolve. But I'm
convinced that your book will always serve as the basic reference for
works linked to the theory of the everything ensemble.

Youness


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Re: JOINING post

[Russell Standish]

On Fri, Aug 31, 2007 at 12:40:08AM -0700, Youness Ayaita wrote:
> 
> Hello everyone.
> 
> Yesterday I found this list. I am still surprised and pleased that my
> old ideas are also developed and discussed by others than myself.
> Since my thought is only little influenced by the literature, I hope
> that I will be able to give some new perspectives in future
> discussions.
> 
> Youness

Welcome to the list! We've been going about ten years now, and had
some extremely stimulating discussions, of which only a smattering has
ended up in the published literature. I look forward to hearing some
new ideas. My book, Theory of Nothing is probably still the best
summary of the list's discussion up until circa beginning of 2006, and
is available as a free download fropm my website, or as a hardcopy
from Amazon.com. There have been some interesting topics discussed
since that time, of course. We tried to get a Wiki going to at least
sort out definitional matters, but I found myself the only
contributer, so it is not in a healthy state.

Cheers

-- 


A/Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Mathematics  
UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: JOINING post

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Youness,

Le 31-août-07, à 09:40, Youness Ayaita wrote :

>
> Hello everyone.

You are welcome.


>
> My name's Youness Ayaita and currently I'm a graduate student of
> physics and mathematics at Heidelberg University, with special
> interests in the field of theoretical quantum physics and in the
> question how it comes to our specific laws of nature.
>
> In the beginning of the year 2003 (I was as a sixteen-year-old)
> philosophical considerations led me to the idea that possibly
> everything exists. Independently from everything that was said or
> written by others working on the issue, I went on developing my
> theories and found different justifications for the everything-
> hypothesis (some of which are substantially different from the
> mathematicalist approach or the motivation by information theory). In
> particular, I was interested in the implications of the everything-
> hypothesis for physics, or to be more precise, for the expected
> structure of the world that we experience. I asked the question
> whether it is even possible (in principle) to mathematically deduce
> properties of the physical world from the everything-hypothesis (if
> the answer is yes, then this could provide some kind of experimental
> test of the everything-hypothesis, making it falsifiable in a vague--
> though not exact--sense). In this context, I found several plausible
> arguments and I explored ideas how to capture mathematically the
> Everything.


Nice.


>
> Until the end of the year 2005, I had no idea that other people were
> seriously working on the issue. But then, I read of David Lewis and
> bought his book "On the Plurality of Worlds".


A good one. Note that David Lewis has evolved on his critics of its 
erzatz world. Eventually he took those world seriously. I thionk he got 
the idea that universal machine cannot really distinguish erzats world 
and "real" worlds.




> Later, in 2006, I was
> interested in the philosophy of quantum physics and became a supporter
> of the Everett interpretation. I read recent publications by Wallace,
> Saunders, Zurek, Zeh, Deutsch, Tegmark and others.


Nice stuff.




>
> Yesterday I found this list. I am still surprised and pleased that my
> old ideas are also developed and discussed by others than myself.
> Since my thought is only little influenced by the literature, I hope
> that I will be able to give some new perspectives in future
> discussions.
>

Don't hesitate.


Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: JOINING post

[John Mikes]

Dear Mindaugas Indriunas
(this reply wsas sitting half-way written in my DRAFTS box. Excuse the
delay, please)

I feel we get entangled into more than what we want to.
As I translate (to my mind) your words, a 'consequence' should be viewed as
'connected' to its originating (you said: cause),  while I keep it more open
that an 'entailer' can have different entailments,
 according to the total interconnectedness and the changings. of the
totality. ((since many variants from diverse parts play into the process))
So the 'originating point may be "ONE" of the outcomeS of that "cause(-es we
regognized so far)".
I like to view  'process' linked to all changes in the totality - not the
'snapshots' which science likes to study (states? equilibria?).
So I am not so sure about "CAUSE", in most cases it is a model-view: we
select a portion of the totality for our observation (=model) and find IN IT
a momentum that can be picked in the entailment of the object. WE call it
'cause', while the totality interferes with other effects as well, maybe
beyond our model, maybe others are not even discovered yet, and a cumulative
outcome is the 'object' we assign to that ONE "cause" within the limited
model we observed.
This is the way I 'separate' the process of our universe FROM - what you
called (not my word) "originating point" in the (model view) called
'universe'. (ours, that is, among unlimited and different others.)
*
I see a dynamic interactive process, not 'rules', which are extracted from a
selection (model) of observations as accounted for "most" occurring.
(People call that 'statistical'). Physical law is such, cellular automata
are sub-models - in this view, deduced rules change.
I think it is time to get over the conventional prejudices based on a
primitive explanatory mindset upon superficial observations, I say
'superficial' because we are not (yet as well) capable of applying FULL
informative understanding to our observations.
That resuloted historically in the 'primitive material worldview' and the
quantized edifice of the physical views.
I cannot tell what is the right stance but hope in progressing into a better
understanding.
Most "advanced" poisitions of today still anchor in the old views. We CANNOT
do better. I condone it as a possibiloity of stepping forward.
You as part of the new generation may get further.

John Mikes


On 3/13/07, 明迪 < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Dear John,
>
> I feel I understand your view and distinction of "origination point"
> and "origination".
> "Origination" is entailment of "origination point". "Origination
> point" is part of our world ("the item to be originated"). Is that
> correct?
>
> Now, my opinion is that there is no "origination" of the "origination
> point", because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be
> originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some
> relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually
> try to reduce it to some even simpler rule.
>
> It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are
> irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the
> patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that
> our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case,
> there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata
> rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we
> know :-). Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular
> automata with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to
> find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually
> produces the initial state of our world.
>
> Mindaugas Indriunas
>
> On 3/8/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > I feel a misunderstanding here:
> >
> > "origination point" IMO is part of the item to be originated, the
> pertinent
> > 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from.
> > As I used 'origination" refers to the entailment producing such "point"
> - if
> > we use a 'point' to start with.
> > Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its'
> entailing
> > circumstgances we have no access to.
> > I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and
> preferred
> > one. Hence the misunderstandability.  Sorry.
> >
> > John Mikes
> >
> >
> > - Original Message -
> > From: 明迪
> > To: everything-l

Re: JOINING post

[John M]

Dear Mindaugas.
you wrote:
 "Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular
automata ..."
I PRESUME THIS IS your STARTING POINT:  "if..." 
if not, if we find that our world is more(?) than a cellular automaton - which 
is in my word-use 'reductionist' - then the world is NOT governed by some 
simple rules. 
We don't set rules, we select models, count/identify in them the occurrences 
and deduct what happened most which then is called "law".  And the world is not 
GOVERNED. it is a process of them all. Nothing can be excluded from the 
interefficiency, because that would lead to separate worlds - which may well 
be, but we do not know about them. So your 'origination point' is causally 
connected (your word) to the rest of the totality and its process. A 'next 
step' segmentually observed. 
Initial state? I don't believe the narrative of the physical cosmology, because 
it has logical flaws even in human logic. I made another narrative, which may 
not be more 'true', but eliminates SOME flaws. You can make another one.
We "know" nothing about that 'origin', it was before the 'time' of Loebian 
machines (even before my time). 
We can speculate, it is cheap. 

John
  - Original Message ----- 
  From: 明迪 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 13, 2007 2:45 AM
  Subject: Re: JOINING post



  Dear John,

  I feel I understand your view and distinction of "origination point"
  and "origination".
  "Origination" is entailment of "origination point". "Origination
  point" is part of our world ("the item to be originated"). Is that
  correct?

  Now, my opinion is that there is no "origination" of the "origination
  point", because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be
  originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some
  relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually
  try to reduce it to some even simpler rule.

  It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are
  irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the
  patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that
  our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case,
  there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata
  rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we
  know :-).with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to
  find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually
  produces the initial state of our world.

  Mindaugas Indriunas

  On 3/8/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  >
  >
  > I feel a misunderstanding here:
  >
  > "origination point" IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent
  > 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from.
  > As I used 'origination" refers to the entailment producing such "point" - if
  > we use a 'point' to start with.
  > Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing
  > circumstgances we have no access to.
  > I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred
  > one. Hence the misunderstandability.  Sorry.
  >
  > John Mikes
  >
  >
  > - Original Message -
  > From: 明迪
  > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
  > Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM
  > Subject: Re: JOINING post
  >
  > Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the
  > same as the word 'origination-point'.
  >
  > You said: (1)
  >
  > > 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
  > >
  >
  > And you also said: (2)
  >
  > > we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it
  > may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely).
  > >
  >
  > From (2) claim it logically follows a statement "we can reach to items later
  > or equal to origination-point."
  >
  > I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement.
  >
  >
  > Mindaugas Indriunas
  >
  >
  > On 3/5/07, John M < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
  > >
  > >
  > > Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
  > > what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use
  > >
  > > in our speculations only our present cognitive
  > > inventory of our existing mind.
  > > No information from super(extra)natural sources
  > > included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier
  > > items than the origination-point (whatever it may be)
  > > of our existence (I called it 'universe&

Re: JOINING post

[明迪]

Dear John,

I feel I understand your view and distinction of "origination point"
and "origination".
"Origination" is entailment of "origination point". "Origination
point" is part of our world ("the item to be originated"). Is that
correct?

Now, my opinion is that there is no "origination" of the "origination
point", because whatever it may be, it is connected to the item to be
originated through causality. What I mean is, if we were to find some
relatively simple rule generating our world, then we could actually
try to reduce it to some even simpler rule.

It is now thought of that some rules governing cellular automata are
irreducible, since there seem to be no simpler rule to produce the
patterns they some cellular automata produce, however, suppose that
our world is governed by some relatively simple rule. In this case,
there is a rule to reduce most if not all of the cellular automata
rules, since it actually produces all the cellular automata that we
know :-). Analogically, if we find that our world is some cellular
automata with the initial state that we do not know, we could try to
find the world produced by an even simpler rule, that eventually
produces the initial state of our world.

Mindaugas Indriunas

On 3/8/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> I feel a misunderstanding here:
>
> "origination point" IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent
> 'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from.
> As I used 'origination" refers to the entailment producing such "point" - if
> we use a 'point' to start with.
> Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing
> circumstgances we have no access to.
> I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred
> one. Hence the misunderstandability.  Sorry.
>
> John Mikes
>
>
> - Original Message -
> From: 明迪
> To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
> Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM
> Subject: Re: JOINING post
>
> Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the
> same as the word 'origination-point'.
>
> You said: (1)
>
> > 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
> >
>
> And you also said: (2)
>
> > we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it
> may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely).
> >
>
> From (2) claim it logically follows a statement "we can reach to items later
> or equal to origination-point."
>
> I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement.
>
>
> Mindaugas Indriunas
>
>
> On 3/5/07, John M < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
> > what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use
> >
> > in our speculations only our present cognitive
> > inventory of our existing mind.
> > No information from super(extra)natural sources
> > included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier
> > items than the origination-point (whatever it may be)
> > of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite
> > precisely).
> > Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg
> > cannot 'generate' information about ' no information'
> > topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence
> > items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion.
> > What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the
> > conventionally outlined "scientific method".
> >
> > John M
> >
> >
> >
> > --- 明迪 < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > Dear John Mikes.
> > >
> > > I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only
> > > to 1 part of your
> > > letter:
> > >
> > > 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
> > >
> > >
> > > If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does
> > > produce the data that
> > > we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to
> > > (with some certainty)
> > > know it. Even the cellular automaton that is
> > > equivalent to universal turing
> > > machine, has its beginning.
> > >
> > > Mindaugas Indriunas
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >

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Re: JOINING post

[John M]

I feel a misunderstanding here:

"origination point" IMO is part of the item to be originated, the pertinent 
'point' (within and for) the evolving total to grow out from. 
As I used 'origination" refers to the entailment producing such "point" - if we 
use a 'point' to start with. 
Such 'point' is the limit we can go back to, not further to 'its' entailing 
circumstgances we have no access to. 
I tried to adjust to a vocabulary I responded to, not my own and preferred one. 
Hence the misunderstandability.  Sorry.

John Mikes
  - Original Message - 
  From: 明迪 
  To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
  Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2007 10:45 AM
  Subject: Re: JOINING post


  Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the same 
as the word 'origination-point'.

  You said: (1)

1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.


  And you also said: (2)

we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it 
may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely).


  From (2) claim it logically follows a statement "we can reach to items later 
or equal to origination-point." 

  I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement.


  Mindaugas Indriunas


  On 3/5/07, John M < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use 

in our speculations only our present cognitive
inventory of our existing mind.
No information from super(extra)natural sources
included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier
items than the origination-point (whatever it may be) 
of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite
precisely).
Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg
cannot 'generate' information about ' no information'
topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence 
items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion.
What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the
conventionally outlined "scientific method".

John M



--- 明迪 < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Dear John Mikes.
>
> I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only
> to 1 part of your
> letter:
>
> 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. 
>
>
> If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does
> produce the data that
> we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to
> (with some certainty)
> know it. Even the cellular automaton that is 
> equivalent to universal turing
> machine, has its beginning.
>
> Mindaugas Indriunas
> 
>
>
>
>


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Re: JOINING post

[John Mikes]

2 objections:

A. If I state that i cannot do something that does not (logically) imply
that I CAN do another thing.

B. Your last line is "your opinion" substantiated by nothing, I appreciate
anybodies "opinion" as such, it may have a personal (not factual) meaning -
weight.

We diverted from my point that I resist to "reach back" in statements to a
state that may have been (or may not have been?) before (outside?) our
comprehensive limits.

John M



On 3/6/07, 明迪 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the
> same as the word 'origination-point'.
>
> You said: (1)
>
> >  1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
> >
>
> And you also said: (2)
>
> > we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it
> > may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely).
> >
>
> From (2) claim it logically follows a statement "we can reach to items
> later or equal to origination-point."
>
> I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement.
>
>
> Mindaugas Indriunas
>
> On 3/5/07, John M < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> >
> > Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
> > what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use
> >
> > in our speculations only our present cognitive
> > inventory of our existing mind.
> > No information from super(extra)natural sources
> > included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier
> > items than the origination-point (whatever it may be)
> > of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite
> > precisely).
> > Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg
> > cannot 'generate' information about ' no information'
> > topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence
> > items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion.
> > What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the
> > conventionally outlined "scientific method".
> >
> > John M
> >
> >
> >
> > --- 明迪 < [EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > > Dear John Mikes.
> > >
> > > I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only
> > > to 1 part of your
> > > letter:
> > >
> > > 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
> > >
> > >
> > > If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does
> > > produce the data that
> > > we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to
> > > (with some certainty)
> > > know it. Even the cellular automaton that is
> > > equivalent to universal turing
> > > machine, has its beginning.
> > >
> > > Mindaugas Indriunas
> > > http://i.tai.lt
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > >
> >
> >
> > > >
> >

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Re: JOINING post

[明迪]

Dear John Mikes, I thought your words 'Origin of (our) universe' are the
same as the word 'origination-point'.

You said: (1)

> 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
>

And you also said: (2)

> we CANNOT reach to earlier items than the origination-point (whatever it
> may be) of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite precisely).
>

>From (2) claim it logically follows a statement "we can reach to items later
or equal to origination-point."

I agree (2) statement, but slightly disagree with (1) statement.


Mindaugas Indriunas

On 3/5/07, John M <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>
> Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
> what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use
>
> in our speculations only our present cognitive
> inventory of our existing mind.
> No information from super(extra)natural sources
> included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier
> items than the origination-point (whatever it may be)
> of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite
> precisely).
> Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg
> cannot 'generate' information about ' no information'
> topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence
> items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion.
> What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the
> conventionally outlined "scientific method".
>
> John M
>
>
>
> --- 明迪 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > Dear John Mikes.
> >
> > I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only
> > to 1 part of your
> > letter:
> >
> > 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
> >
> >
> > If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does
> > produce the data that
> > we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to
> > (with some certainty)
> > know it. Even the cellular automaton that is
> > equivalent to universal turing
> > machine, has its beginning.
> >
> > Mindaugas Indriunas
> > http://i.tai.lt
> >
> >
> >
> >
>
>
> >
>

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Re: JOINING post

[John M]

Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
what I meant consists of the worldview that we can use

in our speculations only our present cognitive
inventory of our existing mind. 
No information from super(extra)natural sources
included. Accoredingly we CANNOT reach to earlier
items than the origination-point (whatever it may be)
of our existence (I called it 'universe', not quite
precisely). 
Nor can a 'valid' ALGORITHM reach back further. Itg
cannot 'generate' information about ' no information'
topics. All we can speak about are intra-existence
items, the rest is fantasy, sci-fi, religion. 
What I may use in a narrative, but by no means in the
conventionally outlined "scientific method".

John M



--- 明迪 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:

> Dear John Mikes.
> 
> I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only
> to 1 part of your
> letter:
> 
> 1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.
> 
> 
> If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does
> produce the data that
> we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to
> (with some certainty)
> know it. Even the cellular automaton that is
> equivalent to universal turing
> machine, has its beginning.
> 
> Mindaugas Indriunas
> http://i.tai.lt
> 
>
> 
> 


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Re: JOINING post

[明迪]

Dear John Mikes.

I am sorry for the late response. I will reply only to 1 part of your
letter:

1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know.


If we do come up with an alorythm that actually does produce the data that
we postdict (predict in the past), we may be able to (with some certainty)
know it. Even the cellular automaton that is equivalent to universal turing
machine, has its beginning.

Mindaugas Indriunas
http://i.tai.lt

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Re: JOINING post

[John Mikes]

Dear Mindaugas Indriunas,
I usually do not reply to newcomers, I leave it to the more seasoned list
members and keep my pretty unorthodox ideas from the 'unseasoned' fresh
theoretically idealists. Now I make an exemption, mainly not for you, but
for other listers to expose some of my heretic positions I always just
lightly touch. So please, do not take it personally, but do with them
anything that fits your taste.

1 Origin of (our) universe: we have no way to know. We speculate, calculate
(wrongly), imagine and suppose. We derive theories and fit our half-baked
conclusions into them.
I am no exception, but I call it a "narrative" and fit it into 'human'
understandability (what by no means is necessary, except for us, to talk
about it).

2.Is indeed No1: IS THERE an origin? Even among those who accepted Hubble's
view on the expanding universe there is the oscillatory originless view. See
2A and 2B below

2A -Hubble? he detected the redshift and equated it with an optical Doppler
leading to an expansional(?) recess of light sources - hence the universe
expands. No analysis that could explain the redshift by other factors
(fields the light passed through, or even to assume not yet discovered
circumstances to such result). Then many thousand physicists jumped on the
bandwagon to reap Nobel prizes and academic tenures by millions (sic) of
experiments all designed to PROVE the expansion. If it did not, it was the
wrong experiment.  So since 1922 we do expand.

2B If something expands, it expands FROM a zero point (if not by harmonic
play Point 2)
Physicists are constructivist reductionists so the 'zero' was more likable
than the elusive "exists forever" shoving the origin under the rug. It it
expands, let us see in retrograde, where it came from - and physical
cosmology made the trip to their Big Bang: the ZERO.
I am not referring to the fictions how the zero started into non-zero, I
just address the retrogradicity of our present (widely expanded and loosened
up) - physical system int the denser past allo the way to million-billion
times closer - and eo ipso absolutely different physical 'laws'  applying
our present system-laws as valid for those different states.
And this is only one side. The other: retrogradicity was imagined linearly
in a cosmos that indeed evolved under nonlinear processes. So the 'age' and
conditions must be all wrong in their BB-fable. Realizing the paradoxes new
tales were invented to correct the quantitative errors (inflation, etc.) not
making the basic assumptions any better.

This is for breakfast, now you may take a pinch of salt to the rest of the
story.
Welcome to this list and good luck to you

John Mikes



On 2/14/07, Mindaugas Indriūnas <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Hello,
>
>  I am an undergraduate student of mathematics, I come from Europe,
> Lithuania. My lifetime research interests are the universe and it's origin
> (it's structure). I have been studying physics, but changed my field to
> mathematics because physics has no model which can explain the earliest
> moments of the universe's existence. I have hopes to understand it through
> comparison and analysis of the properties of possible computational
> universe(s) with the properties our universe.
>
> I have read some pages of Paul Budnik's homepage ( http://www.mtnmath.com/) 
> on DP, and about 80 pages of his book ("What will be"), also Edward
> Fredkin Digital Philosophy site, about 100 pages of Stephen Wolfram's book
> on NKS, now, searching for the English translation of the Konrad Zuse's
> "Rechnender Raum."; more previously, I have been browsing the pages
> http://www.physics.co.uk/ and the http://www.the-origin.org/ , that may be
> a little bit less related with DP, but that are related with the try to
> understand the origin of the universe.
>
> Yours sincerely,
> Mindaugas Indriūnas
> >
>

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Re: JOINING post

[Jason]

Bruno Marchal wrote:
I will take a look once I get enough time. It seems you belong to the

ASSA group, that is you accept some form of bayesianism for fundamental
probability question. Hope you will wake them up ...
(ASSA = absolute self-sampling assumption). You should read Nick
Bostrom and the posts by Hal Finney, Wei Dai and some others in the
list archive) ...
Apparently we agree on "mathematicalism" ...



Bruno,

Thanks for the welcome, I've been looking over the list archive and
have found your posts to be very logical and concisely described.  From
what I gather your believe in mathematicalism and computationalism.  In
the posts of yours I have seen, I have not come across anything that I
would disagree with.  My question is, do you see ASSA as incompatible
with COMP, and if so how?  One of the ideas I describe on the website I
posted is that Turing machines, being mathematical structures exist and
there should exist an instance of a turing machine for every possible
program.  Some of these programs define more states than others (before
looping or halting) and life forms should be most likely to occur
within programs that define the most states.  Is what I described
compatible with both COMP and ASSA?


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Re: JOINING post

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi Jason,

Welcome,


Le 03-janv.-07, à 11:07, Jason a écrit :


http://home.gcn.cx/users/jason/ideas.html


I will take a look once I get enough time. It seems you belong to the 
ASSA group, that is you accept some form of bayesianism for fundamental 
probability question. Hope you will wake them up ...
(ASSA = absolute self-sampling assumption). You should read Nick 
Bostrom and the posts by Hal Finney, Wei Dai and some others in the 
list archive) ...

Apparently we agree on "mathematicalism" ...

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: JOINING post

[Doriano Brogioli]

andy wrote:
Hi Everyone,

This is really a cool list, where even the most exotic
scenarios are seriously taken into account. 

I'm andy, have mostly worked in IT during the 13 years 
since my physics graduation. 

I like simple theories. You may notice this in future 
postings and on my web site.

Hopefully some day you will find some more lines about 
me at

www.universes.org/a/andy.html
It doesn't exist
Doriano

Cheers
 andy
 [EMAIL PROTECTED]