date:20170921

It's definitely sage.  But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it 
hinges on the word _useful_.  Science is often thought to be a body of 
knowledge.  But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science 
is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. 
 It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this.  But Feynman is a good 
candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to 
_know_.

Philosophy (of anything) can be useful.  But to any working scientist, it is 
far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting.  And if 
you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness 
of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about 
you than it does about them.

On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people 
> keep trotting it out as if it was sage.  The reason birds can’t make use of 
> ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo 
> host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification.   
> Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they 
> can’t think?  I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that 
> conclusion.  Bad metaphor. 

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] Wimsical silly question re: coffee making

So I repeated Nicks experiment on the Densmore Coffe Effect (the one where
some silly imp has some not the: run around the block or get inspired to do
fun things.)

I think Nich and steve are both right on this one. ^_^

Hmm so does adding water discourage sprites and dwarfs from creating a
quatum tunnel to socks where the coffe goes?
Or is it as Merdle and you suspect adding water to coffe grounds gets water
into the dry beans and also help the machine work? ^_^

As a follow up question: Being the good Norse+Iriish person I am I prefer
blends of Arabica+Esspresso+Robusto. Rubusto is weirdly hard to find but
doesn't taste like Freds Burnt What was that.?
Adding water to the grounds somehow gives Trader Joes Smooth Morning blend
a nice smooth flavor. Any guesses to Why?  I joke their's some Quantom
effect going on. :P

Might it  have to do with steam (in the basket?) and or the basket having a
extra cup or so somehow rounds out the flavors?

On Wed, Sep 20, 2017 at 1:52 PM, Nick Thompson 
wrote:

> Ok, so, I did the experiment.
>
>
>
> In a ten cup coffee maker I took a cup of water and pre soaked the
> grounds, taking off what dribbled through and pouring it back through until
> I had saturated the grounds.  The the grounds required a little short of a
> cup to saturate.  Then I put ten cups of water in the coffeemaker and let
> it rip.  I got ten cups of coffee out of it. The Densmore effect is due to
> the grounds.  Qed.
>
>
>
> N
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Gillian
> Densmore
> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 19, 2017 10:22 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Wimsical silly question re: coffee making
>
>
>
> H... well fortunatly Iike fun colorful socks... now if they show up
> full coffee been...
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 7:57 PM, Steven A Smith  wrote:
>
> Ooops... the "reply-to" on the list reflector seems not to be the list by
> default, so this just went to Merle the first time!
>
> Gil -
>
> I don't use an automated coffee maker often, but when I do (e.g. motel or
> visiting a friend) I forget that the filling system is measured in 8 oz
> cups but my expectations are closer to a 12 ounce mugfull, so 4 cups of
> water in yields something closer to 2.5 mugs out and of course if I"m on
> the west coast, the mugs are 16 ouncers which REALLY aggravates the
> situation!
>
>  - Steve
>
> PS.  a more whimsical answer is that you can probably expect to find the
> extra coffee in your laundry from time to time and some mismatched socks in
> your coffeemaker somewhere down the line!
>
>
>
> On 9/19/17 3:50 PM, Merle Lefkoff wrote:
>
> Gillian, all of the initial water is boiled, so some of the steam escapes
> from the coffeemaker, and some of the rest is in the wet grounds in the
> filter basket.  There may well be something else happening, but this
> accounts for some of it.
>
>
>
> On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 9:55 AM, Gillian Densmore 
> wrote:
>
> What on earth happens to some of the coffe when I make it drop style? I
> prepare 6-8 cups so as if someone stops by they can have a bit as well.
>
> But then it only gives a bit over 4-5 cups.
>
>
>
> Does some invisible dwarf drink a bit of it before it gets to the
> Kareff(sp)? oO
>
>
>
> I am genuinly perplexed by this.^_^
>
>
>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>
>
>
>
> --
>
> Merle Lefkoff, Ph.D.
> President, Center for Emergent Diplomacy
> emergentdiplomacy.org
>
> Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA
>
> Visiting Professor in Integrative Peacebuilding
>
> Saint Paul University
>
> Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
>
>
>
> merlelefk...@gmail.com 
> mobile:  (303) 859-5609
> skype:  merle.lelfkoff2
>
> twitter: @Merle_Lefkoff
>
>
>
> 
>
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
>
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
>
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
>
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>
>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>
>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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[FRIAM] Fun facts about coffe

Adding to the wimsical side:
http://www.minq.com/lifestyle/8913/19-coffee-hacks-that-every-coffee-drinker-has-to-know-immediately?fb_comment_id=659282570844212_812541528851648#f382a4af585002c

Weird a small amount helps you process certain fats? oO  that's awesome!

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Re: [FRIAM] Fun facts about coffe


Gil-


Adding to the wimsical side:
http://www.minq.com/lifestyle/8913/19-coffee-hacks-that-every-coffee-drinker-has-to-know-immediately?fb_comment_id=659282570844212_812541528851648#f382a4af585002c 



Weird a small amount helps you process certain fats? oO  that's awesome!

Great rundown on coffee options/ideas Gil... thanks!

Coffee is part of the prescription in ketogenic (zero carb, fat-burning) 
diets.



Carry on!
 - Steve


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[FRIAM] Fwd: Re: Wimsical silly question re: coffee making




Mr. Coffee Gil -

I usually make my coffee with folded filter paper in a beaker, pouring 
through water just at the boiling point.  I'm not terribly picky about 
my coffee but I do enjoy the details of such a ritual and try to stay 
close to some optimum.  I think the common brand is "Chemex" (speaking 
of Glen's utility of beakers vs Popper's 3 worlds".


I find the two biggest variables beyond the choice of bean/roast is the 
grind and the temperature of the water.


Being sometimes impatient, I am tempted to pour my water before it is at 
full temperature, or at least to "wet the grounds" with hot water in 
anticipation of the full event.


My subjective experience is that wetting the grounds (or starting with 
water not quite up to boiling) yields less-good results.  It could be a 
subjective judgement I have about "doing it right".  I seem to remember 
that English Tea is presumed to be best made by letting the kettle 
settle for a moment after it boils... that being too close too boiling 
is somehow a bad thing?  But you can't be sure it is "just below 
boiling" until it hits that point first?


I also find that the grind matters.  I recently recovered my coffee 
grinder so am no longer dependent on the grinds I get from the grocery.  
For my method a finer, almost espresso-fine grind is preferred.


I just recovered a French Press maker which is a good alternative to the 
pour through, especially for just enough coffee for myself.   I think it 
is a 24 ounce vessel, so minus the grinds I probably get about 22 ounces 
of coffee... two good solid mugs.  More than that and I start 
compulsively posting nonsense to Friam!   This prefers a coarser ground 
to avoid that fine powdered coffee residue in the bottom of the cup.


This summer I tried making "cold brew" which is pretty simple.. rather 
than dropping the dirty sock filled with grounds into boiling water you 
put it in cold water and let it sit for 12-18 hours.  Despite my crude 
ideations about making coffee with dirty socks, I actually use a fancy 
carafe with a fine metal mesh filter for this...  it is much more 
civilized and doesn't require finding a sock without a hole.  Since I 
was *mostly* drinking iced coffee anyway, I decided to give it a 
whirl... it is supposed to (according to my PaleoDaughter) be healthier 
for you and according to (some) afficianados of coffee to be less 
bitter.   I liked it (esp for iced coffee), but also enjoy my coffee 
"brew" ritual enough that I'm very glad to have the temperatures 
dropping again so that I don't mind dumping a few extra BTUs into the 
house.   I'm very much looking forward to being able to have at least a 
small fire in my wood cookstove in the morning, which allows my beaker 
of coffee to sit and stay hot for much longer...    right now my weekly 
Junk-mail burn isn't quite enough to keep my coffee warm.


As for coffee sources, I have to admit to not really having good 
discrimination there.  I am *almost* as whimsical about that as about 
wine... I don't quite buy it (just) for the label (or the name of the 
source) but it *IS* a temptation.   I've a good friend from the 
highlands of Ethiopia so I often buy coffee from the region she came 
from just out of some weird loyalty. After a long visit to Hawaii I 
found myself often enjoying Kona coffee.    I prefer a darker roast in 
general.  Oh yeh, and it almost exclusively involves some kind of 
Colonial Exploitation and a fat Carbon Footprint to haul it halfway 
around the world to me.  If I continue on my social-conscious arc, I may 
be reduced to dunking burned toast in a cup of hot water...


What do you add to your coffee?  I've always been a "I prefer my coffee 
dark and bitter like my women" kinda guy, but on a keto diet I'm 
learning to use a variety of fats to modify it. The Keto/Paleo people 
suggest full on heavy creme (pure fat, no lactose) but I find it too 
weird (oily).   The hardcore Paleos who also endorse cold-brew describe 
"bulletproof" coffee with a dollop of butter, ghee, or coconut oil.   As 
much as I like butter, I don't like it much in coffee.  I'm looking 
forward to Pinon harvest because I grew up with the tradition of tossing 
a dozen pinon nuts (shell and all) into the grinder with the beans.   
The nuts' fat DOES cut the harsher overtones and add an interesting 
aroma as well as a mild flavor.   But you kinda have to like "oily 
coffee" for any of these.


As for your "Fred Burns what was that?" style... I grew up on what most 
people would call "Diner Coffee" and have to admit that I can drink a 
half-dozen cups of that a truck stop with a traditional "Trucker's 
Breakfast" and be very happy. Especially if the waitress (always named 
Flo) flirts with me a lot.  But it is not hardly the same as what I 
prefer to make in my beaker at home.


'nuff for now

 - Steve



On 9/21/17 10:44 AM, Gillian Densmore wrote:
So I repeated Nicks experiment on the Densmore Coffe Effect (the one 
where some silly imp has

Re: [FRIAM] Fwd: Re: Wimsical silly question re: coffee making

Mmm Kona Koffe and Kava Coffe are indeed gloriusly awsome

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 11:34 AM, Steven A Smith  wrote:

>
>
> Mr. Coffee Gil -
>
> I usually make my coffee with folded filter paper in a beaker, pouring
> through water just at the boiling point.  I'm not terribly picky about my
> coffee but I do enjoy the details of such a ritual and try to stay close to
> some optimum.  I think the common brand is "Chemex" (speaking of Glen's
> utility of beakers vs Popper's 3 worlds".
>
> I find the two biggest variables beyond the choice of bean/roast is the
> grind and the temperature of the water.
>
> Being sometimes impatient, I am tempted to pour my water before it is at
> full temperature, or at least to "wet the grounds" with hot water in
> anticipation of the full event.
>
> My subjective experience is that wetting the grounds (or starting with
> water not quite up to boiling) yields less-good results.  It could be a
> subjective judgement I have about "doing it right".  I seem to remember
> that English Tea is presumed to be best made by letting the kettle settle
> for a moment after it boils... that being too close too boiling is somehow
> a bad thing?  But you can't be sure it is "just below boiling" until it
> hits that point first?
>
> I also find that the grind matters.  I recently recovered my coffee
> grinder so am no longer dependent on the grinds I get from the grocery.
> For my method a finer, almost espresso-fine grind is preferred.
>
> I just recovered a French Press maker which is a good alternative to the
> pour through, especially for just enough coffee for myself.   I think it is
> a 24 ounce vessel, so minus the grinds I probably get about 22 ounces of
> coffee... two good solid mugs.  More than that and I start compulsively
> posting nonsense to Friam!   This prefers a coarser ground to avoid that
> fine powdered coffee residue in the bottom of the cup.
>
> This summer I tried making "cold brew" which is pretty simple.. rather
> than dropping the dirty sock filled with grounds into boiling water you put
> it in cold water and let it sit for 12-18 hours.  Despite my crude
> ideations about making coffee with dirty socks, I actually use a fancy
> carafe with a fine metal mesh filter for this...  it is much more civilized
> and doesn't require finding a sock without a hole.  Since I was *mostly*
> drinking iced coffee anyway, I decided to give it a whirl... it is supposed
> to (according to my PaleoDaughter) be healthier for you and according to
> (some) afficianados of coffee to be less bitter.   I liked it (esp for iced
> coffee), but also enjoy my coffee "brew" ritual enough that I'm very glad
> to have the temperatures dropping again so that I don't mind dumping a few
> extra BTUs into the house.   I'm very much looking forward to being able to
> have at least a small fire in my wood cookstove in the morning, which
> allows my beaker of coffee to sit and stay hot for much longer...right
> now my weekly Junk-mail burn isn't quite enough to keep my coffee warm.
>
> As for coffee sources, I have to admit to not really having good
> discrimination there.  I am *almost* as whimsical about that as about
> wine... I don't quite buy it (just) for the label (or the name of the
> source) but it *IS* a temptation.   I've a good friend from the highlands
> of Ethiopia so I often buy coffee from the region she came from just out of
> some weird loyalty.  After a long visit to Hawaii I found myself often
> enjoying Kona coffee.I prefer a darker roast in general.  Oh yeh, and
> it almost exclusively involves some kind of Colonial Exploitation and a fat
> Carbon Footprint to haul it halfway around the world to me.  If I continue
> on my social-conscious arc, I may be reduced to dunking burned toast in a
> cup of hot water...
>
> What do you add to your coffee?  I've always been a "I prefer my coffee
> dark and bitter like my women" kinda guy, but on a keto diet I'm learning
> to use a variety of fats to modify it.   The Keto/Paleo people suggest full
> on heavy creme (pure fat, no lactose) but I find it too weird (oily).   The
> hardcore Paleos who also endorse cold-brew describe "bulletproof" coffee
> with a dollop of butter, ghee, or coconut oil.   As much as I like butter,
> I don't like it much in coffee.  I'm looking forward to Pinon harvest
> because I grew up with the tradition of tossing a dozen pinon nuts (shell
> and all) into the grinder with the beans.   The nuts' fat DOES cut the
> harsher overtones and add an interesting aroma as well as a mild flavor.
> But you kinda have to like "oily coffee" for any of these.
>
> As for your "Fred Burns what was that?" style... I grew up on what most
> people would call "Diner Coffee" and have to admit that I can drink a
> half-dozen cups of that a truck stop with a traditional "Trucker's
> Breakfast" and be very happy.   Especially if the waitress (always named
> Flo) flirts with me a lot.  But it is not hardly the same as what I prefer
>

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC 
interview:

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse 
without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, 
possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type 
of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy.  The 
point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful.  But that one can 
_justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be 
done in the _service_ of something else.

You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant.  Many of Smullyan's 
publications are puzzles, games.  Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) 
But every puzzle is a math problem.  It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on 
why they're solving puzzles.  Are they doing it because it FEELS good?  Or are 
they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some 
other objective?  Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a 
defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against the world around 
them.  The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make 
some of them defensive.  And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for 
doing it just because they enjoy it.

But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher 
can't distinguish their own _why_.  Someone who does it because it's fun 
shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is.  And someone who does 
it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is.  
Get over it.  Be confident.  Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers.

On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> Glen -
> 
> I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) 
> defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the 
> process rather than the product (aka "Artifact").
> 
> When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as 
> that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on 
> the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher 
> group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist".  I have a similar 
> ambivalence about "Scientist/Science".   Despite degrees in Math and Physics, 
> my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really 
> fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real Scientists" and close to 
> "Scientific Progress" for most of my life.   I don't even think of my work as 
> having been that of an Engineer, but truly much closer to simply that of a 
> "Technologist".   And as everyone who has read my missives here can attest, 
> my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is equally detuned... but suspect myself to 
> oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and "Philistine".   All 
> that rattled off, I truly value having enough understanding of all of these
> ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly 
> informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each quantitatively.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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[FRIAM] One more from the feeling awesome and inspired dept

Going back over my weby-web basics...I seriusly don't recall when WebyWebs
got to having good support for SVG and PostScripts. That is so awesome.  Is
that new to HTML5. Udacity sugests including them with Canvas something
about compatability and fluidity/responsitveness.

Either way that rocks rocks as a option.

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Glen -

in stark juxtaposition, we have Freeman Dyson saying:

"it is better to be wrong than vague"

I think I know what he meant and generally support not getting frozen in
inaction or muddying/qualifying a statement to the point of losing meaning.

On the other hand, I find this quote (or at least idea) as an excuse for
rash over thoughtful action.

- Steve

On 9/21/17 11:58 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:

A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC
interview:

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with doubt,
and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to live not knowing
than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate answers, and possible
beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely
sure of anything. And there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have
to know an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being
lost in the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι
can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type of "knowledge",
including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy. The point is not that "thought
manipulation" can never be useful. But that one can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy
should (moral imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else.

You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant. Many of Smullyan's publications are
puzzles, games. Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) But every puzzle is a math
problem. It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on why they're solving puzzles. Are
they doing it because it FEELS good? Or are they doing it because either the solutions
or the exercises facilitate some other objective? Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video
gamers) find themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against
the world around them. The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at
philosophers can make some of them defensive. And it's a real shame that we shame
philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy it.

But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher
can't distinguish their own _why_. Someone who does it because it's fun
shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is. And someone who does
it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is.
Get over it. Be confident. Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers.

On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:

Glen -

I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) defined by "the Scientific
Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the process rather than the product (aka "Artifact").

When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on the
conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist". I have a similar ambivalence about
"Scientist/Science". Despite degrees in Math and Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really fancy arithmetic), though I
have worked with "real Scientists" and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life. I don't even think of my work as having been that of an Engineer,
but truly much closer to simply that of a "Technologist". And as everyone who has read my missives here can attest, my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is
equally detuned... but suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and "Philistine". All that rattled off, I truly value having
enough understanding of all of these
ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly informed
opinions about the better and worser examples of each quantitatively.

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Good have the metaknowledge of vagueness and seek to reduce it.  
Like learning to avoid mistakes..

https://www.wired.com/story/the-education-of-brett-the-robot/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Steven A Smith
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:09 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Glen -

in stark juxtaposition, we have Freeman Dyson saying:

     "it is better to be wrong than vague"

I think I know what he meant and generally support not getting frozen in 
inaction or muddying/qualifying a statement to the point of losing meaning.

On the other hand, I find this quote (or at least idea) as an excuse for rash 
over thoughtful action.

- Steve

On 9/21/17 11:58 AM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:
> A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a 
> BBC interview:
>
> "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
> doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting 
> to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have 
> approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty 
> about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are 
> many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. 
> I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in 
> the unverse without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far 
> as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."
>
> He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every 
> type of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy. 
>  The point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful.  But that 
> one can _justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral 
> imperative) be done in the _service_ of something else.
>
> You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant.  Many of Smullyan's 
> publications are puzzles, games.  Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) 
> But every puzzle is a math problem.  It's up to the puzzle solver to settle 
> on why they're solving puzzles.  Are they doing it because it FEELS good?  Or 
> are they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate 
> some other objective?  Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find 
> themselves in a defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against 
> the world around them.  The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at 
> philosophers can make some of them defensive.  And it's a real shame that we 
> shame philosophers for doing it just because they enjoy it.
>
> But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher 
> can't distinguish their own _why_.  Someone who does it because it's fun 
> shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is.  And someone who 
> does it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it 
> is.  Get over it.  Be confident.  Engage your fetish and ignore the 
> nay-sayers.
>
> On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
>> Glen -
>>
>> I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) 
>> defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the 
>> process rather than the product (aka "Artifact").
>>
>> When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role 
>> as that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis 
>> on the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, 
>> higher group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist".  I have a similar 
>> ambivalence about "Scientist/Science".   Despite degrees in Math and 
>> Physics, my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than 
>> just really fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real Scientists" 
>> and close to "Scientific Progress" for most of my life.   I don't even think 
>> of my work as having been that of an Engineer, but truly much closer to 
>> simply that of a "Technologist".   And as everyone who has read my missives 
>> here can attest, my throwdown as a "Philosopher" is equally detuned... but 
>> suspect myself to oscillate wildly between the poles of "Philosopher" and 
>> "Philistine".   All that rattled off, I truly value having enough 
>> understanding of all of these
>> ideals to recognize the differences qualitatively, and to have mildly 
>> informed opinions about the better and worser examples of each 
>> quantitatively.
>



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Mee

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Bah!  Do you actually think Dyson's aphorism is in stark juxtaposition to 
Feynman's?  I thought, by including so much of what Feynman said, it would be 
less likely anyone would read it wrong.  But if you think Feynman was saying 
being vague is better than being wrong, you TOTALLY misunderstood what he was 
saying.

I'm reminded of Otto.  Are we seriously trading aphorisms?  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YKbYLb5GVc

On 09/21/2017 11:09 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:
> in stark juxtaposition, we have Freeman Dyson saying:
> 
> "it is better to be wrong than vague"
> 
> I think I know what he meant and generally support not getting frozen in 
> inaction or muddying/qualifying a statement to the point of losing meaning.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Glen,

This baffled me as much as it interested me.  In the end, I wasn't sure whose 
side you were on.  My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is for 
me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge is 
just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific knowledge.  
Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor stinks. It 
still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted 
out by people without the knowledge of experience to think philosophically.  
Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he 
knew so much about bats and insects? 

Nick 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:28 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

It's definitely sage.  But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it 
hinges on the word _useful_.  Science is often thought to be a body of 
knowledge.  But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science 
is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. 
 It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this.  But Feynman is a good 
candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to 
_know_.

Philosophy (of anything) can be useful.  But to any working scientist, it is 
far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting.  And if 
you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness 
of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about 
you than it does about them.

On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people 
> keep trotting it out as if it was sage.  The reason birds can’t make use of 
> ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo 
> host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification.   
> Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they 
> can’t think?  I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that 
> conclusion.  Bad metaphor. 

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Heh, I'm on the side of people who refuse to take aphorisms seriously, no 
matter who coins them, repeats them, etc.  Otto's reading Nietzsche is the 
perfect example.  Attempts to be pithy only appeal to sloppy thinkers.

I admit that inside jokes can be good and comforting, but ONLY when you're sure 
there is an "inside".  If you have any doubt about the in-group status of the 
group you find yourself with, then stay away from aphorisms and try to tell an 
authentic story.

On 09/21/2017 12:31 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> This baffled me as much as it interested me.  In the end, I wasn't sure whose 
> side you were on.  My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is 
> for me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge 
> is just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific 
> knowledge.  Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor 
> stinks. It still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical 
> platitudes trotted out by people without the knowledge of experience to think 
> philosophically.  Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about 
> "mind" because he knew so much about bats and insects? 

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia


OK, you got me..  (as usual).

I suppose I was speaking of how this particular Feynman Quote is 
(mis)used vs how the Dyson quote is (mis)used.   I wasn't responding to 
your elaboration in this case, nor presuming to know what either of them 
actually *meant*.   How is that for weasely?


Thanks for the Otto/Wanda link... not sure of the precise relevance 
(except for audacious banter?)


   Kline:  "Don't Call me Stupid!"

   Curtis:  "To call you stupid is an insult to stupid people!"

   Kline:  "Apes don't read Philosophy!"

   Curtis:  "Yes they do, they just don't understand it!"

Wanda is one of my favorite characters of all time (not Otto, I have 
other favorite Kevin Kline roles) but the scene where he is huffing 
Jamie Lee Curtis' boot is classic!



On 9/21/17 12:33 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣ wrote:

Bah!  Do you actually think Dyson's aphorism is in stark juxtaposition to 
Feynman's?  I thought, by including so much of what Feynman said, it would be 
less likely anyone would read it wrong.  But if you think Feynman was saying 
being vague is better than being wrong, you TOTALLY misunderstood what he was 
saying.

I'm reminded of Otto.  Are we seriously trading aphorisms?  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5YKbYLb5GVc

On 09/21/2017 11:09 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:

in stark juxtaposition, we have Freeman Dyson saying:

 "it is better to be wrong than vague"

I think I know what he meant and generally support not getting frozen in 
inaction or muddying/qualifying a statement to the point of losing meaning.



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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

To clarify, I meant `meta-knowledge' in the sense of "Do I know what I know?" 
or "Do I know I don't know?"  as opposed to the idea of drawing conclusions by 
studying other studies.  Can one label their questions or propositions as vague 
or not vague..  

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:32 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Cc: 'Mike Bybee' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Glen,

This baffled me as much as it interested me.  In the end, I wasn't sure whose 
side you were on.  My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is for 
me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge is 
just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific knowledge.  
Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor stinks. It 
still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted 
out by people without the knowledge of experience to think philosophically.  
Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he 
knew so much about bats and insects? 

Nick 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:28 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

It's definitely sage.  But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it 
hinges on the word _useful_.  Science is often thought to be a body of 
knowledge.  But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science 
is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. 
 It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this.  But Feynman is a good 
candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to 
_know_.

Philosophy (of anything) can be useful.  But to any working scientist, it is 
far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting.  And if 
you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness 
of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about 
you than it does about them.

On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people 
> keep trotting it out as if it was sage.  The reason birds can’t make use of 
> ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo 
> host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification.   
> Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they 
> can’t think?  I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that 
> conclusion.  Bad metaphor. 

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe 
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Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Dear Glen,  

I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the 
universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι 
can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

… is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as 
absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.  

Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot doubt 
that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in 
the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us 
that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is doubtable in the 
sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we 
live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed.  Like the 
other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it 
and make something wise and noble of what is left. 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:59 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC 
interview:

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse 
without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, 
possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type 
of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy.  The 
point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful.  But that one can 
_justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be 
done in the _service_ of something else.

You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant.  Many of Smullyan's 
publications are puzzles, games.  Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) 
But every puzzle is a math problem.  It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on 
why they're solving puzzles.  Are they doing it because it FEELS good?  Or are 
they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some 
other objective?  Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a 
defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against the world around 
them.  The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make 
some of them defensive.  And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for 
doing it just because they enjoy it.

But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher 
can't distinguish their own _why_.  Someone who does it because it's fun 
shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is.  And someone who does 
it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is.  
Get over it.  Be confident.  Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers.

On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:

> Glen -

> 

> I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) 
> defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the 
> process rather than the product (aka "Artifact").

> 

> When I do anything vaguely (or presumptively) artistic, I think of my role as 
> that of an "Artifex" more than an "Artist" because I feel more emphasis on 
> the conception/making than on being tuned into or tied into a larger, higher 
> group/power which is how I read "Art and Artist".  I have a similar 
> ambivalence about "Scientist/Science".   Despite degrees in Math and Physics, 
> my practice has rarely involved actual Science (or more math than just really 
> fancy arithmetic), though I have worked with "real Scientists" and close to 
> "Scientific Progress" for most of my life.   I don't even think of my work as

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem 
with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than a 
few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For goodness 
sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder when people 
can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Dear Glen,

I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the 
universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι 
can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

… is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as 
absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.

Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot doubt 
that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in 
the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us 
that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is doubtable in the 
sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we 
live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed.  Like the 
other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it 
and make something wise and noble of what is left.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:59 PM
To: FriAM mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC 
interview:

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse 
without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι can tell, 
possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

He was talking in the context of religion, but I think it applies to every type 
of "knowledge", including the "thought manipulation" that is philosophy.  The 
point is not that "thought manipulation" can never be useful.  But that one can 
_justifiably_ take the position that philosophy should (moral imperative) be 
done in the _service_ of something else.

You cited Smullyan in the OP, which is relevant.  Many of Smullyan's 
publications are puzzles, games.  Some of us simply enjoy puzzles. (I don't.) 
But every puzzle is a math problem.  It's up to the puzzle solver to settle on 
why they're solving puzzles.  Are they doing it because it FEELS good?  Or are 
they doing it because either the solutions or the exercises facilitate some 
other objective?  Some puzzle solvers (e.g. video gamers) find themselves in a 
defensive position, trying to justify their fetish against the world around 
them.  The silly rancor many "practical" people aim at philosophers can make 
some of them defensive.  And it's a real shame that we shame philosophers for 
doing it just because they enjoy it.

But it moves from merely shameful to outright dangerous when a philosopher 
can't distinguish their own _why_.  Someone who does it because it's fun 
shouldn't waste any time yapping about how useful it is.  And someone who does 
it because it's useful shouldn't waste any time yapping about how fun it is.  
Get over it.  Be confident.  Engage your fetish and ignore the nay-sayers.

On 09/21/2017 09:53 AM, Steven A Smith wrote:

> Glen -

>

> I share your use of the term "Science" as in being an activity (roughly) 
> defined by "the Scientific Method" just as I use the term "Art" as the 
> process rather than the product (aka "Artifact").

>

> When I do anything vaguely (o

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

It's strange.  You speak about the way _you_ think and behave as if that's the 
way _I_ think and behave.  Can we all say "vainglorously" together? 8^)

I can tell you unflinchingly and honestly that I DO doubt that the floor is 
still under my feet when I put my legs out of the bed in the morning.  If you 
don't doubt it, then you are governed by faith and convinced by things you 
believe.   Even IF you know precisely what Peirce WOULD say (which we can 
doubt), it still doesn't mean Peirce was right.  Yeah, it's likely he was way 
smarter than me.  But that doesn't mean he knows what I do and don't doubt.

I doubt nearly everything about myself on a continual basis.  I doubt my 
strength.  I doubt my intelligence.  I doubt every purchase I've ever made.  I 
doubt that Renee' will stay with me.  I doubt everything on a continual basis.  
So, you (or Peirce) are clearly flat-out wrong.  It seems very arrogant to 
stumble along thinking your expectations are somehow important enough to remain 
true.

On 09/21/2017 12:48 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot 
> doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the 
> bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes 
> tell us that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is doubtable 
> in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most 
> part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed. 
>  Like the other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is 
> absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what is left.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Glen, 

I apologize.  My rhetorical manners are not in good order.  I am being cranky.  

I am afraid this discussion is about to dissolve into a quibble about the 
meaning of the words "doubt" and "belief", but let's take it one more round.
In my use of the words ... and I think Peirce's ... one can entertain a doubt 
without "really" having one.  Knowledge of perception tells us that every 
perceived "fact" is an inference subject to doubt and yet, if one acts in the 
assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be said to really doubt it, 
can one?   It follows, then, that to the extent that we act on our perceptions, 
we act without doubt on expectations that are doubtable.  

Eric Charles may be able to help me with this:  there is some debate between 
William  James and Peirce about whether the man, being chased by the bear who 
pauses at the edge of the chasm, and then leaps across it, doubted at the 
moment of leaping that he could make the jump.  I think James says Yes and 
Peirce says No.  If that is the argument we are having, then I am satisfied we 
have wrung everything we can out of it.  

Anyway.  I regret being cranky, but I can't seem to stop.  Is that another 
example of what we are talking about here?  

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:58 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

It's strange.  You speak about the way _you_ think and behave as if that's the 
way _I_ think and behave.  Can we all say "vainglorously" together? 8^)

I can tell you unflinchingly and honestly that I DO doubt that the floor is 
still under my feet when I put my legs out of the bed in the morning.  If you 
don't doubt it, then you are governed by faith and convinced by things you 
believe.   Even IF you know precisely what Peirce WOULD say (which we can 
doubt), it still doesn't mean Peirce was right.  Yeah, it's likely he was way 
smarter than me.  But that doesn't mean he knows what I do and don't doubt.

I doubt nearly everything about myself on a continual basis.  I doubt my 
strength.  I doubt my intelligence.  I doubt every purchase I've ever made.  I 
doubt that Renee' will stay with me.  I doubt everything on a continual basis.  
So, you (or Peirce) are clearly flat-out wrong.  It seems very arrogant to 
stumble along thinking your expectations are somehow important enough to remain 
true.

On 09/21/2017 12:48 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot 
> doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the 
> bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes 
> tell us that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is doubtable 
> in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most 
> part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed. 
>  Like the other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is 
> absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what is left.

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Hmm! 

I meant "meta knowledge" as knowledge of how to go about something gleaned from 
watching others succeed and fail at it.  Is that the same thing? 

n

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:39 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Cc: 'Mike Bybee' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

To clarify, I meant `meta-knowledge' in the sense of "Do I know what I know?" 
or "Do I know I don't know?"  as opposed to the idea of drawing conclusions by 
studying other studies.  Can one label their questions or propositions as vague 
or not vague..  

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:32 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Cc: 'Mike Bybee' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Glen,

This baffled me as much as it interested me.  In the end, I wasn't sure whose 
side you were on.  My problem may be that, being a Peircean, philosophy is for 
me just an extension of the scientific method and philosophical knowledge is 
just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same sources as scientific knowledge.  
Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I still think the metaphor stinks. It 
still strikes me as one of those unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted 
out by people without the knowledge of experience to think philosophically.  
Remember that guy Donald Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he 
knew so much about bats and insects? 

Nick 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University 
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:28 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

It's definitely sage.  But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word "science", it 
hinges on the word _useful_.  Science is often thought to be a body of 
knowledge.  But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who think science 
is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and testing hypotheses. 
 It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this.  But Feynman is a good 
candidate because he cared far more about what you _do_ than what you claim to 
_know_.

Philosophy (of anything) can be useful.  But to any working scientist, it is 
far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting.  And if 
you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the usefulness 
of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression says more about 
you than it does about them.

On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that people 
> keep trotting it out as if it was sage.  The reason birds can’t make use of 
> ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a cuckoo 
> host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg identification.   
> Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of science that they 
> can’t think?  I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism” would come to that 
> conclusion.  Bad metaphor. 

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

2017-09-21 Thread Frank Wimberly

To me "metaknowledge" denotes knowledge about knowledge.  For example, "I
know 7,486 aphorisms".  That's a false statement.

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Sep 21, 2017 2:25 PM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

> Hmm!
>
> I meant "meta knowledge" as knowledge of how to go about something gleaned
> from watching others succeed and fail at it.  Is that the same thing?
>
> n
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
> Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
> Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:39 PM
> To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
> Cc: 'Mike Bybee' 
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
> To clarify, I meant `meta-knowledge' in the sense of "Do I know what I
> know?" or "Do I know I don't know?"  as opposed to the idea of drawing
> conclusions by studying other studies.  Can one label their questions or
> propositions as vague or not vague..
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
> Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:32 PM
> To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam@redfish.com>
> Cc: 'Mike Bybee' 
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
> Glen,
>
> This baffled me as much as it interested me.  In the end, I wasn't sure
> whose side you were on.  My problem may be that, being a Peircean,
> philosophy is for me just an extension of the scientific method and
> philosophical knowledge is just "meta-knowledge" gleaned from the same
> sources as scientific knowledge.  Speaking as a sort-of ornithologist, I
> still think the metaphor stinks. It still strikes me as one of those
> unthinking philosophical platitudes trotted out by people without the
> knowledge of experience to think philosophically.  Remember that guy Donald
> Griffin who thought he knew about "mind" because he knew so much about bats
> and insects?
>
> Nick
>
> Nick
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology Clark University
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
> Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 12:28 PM
> To: FriAM 
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
> It's definitely sage.  But the sagacity doesn't hinge on the word
> "science", it hinges on the word _useful_.  Science is often thought to be
> a body of knowledge.  But there's a huge swath of people, me included, who
> think science is not knowledge, but a method/behavior for formulating and
> testing hypotheses.  It's not clear to me that Feynman actually said this.
> But Feynman is a good candidate because he cared far more about what you
> _do_ than what you claim to _know_.
>
> Philosophy (of anything) can be useful.  But to any working scientist, it
> is far less useful than, say, glass blowing, programming, or cell sorting.
> And if you think distinguishing between the usefulness of beakers from the
> usefulness of ... oh, let's say Popper's 3 worlds, then your expression
> says more about you than it does about them.
>
>
> On 09/20/2017 08:27 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> > By the way, the Feynman quote is really dumb, and it’s annoying that
> people keep trotting it out as if it was sage.  The reason birds can’t make
> use of ornithology is they can’t read. Think how useful it would be for a
> cuckoo host to be able to spend a few hours reading a text on egg
> identification.   Is the reason physicists can’t make use of philosophy of
> science that they can’t think?  I doubt anyone who cites this “aphorism”
> would come to that conclusion.  Bad metaphor.
>
> --
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe
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>
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
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> 
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>
>
> 
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> FRIAM-COMIC

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

No regrets or apology are needed.  And even if we are about to "argue about 
words" ... I forget what famous dead white guy said that ... it's still useful 
to me.

You say: "if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot 
be said to really doubt it"  The answer is clarified by reading Marcus' post.  
If you act with assurance, then you're not open to changing your mind.  So, 
you've simply moved the goal posts or passed the buck.

I *never* act with assurance, as far as I can tell.  Every thing I do seems 
plagued with doubt.  I can force myself out of this state with some activities. 
 Running more than 3 miles does it.  Math sometimes does it.  Beer does it.  
Etc.  But for almost every other action, I do doubt it.  So, I don't think 
we're having the discussion James and Peirce might have.  I think we're talking 
about two different types of people, those with a tendency to believe their own 
beliefs and those who tend to disbelieve their own beliefs.

Maybe it's because people who act with assurance are just smarter than people 
like me?  I don't know.  It's important in this modern world, what with our 
affirmation bubbles, fake news, and whatnot.  What is it that makes people 
prefer to associate with people whose beliefs they share?  What makes some 
people prefer the company of people different from them?  Etc.

On 09/21/2017 01:20 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> I am afraid this discussion is about to dissolve into a quibble about the 
> meaning of the words "doubt" and "belief", but let's take it one more round.  
>   In my use of the words ... and I think Peirce's ... one can entertain a 
> doubt without "really" having one.  Knowledge of perception tells us that 
> every perceived "fact" is an inference subject to doubt and yet, if one acts 
> in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be said to really 
> doubt it, can one?   It follows, then, that to the extent that we act on our 
> perceptions, we act without doubt on expectations that are doubtable.  
> 
> Eric Charles may be able to help me with this:  there is some debate between 
> William  James and Peirce about whether the man, being chased by the bear who 
> pauses at the edge of the chasm, and then leaps across it, doubted at the 
> moment of leaping that he could make the jump.  I think James says Yes and 
> Peirce says No.  If that is the argument we are having, then I am satisfied 
> we have wrung everything we can out of it.  
> 
> Anyway.  I regret being cranky, but I can't seem to stop.  Is that another 
> example of what we are talking about here?  

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Time for an aphorism!

The fundamental cause of the trouble is that in the modern world the stupid are 
cocksure while the intelligent are full of doubt. Bertrand Russell  

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:32 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

No regrets or apology are needed.  And even if we are about to "argue about 
words" ... I forget what famous dead white guy said that ... it's still useful 
to me.

You say: "if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot 
be said to really doubt it"  The answer is clarified by reading Marcus' post.  
If you act with assurance, then you're not open to changing your mind.  So, 
you've simply moved the goal posts or passed the buck.

I *never* act with assurance, as far as I can tell.  Every thing I do seems 
plagued with doubt.  I can force myself out of this state with some activities. 
 Running more than 3 miles does it.  Math sometimes does it.  Beer does it.  
Etc.  But for almost every other action, I do doubt it.  So, I don't think 
we're having the discussion James and Peirce might have.  I think we're talking 
about two different types of people, those with a tendency to believe their own 
beliefs and those who tend to disbelieve their own beliefs.

Maybe it's because people who act with assurance are just smarter than people 
like me?  I don't know.  It's important in this modern world, what with our 
affirmation bubbles, fake news, and whatnot.  What is it that makes people 
prefer to associate with people whose beliefs they share?  What makes some 
people prefer the company of people different from them?  Etc.

On 09/21/2017 01:20 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> I am afraid this discussion is about to dissolve into a quibble about the 
> meaning of the words "doubt" and "belief", but let's take it one more round.  
>   In my use of the words ... and I think Peirce's ... one can entertain a 
> doubt without "really" having one.  Knowledge of perception tells us that 
> every perceived "fact" is an inference subject to doubt and yet, if one acts 
> in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be said to really 
> doubt it, can one?   It follows, then, that to the extent that we act on our 
> perceptions, we act without doubt on expectations that are doubtable.  
> 
> Eric Charles may be able to help me with this:  there is some debate between 
> William  James and Peirce about whether the man, being chased by the bear who 
> pauses at the edge of the chasm, and then leaps across it, doubted at the 
> moment of leaping that he could make the jump.  I think James says Yes and 
> Peirce says No.  If that is the argument we are having, then I am satisfied 
> we have wrung everything we can out of it.  
> 
> Anyway.  I regret being cranky, but I can't seem to stop.  Is that another 
> example of what we are talking about here?  

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

2017-09-21 Thread Eric Smith

Somehow I imagine that Nick means to say there are costly signals in this game 
— that motor action is thicker than conversation or reflection.

If I am walking across a snowfield that I know to be filled with crevasses, and 
I know I can’t tell which snow holds weight and which doesn’t, my movement is 
really different than it is putting my feet on the floor beside the bed in the 
morning.

To take a different example that is counterfactual but easier to use in 
invoking the real physiological paralysis, if Thank God Ledge on halfdome were 
not actually a solid ledge, but a fragile bridge, or if there had been a 
rockfall that left part of it missing and I were blindfolded, or if I were a 
prisoner of pirates blindfolded and made to walk the plank, my steps would land 
differently than they do when I get out of bed in the morning.

There I didn’t say what anyone else would do in any circumstance, but did claim 
that my own motions have different regimes that are viscerally _very_ distinct. 
 I’m not sure I can think about whether I would fight for air when being 
drowned.  It might be atavistic and beyond anything I normally refer to as 
“thought”.  I certainly have had people claim to me that that is the case.

Those distinctions may occupy a different plane than the distinction between 
reasonableness and dogmatism all in the world of conversation and the social 
exchange.

But I should not speak for others.  Only for myself as a spectator.

Eric

> On Sep 21, 2017, at 4:32 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣  wrote:
> 
> No regrets or apology are needed.  And even if we are about to "argue about 
> words" ... I forget what famous dead white guy said that ... it's still 
> useful to me.
> 
> You say: "if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot 
> be said to really doubt it"  The answer is clarified by reading Marcus' post. 
>  If you act with assurance, then you're not open to changing your mind.  So, 
> you've simply moved the goal posts or passed the buck.
> 
> I *never* act with assurance, as far as I can tell.  Every thing I do seems 
> plagued with doubt.  I can force myself out of this state with some 
> activities.  Running more than 3 miles does it.  Math sometimes does it.  
> Beer does it.  Etc.  But for almost every other action, I do doubt it.  So, I 
> don't think we're having the discussion James and Peirce might have.  I think 
> we're talking about two different types of people, those with a tendency to 
> believe their own beliefs and those who tend to disbelieve their own beliefs.
> 
> Maybe it's because people who act with assurance are just smarter than people 
> like me?  I don't know.  It's important in this modern world, what with our 
> affirmation bubbles, fake news, and whatnot.  What is it that makes people 
> prefer to associate with people whose beliefs they share?  What makes some 
> people prefer the company of people different from them?  Etc.
> 
> 
> On 09/21/2017 01:20 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
>> I am afraid this discussion is about to dissolve into a quibble about the 
>> meaning of the words "doubt" and "belief", but let's take it one more round. 
>>In my use of the words ... and I think Peirce's ... one can entertain a 
>> doubt without "really" having one.  Knowledge of perception tells us that 
>> every perceived "fact" is an inference subject to doubt and yet, if one acts 
>> in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot be said to really 
>> doubt it, can one?   It follows, then, that to the extent that we act on our 
>> perceptions, we act without doubt on expectations that are doubtable.  
>> 
>> Eric Charles may be able to help me with this:  there is some debate between 
>> William  James and Peirce about whether the man, being chased by the bear 
>> who pauses at the edge of the chasm, and then leaps across it, doubted at 
>> the moment of leaping that he could make the jump.  I think James says Yes 
>> and Peirce says No.  If that is the argument we are having, then I am 
>> satisfied we have wrung everything we can out of it.  
>> 
>> Anyway.  I regret being cranky, but I can't seem to stop.  Is that another 
>> example of what we are talking about here?  
> 
> -- 
> ☣ gⅼеɳ
> 
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Ok.  Self-reflection time. 

1.   Ah!  Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings.  To what extent 
does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of acting, one 
holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a matter of 
logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.  

2.   I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God, 
particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out 
Feynman as if HE were God.  I do so because it is easier for me to figure out 
what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if feels 
less narcissistic.  But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral because, 
of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I think] and 
others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right. 

3.   I now know why I am being cranky.  I am supposed to be winterizing the 
Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe.  I hate travel, I hate 
winterizing, and I hate packing.  From my actions, I surmise that I have been 
acting in the belief that I will be happier if I start a fight on FRIAM then if 
I put my head down and do the things I am supposed to be doing.  Sober 
reflection suggests that I may be wrong in that belief.  Will this reflection 
result in a change in my beliefs?  Only my actions will tell. 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

 

There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem 
with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than a 
few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For goodness 
sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder when people 
can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

 

Dear Glen,  

 

I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:

 

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the 
universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι 
can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

 

… is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as 
absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.  

 

Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot doubt 
that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in 
the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us 
that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is doubtable in the 
sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we 
live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed.  Like the 
other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it 
and make something wise and noble of what is left. 

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

 

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:59 PM
To: FriAM mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

 

A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a BBC 
interview:

 

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the unverse 
without having any purpose, which is

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

2017-09-21 Thread Frank Wimberly

1.  Empirical.

2.  Freud is as close to God as early 20th century intellectuals can get.

3.  Your rationalized procrastination makes sense to me.

:-)

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

On Sep 21, 2017 2:46 PM, "Nick Thompson"  wrote:

> Ok.  Self-reflection time.
>
> 1.   Ah!  Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings.  To what
> extent does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of
> acting, one holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a
> matter of logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.
>
> 2.   I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God,
> particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out
> Feynman as if HE were God.  I do so because it is easier for me to figure
> out what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if
> feels less narcissistic.  But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral
> because, of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I
> think] and others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right.
>
> 3.   I now know why I am being cranky.  I am supposed to be
> winterizing the Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe.  I
> hate travel, I hate winterizing, and I hate packing.  From my actions, I
> surmise that I have been acting in the belief that I will be happier if I
> start a fight on FRIAM then if I put my head down and do the things I am
> supposed to be doing.  Sober reflection suggests that I may be wrong in
> that belief.  Will this reflection result in a change in my beliefs?  Only
> my actions will tell.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Marcus
> Daniels
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem
> with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than
> a few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For
> goodness sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder
> when people can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com
> ] *On Behalf Of *Nick Thompson
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> Dear Glen,
>
>
>
> I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:
>
>
>
> *"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live
> with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more
> interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong.
> I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of
> certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And
> there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know
> an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by
> being lost in the universe without having any purpose, which is the way it
> really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."*
>
>
>
> … is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise
> as absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.
>
>
>
> Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot
> doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of
> the bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our
> eyes tell us that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is
> doubtable in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet
> for the most part we live in a world of inferred expectations which are
> largely confirmed.  Like the other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we
> stipulate what is absurd about it and make something wise and noble of what
> is left.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
>
>
> -Original Message-
> From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com ]
> On Behalf Of g??? ?
> Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:59 PM
> To: FriAM 
> Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> A better Feynman quote that targets this issue is this one, I think from a
> BBC interview:
>
>
>
> "When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live
> with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more
> interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong.
> I have approxim

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Excellent digestion!  I'll fully admit that my body has a kind of momentum.  
The running example is perfect.  For the 1st mile (for certain), every breath 
and every step seems equivalently doubted, ungainly, awkward.  As I literally 
force myself into the 2nd mile, I suspect my body changes.  I begin thinking 
about other things.  Some automatic part of me has begun to take control.  By 
the 4th mile, I am completely automatic.

That automation seems to be a forcing structure.  In contrast, when I'm doing 
calisthenics, I never achieve such automation.  At any given position or 
movement, any one of my multifarious weaknesses might cause me to fail.  My 
lower or upper back kinks or spasms, the cartiledge in my wrist will crumple, 
my epicondyl will sprain, etc.  I can get into a kind of "flow" or groove when 
doing it, so that my self dissolves or I begin thinking about other things.  
But here, unlike running, as soon as I begin thinking about my body again, that 
momentum evaporates and I, again, doubt every movement.

So, there are some types of activity that have more "convinced" regimes than 
other types of activity.  In my 4th mile of running, I am like Nick, convinced 
of some "belief", with no doubt.  But I never achieve that state in 
calisthenics.

On 09/21/2017 01:44 PM, Eric Smith wrote:
> Somehow I imagine that Nick means to say there are costly signals in this 
> game — that motor action is thicker than conversation or reflection.
> 
> If I am walking across a snowfield that I know to be filled with crevasses, 
> and I know I can’t tell which snow holds weight and which doesn’t, my 
> movement is really different than it is putting my feet on the floor beside 
> the bed in the morning.
> 
> To take a different example that is counterfactual but easier to use in 
> invoking the real physiological paralysis, if Thank God Ledge on halfdome 
> were not actually a solid ledge, but a fragile bridge, or if there had been a 
> rockfall that left part of it missing and I were blindfolded, or if I were a 
> prisoner of pirates blindfolded and made to walk the plank, my steps would 
> land differently than they do when I get out of bed in the morning.
> 
> There I didn’t say what anyone else would do in any circumstance, but did 
> claim that my own motions have different regimes that are viscerally _very_ 
> distinct.  I’m not sure I can think about whether I would fight for air when 
> being drowned.  It might be atavistic and beyond anything I normally refer to 
> as “thought”.  I certainly have had people claim to me that that is the case.
> 
> Those distinctions may occupy a different plane than the distinction between 
> reasonableness and dogmatism all in the world of conversation and the social 
> exchange.
> 
> But I should not speak for others.  Only for myself as a spectator.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Speaking for myself, I don’t hold A as an assumption.  A is more like a 
function parameterized on relevant conditions that computes an expected value.  
 Alternatively it could also be a predicate, but parameterized on some 
threshold of risk and/or reward.  If snows a little, I just jump in the car and 
go.   If it is wet and cold and snowed a lot, I go look at the pavement, and 
consider the risks of not getting to where I might be expected or try to think 
of ways to mitigate the risk (e.g. chains).  Sometimes I miscalculate or 
misapprehend the risks and rewards, like the time the car was acting up, but I 
felt I needed to get to work to take a large supercomputer reservation.   (I 
kept going and the car broke a tie rod and was ruined!)

And I never just hop out of bed without looking because the dog could be there.

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:46 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Ok.  Self-reflection time.

1.   Ah!  Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings.  To what extent 
does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of acting, one 
holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a matter of 
logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.

2.   I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God, 
particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out 
Feynman as if HE were God.  I do so because it is easier for me to figure out 
what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if feels 
less narcissistic.  But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral because, 
of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I think] and 
others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right.

3.   I now know why I am being cranky.  I am supposed to be winterizing the 
Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe.  I hate travel, I hate 
winterizing, and I hate packing.  From my actions, I surmise that I have been 
acting in the belief that I will be happier if I start a fight on FRIAM then if 
I put my head down and do the things I am supposed to be doing.  Sober 
reflection suggests that I may be wrong in that belief.  Will this reflection 
result in a change in my beliefs?  Only my actions will tell.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem 
with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than a 
few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For goodness 
sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder when people 
can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia


Dear Glen,



I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:



"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the 
universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι 
can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."



… is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as 
absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.



Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot doubt 
that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in 
the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us 
that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is doubtable in the 
sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we 
live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed.  Like the 
other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it 
and make something wise and noble of what is left.



Nick





Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

2017-09-21 Thread Roger Critchlow

I believe you all have too much free time.

-- rec --


On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Marcus Daniels 
wrote:

> Speaking for myself, I don’t hold A as an assumption.  A is more like a
> function parameterized on relevant conditions that computes an expected
> value.   Alternatively it could also be a predicate, but parameterized on
> some threshold of risk and/or reward.  If snows a little, I just jump in
> the car and go.   If it is wet and cold and snowed a lot, I go look at the
> pavement, and consider the risks of not getting to where I might be
> expected or try to think of ways to mitigate the risk (e.g. chains).
> Sometimes I miscalculate or misapprehend the risks and rewards, like the
> time the car was acting up, but I felt I needed to get to work to take a
> large supercomputer reservation.   (I kept going and the car broke a tie
> rod and was ruined!)
>
>
>
> And I never just hop out of bed without looking because the dog could be
> there.
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Nick
> Thompson
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:46 PM
>
> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> Ok.  Self-reflection time.
>
> 1.   Ah!  Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings.  To what
> extent does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of
> acting, one holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a
> matter of logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.
>
> 2.   I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God,
> particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out
> Feynman as if HE were God.  I do so because it is easier for me to figure
> out what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if
> feels less narcissistic.  But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral
> because, of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I
> think] and others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right.
>
> 3.   I now know why I am being cranky.  I am supposed to be
> winterizing the Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe.  I
> hate travel, I hate winterizing, and I hate packing.  From my actions, I
> surmise that I have been acting in the belief that I will be happier if I
> start a fight on FRIAM then if I put my head down and do the things I am
> supposed to be doing.  Sober reflection suggests that I may be wrong in
> that belief.  Will this reflection result in a change in my beliefs?  Only
> my actions will tell.
>
>
>
> Nick
>
>
>
> Nicholas S. Thompson
>
> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>
> Clark University
>
> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com
> ] *On Behalf Of *Marcus Daniels
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem
> with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than
> a few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For
> goodness sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder
> when people can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.
>
>
>
> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com
> ] *On Behalf Of *Nick Thompson
> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
> friam@redfish.com>
> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>
>
>
> Dear Glen,
>
>
>
> I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:
>
>
>
> *"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live
> with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more
> interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong.
> I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of
> certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And
> there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know
> an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by
> being lost in the universe without having any purpose, which is the way it
> really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."*
>
>
>
> … is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise
> as absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.
>
>
>
> Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot
> doubt that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of
> the bed in the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our
> eyes tell us that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is
> doubtable in the sense that Feynman so vaingloriousl

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Thanks, Eric.  Great as always to hear from you. 

One of the surest ways to avoid packing and winterizing a house is to make a 
dumb statement and then spend the next week defending it on a list-serv. I am 
not quite sure I am in that territory, yet, but I am entertaining doubts. 

As a behaviorist, I have to concede that it is possible to act tentatively.  
When I am meeting a dog for the first time, I extend the back of my hand into 
the danger zone near its muzzle, rather than putting out my hand confidently 
and stroking its neck, head, or flank.  This allows the dog a chance to smell 
my hand and me a chance to gauge its intentions.  Am I acting in doubt.  I 
guess it depends on what the proposition is.  If the proposition is that I am 
safe to reach out and pet the dog, I definitely doubt that.  If the proposition 
is that no dog is safe to touch on the first meeting, then my tentative 
behavior affirms that belief.  

Peirce defined belief as that upon which we act and doubt as the absence of 
belief.  It follows logically that anything we act on affirms some belief and, 
therefore, at the moment of action, extinguishes all contrary beliefs.  If you 
follow me here, I may appear to win the argument, but only on sophistic points. 

Allow me to go for a KO.  When you are interacting with humans, how exactly DO 
you decide what they believe?  What are the practices you would engage in to 
test the belief of somebody.  Can you imagine a test of some belief that would 
allow you to infer that I believe something even though my actions are 
inconsistent with that belief?  Would that be rational on your part, or just 
evidence of your Christian good nature?  Or your belief in a non-material mind? 

All the best, 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Eric Smith
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 4:44 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Somehow I imagine that Nick means to say there are costly signals in this game 
— that motor action is thicker than conversation or reflection.

If I am walking across a snowfield that I know to be filled with crevasses, and 
I know I can’t tell which snow holds weight and which doesn’t, my movement is 
really different than it is putting my feet on the floor beside the bed in the 
morning.

To take a different example that is counterfactual but easier to use in 
invoking the real physiological paralysis, if Thank God Ledge on halfdome were 
not actually a solid ledge, but a fragile bridge, or if there had been a 
rockfall that left part of it missing and I were blindfolded, or if I were a 
prisoner of pirates blindfolded and made to walk the plank, my steps would land 
differently than they do when I get out of bed in the morning.

There I didn’t say what anyone else would do in any circumstance, but did claim 
that my own motions have different regimes that are viscerally _very_ distinct. 
 I’m not sure I can think about whether I would fight for air when being 
drowned.  It might be atavistic and beyond anything I normally refer to as 
“thought”.  I certainly have had people claim to me that that is the case.

Those distinctions may occupy a different plane than the distinction between 
reasonableness and dogmatism all in the world of conversation and the social 
exchange.

But I should not speak for others.  Only for myself as a spectator.

Eric

> On Sep 21, 2017, at 4:32 PM, gⅼеɳ ☣  wrote:
> 
> No regrets or apology are needed.  And even if we are about to "argue about 
> words" ... I forget what famous dead white guy said that ... it's still 
> useful to me.
> 
> You say: "if one acts in the assurance that some fact is the case, one cannot 
> be said to really doubt it"  The answer is clarified by reading Marcus' post. 
>  If you act with assurance, then you're not open to changing your mind.  So, 
> you've simply moved the goal posts or passed the buck.
> 
> I *never* act with assurance, as far as I can tell.  Every thing I do seems 
> plagued with doubt.  I can force myself out of this state with some 
> activities.  Running more than 3 miles does it.  Math sometimes does it.  
> Beer does it.  Etc.  But for almost every other action, I do doubt it.  So, I 
> don't think we're having the discussion James and Peirce might have.  I think 
> we're talking about two different types of people, those with a tendency to 
> believe their own beliefs and those who tend to disbelieve their own beliefs.
> 
> Maybe it's because people who act with assurance are just smarter than people 
> like me?  I don't know.  It's important in this modern world, what with our 
> affirmation bubbles, fake news, and whatnot.  What is it that makes people 
> prefer to associate with people whose beliefs they share?  What

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

If I carry on for another 45 minutes it will be time to cook dinner and I 
cannot either pack or winterize for yet another day. 

 

May God have mercy on my soul. 

 

n

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Frank Wimberly
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 4:51 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

 

1.  Empirical.

 

2.  Freud is as close to God as early 20th century intellectuals can get.

 

3.  Your rationalized procrastination makes sense to me.

 

:-)

 

Frank

Frank Wimberly
Phone (505) 670-9918

 

On Sep 21, 2017 2:46 PM, "Nick Thompson" mailto:nickthomp...@earthlink.net> > wrote:

Ok.  Self-reflection time. 

1.   Ah!  Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings.  To what extent 
does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of acting, one 
holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a matter of 
logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.  

2.   I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God, 
particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out 
Feynman as if HE were God.  I do so because it is easier for me to figure out 
what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if feels 
less narcissistic.  But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral because, 
of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I think] and 
others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right. 

3.   I now know why I am being cranky.  I am supposed to be winterizing the 
Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe.  I hate travel, I hate 
winterizing, and I hate packing.  From my actions, I surmise that I have been 
acting in the belief that I will be happier if I start a fight on FRIAM then if 
I put my head down and do the things I am supposed to be doing.  Sober 
reflection suggests that I may be wrong in that belief.  Will this reflection 
result in a change in my beliefs?  Only my actions will tell. 

 

Nick 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

  
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com 
 ] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

 

There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem 
with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than a 
few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For goodness 
sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder when people 
can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.

 

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' mailto:friam@redfish.com> >
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

 

Dear Glen,  

 

I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:

 

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the 
universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι 
can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

 

… is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as 
absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.  

 

Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot doubt 
that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in 
the morning or that the visual field is whole, even though our eyes tell us 
that there are two gian holes in it.  Every perception is doubtable in the 
sense that Feynman so vaingloriously lays out here, yet for the most part we 
live in a world of inferred expectations which are largely confirmed.  Like the 
other Feynman quote, it is wise only when we stipulate what is absurd about it 
and make something wise and noble of what is left. 

 

Nick 

 

 

Nicholas S. Thompson

Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology

Clark University

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

If you, as a non-dualist, allow for tentative action, why not allow for 
tentative belief?

On 09/21/2017 02:20 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Peirce defined belief as that upon which we act and doubt as the absence of 
> belief.  It follows logically that anything we act on affirms some belief 
> and, therefore, at the moment of action, extinguishes all contrary beliefs.  
> If you follow me here, I may appear to win the argument, but only on 
> sophistic points.  

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

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Re: [FRIAM] The Atlantic article on "the illusion of reality"

2017-09-21 Thread Russell Standish

On Tue, Sep 19, 2017 at 03:38:29AM +, Russ Abbott wrote:
> Nick wrote, "the idea of a real world outside experience is nonsense"
> 
> What does that say about areas of the universe or periods of the universe
> that have no experiencing beings?
> 
> Also, we synchronize our experiences so that we can communicate. (And we
> manage to do that reasonably well most of the time.) Is there any reason
> that's even possible if there is no real world outside each person's
> individual experience? (Or does this misrepresent what you have in mind?)
> 

My dear realist and anti-realist friends! I have been having a long
debate with another philosopher friend of mine who essentially argues
that Goedel's incompleteness theorem entails realism. For the purposes
of our discussion, we define realism as being properties independent
of observation, ie brute facts about the world, and anti-realism as
the position that there are no such properties - every observed
property must either come about through the process of observation, or
be effectively random eg I speak English here,but there are other
people who speak Chinese, and somewhere out in the Multiverse are
people speaking any conceivable language,

One may categorise realism as the position that some things are and
other things aren't. Roughly as a result of that, I argue in my book
Theory of Nothing that Everythingism (ie everything exists in a
Multiverse) entails anti-realism, ie that laws of physics must be
grounded in psychological laws, and vice-versa. As a consequence,
discussions of ontology (what might be the real fabric of our
existence) are pointless, as no empirical observation can reveal
anything about it.

Anyway, back to lurking...

Cheers

-- 

Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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Re: [FRIAM] The Atlantic article on "the illusion of reality"

Russell writes:

"One may categorise realism as the position that some things are and other 
things aren't. Roughly as a result of that, I argue in my book Theory of 
Nothing that Everythingism (ie everything exists in a Multiverse) entails 
anti-realism, ie that laws of physics must be grounded in psychological laws, 
and vice-versa. As a consequence, discussions of ontology (what might be the 
real fabric of our existence) are pointless, as no empirical observation can 
reveal anything about it."

Isn't it plausible that there are different psychological laws in different 
bubbles of the multiverse?   How would minds span these multiverses to find out 
if there are universal laws?

Marcus


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Re: [FRIAM] One more from the feeling awesome and inspired dept

2017-09-21 Thread Russell Standish

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 11:59:02AM -0600, Gillian Densmore wrote:
> Going back over my weby-web basics...I seriusly don't recall when WebyWebs
> got to having good support for SVG and PostScripts. That is so awesome.  Is
> that new to HTML5. Udacity sugests including them with Canvas something
> about compatability and fluidity/responsitveness.
> 
> Either way that rocks rocks as a option.

Yes SVG and Canvas are HTML5 features that are very nifty. Canvas has
an excellent Javascript API, comparable, though not identical, to the
Cairo graphics library for C/C++.

A big shame is that MathML seems to have died. It is only supported in
Gecko-based browsers like Firefox, which has rapidly diminishing
market share. So we still have to embed images to represent
mathematics (poorly) like it was 1993.

-- 

Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

2017-09-21 Thread Merle Lefkoff

Thank you, Roger, for reading my mind.

Hurry up and pack, Nick.  I'm sure everyone misses you.

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 3:03 PM, Roger Critchlow  wrote:

> I believe you all have too much free time.
>
> -- rec --
>
>
> On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Marcus Daniels 
> wrote:
>
>> Speaking for myself, I don’t hold A as an assumption.  A is more like a
>> function parameterized on relevant conditions that computes an expected
>> value.   Alternatively it could also be a predicate, but parameterized on
>> some threshold of risk and/or reward.  If snows a little, I just jump in
>> the car and go.   If it is wet and cold and snowed a lot, I go look at the
>> pavement, and consider the risks of not getting to where I might be
>> expected or try to think of ways to mitigate the risk (e.g. chains).
>> Sometimes I miscalculate or misapprehend the risks and rewards, like the
>> time the car was acting up, but I felt I needed to get to work to take a
>> large supercomputer reservation.   (I kept going and the car broke a tie
>> rod and was ruined!)
>>
>>
>>
>> And I never just hop out of bed without looking because the dog could be
>> there.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] *On Behalf Of *Nick
>> Thompson
>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:46 PM
>>
>> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
>> friam@redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>>
>>
>>
>> Ok.  Self-reflection time.
>>
>> 1.   Ah!  Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings.  To what
>> extent does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of
>> acting, one holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a
>> matter of logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.
>>
>> 2.   I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God,
>> particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out
>> Feynman as if HE were God.  I do so because it is easier for me to figure
>> out what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if
>> feels less narcissistic.  But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral
>> because, of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I
>> think] and others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right.
>>
>> 3.   I now know why I am being cranky.  I am supposed to be
>> winterizing the Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe.  I
>> hate travel, I hate winterizing, and I hate packing.  From my actions, I
>> surmise that I have been acting in the belief that I will be happier if I
>> start a fight on FRIAM then if I put my head down and do the things I am
>> supposed to be doing.  Sober reflection suggests that I may be wrong in
>> that belief.  Will this reflection result in a change in my beliefs?  Only
>> my actions will tell.
>>
>>
>>
>> Nick
>>
>>
>>
>> Nicholas S. Thompson
>>
>> Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
>>
>> Clark University
>>
>> http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com
>> ] *On Behalf Of *Marcus Daniels
>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
>> *To:* The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group <
>> friam@redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>>
>>
>>
>> There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem
>> with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than
>> a few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For
>> goodness sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder
>> when people can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.
>>
>>
>>
>> *From:* Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com
>> ] *On Behalf Of *Nick Thompson
>> *Sent:* Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
>> *To:* 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' <
>> friam@redfish.com>
>> *Subject:* Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear Glen,
>>
>>
>>
>> I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:
>>
>>
>>
>> *"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live
>> with doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more
>> interesting to live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong.
>> I have approximate answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of
>> certainty about different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And
>> there are many things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know
>> an answer. I don't ... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by
>> being lost in the universe without having any purpose, which is the way it
>> really is as far as Ι can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."*
>>
>>
>>
>> … is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise
>> as absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.
>>
>>
>>
>> Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.

Re: [FRIAM] The Atlantic article on "the illusion of reality"

2017-09-21 Thread Russell Standish

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 10:44:51PM +, Marcus Daniels wrote:
> 
> Isn't it plausible that there are different psychological laws in
> different bubbles of the multiverse?   

Obviously. Differences in "laws" means they're not laws, of course, but
geographical facts. 

> How would minds span these multiverses to find out if there are universal 
> laws?
> 

In much the same way as porcupines have sex - with difficulty! But I'm
an optimistic guy - I think it is doable. Ultimately, we probably
won't know for sure, though, without a decent theory of consciousness.

-- 

Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

You should get back to talking to your television!

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Roger Critchlow
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:04 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

I believe you all have too much free time.

-- rec --

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 5:01 PM, Marcus Daniels 
mailto:mar...@snoutfarm.com>> wrote:
Speaking for myself, I don’t hold A as an assumption.  A is more like a 
function parameterized on relevant conditions that computes an expected value.  
 Alternatively it could also be a predicate, but parameterized on some 
threshold of risk and/or reward.  If snows a little, I just jump in the car and 
go.   If it is wet and cold and snowed a lot, I go look at the pavement, and 
consider the risks of not getting to where I might be expected or try to think 
of ways to mitigate the risk (e.g. chains).  Sometimes I miscalculate or 
misapprehend the risks and rewards, like the time the car was acting up, but I 
felt I needed to get to work to take a large supercomputer reservation.   (I 
kept going and the car broke a tie rod and was ruined!)

And I never just hop out of bed without looking because the dog could be there.

From: Friam 
[mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf 
Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 2:46 PM

To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Ok.  Self-reflection time.

1.   Ah!  Perhaps we ARE just quibbling about meanings.  To what extent 
does action based on assumption, A, imply that at the moment of acting, one 
holds A as a belief? I seem to be claiming that it does so as a matter of 
logic; perhaps the rest of you think it is an empirical claim.

2.   I have not defended my trotting out Peirce as if he were God, 
particularly given that I have done so in commentary on others trotting out 
Feynman as if HE were God.  I do so because it is easier for me to figure out 
what somebody else thinks than to figure out what I think, and also if feels 
less narcissistic.  But as Glen points out, this benefit is ephemeral because, 
of course, [What I think Peirce thinks] is just [Something that I think] and 
others may wisely doubt that I have Peirce right.

3.   I now know why I am being cranky.  I am supposed to be winterizing the 
Massachusetts house and packing to travel to Santa Fe.  I hate travel, I hate 
winterizing, and I hate packing.  From my actions, I surmise that I have been 
acting in the belief that I will be happier if I start a fight on FRIAM then if 
I put my head down and do the things I am supposed to be doing.  Sober 
reflection suggests that I may be wrong in that belief.  Will this reflection 
result in a change in my beliefs?  Only my actions will tell.

Nick

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Marcus Daniels
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 3:54 PM
To: The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

There is nothing that infuriates me more than trying to solve a problem 
with/for someone is confident in their hypothesis for no reason other than a 
few past experiences.   No we definitely can live with doubt.  For goodness 
sake we have Donald as president.It is a personality disorder when people 
can’t depart from their priors in the face of actual evidence.

From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of Nick Thompson
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 1:48 PM
To: 'The Friday Morning Applied Complexity Coffee Group' 
mailto:friam@redfish.com>>
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Dear Glen,

I don't know why I am so pissed at Feynman right now but this quote:

"When you doubt and ask, it gets a little harder to believe. I can live with 
doubt, and uncertainty, and not knowing. I think it's much more interesting to 
live not knowing than to have answers which might be wrong. I have approximate 
answers, and possible beliefs, and different degrees of certainty about 
different things. I'm not absolutely sure of anything. And there are many 
things Ι don't know anything about. But Ι don't have to know an answer. I don't 
... Ι don't feel frightened by not knowing things, by being lost in the 
universe without having any purpose, which is the way it really is as far as Ι 
can tell, possibly. It doesn't frighten me."

… is another one of those sentiments that we would immediately recognise as 
absurd if Feynman hadn’t said it.

Peirce would say, for the most part, we cannot live in doubt.  We cannot doubt 
that the floor is still under our feet when we put our legs out of the bed in 
the morning or that the visual field is wh

Re: [FRIAM] The Atlantic article on "the illusion of reality"

Is this substantially different from modal realism? 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modal_realism

On 09/21/2017 03:54 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 10:44:51PM +, Marcus Daniels wrote:
>>
>> Isn't it plausible that there are different psychological laws in
>> different bubbles of the multiverse?   

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove

Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

Glen, 

Well, answering in the sophistic manner, because logically speaking, acting 
tentatively affirms tentativeness.  

Let's me think about this for a moment.  If acting and believing are 
inextricable then the following question becomes relevant.  Is it possible (can 
you give me an example) of a contradictory ACTION.  EG, can I both stop to pick 
up the Wheaties that I just dropped on the floor flake (that my wife will kill 
me for leaving there} and NOT stop to pick it up?  Because, if we can have our 
cake and eat it to in the behavior department AND we are Peirceans, the we 
probably can have our cake and eat it too in the belief department. 

Nick 

Nicholas S. Thompson
Emeritus Professor of Psychology and Biology
Clark University
http://home.earthlink.net/~nickthompson/naturaldesigns/

-Original Message-
From: Friam [mailto:friam-boun...@redfish.com] On Behalf Of g??? ?
Sent: Thursday, September 21, 2017 5:29 PM
To: FriAM 
Subject: Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

If you, as a non-dualist, allow for tentative action, why not allow for 
tentative belief?

On 09/21/2017 02:20 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Peirce defined belief as that upon which we act and doubt as the absence of 
> belief.  It follows logically that anything we act on affirms some belief 
> and, therefore, at the moment of action, extinguishes all contrary beliefs.  
> If you follow me here, I may appear to win the argument, but only on 
> sophistic points.  

--
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College to unsubscribe 
http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
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FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia

On 09/21/2017 04:50 PM, Nick Thompson wrote:
> Well, answering in the sophistic manner, because logically speaking, acting 
> tentatively affirms tentativeness.  

You seem to forget that there are many types of logic, paraconsistent, 
defeasible, higher order, etc.

> Is it possible (can you give me an example) of a contradictory ACTION.

Yes, of course.  E.g. Since most of my actions involve very tight feedback 
loops, something like tossing a ball to a friend can be launched and then I can 
make attempts to abort it if, say, I notice the friend has looked away.  Since 
I would claim that all actions are actually temporally extended processes 
rather than quantum events, I would claim that MOST actions involve branches 
and many branches can be reached from other branches.  So, not only are they 
branched, but many of the branches don't "contradict" the other branches.

-- 
☣ gⅼеɳ

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] One more from the feeling awesome and inspired dept

I've heard of MathML having issues.. Do you know if something like
webcompents+polymer or baking it into HTML might be next.
And yeah Iike some things fire fox does over Chrome. History, addons. older
browser versions. Wich is great. like if their's a gremlin in Acme's
Latest. I can use Acme's Slightly Older one.
It amuses me everything but I doesn't like canvas..I've found canvas
useful as a backup.
Unless it's changed Wordpress is really weird when it comes to JavaScript.
Canvas can do some stuff pretty well without lagging horribly. (Loading
slides for example)

YAR!

On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 4:50 PM, Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Thu, Sep 21, 2017 at 11:59:02AM -0600, Gillian Densmore wrote:
> > Going back over my weby-web basics...I seriusly don't recall when
> WebyWebs
> > got to having good support for SVG and PostScripts. That is so awesome.
> Is
> > that new to HTML5. Udacity sugests including them with Canvas something
> > about compatability and fluidity/responsitveness.
> >
> > Either way that rocks rocks as a option.
>
> Yes SVG and Canvas are HTML5 features that are very nifty. Canvas has
> an excellent Javascript API, comparable, though not identical, to the
> Cairo graphics library for C/C++.
>
> A big shame is that MathML seems to have died. It is only supported in
> Gecko-based browsers like Firefox, which has rapidly diminishing
> market share. So we still have to embed images to represent
> mathematics (poorly) like it was 1993.
>
> --
>
> 
> 
> Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
> Principal, High Performance Coders
> Visiting Senior Research Fellowhpco...@hpcoders.com.au
> Economics, Kingston University http://www.hpcoders.com.au
> 
> 
>
> 
> FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
> Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
> to unsubscribe http://redfish.com/mailman/listinfo/friam_redfish.com
> FRIAM-COMIC http://friam-comic.blogspot.com/ by Dr. Strangelove
>

FRIAM Applied Complexity Group listserv
Meets Fridays 9a-11:30 at cafe at St. John's College
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Re: [FRIAM] Doxastic logic - Wikipedia