Re: Gnupg-users Digest, Vol 220, Issue 11
Hello, Please unsubscribe me from this list. Chris On 10/01/2022 15:08, gnupg-users-requ...@gnupg.org wrote: Send Gnupg-users mailing list submissions to gnupg-users@gnupg.org To subscribe or unsubscribe via the World Wide Web, visit http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users or, via email, send a message with subject or body 'help' to gnupg-users-requ...@gnupg.org You can reach the person managing the list at gnupg-users-ow...@gnupg.org When replying, please edit your Subject line so it is more specific than "Re: Contents of Gnupg-users digest..." Today's Topics: 1. AW: GPG key generated on Windows... (Robert Flosbach) 2. Re: AW: GPG key generated on Windows... (Werner Koch) 3. Re: one ecc key-pair for both encryption and signature? (Bernhard Reiter) 4. Re: Yubikeys and GnuPG 2.2/2.3 (Werner Koch) 5. Fwd: gpg: onepass_sig with unknown version 105 (Gilberto F. da Silva) 6. Re: one ecc key-pair for both encryption and signature? (Robert J. Hansen) -- Message: 1 Date: Sun, 9 Jan 2022 10:25:39 +0100 From: "Robert Flosbach" To: Subject: AW: GPG key generated on Windows... Message-ID: <003a01d8053a$de2469c0$9a6d3d40$@gmx.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Thank you very much for your help! For future reference and people having the same issue: gpg2.3 introduced a new packet type 20 which provides authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) [1]. A key generated with gpg2.3 supports this encryption type and encryption in Windows (using the current Gpg4win 4.0.0) defaults to AEAD for a key generated with default settings. Since AEAD/type 20 is not supported yet by version 2.2, decryption on linux distros is not possible using version 2.2.X from their repositories. [1] https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-06.html#rfc.section.5.16 -- Message: 2 Date: Sun, 09 Jan 2022 12:14:27 +0100 From: Werner Koch To: Robert Flosbach via Gnupg-users Subject: Re: AW: GPG key generated on Windows... Message-ID: <87h7adtb3g@wheatstone.g10code.de> Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" On Sun, 9 Jan 2022 10:25, Robert Flosbach said: For future reference and people having the same issue: gpg2.3 introduced a new packet type 20 which provides authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) [1]. A key generated with gpg2.3 supports this encryption type and encryption in Windows (using the current Gpg4win 4.0.0) defaults to AEAD for a key generated with There are two ways to change this: the first is to change the preferences on your key (using 2.3's --edit-key) and the second is to put --8<---cut here---start->8--- ignore-invalid-option personal-aead-preferences personal-aead-preferences none --8<---cut here---end--->8--- into gpg.conf . From the man page: --personal-aead-preferences string Set the list of personal AEAD preferences to string. Use gpg --version to get a list of available algorithms, and use none to set no preference at all. This allows the user to safely override the algorithm chosen by the recipient key preferences, as GPG will only select an algorithm that is usable by all recipients. The most highly ranked cipher in this list is also used for the --symmetric encryption command. (the ignore-invalid-option line allows to use the same gpg.conf also with gpg 2.2) Shalom-Salam, Werner ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is it possible to require two private keys to decrypt with gpg?
However, I would like to question your need for requiring two gpg keys. How are they two gpg going to be more secure? Guessing that possibly two different people need to be in agreement in order to access data, along the lines of needing two keys to launch missiles? :) Otherwise, I agree just encrypting twice doesn't seem to buy much. -C ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Unable to decrypt file copied from USB thumb drive.
The hash of my gpg file on my laptop is different to it's hash on the thumb drive. For comparison, the hash of the tar.gz file (i.e. before encryption) is the same before and after I copy it to the thumb drive. Are there any techniques I should be using to protect my gpg file? Chris Taylor ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Unable to decrypt file copied from USB thumb drive.
Thank you - I will check. Almost certainly the hash of my .gpg file will be different after it has passed through the Thumb Drive. However, no other files on the Thumb Drive get corrupted. So, my question will probably become how can I protect my .gpg file when it is moved off my laptop onto other meda? Chris. On 29/10/2021 12:05, Dirk-Willem van Gulik wrote: On 29 Oct 2021, at 10:17, Chris Taylor wrote: I am developing a backup process for personal files, on USB thumb drive. I tar and zip my files (30GB) then encrypt them with: gpg --no-symkey-cache --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 my-backup.tar.gz I copy my-backup.tar.gz.gpg to my USB thumb drive. I am using Ubuntu so the USB drive is formatted to Ext4. I try to decrypt with: gpg --output my-backup.tar.gz --decrypt my-backup.tar.gz.gpg and get the following error: gpg: AES256 encrypted data gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase gpg: block_filter 0x556d112aa1e0: read error (size=13328,a->size=13328) gpg: WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated! gpg: block_filter: pending bytes! I have gpg version 2.2.19, libgcrypt 1.8.5. Without encryption this process has worked perfectly well many times. I'd first check with something like openssl sha256 my-backup.tar.gz prior to copy / post copy if your thumb drive is good. Dw. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Unable to decrypt file copied from USB thumb drive.
Hello Group, I am developing a backup process for personal files, on USB thumb drive. I tar and zip my files (30GB) then encrypt them with: gpg --no-symkey-cache --symmetric --cipher-algo AES256 my-backup.tar.gz I copy my-backup.tar.gz.gpg to my USB thumb drive. I am using Ubuntu so the USB drive is formatted to Ext4. I try to decrypt with: gpg --output my-backup.tar.gz --decrypt my-backup.tar.gz.gpg and get the following error: gpg: AES256 encrypted data gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase gpg: block_filter 0x556d112aa1e0: read error (size=13328,a->size=13328) gpg: WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated! gpg: block_filter: pending bytes! I have gpg version 2.2.19, libgcrypt 1.8.5. Without encryption this process has worked perfectly well many times. Any advice greatly appreciated. Chris. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GTK pinentry with gpg-agent as ssh-agent
On Tue, 2021-03-02 at 10:35 +, Romain Lebrun Thauront via Gnupg-users wrote: > Hi folks, > > I start using my gpg key as my ssh key and I configure gpg-agent to manage my > ssh keys as mention in the arch wiki > article. > The problem is, it work well but my gpg-agent is now "link" to the last > terminal I opened, and I do not have the GTK's > Pinentry prompt. > It's very annoying as I use a lot of terminal, and some graphic software like > thunderbird will not trigger the GTK > prompt to unlock my GPG key anymore. (Therefore hanging indefinitely in the > hope to receive access to my GPG private > key, which they never acceed as I do not have any prompt to unlock it) > I actually trigger a dummy unlocking of my GPG key on the last terminal I have > open every time I know an application is > going to need access to the key. (which is really annoying) > > So, is there a way to have BOTH gpg-agent managing ssh, and GTK pinentry > prompts for unlocking keys ? > If not, is there a way to export/convert a gpg private key into an ssh private > key, so I can go back to classic ssh- > agent. (And I will convert my GPG A private subkey to a SSH private key each > time I rotate my subkeys) (this is not a > big deal if I can automate it...) > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users Sounds like you don't have GPG_TTY setup correctly. Did you pass over this part of the documentation? Adding this to your .bashrc (or equivalent) should allow whichever terminal you're using to access the gpg-agent https://wiki.archlinux.org/index.php/GnuPG#Configure_pinentry_to_use_the_correct_TTY ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: binary distribution of GnuPG for SuSE Linux SLES 15
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Tue, 2020-10-13 at 15:11 +0200, Matthias Apitz wrote: > > Hello, > > Is there any provider for a binary RPM for this OS: > > # cat /etc/os-release > NAME="SLES" > VERSION="15-SP1" > VERSION_ID="15.1" > PRETTY_NAME="SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 15 SP1" > ID="sles" > ID_LIKE="suse" > ANSI_COLOR="0;32" > CPE_NAME="cpe:/o:suse:sles:15:sp1" > > Or do we have to compile it from source? > > Thanks > > matthias > Hi Matthias, There appear to be a few different repositoris related to SLES 15, and to be honest I'm not sure what the difference between them actually is. - From my initial investigation it that gpg2 is available in either one of the following two repositories (original SLE 15) https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/SUSE:SLE-15:GA/gpg2 https://build.opensuse.org/package/show/SUSE:SLE-15:Update/gpg2 yet is missing from SLE SP1 and SP2 https://build.opensuse.org/project/show/SUSE:SLE-15-SP1:GA https://build.opensuse.org/project/show/SUSE:SLE-15-SP1:Update https://build.opensuse.org/project/show/SUSE:SLE-15-SP2:GA https://build.opensuse.org/project/show/SUSE:SLE-15-SP2:Update I would try to get it from one of the original SLE repos, or ask on a SUSE mailing list about why it's missing from SP1. Cheers, Chris -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEEss2dENO/PTuA9NTTOdNgxkl4+QMFAl+ItZsACgkQOdNgxkl4 +QOESBAAhkpR/b8mMiG8HMPDLy831IRfoDrv9dC1r0ZpfaqgKSELkGh7LBQ4Ch6o daCBAv+zjOkBjohQ0mLpAJEWShBeE76mRYWGNBYycWjV1ZoxOiP3kTIK7WH0lCkL LpzSFG7BDbtGqUsP1SZbq0hL6WT7WQI+OTuqSjXrYOrOZQLQxCSs66w3HBEOzfvI RKw28bCvFCcxY89Gr8gj//gns7b2yk6qOCO0pFlRARvVA1iV6MT9CNoyMZjJZFiv +OgksA4y50QOWAY11XtJg93gGffLEXcwauNoyAln2CQmDKTmGu7/ed19TGxw0rFF kIy8abJXtHr2MZ2xunOxK2Kx84aTD+0riMq0+PWVrZe02szOO0JQzk+OMb21wOKQ 7QJPt6rVvELRmUEeNT+/Td279+lbLGh6kYdw3ur4kjUNnft8xKWBTYRlzEwBHJYN jpWID+LTxWCdeC4w4/NSSE7Du3fIOWu5gUyxyWxQuXQbcmPn/HAo8v6g9/TotfkR CTUSS4YBXZCR7s3SUnRpaVnJfg+lkEw1dMwE0baeNi8kx1jrolX2+miRqvU5R9DE Gm6cE8ObQS/n9x/nEd0gTORhCDZ1T5gqr8/BL4jzeKnzpK9hRAv9BeLPAtFTXY8P cOx1GeEqhPjPhmBa9jGrmNRTXOShghGwdPEd+dnTbuBcSyl41Ac= =ogQv -END PGP SIGNATURE- ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Revoking a Lost Key
I wouldn't think you would want to be able to do that. If it can be done without the private key, then I can revoke your key for you... :-) -C On 2/5/2020 3:59 PM, Mark wrote: Is there anyway to revoke an OLD LOST PGP key? I no longer have either the public or private keys but can find the KeyID. I'm guessing not but figured I'd ask just in case. Thanks ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Android
YubiKeys are supported. You can use NFC key to perform crypto gimmicks or plug USB one. OpenKeychain does support quite large palette of hardware tokens. Paired with K-9 it actually provides relatively good UX.___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: FAQ October 2019 update
On 15/10/2019 21:59, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Should they update? Yes. Is the problem mitigated by an update? Yes. > But will they? Probably not before wedging their keyring. Given that > high-profile people in the community have had our certificates defaced, > it's possible someone will say "I want to ask dkg a question," pull down > his cert, get wedged, and... etc. I can confirm that this happens and users are being b0rked because of trolls. Street level rumour is that GnuPG key exchange is broken and you should not use it. It doesn't matter what the truth is - it is the public perception that recent SKS events made it unusable, this was advertised across the media all over the place and the image stuck. Additionally, poor handling of SKS fiasco by GnuPG community hurt it's credibility a lot, so a clear signal that this issue was treated seriously would be beneficial. Should it be advertised as a new go-to standard or as transitional standard, beta/alpha/whatever - I don't know, it's debatable. Cheers, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Future OpenPGP Support in Thunderbird
On 12/10/2019 12:14, Werner Koch via Gnupg-users wrote: > After 20 years of strong resistance against implementing OpenPGP [1], they > finally seem to do it. That is a good move. Do you know why they resited OpenPGP adoption it so much? Cheers, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Future OpenPGP Support in Thunderbird
On 09/10/2019 08:06, Tony Lane via Gnupg-users wrote:> It doesn't do that? Why would they choose to tightly couple TB with > OpenPGP? If I have to maintain two key databases, that's a dealbreaker for me. Dealing with GnuPG complexity is a deal breaker for ordinary users, preventing adoption. You need to look at it from product/business development perspective and it makes perfect sense that they want to ship their own UX. Also, they mention that the key management workflow is something they plan to address. Cheers, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Future OpenPGP Support in Thunderbird
On 11/10/2019 19:15, Phillip Susi wrote: > Why the heck don't they just run gpg the way enigmail did? They don't want to bundle GnuPG because of GnuPG licence: https://wiki.mozilla.org/Thunderbird:OpenPGP:2020#OpenPGP_engine Requiring user to set up GnuPG separately is out of question if they want to achieve any sensible level of adoption. There is another matter of key distribution and I guess they plan on taking control over it to provide acceptable level of UX. Cheers, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: We have GOT TO make things simpler
On 05/10/2019 15:06, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > OpenPGP was never meant to be about email. https://www.openpgp.org/ tells a different story. It would benefit the community if you guys stop bending over backwards, explaining potential users that their needs are invalid. Over and out. I really don't want to continue this fruitless conversation. Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: We have GOT TO make things simpler
> On 10/4/19 3:35 AM, Stefan Claas wrote: >> And do those 20 companies business with their customers were GnuPG >> signatures are legally binding, like real signatures on letters? > > _At least_ 20 fortune 500 businesses _that I know of_. Mind you, I'm not even counting governments. 20? Wow. There are 8 billion people on this planet, most of them don't work at 20 companies from Fortune 500. WhatsApp build crypto system that is successfully adopted by billions of users without technical knowledge. Our views on what can be considered a successful adoption are strongly misaligned. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: We have GOT TO make things simpler
On 02/10/2019 00:55, Tony Lane via Gnupg-users wrote: > This is not an issue with GnuPG. GnuPG is a back-end utility that front-end > applications (like GUIs) interface to. Go to your vendor of choice that > interfaces with GPG and complain (...) And this is precisely why GnuPG failed. Cheers, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Slightly OT - mobile OpenPGP usage
On 27/08/2019 20:50, Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote: > But what would be, when using computers at work or public places, then > the best strategy for using OpenPGP, without carrying a Notebook or > smartphone? The strategy I advice would be to not use GnuPG and look for alternatives. I wouldn't look for some golden practice because I believe there is none. Bluntly speaking, GnuPG is not fit for purpose of securing everyday communication and shall not be advertised as such. Generally your keys should never leave secure environment. Secure environment can be either dedicated machine that you control or (better) SmartCard/HSM. If your keys cannot be contained in secure environment, your comms channel should be re-keyed after use. Modern communicators perform re-keying after every message. GnuPG makes re-keying very cumbersome. > There should be good solution available IMHO. :-) Sadly, GnuPG never delivered friendly user experience. It found it's niche in some specialized use-cases, such as infrastructure - package signing, backup encryption, commands by e-mail, etc - but it never gained significant adoption among wider population. If you expected more - I' m sorry that you will be disappointed. Cheers, Chris Narkiewicz ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Slightly OT - mobile OpenPGP usage
On 27/08/2019 22:41, Peter Lebbing wrote: > If a computer is compromised, this is game over for cryptography. Full > stop. This is not true. Many crypto systems are designed to perform damage control and recovery in such cases. If the compromise is game over for the user - it depends on threat profile. Cheers, Chris Narkiewicz ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Slightly OT - mobile OpenPGP usage
On 26/08/2019 19:47, Wiktor Kwapisiewicz via Gnupg-users wrote: > If one sets URL field on the > token then just plugging the token when OpenKeychain is opened is enough > to get the key ready-to-use. Can you explain what kind of workflow do you mean here? signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Slightly OT - mobile OpenPGP usage
On 25/08/2019 19:40, Stefan Claas via Gnupg-users wrote: > Hi all, > > I am curious what apps you are using when not at home, to send > OpenPGP compatible email messages? Do you carry a Notebook with > GnuPG or do you use an OpenPGP smartphone app? Shortly, I know only one combination that provides reasonable use experience on mobile. Android + K-9 Mail + OpenKeychain + YubiKey with NFC. Cheers, Chris Narkiewicz signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: wrong gpg-agent version running?
Hi, I've run into this issue when my package manager updates gnupg without killing running gpg-agent daemons. I think you have a previous (old version) gpg-agent daemon still running. You can see if that's the case by looking at the output of 'ps x'. I would recommend killing that daemon by using 'gpgconf --kill gpg-agent'. Your next invocation of a gpg command will launch a fresh daemon using the correct version. Chris On Thu, 11 Jul 2019 at 11:50, Matthias Herrmann via Gnupg-users < gnupg-users@gnupg.org> wrote: > Hello > > I've recently upgraded to Debian buster, and then upgraded gpg by > downloading and installing the new version 2.2.17. > Now, I get this warning: > > > gpg: WARNING: server 'gpg-agent' is older than us (2.2.12 < 2.2.17) > > $ gpg --version > gpg (GnuPG) 2.2.17 > libgcrypt 1.8.4 > > $ which gpg-agent > /usr/local/bin/gpg-agent > > $ /usr/local/bin/gpg-agent --version > gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.2.17 > libgcrypt 1.8.4 > > $ gpgconf --list-dirs > sysconfdir:/usr/local/etc/gnupg > bindir:/usr/local/bin > libexecdir:/usr/local/libexec > libdir:/usr/local/lib/gnupg > datadir:/usr/local/share/gnupg > localedir:/usr/local/share/locale > socketdir:/run/user/1000/gnupg > > $ whereis gpg-agent > gpg-agent: /usr/bin/gpg-agent /usr/local/bin/gpg-agent > /usr/share/man/man1/gpg-agent.1.gz > > and: > $ /usr/bin/gpg-agent --version > gpg-agent (GnuPG) 2.2.12 > libgcrypt 1.8.4 > > $ echo $PATH > /usr/local/bin /usr/bin /bin /usr/local/games /usr/games > > I've even tried to add agent-program /usr/local/bin/gpg-agent to gpg.conf > > I don't know why the "wrong" agent gets started, can you please help me? > > -Hermi > > ___ > Gnupg-users mailing list > Gnupg-users@gnupg.org > http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users > ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: SKS Keyserver Network Under Attack
> I must have missed the memo > describing the exact nature of the problem. https://gist.github.com/rjhansen/67ab921ffb4084c865b3618d6955275f___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
What to do with public key signature
So I received a public key from a party. I verified it and I'm ready to sign it. What's next step? What should I ideally do with that signature? 1) send back to the key owner hoping that he will publish it to the keyserver? 2) should I just push it to keyserver myself? 3) what if the key owner did not publish his key? Best regards, Chris signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Help with SSH and GPG subkey for authentication
On Feb-23-19, Peter Lebbing wrote: On 23/02/2019 12:43, Chris Coutinho wrote: I'm not exactly sure what the difference is between that and a fingerprint A key's fingerprint is something specific to OpenPGP. It includes OpenPGP-specific information and formats. As such, it is undefined for an OpenSSH key or a CMS (X.509) key; it simply doesn't exist. A keygrip is a short representation of an asymmetric keypair's actual public key material. For example, it is the same for an RSA key whether that key is used for an OpenPGP key, an OpenSSH key or a CMS key. gpg-agent works with keygrips because it provides services to all of OpenPGP, SSH and CMS. And it allows you to use the same material in multiple formats that way, such as with the Authentication subkey. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter> Thanks for the succinct explanation Peter. signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Help with SSH and GPG subkey for authentication
On Feb-22-19, swedebugia wrote: Hi I'm quite a beginner to gnupg. I would like to have a master key used for both encrypting documents and mail and a subkey of that used for SSH. Following this https://incenp.org/notes/2015/gnupg-for-ssh-authentication.html I first set up the keys: sec ed25519/CFCD435B280B6CD2 created: 2019-02-22 expires: 2021-02-21 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate ssb cv25519/4FD4A5C38C7715BB created: 2019-02-22 expires: 2021-02-21 usage: E ssb ed25519/B84BE844E27BFE21 created: 2019-02-22 expires: 2021-02-21 usage: A [ultimate] (1). swedebugia (followed these two guides: https://www.gniibe.org/memo/software/gpg/keygen-25519.html and https://www.g-loaded.eu/2010/11/01/change-expiration-date-gpg-key/) I get this after restarting my gpg-agent: $ gpg-agent --server OK Pleased to meet you and in another terminal: $ ssh-add -l The agent has no identities. My environment is this: $ env|grep SSH SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh SSH_AGENT_PID=538 $ gpgconf --list-dirs agent-ssh-socket /run/user/1000/gnupg/S.gpg-agent.ssh My configs are attached. Thanks in advance! Cheers swedebugia enable-ssh-support 7338C1836152D95BBCEFF33F45C49516CC810826 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users What is the key that you in include in the .gnupg/sshcontrol file? On my system, it's the authentication subkey's 'keygrip'. I'm not exactly sure what the difference is between that and a fingerprint, but you can determine what it is using: $ gpg --list-secret-keys --with-keygrip Then make sure the keygrip in 'sshcontrol' matches the keygrip of your authentication subkey. Cheers, Chris signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
gpg-agent forwarding to remote with systemd - status?
Hi, I'm trying to forward my local gpg-agent over ssh to a remote that controls the gnupg sockets via systemd. This fails because sshd attempts to place the socket in a directory that doesn't exist, because that is handled on the remote by systemd. This issue was raised back in 2016: https://gnupg-users.gnupg.narkive.com/eYVmOa2h/agent-forwarding-failure-when-the-socketdir-was-autodeleted It was suggested in that thread to place `gpgconf --create-socketdir` in '.bashrc' to create the proper directory, but this doesn't work in my case because on the remote the directory is created/deleted by systemd and shell scripts are sourced after ssh attempts to place the socket. >From my limited understanding of the issue, it seems that it wasn't clear in what project the solution should be (openssh, systemd, gnupg). Is there an update regarding this issue, or any proposed workarounds for systemd-based remotes? Regards, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg-agent forwarding to remote with systemd - status?
I should add that the remote is OpenSUSE Leap 15.0 running GnuPG 2.2.5, and my current client is OpenSUSE Leap 15.0 running WSL on Windows 10, also running GnuPG 2.2.5. The WSL client doesn't have systemd installed on it, so it uses the old ~/.gnupg directory for holding sockets. On client: $ gpgconf --list-dir socketdir /home/chris/.gnupg On remote: $ gpgconf --list-dir socketdir /run/user/1001/gnupg Regards, Chris On Fri, 1 Feb 2019 at 11:42, Chris Coutinho wrote: > > Hi, > > I'm trying to forward my local gpg-agent over ssh to a remote that > controls the gnupg sockets via systemd. This fails because sshd > attempts to place the socket in a directory that doesn't exist, > because that is handled on the remote by systemd. > > This issue was raised back in 2016: > > https://gnupg-users.gnupg.narkive.com/eYVmOa2h/agent-forwarding-failure-when-the-socketdir-was-autodeleted > > It was suggested in that thread to place `gpgconf --create-socketdir` > in '.bashrc' to create the proper directory, but this doesn't work in > my case because on the remote the directory is created/deleted by > systemd and shell scripts are sourced after ssh attempts to place the > socket. > > From my limited understanding of the issue, it seems that it wasn't > clear in what project the solution should be (openssh, systemd, > gnupg). > > Is there an update regarding this issue, or any proposed workarounds > for systemd-based remotes? > > Regards, > Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GPG on Android
OpenKeychain plus K9, both free and fully featured. On November 3, 2018 12:04:45 PM EDT, Yagthara Aghhay-Boor wrote: >Hello Group, > >I'm very new to GPG and email encryption and looking for a app to use >gpg >and signed email on my android devices. >Can you recommend me a email app to use with pgp on Android? > >best >Masha -- Sent from my Android device with K-9 Mail. Please excuse my brevity.___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: PGP Authentication with gpg4win+ssh
Yep did all of that, my auth key is in sshcontrol. Pagent simply doesn't see it, and ssh-add -l is blank. If I connect my PGP smartcard it works just fine. If I do a gpg --list-keys my keys all show up just fine. 'Tis a mystery. Chris On Tue, Oct 30, 2018 at 12:08 AM NIIBE Yutaka wrote: > Chris Horry wrote: > > I also created an Authentication subkey for my other PGP Key, the only > > difference being it's not on my Yubkiey but in my regular keyring with > > Kleopatra. This same key works just fine on my Linux boxes when I use it > > for authentication between them but not in Windows. PuTTY shows no keys > > available in the agent and thus my login is rejected. > > > > Is there some setting I'm missing or does gpg4win only support PGP > > authentication with SSH via a smart card? > > Your authentication subkey should be listed in .gnupg/sshcontrol, while > it is automatically supported for Gnuk Token and OpenPGP card. > > For detail, I found this post: > https://ryanlue.com/posts/2017-06-29-gpg-for-ssh-auth#adding-keys > -- > -- Chris Horry Ham Radio - KG4TSM zer...@gmail.com https://twitter.com/zerbey <http://twitter.com/zerbey> ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
PGP Authentication with gpg4win+ssh
Hello All, I'm trying to get this to work with gpg4win. I have a Yubikey with a PGP key stored and it works just fine. I connect with PuTTY, it connects to the GPG agent and it pops up asking for my Yubikey PIN and away I go. My config looks like this: Linux side: authorized_keys file has the converted PGP key as RSA keys added. Windows side: PGP key is in the Kleopata keyring. gpg-agent.conf has enable-putty-support, gpg-connect-agent is running. I also created an Authentication subkey for my other PGP Key, the only difference being it's not on my Yubkiey but in my regular keyring with Kleopatra. This same key works just fine on my Linux boxes when I use it for authentication between them but not in Windows. PuTTY shows no keys available in the agent and thus my login is rejected. Is there some setting I'm missing or does gpg4win only support PGP authentication with SSH via a smart card? Chris -- Chris Horry Ham Radio - KG4TSM zer...@gmail.com https://twitter.com/zerbey <http://twitter.com/zerbey> ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Wrong key usage (0x19, 0x2) on key
Werne, Thanks for letting me know and for the patch, 73, Chris On Mon, Oct 8, 2018 at 10:34 AM Werner Koch wrote: > On Fri, 5 Oct 2018 21:04, zer...@gmail.com said: > > > gpg: bad data signature from key : Wrong key usage (0x19, 0x2) > > Secret key is available. > > Right, I noticed this as well but ignored it. Thanks for raising this. > I re-opened task 4014 and pushed a fix to master. I attach it in case > you want to apply and test it in stable. > > 73 de DD9JN > > -- > Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz. > -- Chris Horry Ham Radio - KG4TSM zer...@gmail.com https://twitter.com/zerbey <http://twitter.com/zerbey> ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Wrong key usage (0x19, 0x2) on key
Hello all, I noticed my key has started throwing this warning in new versions, it may have been related to me trying to add an authentication key for my YubiKey so I'm hoping I didn't mess it up. I've done some Googling to see if there's a way to restore it to normal operation without much success: gpg: bad data signature from key : Wrong key usage (0x19, 0x2) Secret key is available. sec rsa4096/ created: 2016-05-03 expires: 2021-05-03 usage: SC trust: ultimate validity: ultimate ssb rsa4096/ created: 2016-05-03 expires: 2021-05-03 usage: E The following key was revoked on 2018-09-26 by RSA key Chris Horry sub rsa4096/ created: 2018-09-23 revoked: 2018-09-26 usage: SEA The following key was revoked on 2018-09-26 by RSA key Chris Horry sub rsa4096/ created: 2018-09-23 revoked: 2018-09-26 usage: E [ultimate] (1). Chris Horry [ultimate] (2) Chris Horry [ultimate] (3) Chris Horry [ultimate] (4) Chris Horry The two revoked subkeys were from my YubiKey experiments, I've since created a separate key for that device and it's working just fine. Any help appreciated, I just want to remove the warnings and hopefully get reassurance my key is working. I just use it for signing, certification and encryption (and decryption). Creating a new key is an option, but would be inconvenient :( Thanks! Chris -- Chris Horry Ham Radio - KG4TSM zer...@gmail.com https://twitter.com/zerbey <http://twitter.com/zerbey> ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Forwarding both gpg and ssh agents
Thanks for your reply Peter, the ForwardAgent flag is exactly what I was looking for. Although some sources note the potential security holes of using this method, it works great for my use case https://heipei.github.io/2015/02/26/SSH-Agent-Forwarding-considered-harmful/ Regards, Chris On Jul-16-18, Peter Lebbing wrote: On 16/07/18 12:36, Chris Coutinho wrote: I have a few remotes where I would also like to forward my ssh-agent Have you played with OpenSSH's ForwardAgent option or its -A command line argument counterpart? I'm fairly sure I had success with it in the past with an authentication key on an OpenPGP smartcard, but it's quite a while back. HTH, Peter. -- I use the GNU Privacy Guard (GnuPG) in combination with Enigmail. You can send me encrypted mail if you want some privacy. My key is available at <http://digitalbrains.com/2012/openpgp-key-peter> signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Forwarding both gpg and ssh agents
Hello, I use the ssh-agent functionality of gnupg (version 2.2.8) to handle connecting to remote hosts, which works great. I'm also able to forward my gpg-agent to remote machines to e.g. decrypt files using the `RemoteForward` flag in my ~/.ssh/config: Host myremote RemoteForward /path/to/remote/S.gpg-agent /path/to/local/S.gpg-agent.extra I have a few remotes where I would also like to forward my ssh-agent so that I can make a third connection to a remote machine using my local ssh-agent (through gpg-agent). Specifically, I'm trying to ssh into a FreeBSD remote, and from there connect to a third remote git server using the ssh credentials from my local machine. Is this functionality available? Regards, Chris signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Importing existing key as subkey
Hello, I'm trying to consolidate my various master keys into a single master with subkeys. On my 'old' computer with gpg2.0 (openSUSE 42.3) I was able to export the secret key and split it up with `gpgsplit`. On my new machine (openSUSE Tumbleweed), the `gpgsplit` command is unavailable, and I'm curious if that functionality has been removed or named to something else between the two versions. Longer version: I have an existing key generated using gpg2.0 that I would like to import as a subkey to my main master key, which is on a computer with gpg2.2. For the most part I'm following this SO answer: https://security.stackexchange.com/a/62480/172661 I've been able to split up the 'old' key (step 1) into its constituent packets using `gpg --export-secret-keys XXX | gpgsplit -vp XXX_` and transport them to my main computer. From there I created some dummy slots in my master. I'm stuck at step four where I need to split up my master key into its packets because gpgsplit is missing, and apparently not to be found in a gpg-related tool in the main repositories. I realize this answer might be out-of-date (2014), but I haven't found anything thus far as thorough about consolidating. If someone can point me to another resource on this topic, I would certainly appreciate it. Best Regards, Chris signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Key expiration question
Hi, I have a question around key expiry that I can't seem to find any thorough documentation on; & the @Gnupg twitter account pointed me here. What purpose does key expiration have? At first I thought it may be a mechanism for revalidating private key ownership but key expiration doesnt appear to impact on trust or validity. So I thought it may be a mechanism for time constraining key use but there doesnt appear to be anything in the RFC to mandate the handling (or not as the case may/should be) of expired keys. Have I completely misunderstood? Regards Chris___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Error verifying signature: Cannot verify message signature: Incorrect message format
On Mon, 2017-05-08 at 18:52 +0200, Francesco Ariis wrote: > On Mon, May 08, 2017 at 08:58:59AM -0500, Chris wrote: > > > > I've noticed the above recently when I see a post from certain > > users > > including myself in a couple of the Ubuntu mailing lists. I don't > > see > > issues in other lists I'm on nor does it happen if I ask the sender > > of > > the post to send me a signed private message. I also see this: > > > > Error verifying signature: parse error > Hello Chris, more often than not mailing lists mangle messages in a > subtle way, thus breaking the signature. > At least that's what happened the last time I tried to verify a ML > message. > Thanks Francesco, that's what I figured is going on but wanted to make sure it wasn't something wrong on my end. Chris -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C 31.11972; -97.90167 (Elev. 1092 ft) 12:49:56 up 6 days, 19:33, 1 user, load average: 0.65, 0.37, 0.30 Description:Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS, kernel 4.4.0-77-generic signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Error verifying signature: Cannot verify message signature: Incorrect message format
I've noticed the above recently when I see a post from certain users including myself in a couple of the Ubuntu mailing lists. I don't see issues in other lists I'm on nor does it happen if I ask the sender of the post to send me a signed private message. I also see this: Error verifying signature: parse error I'm not sure what else to post here for anyone to look at that may help but I believe it's something to do with the list that changed and not on my end. If I can post any more information please let me know. Chris -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C 31.11972; -97.90167 (Elev. 1092 ft) 08:46:36 up 6 days, 15:29, 1 user, load average: 0.85, 0.49, 0.29 Description:Ubuntu 16.04.2 LTS, kernel 4.4.0-77-generic signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Smartcard working completely with GPG2 and incompletely with GPG1.4
Hello all,
after using GnuPG since 2014 I now purchased a Nitrokey USB smartcard. I set it
up mainly* following the steps at
https://wiki.fsfe.org/TechDocs/CardHowtos/CardWithSubkeysUsingBackups with
GnuPG 2 and tried to configure GnuPG 1.4 to work likewise (on Linux Mint, it's
installed as well). I'm now running into a strange problem which is a bit like
https://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2015-September/054345.html , but
the other way around.
With GnuPG 2, signing, encrypting and decrypting a file works without any
problems. With 1.4, I can encrypt and sign a file, but I can't decrypt it. It's
failing with the message:
gpg: public key decryption failed: general error
gpg: decryption failed: secret key not available
The commands gpg --card-status and gpg2 --card-status seem to display mainly
the same things, the only strange line is "Key Attributes" at GPG 1.4:
$ gpg --card-status
Application ID ...:
Version ..: 2.1
Manufacturer .: ZeitControl
Serial number :
Name of cardholder: Christoph Pxxx
Language prefs ...: de
Sex ..: male
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data ...: [not set]
Signature PIN : forced
Key attributes ...: 0R 0R 0R
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 10
Signature key : D2F4 E619 8D05 9E98 AD58 7E6E 9965 610B 43F2 7C98
created : 2017-01-24 17:52:18
Encryption key: 4AD3 7EE7 6418 CABE 4026 923E D82A 7A84 3A07 266F
created : 2014-04-12 10:52:41
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: pub 4096R/43F27C98 2017-01-24 Christoph Pxxx
<...@x.de>
sec# 4096R/E728903D created: 2014-04-12 expires: never
ssb> 4096R/3A07266F created: 2014-04-12 expires: never
card-no: 0005 5031
ssb> 4096R/43F27C98 created: 2017-01-24 expires: never
card-no: 0005 5031
$ gpg2 --card-status
Reader ...:
Application ID ...:
Version ..: 2.1
Manufacturer .: ZeitControl
Serial number :
Name of cardholder: Christoph Pxxx
Language prefs ...: de
Sex ..: male
URL of public key : [not set]
Login data ...: [not set]
Signature PIN : forced
Key attributes ...: rsa4096 rsa4096 rsa2048
Max. PIN lengths .: 32 32 32
PIN retry counter : 3 0 3
Signature counter : 10
Signature key : D2F4 E619 8D05 9E98 AD58 7E6E 9965 610B 43F2 7C98
created : 2017-01-24 17:52:18
Encryption key: 4AD3 7EE7 6418 CABE 4026 923E D82A 7A84 3A07 266F
created : 2014-04-12 10:52:41
Authentication key: [none]
General key info..: sub rsa4096/43F27C98 2017-01-24 Christoph Pxxx
<...@x.de>
sec# rsa4096/E728903D created: 2014-04-12 expires: never
ssb> rsa4096/3A07266F created: 2014-04-12 expires: never
card-no: 0005 5031
ssb> rsa4096/43F27C98 created: 2017-01-24 expires: never
card-no: 0005 5031
I also set up a logfile for scdaemon as in the mentioned thread ("verbose",
"debug ipc, cardio" in ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf). At encryption, there doesn't
seem to be much difference. At decryption however, when using GnuPG 1.4 the new
lines in scdaemon are
2017-01-25 19:54:15 scdaemon[8806] DBG: chan_5 <- SERIALNO openpgp
2017-01-25 19:54:15 scdaemon[8806] DBG: chan_5 -> S SERIALNO
0
2017-01-25 19:54:15 scdaemon[8806] DBG: chan_5 -> OK
2017-01-25 19:54:15 scdaemon[8806] DBG: chan_5 <- RESTART
2017-01-25 19:54:15 scdaemon[8806] DBG: chan_5 -> OK
while using GnuPG 2.1 leads to 26 lines consisting of the decryption
information. Instead of "SERIALNO openpgp" it's just "SERIALNO" there.
The output of 'gpg-connect-agent "KEYINFO --list" /bye' is
S KEYINFO 4C4D4CBB69450D70DAECB0929B4E57E00D96A270 T
OPENPGP.2 - - - - -
S KEYINFO 259BD34A8AFCFDE34C08C637086496C890AF3640 D - - - P - - -
S KEYINFO 6BB6690E54C14D959135BBFEA6665F2E8A04231C T
OPENPGP.1 - - - - -
OK
– I don't have an authentication subkey.
I know this is much information, but as all of this was asked for in the thread
mentioned above, I thought it'd be better providing you with all of these
outputs now than sending them one at a time later. I hope you have an idea why
this strange problem occurs.
Regards,
Chris
P. S.: I'm sure you've noticed that, but anyway: Every "" sequence is not
taken from the original output, but changed for anonymity reasons.
*: I used my existing RSA keypair, generated a signing subkey and put this
subkey and the already existing encryption subkey on the card. So, no DSA &
Elgamal. I also didn't follow the steps after "Ready to go" as I don't have
more than
Is there a “ground-up” explanation of PGP/GnuPG?
I have asked this on HN[1] as well as Reddit[2] too, but I realised you people might be a better audience for the question! (...And it gives me a good excuse to subscribe to my first mailing list!) Question below: Understanding how git works internally "from the ground up" has been incredibly helpful in my everyday work; things like blobs, commit objects, hashes and how they connect to form the git experience as I know it. Where I had been cargo-culting along previously, it all became clear once I understood the fundamental model of what was going on underneath the interface. I feel like the same thing could apply to PGP/GnuPG. I am cargo culting my way along but I feel like I would feel much, much, much more comfortable if I knew how it worked from the ground up. I have loose ideas of asymmetric cryptography and trust circles and such, but nothing concrete to hinge my actions upon, so I mostly try different permutations of command line arguments until GPG appears to do what I want it to do. Is there a "from the ground up" good guide to PGP that allows me to break out of this pattern? [1]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=13070261 [2]: https://www.reddit.com/r/GnuPG/comments/5fpfgy/crosspost_from_hn_is_there_a_groundup_explanation/ ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: What am I missing? (Again)
Let me condense and try again: Let me preface by saying that I am answering based on what I think likely, not what I *know*, so take my comments in that context (and I welcome corrections from anyone who does know, of course). 1) Is it correct that this particular device maker designed a sophisticated hardware-based system with the specific purpose of thwarting the brute-forcing of ridiculously low-entropy user's secret? Yes/no? I don't know. However, it seems unlikely that you'll know the system internals so well that you can have true confidence in a "yes" answer, even if you suspect it to be yes, or the device maker claims it is yes. Therefore, for any applications where it actually matters, you'd be well advised to assume "no". 2) Is it possible for the user to circumvent the potential problem of the device maker cooperating with his adversary to by-pass this protection, simply by using a pass-phrase of an appropriate length? Yes/no? I imagine that the potential problem can be circumvented, yes, but not simply by using a longer passphrase. I don't know whether it even allows that option, but it really doesn't matter since you don't know what it does with that passphrase internally anyway. Since you don't know, you can't trust it. However, remember that the device in question is a computer. It's not a phone, or a camera, or a GPS receiver, it's just a computer that happens to have supporting hardware to enable some of those functions. As such, one can write whatever software one wants for it, and that includes a correctly implemented encrypted data storage mechanism which does not require you to trust any decisions made by the manufacturer. *That* is how you circumvent the problem you're referring to. The android world is more open to third party developers so it's probably easier there, but I expect it should be possible either way. Regardless, if the system relies on code you can't see, then (in principle) you can't trust it completely. -Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
On Fri, 2014-10-03 at 07:40 +0200, Hauke Laging wrote: Am Do 02.10.2014, 22:38:56 schrieb Chris: I'm having to put my system back together again after my Mandriva box crashed back in August. I'm up to getting my key installed and when sending myself a test post I get this: gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. If you have not restored the whole GnuPG directory (~/.gnupg under Linux) but imported the keys only then the problem is that your keys have lost their absolute trust. You can restore that with gpg --trusted-key 0xE372A7DA98E6705C --list-keys 0x98E6705C or gpg --edit-key 0x98E6705C trust Hauke Good morning Hauke and thank you for the reply. I ran the above and now it does seem to show as a trusted key: gpg: using character set `utf-8' gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) :signature packet: algo 17, keyid E372A7DA98E6705C version 4, created 1412342971, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00 digest algo 2, begin of digest b6 29 hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-10-03) subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID E372A7DA98E6705C) data: [159 bits] data: [157 bits] gpg: armor header: gpg: Signature made Fri 03 Oct 2014 08:29:31 AM CDT using DSA key ID 98E6705C gpg: using PGP trust model gpg: key 98E6705C: accepted as trusted key gpg: Good signature from Chris Pollock (New email address as of 04/21/07) cpoll...@embarqmail.com gpg: aka Chris Pollock cpoll...@earthlink.net gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA1 Sending a test post to myself shows the above however shouldn't the icon that Evolution shows for the signature be green instead of red since it's now ultimately trusted? I seem to remember that being the case. I published the key last night to hkp://keyserver.ubuntu.com:11371 hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net I'm using Gnomes 'Passwords/Keys' app which looks similar to GPG-Agent which I was used to using on my Mandriva box before it crashed. I've installed GPG-Agent on this Ubuntu box however I seem to remember in the old box a 'user interface' that I could use to retrieve keys and so forth. Guess when time allows today I'll go in and read the docs on it, I was just too tired last night to get very involved in it. I should also be able to import your key to my keyring from one of the key servers, will have to work on that issue today. All of this is I'm sure has simple solutions, it's just been so long since I had first installed it on the old box that I've forgotten a lot of what I did. I shall go back and Read The Fine Manual today and see if I can figure out what I've neglected to do. Thanks very much again Hauke for your reply, it was very helpful. Chris -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C 31.11°N 97.89°W (Elev. 1092 ft) 09:38:07 up 2 days, 17:53, 1 user, load average: 0.31, 0.57, 0.77 Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, kernel 3.13.0-37-generic signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
signed message test
I sent myself a post and signed it. The icon for the signed message stays red (I seem to remember on my old Mandriva box it would be green if valid). Clicking the icon the output shows: gpg: using character set `utf-8' gpg: armor: BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE Version: GnuPG v2.0.22 (GNU/Linux) :signature packet: algo 17, keyid E372A7DA98E6705C version 4, created 1412384205, md5len 0, sigclass 0x00 digest algo 2, begin of digest 52 ba hashed subpkt 2 len 4 (sig created 2014-10-04) subpkt 16 len 8 (issuer key ID E372A7DA98E6705C) data: [158 bits] data: [159 bits] gpg: armor header: gpg: Signature made Fri 03 Oct 2014 07:56:45 PM CDT using DSA key ID 98E6705C gpg: using PGP trust model gpg: key 98E6705C: accepted as trusted key gpg: Good signature from Chris Pollock (New email address as of 04/21/07) cpoll...@embarqmail.com gpg: aka Chris Pollock cpoll...@earthlink.net gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA1 I'm still trying to work out glitches in this new Ubuntu install and I'm wondering if this is an issue with my setup or with Evolution. Thanks in advance for any advice Chris -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C 31.11°N 97.89°W (Elev. 1092 ft) 20:25:32 up 3 days, 4:41, 2 users, load average: 0.10, 0.17, 0.20 Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, kernel 3.13.0-37-generic ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature!
I'm having to put my system back together again after my Mandriva box crashed back in August. I'm up to getting my key installed and when sending myself a test post I get this: gpg: armor header: Version: GnuPG v1 gpg: Signature made Thu 02 Oct 2014 10:15:58 PM CDT using DSA key ID 98E6705C gpg: using PGP trust model gpg: Good signature from Chris Pollock (New email address as of 04/21/07) cpoll...@embarqmail.com gpg: aka Chris Pollock cpoll...@earthlink.net gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. Primary key fingerprint: 441D 71BC 727D 0B1C EC1F 6B39 E372 A7DA 98E6 705C gpg: binary signature, digest algorithm SHA1 It's been so long since I had to set it up that I must be missing something simple. Possibly a knock on the head with a 2X4 from someone my jog my memory. Chris -- Chris KeyID 0xE372A7DA98E6705C 31.11°N 97.89°W (Elev. 1092 ft) 22:28:26 up 2 days, 6:44, 3 users, load average: 1.39, 1.14, 1.15 Ubuntu 14.04.1 LTS, kernel 3.13.0-37-generic ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Resetting an OpenPGP smart card bricks it
On 12/03/14 13:54, Werner Koch wrote: On Tue, 11 Mar 2014 18:20, bo...@bootc.net said: scd serialno undefined ERR 100663356 Not supported SCD This is running GnuPG 2.0.22. Oops. I am sorry, this is not implemented in 2.0. I am using 2.1 for so long now that I didn't remember that undefined only works in master. pcsclite should have tool to send APDUs to a card. My old gscutils card tools have been replaced by scdaemon's APDU command. You may find them somewhere but using the tools from pcsc should be easier. Maybe useful to backport the changes. Hi Werner, I tried using 'scriptor' to send 00 44 00 00 to the card, but the card refused that too. Not being a Smart Card expert, I really don't know what else I should try to send to the card to get meaningful replies from it. $ scriptor No reader given: using Gemalto USB Shell Token V2 (2BAA4AC2) 00 00 Using T=1 protocol Reading commands from STDIN 00 44 00 00 00 44 00 00 6A 88 : Wrong parameter(s) P1-P2. Referenced data not found. Thanks, Chris -- Chris Boot bo...@bootc.net ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Resetting an OpenPGP smart card bricks it
On 12/03/14 15:21, Peter Lebbing wrote:
On 2014-03-12 14:54, Werner Koch wrote:
pcsclite should have tool to send APDUs to a card. My old gscutils card
tools have been replaced by scdaemon's APDU command. You may find them
somewhere but using the tools from pcsc should be easier.
Back in January, in a similar situation, I found[1] someone had written
a little python script[2] to send the APDU's. If the smartcard isn't
pleased by the order of the two APDU's, try them in reverse order (the
code is easy to read).
HTH,
Peter.
[1] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2014-January/048836.html
[2] http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-devel/2013-March/027518.html
Peter,
THANK YOU! Your pointers helped me recover both cards.
I didn't use the Python script at [2], but I sent the two APDUs that it
sends to the cards using 'scriptor', which recovered them. Unfortunately
I closed the window shortly after celebrating so I don't have the exact
transcript of the session, but it looked something like:
$ scriptor
No reader given: using Gemalto USB Shell Token V2 (D4182110) 00 00
Using T=1 protocol
Reading commands from STDIN
00 a4 04 00 06 d2 76 00 01 24 01
00 a4 04 00 06 d2 76 00 01 24 01
XX YY : {{ NVRAM not changed }}
00 44 00 00
00 44 00 00
90 00 : Normal processing.
Note the line that says XX YY and NVRAM not changed is from memory; I
remember it saying about the NVRAM having _not_ being changed, but it
worked anyway. I really wish I hadn't fat-fingered my terminal and
closed it.
For others following this thread, 'scriptor' is in the pcsc-tools
package in Debian, and seems to be a pretty neat if scary tool for
sending raw ADPUs to smart cards.
Thanks again Peter for pointing me at that Python script.
Cheers,
Chris
--
Chris Boot
bo...@bootc.net
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Re: Resetting an OpenPGP smart card bricks it
On 11/03/2014 21:00, Peter Lebbing wrote: On 11/03/14 18:20, Chris Boot wrote: scd reset [...] reset You forgot the 'scd' prefix on reset. That might be the problem. Sadly that makes no difference either :-( Cheers, Chris -- Chris Boot bo...@bootc.net ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Resetting an OpenPGP smart card bricks it
Hi, I've reset two OpenPGP smart cards using the instructions at http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2013-March/046261.html and both have been rendered unusable. Both are OpenPGP V2 cards. I notice the instructions at http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-users/2009-September/037413.html reverse the last two APDUs (e6 then 44 rather than 44 then e6). I believe that E6 is 'TERMINATE DF' and 44 is 'ACTIVATE FILE', so the 2009 instructions are probably correct while the 2013 ones are not. Is there a way to recover cards that have had the erroneous procedure run on them, please? I can't even get gpg-connect-agent to talk to the cards now (gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Not supported), nor even tools like opensc-explorer. Please CC me as I'm not subscribed. Cheers, Chris -- Chris Boot bo...@bootc.net ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Resetting an OpenPGP smart card bricks it
On 11/03/14 16:10, Werner Koch wrote: On Tue, 11 Mar 2014 11:44, bo...@bootc.net said: reverse the last two APDUs (e6 then 44 rather than 44 then e6). I believe that E6 is 'TERMINATE DF' and 44 is 'ACTIVATE FILE', so the 2009 instructions are probably correct while the 2013 ones are not. IIRC, early v2 cards have a bug which partly reverses terminate and activate. Thus there should actually be 4 versions of the instructions. Unfortunately I have never worked out the details. My way of resetting the card is using the commands several times while inbetween removing the card from the reader. Hi Werner, Hmm. I did my two cards by: 1. Plugging in reader with embedded card (I'm using Gemalto IDBridge K30 and K50 readers). 2. gpg2 --card-status 3. gpg-connect-agent, then run commands as per your email 4. Unplug reader with card. 5. Plug in again and find that gpg2 --card-status fails. If it's any use, the two cards in question have serial numbers: - 00051BDE - 000520D5 run on them, please? I can't even get gpg-connect-agent to talk to the cards now (gpg: OpenPGP card not available: Not supported), nor even tools like opensc-explorer. There is a little trick here: scd reset OK scd serialno undefined S SERIALNO FF7F00 0 The SEARIALNO command takes an option argument to select the application. You may use 'undefined' followed by standard APDU commands: @subsection The Undefined card application ``undefined'' This is a stub application to allow the use of the APDU command even if no supported application is found on the card. This application is not used automatically but must be explicitly requested using the SERIALNO command. Hi Werner, Unfortunately, neither bricked card appears to want to respond to the serialno command: $ gpg-connect-agent /hex reset OK scd serialno undefined ERR 100663356 Not supported SCD scd apdu 00 e6 00 00 ERR 100663351 Invalid value SCD scd apdu 00 44 00 00 ERR 100663351 Invalid value SCD This is running GnuPG 2.0.22. Cheers, Chris -- Chris Boot bo...@bootc.net ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Using SCIM with GTK pinentry does not work
On 2014-02-24 15:28:12 +0800, Chris Down wrote: I use SCIM[0] to input Pinyin on Linux. This works with other programs, but not the GTK pinentry dialog for gpg-agent. I just tried with pinentry-qt4, and it works, so I guess I'll use that for now. It would be nice if this was looked into, though. :-) pgpghLzRaGJvo.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Using SCIM with GTK pinentry does not work
I use SCIM[0] to input Pinyin on Linux. This works with other programs, but not the GTK pinentry dialog for gpg-agent. In gpg-agent, no characters are recorded when I press keys. Disabling SCIM fixes this problem, but that's not an acceptable solution for me -- I need it. The changelog notes that this particular problem was fixed in 2009[1] in 2.0.13, but it still persists with 2.0.22 for me: From the changelog: * The envvars XMODIFIERS, GTK_IM_MODULE and QT_IM_MODULE are now passed to the Pinentry to make SCIM work. I found some open bug entries[2] for this issue, which do not appear to have been resolved. The input method environment variables are in the pinentry program's environment, but this still does not work. Any ideas? Thanks. [0]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Smart_Common_Input_Method [1]: http://lists.gnupg.org/pipermail/gnupg-announce/2009q3/000294.html [2]: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=714041 pgpmBFTJUlsov.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
GPGME trouble finding gpg executable.
I have been attempting to use GPGME for a Qt app under Windows. I'm running into issues with two applications that use the same code finding the gpg executable. I set the engine info in both t-engine-info.c( exists in gpgme test directory ) and main.cpp ( exists in my Qt app directory ) applications using: gpgme_set_engine_info(GPGME_PROTOCOL_OpenPGP,c:\\gnupg\\gpg.exe, c:\\Users\\Chris\\AppData\\Roaming\\gnupg\\); gpgme_check_version (NULL); err = gpgme_get_engine_info (info); printf( version = %s \n, info-version ); fail_if_err (err); The test app t-engine-info prints out version = 1.4.9 . My Qt app prints out version = (null) , The qt application throws a GPGME: Invalid crypto engine error on: err = gpgme_engine_check_version (GPGME_PROTOCOL_OpenPGP); fail_if_err (err); but the t-engine-info application does not. Why cannot it not find the executable in the my qt application but it can find the executable in the t-engine-info application? I've ran out of all possible ideas, and I am not sure what else I can try. Any tips or solutions would be great, as I really would like to use this in my app. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Cross-compiling GPGME
Robert J. Hansen rjh at sixdemonbag.org writes: What I note immediately is EXPORTS is declared twice. Now, I'm hardly a libtool expert, but this seems ... incorrect. Any ideas? I was curious what you did to fix this issue? As I am also running into it, and I'm not sure where to go from here. My file looks exactly the same as yours. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: encryption algorithm
On 12/17/2013 2:54 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: The amount of energy we're talking about here is so large there is a non-zero chance it would disturb the false vacuum of spacetime and annihilate the cosmos. Well, probably not - because in order to apply this energy to your brute-force calculation process you presumably have some way of capturing it, thereby making it unavailable for use in the destruction of the cosmos. :-) signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: article about Air Gapped OpenPGP Key
On 11/19/2013 3:50 PM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: [...] then used to do all further crypto operations. To put the data forever beyond recovery, you generate a new nonce, encrypt it with the same passphrase, and write it over the old nonce. If someone demands your cryptographic key you can honestly and genuinely give it up without any fear of your old data being compromised. The investigator will be able to verify that you've complied with the court's order, and the investigator will also be able to verify that you never knew the original nonce. I'd be surprised if this gets you very far in a US court. Technical details aside, what the court will likely see is that you deliberately took action intended to put the data beyond the reach of the court in order to avoid whatever legal ramifications that access might have. The results of that will probably not be very good (US judges have quite broad powers when it comes to contempt of court). -C signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
GPG and Outlook revisited
Hello, It's been some time since I looked at options for integrating GPG and Outlook on Windows, and at the time there seemed to be no particularly good solutions. GPG4Win/Enigmail/Thunderbird works great for my personal use, but work mandates Outlook, and in light of the latest NSA-related info it seems a good time to revisit the options for reliable encryption in an Outlook/Exchange environment - if any. (Yes, one make the argument that there are probably NSA backdoors in Windows itself and so nothing I do here matters - but it still seems like a reasonable effort is probably better than throwing my hands in the air. :) ) Thanks! -Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Aw: Re: GpgEX for 64 bit Windows test version
Hi, That might be the cause for the problem. The translations (*.mo) files from the old installer may not match the newer gettext version as used by gpgex. good point and thanks for this hint. Will try to use the gpg4win-light-2.1.2-beta20.exe and let you know when i still have this problem. Thanks again for your help! ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GpgEX for 64 bit Windows test version
Hi, thanks for your reply. I can' replicate it on my German Windows 7 Home Premium 64 bit (6.01.7600). However, I recall that I noticed such a behaviour during development. My windows version here is 6.1.7601. - Did you just install a gpgex DLL or is that the one from gpg4win-light-2.1.2-beta20.exe ? I've installed gpg4win-2.1.1.exe which fails to register the gpgex and then installed the gpgex from the archive: ftp://ftp.g10code.com/g10code/gpgex/gpgex-1.0.0-beta24-bin.zip with the regsrv32 command as an admin. - What codepage are you using? It is different from the default? I'm using the default codepage Deutsch (Deutschland) of a German win7 installation. - Did you set one of the environment variables: LANG, LC_ALL, or LS_MESSAGES? Just checked my environment variables with SET and none of the above is set. If you need the whole output of SET i can send it to you via a direct e-mail. Thanks Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GpgEX for 64 bit Windows test version
Hi, just want to let you know that using the latest gpgex-1.0.0-beta24 on a german windows 7 professional sp1 64bit system leads to some strange context menus [1]. Using beta19 doesn't translate the context menu to german but the context menu is not broken. [1] http://s1.directupload.net/images/130703/iobbaatv.png ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Is a document signed with hellosign legally binding?
This is a off topic question, but I do not know where to go with it. I just signed up with hellosign.com. It is a service where you upload an image file with your handwritten signature. Later on you can upload a document and they will merge your signature and document, and mail it to the one you specified. (at least that is how I understand it) Although this isn't an answer to your question - I'm not sure I understand the benefit of such a service in the first place; what is the advantage of this process over printing your document instead of uploading it, signing it yourself with a pen, and mailing it to the one you want it to go to yourself? If the idea is that the document isn't a format that lends itself to printing, how do they merge your signature image with it in any meaningful way that you couldn't do yourself just as easily? Just curious... -Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
old vs new gnupg - encrypting files
Hi, I have a problem with encrypting some text files with gpg, We recently upgraded our old encrypt/decrypt server (old 32 bit rhel4 box) to a new amazon linux 64 bit server on aws. I moved the gpg keyring to the new server and can encrypt files just fine with the keys on the public keyring, no problems. We have one public key however that the end user (that we send the encrypted files to) is saying they can't decrypt when we encrypt with their key on the new server. I've tried encrypting the same file (md5sum matches) on the old server and new server, and the encrypted file size differs by 1 or 2 bytes on the new server. As expected, the md5sums of the encrypted file on old and new server also don't match. I thought the problem might have something to do with how the new server doesn't have ELG-E in its cipher list, only ELG, but another person has since told me that shouldn't matter. key details on new server, pub 1024D/96765440 created: 1998-10-06 expires: never usage: SCA trust: ultimate validity: ultimate sub 2048g/0840DAA8 created: 1998-10-06 expires: never usage: E [ultimate] (1). XYZ Corp (XYZ) gpg showpref [ultimate] (1). XYZ Corp (XYZ) Cipher: CAST5, 3DES, [1] Digest: SHA1 Compression: ZIP, Uncompressed key details on old server, pub 1024D/96765440 created: 1998-10-06 expires: never trust: u/u sub 2048g/0840DAA8 created: 1998-10-06 expires: never (1). XYZ Corp (XYZ) Command showpref pub 1024D/96765440 created: 1998-10-06 expires: never trust: u/u (1). XYZ Corp (XYZ) Cipher: CAST5, 3DES, [1] Digest: SHA1 Compression: ZIP, Uncompressed ### Old server gpg --version: -bash-3.00$ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 1.2.6 Copyright (C) 2004 Free Software Foundation, Inc. This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY. This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it under certain conditions. See the file COPYING for details. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, RSA-E, RSA-S, ELG-E, DSA, ELG Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 New server gpg --version: -bash-4.1$ gpg --version gpg (GnuPG) 2.0.18 libgcrypt 1.4.5 Copyright (C) 2011 Free Software Foundation, Inc. License GPLv3+: GNU GPL version 3 or later http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it. There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Home: ~/.gnupg Supported algorithms: Pubkey: RSA, ELG, DSA Cipher: 3DES, CAST5, BLOWFISH, AES, AES192, AES256, TWOFISH, CAMELLIA128, CAMELLIA192, CAMELLIA256 Hash: MD5, SHA1, RIPEMD160, SHA256, SHA384, SHA512, SHA224 Compression: Uncompressed, ZIP, ZLIB, BZIP2 Thanks, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: old vs new gnupg - encrypting files
Got it, I will try that next. Thanks. On Wed, Jul 25, 2012 at 1:16 PM, Hauke Laging mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de wrote: Am Mi 25.07.2012, 12:48:57 schrieb Chris Clifton: Forgive me, can you elaborate on 'encrypting the file to the other one and your own key' ? You can give several recipients. The data is encrypted symmetrically (by AES e.g.) by a random key. This random key is asymmetrically encrypted to all recipients (or even to a passphrase). Thus an additional recipient increases the size of the resulting file slightly only. gpg --recipient 0x12345678 --recipient 0x87654321 --encrypt ./my/file See --encrypt-to. This way you can check whether you can decrypt the data yourself at least. Furthermore it would have been a lot more useful to get the full error message of your recipient instead of a simple cannot. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: old vs new gnupg - encrypting files
Forgive me, can you elaborate on 'encrypting the file to the other one and your own key' ? Thanks, Chris On Wed, Jul 25, 2012 at 12:33 PM, Hauke Laging mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de wrote: Am Mi 25.07.2012, 10:37:54 schrieb Chris Clifton: I moved the gpg keyring to the new server and can encrypt files just fine with the keys on the public keyring, no problems. We have one public key however that the end user (that we send the encrypted files to) is saying they can't decrypt when we encrypt with their key on the new server. Have you tried encrypting the file to the other one and your own key simultaneously? That might allow a better comparison of the difference between the two systems. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: old vs new gnupg - encrypting files
Ok, I encrypted the file in question on the new server with : gpg -vvve -r xxx -r YYY -o filename.dat.pgp filename.dat Where xxx is the problematic key and YYY is our key, and I was able to decrypt the file using my private key with no problems. Not sure if that gives us any more info. I can decrypt with our key at least. Thanks, Chris On Wed, Jul 25, 2012 at 1:16 PM, Hauke Laging mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de wrote: Am Mi 25.07.2012, 12:48:57 schrieb Chris Clifton: Forgive me, can you elaborate on 'encrypting the file to the other one and your own key' ? You can give several recipients. The data is encrypted symmetrically (by AES e.g.) by a random key. This random key is asymmetrically encrypted to all recipients (or even to a passphrase). Thus an additional recipient increases the size of the resulting file slightly only. gpg --recipient 0x12345678 --recipient 0x87654321 --encrypt ./my/file See --encrypt-to. This way you can check whether you can decrypt the data yourself at least. Furthermore it would have been a lot more useful to get the full error message of your recipient instead of a simple cannot. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: 1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012 at 9:08 PM, John Clizbe j...@enigmail.net wrote: Larger and larger RSA keys aren't the solution, ECC is. The balance of power has tipped away from RSA and toward ECC. Feel free to ignore everything I've said. There's no reason you should trust me. But by all means, keep asking questions. But everything I've read agrees larger and larger RSA keys are not the path forward. I agree with you entirely, I'm just waiting for the various standards to pick it up, and for more people to use it. When many people (whose opinion I value) use and trust it, I will also. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: 1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012 at 10:11 PM, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote: A lot of people like to refer to _Applied Cryptography_ or _The Handbook of Applied Cryptography_ for information on algorithms, and for very good reason: they've generally got excellent information. They are also old books. _AC_ is coming up on twenty years old, for instance, and _HoAC_ isn't much younger. At the time these books were written the jury was still out on whether ECC had firm theoretical underpinnings. Nowadays the jury is back, and ECC is generally recognized as being as reputable as RSA, DSA or Elgamal. Are you able to recommend any particular resources or books that cover ECC in a more complete and up to date fashion? Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: 1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
On 1 Feb 2012, at 15:00, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote: Googling for nsa suite b qould be a pretty good starting place, probably. The National Security Agency has approved the use of ECC for classified material as part of their Suite B cryptography package. As is the case with most government standards there is ample documentation about everything from the theoretical to the practical, although it isn't all collected in one place. Thanks, I didn't realise this; it's left me with plenty of reading to do. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: 1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
On 1 Feb 2012, at 15:41, Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org wrote:
@book{Hankerson:2003:GEC:940321
Thank you, that's useful.
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Re: 1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
On Sun, Jan 22, 2012 at 4:02 AM, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote: A 1024-bit key has about an 80-bit keyspace, which is a factor of 16 million larger. Given the advances in supercomputing in the last decade it is reasonable to believe 1024-bit keys are either breakable now or will be in the near future, but only at incredible cost. If the only purpose of the primary key (in my case, where I have subkeys for signing and encryption) is to sign the subkeys, why not simply make it stupidly large? Equivalent to 256 bits with a symmetric cipher, or 512 bits? Then, simply issue 2048 bit keys for encryption or signing as and when required, all signed by this master key. It would not really be used in day to day duties, since the subkeys will be used for this. (I guess, assuming of course that a key strengthening or lengthening algorithm is used for the primary key.) Cheers, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: 1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012 at 6:16 PM, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote: You may say the only purpose of the primary key is to sign the subkeys, but if it's technically possible for the primary key to sign documents then the purpose of the primary key is to sign documents. This is why I think it's kind of absurd to have a larger signing subkey than the primary key. The weak link in the chain is going to be the primary key. That makes sense, thanks. Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: 1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
On Mon, Jan 23, 2012 at 4:52 PM, brian m. carlson sand...@crustytoothpaste.net wrote: Because it's also used to sign other people's keys. Using a very large key (for 256-bit equivalence, ~15kbits) makes verification so slow as to be unusable. You have to not only verify signatures on other keys but also the signatures on the subkeys. That was what I hadn't thought about. Thanks for bringing it to my attention. Cheers, Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
1024 key with 2048 subkey: how affected?
Hi, I created a gpg keypair a while ago, when the default was still 1024D. This has a 4096g encryption subkey, and a 2048D signing subkey. Since it's now recommended (to my knowledge) to use 2048-bit keys and above, how does having a 1024-bit keypair affect me? The encryption and signing is still being done by the subkeys, so is it simply that they're signed by the parent 1024-bit key, and this key is easier to fake? Thanks, Chris Poole ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Quieten gpg-agent output?
Hi, I start gpg-agent with the -q option to make it quiet. I then run a script that executes gpg -qse ... on several files, encrypting and signing them (quietly). I still find output like this in my terminal window: You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: Chris Poole ch...@chrispoole.com2048-bit DSA key, ID 7ED39159, created 2010-12-11 (main key ID BAD248F9) I assume that gpg is reporting this, and then it checks for a key held by the agent, which it uses (everything works fine, it's just the output that annoys me). I could quiten gpg totally, by running gpg ... 21 /dev/null, but then I'd also stop any genuine errors that gpg reports. (I run this command manually, usually, so would see errors.) Is there a better way to get rid of these errors? Cheers ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Signing already-encrypted files (all to self)?
On Mon, Nov 14, 2011 at 2:42 PM, Peter Lebbing pe...@digitalbrains.com wrote:
The trick obviously is that find can do multiple executions. I didn't know
this
either, I just tried it out :). There are different variations. This one
outputs
the hashes on stdout, and I don't know a way to separate the stdout's, for
when
the encryption command would start printing stuff on stdout.
Thank you. Doing something like this had totally slipped my mind. I actually
pass find's output to xargs anyway, so could do something like
find . -not -name '*.gpg' -print0 | xargs -0I{} 'bash -c gpg {}
md5 {} hashes'
This solution now seems, well, very obvious.
And also note that encrypting identical plaintexts will lead to different
ciphertexts, and hence, hashes. If you sometimes re-encrypt the same data, you
need to be aware of this or you'll think your files have been tampered with
because the hash no longer checks out.
Yes I'm aware of this, thanks. (This was why I was going to hash the plaintexts
in the first place.)
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Re: Signing already-encrypted files (all to self)?
On Fri, Nov 11, 2011 at 10:57 PM, Doug Barton do...@dougbarton.us wrote: I think this came up last time and I don't remember the reason you didn't like the solution, but wouldn't something like truecrypt be a whole heckuva lot easier? I don't remember asking it before, but one reason I don't like Truecrypt is that I use Duplicity to backup my local files, so having the individually encrypted makes things easier (since it'll just ignore the ones already backed up). Adding them to the truecrypt container would cause the entire thing to change (ignoring homomorphic encryption or things iterating towards that). On Sat, Nov 12, 2011 at 12:56 PM, gn...@lists.grepular.com wrote: If you'd prefer to automatically encrypt your emails with your public GPG key on delivery, rather than using a batch job every few days, you can read up on the technique I use to do that here: https://grepular.com/Automatically_Encrypting_all_Incoming_Email Thanks, that's interesting reading. I use `getmail` to grab the messages, and just pass them through gpg when this runs, so it works well for what I want. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Signing already-encrypted files (all to self)?
Hi, I have thousands of files in a maildir directory. I've encrypted them all, individually, with the recipient as myself. Just in case someone steals the machine or something. It occurs to me it would be a good idea to sign these emails. Making the assumption that I can trust they haven't already been tampered with, is it OK to simply run gpg -o somefile.gpg -s somefile.gpg or is it better to decrypt them all, and then sign and encrypt in one go? Thanks, Chris Poole ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Signing already-encrypted files (all to self)?
On Fri, Nov 11, 2011 at 10:27 PM, David Tomaschik da...@systemoverlord.com wrote: I would just produce a list of SHA1s of the files and then sign that. OK thanks, I hadn't thought of that. I'd still have to decrypt and re-encrypt them to keep hashes of all plaintext versions of the files though. (Thinking about running this script every few days and hashing the latest files pulled from the IMAP server; it'd be far easier just to find any files not ending in .gpg to hash.) Thanks. ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GnuPG decryption problem
On Mon, Oct 31, 2011 at 8:08 PM, m.aflakpar...@ut.ac.ir wrote: I am asked a passphrase, but the problem is that it is not possible to write any thing in fron of the statement Enter Passphrase:, e.i. whatever you type, nothing appears on the screen! I have not used the gpg.exe you are talking about, but presumably it is the same as on unix-like machines. In this case, the things you type are being passed to the program correctly, it's just that nothing is shown on screen (no ***'s, etc) to inform you of this. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: GnuPG decryption problem
Have you confirmed that the passphrase you have is correct, and it's entered correctly? I would make sure this is the issue, by checking that gpg itself works as expected. 1. Open Notepad, write something in it. It doesn't matter what. Save the file as test.txt or similar. 2. Use gpg to encrypt this file, with a command like `gpg -c -o test.gpg test.txt`. I am unsure of the exact command as I don't use Windows, but this command (with the `-c` option) will have gpg use a symmetric passphrase (i.e., no keys). Keep it simple, just enter a passphrase like hello. 3. Delete test.txt 4. Open test.gpg with Notepad and ensure it's unrecognisable. 5. Decrypt test.gpg, something like `gpg -d -o test-dec.txt test.gpg`. It'll ask you for the passphrase you entered earlier. 6. Open test-dec.txt with Notepad, and check that you get the same text as you started with. This should confirm that gpg works correctly for you, such that your bad passphrase warning you're getting is the result of you having and/or entering an incorrect passphrase. Best of luck. Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg-agent automatically use passphrase for signing subkey?
2011/7/23 Ingo Klöcker kloec...@kde.org: There is already the option --ignore-cache-for-signing (curiously the corresponding option for decryption is missing, i.e. it's not possible to use the cache for signing but not for decryption), so why not add another option like --share-signing-and-decryption-cache? (I guess, if I really wanted this I should provide a patch. :-) ) That was precisely my point; if anything, entering the passphrase twice is more of a security risk than storing it for 2 subkeys at the same time (risk of being overlooked, etc.). Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg-agent automatically use passphrase for signing subkey?
On Thu, Jul 21, 2011 at 5:30 PM, Charly Avital shavi...@mac.com wrote: gpg-agent goes by *actions*: decrypt, or sign. gpg-agent is invoked whenever you use your secret key, either for decrypting or for signing. As far as gpg-agent is concerned, those are two different *actions*. When your passphrase has been cached for each of those *actions*, it will remain in gpg-agent's memory for the duration of the cache set in your home directory ~/.gnupg/gpg-agent.conf That's a shame, but thanks. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
gpg-agent automatically use passphrase for signing subkey?
Hi I have a program which encrypts and signs files; I supply the same key ID for both operations, the 'primary ID'. My key actually consists of the main key and two subkeys, for encryption and signing. I'm using gpg-agent to cache my passphrase. I get asked for my passphrase (pinentry screen) once for the encryption key, and then again, for the signing key. Can I instruct the agent to give the passphrase for any subkey? Given that they're both subkeys, the passphrases are the same. Thanks Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: gpg-agent automatically use passphrase for signing subkey?
Perhaps I explained poorly. I'm using gpg 1.4.11, gpg-agent 2.0.17. Is it possible to enter a passphrase using gpg-agent, and have it cached such that it's used whenever I want to use any subkeys from the same main key? Scenario: I sign a file with my signing subkey, and give gpg-agent my passphrase. I then decrypt another file, which has been encrypted using my encryption key, which is a sister subkey to the signing key (i.e., they both have the same parent 'main key'). Is it possible to not be prompted for my passphrase again for this operation? I understand that they're separate keys, so I'm being prompted twice, but they are both belonging to the same primary key: can that passphrase apply to all subkeys when entered for any one? I hope that clarifies what I want to do... Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why sign as well as encrypt files stored on untrusted drives?
On Thu, Jul 14, 2011 at 4:58 AM, Jerome Baum jer...@jeromebaum.com wrote: On the manifest file, if you're hashing the encrypted files then it's really useless (the attacker can just re-hash and re-encrypt for the manifest file). Yes, Duplicity uses these message digests only as a checksum, to make sure corruption didn't occur during network transfer (i.e., nothing cryptographic). Thanks for the help. I'm just going to get used to entering my passphrase a little more! Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Why sign as well as encrypt files stored on untrusted drives?
Hi Say I encrypt a file to myself using my public key, and only I will ever need or want to access the plaintext. The file will be stored on an untrusted drive somewhere. I don't care about authenticity, in the sense that I'll never need to prove to someone else that it was actually I that sent that file. All I care is that I can get the plaintext, and no-one else can. I've read that it's a good idea to sign this file too, but I'm not sure why. Surely if the file is changed then I've lost that data anyway, and the file will fail to decrypt. Is there some feasible attack that could change the encrypted data in such a way that I won't notice it when I decrypt the file, but somehow the file will still decrypt? Thanks Chris Poole PGP key: BAD246F9 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why sign as well as encrypt files stored on untrusted drives?
On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 1:45 PM, Robert J. Hansen r...@sixdemonbag.org wrote: In case your needs change in the future. That's really all there is to it. OK thanks. I won't bother then, as it's more hassle to have to type my passphrase each time (I don't want to keep it on the agent). (Also, where did you read this?) I can't remember, but possibly some Duplicity documentation. It's a backup program that uses gpg for encryption, and allows for both encryption and signing. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why sign as well as encrypt files stored on untrusted drives?
On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 2:04 PM, Jerome Baum jer...@jeromebaum.com wrote: You've said it yourself. The attack is to encrypt something else to your public key. You're right. Somehow I hadn't thought about someone being able to simply encrypt a file with the same filename as an existing file to me, with some nefarious content. A separate encrypted file is kept, storing a manifest of the backed up files (i.e., which file is in which encrypted container), so I think it'd be more along the lines of getting lucky, since the program (Duplicity) would realise that a file that should be in a certain container isn't, or something extra is there in its place. Have you considered a separate key for the signature? I use a separate signing key anyway, for all my signatures. How would using a separate key help here?... I'd still need to give my passphrase somehow. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Why sign as well as encrypt files stored on untrusted drives?
On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 2:48 PM, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: Look in the Features line for MDC. My key does indeed have this feature; thanks for the informative reply. Back to your original issue though, note that if Fred can get access to your (untrusted) drive, he can just replace the whole file with whatever he likes (since he just needs your public key to encrypt a new file), with no fussy message tampering needed. That may or may not be an issue in your situation. Signing does help there since Fred presumably doesn't have access to your secret key. I had failed to realise this, somehow. A separate manifest file (also encrypted) keeps track of which encrypted containers hold which files, so the attack is definitely harder (or at least more noticeable). I think it's still best to sign though, just to remove more possible attack vectors. Cheers Chris Poole [PGP BAD246F9] ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Check that s2k-count has changed
When changing my secret key's passphrase, I bumped up the s2k-count to 6553600 (I just added two zeros; I don't notice any slow down when decrypting on a Core2Duo). How can I confirm that this count is being used? I ran gpg --list-packets ~/.gnupg/secring.gpg, which told me a number for protect count (in the secret key packet section). Does this map to the number I gave on the command line when changing my passphrase? Thanks Chris Poole ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Check that s2k-count has changed
On 8 Jul 2011, at 17:31, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: Yes. Note that the list-packets output shows the internal packed value: 6553600 should come out to 201. The default of 65536 would encode to 96. I do indeed get 201. Out of interest, how is that calculated? I also changed the digest algorithm to SHA512; the iter+salt line shows this, but still mentions SHA1 protection. Am I right in thinking that this means SHA1 is always used as a kind of checksum for the passphrase (only that and a simple checksum being specified by RFC4880), but the passphrase itself is stored as a SHA512 digest after 6553600 iterations of the hash function? Cheers Chris ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Check that s2k-count has changed
Thank you. On 8 Jul 2011, at 20:06, Hauke Laging mailinglis...@hauke-laging.de wrote: Am Freitag, 8. Juli 2011, 20:35:57 schrieb Chris Poole: On 8 Jul 2011, at 17:31, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: Yes. Note that the list-packets output shows the internal packed value: 6553600 should come out to 201. The default of 65536 would encode to 96. I do indeed get 201. Out of interest, how is that calculated? https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-3.7.1.3 The count is coded into a one-octet number using the following formula: #define EXPBIAS 6 count = ((Int32)16 + (c 15)) ((c 4) + EXPBIAS); The above formula is in C, where Int32 is a type for a 32-bit integer, and the variable c is the coded count, Octet 10. Hauke -- PGP: D44C 6A5B 71B0 427C CED3 025C BD7D 6D27 ECCB 5814 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Check that s2k-count has changed
Thanks for the detailed response. I've done some C programming so it's not too alien to me. I don't know if this would be of any real use (perhaps just for those that are pretty sure of the slowest machine they'll be decrypting their private key on), but a function to calculate how many rounds it takes to run for x.y seconds would be useful. KeePass, for example, automatically calculates how many rounds can be calculated in 1 second, and will set the count accordingly. On 8 Jul 2011, at 20:08, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: On Jul 8, 2011, at 2:35 PM, Chris Poole wrote: On 8 Jul 2011, at 17:31, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: Yes. Note that the list-packets output shows the internal packed value: 6553600 should come out to 201. The default of 65536 would encode to 96. I do indeed get 201. Out of interest, how is that calculated? Brace yourself. This is not pretty: #define S2K_DECODE_COUNT(_val) ((16ul + ((_val) 15)) (((_val) 4) + 6)) OpenPGP historically has a bit of a phobia about using two or four bytes when it could be squeezed into one. Or even better, part of one. That's why the range of valid s2k-count values is 1024 through 65011712, but not all values are actually possible. I also changed the digest algorithm to SHA512; the iter+salt line shows this, but still mentions SHA1 protection. It's using SHA512 for passphrase mangling. The SHA1 protection it is referencing is a checksum on the while secret key packet itself. You can see the details in section 5.5.3 of RFC-4880, but basically it was added in response to the Klima-Rosa attack (which involved modifying the secret key in a way that the simple checksum used previously could not detect). David ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Change key prefs; few questions
Thanks for the detailed reply. Since --s2k-count will just affect the encryption of my private key, I'll go ahead and give myself a half second delay. sending passphrase-encrypted messages (which also have a s2k-count) By this you mean symmetrically-encrypted messages, with the -c flag? So I can just use the --s2k-count flag again, to change this. Presumably it's pretty pointless to change the count for asymmetrically-encrypted messages, since the session key will be long enough to discourage any brute forcing anyway. Cheers Chris On 4 Jul 2011, at 04:01, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: On Jul 3, 2011, at 12:15 PM, Chris Poole wrote: On Sun, Jul 3, 2011 at 4:45 PM, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: There are some obscure edge cases where you must have a 3DES or AES encrypted private key, but for the overwhelming majority of people, no, there is no reason to do this. The default (CAST5) is quite strong (which the original poster acknowledged). It's just helpful to know what the knobs are to understand how something as complex as OpenPGP is put together. Exactly, it's just good to know. I won't bother changing the cipher or count, but this leaves me with one final question: In a few years, assuming GPUs are faster than ever, Moore's law is still on track, and all that; should I change the number of iterations with --s2k-count? The default 65536 is probably fine for now, but it'll certainly end up being too slow. gpg won't do this for me, or counteract this in another way? GnuPG generally has its defaults updated every now and then. While some of the new possible defaults (DSA/Elgamal keys becoming RSA/RSA, new default key sizes) do require the generation of a new key to use, others (default preferences, secret key protection, and secret key iteration count) are available to any key. Since secret key cipher and iteration count are tied to the encryption of the secret key (via the passphrase), if you just change your passphrase with that new version of GnuPG, you'll automatically pick up a new cipher and iteration count. PGP has a clever trick to set an appropriate s2k-count without knowing anything about the various processors it will be run on: it simply figures out how many iterations it can do in 1/10 of a second (which always results in a value higher than 65536 these days), and uses that. I believe that the newer GPG (2.x) has some support for this design, but I don't recall offhand if it is using it fully yet. We should probably raise the (static) GPG 1.x count as well at some point. It's been 65536 for a long time (over a decade). It's not unreasonable to raise your s2k-count for your secret key. If you pick a value that is too high and you find it annoying, you can always set it back down to something lower. It doesn't cause any real harm if you go too high - just wastes some of your time (which is sort of the point!) That's for secret keys, of course. More complex is sending passphrase-encrypted messages (which also have a s2k-count), where you don't know the CPU capabilities of the recipient. There was a case a year or two back where receiving an OpenPGP message with a too-high s2k-count would cause a device to hit its deadman timer since it spent so much time iterating passphrases. Someone had created the message on a fast machine (and so didn't notice the delay), and sent it to someone on a slow machine which was clobbered by it. Of course, if you want extra security against brute forcing, even better than bumping up your s2k-count would be to just add a character or three to your passphrase. David ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Change key prefs; few questions
Thanks. There's no way to change the cipher used for encrypting the private key itself (CAST5 I believe)? (Not that I would, as I'm sure the default is more than good enough for my needs.) Also, if I understand correctly, someone trying to brute-force the key would need to guess my passphrase, then pass it through the key stretching algorithm that gpg uses, before trying to decrypt the key. How often does the work function defining how long the key stretching process take, get updated? (I can't find an option to make it user configurable.) Thanks Chris On 3 Jul 2011, at 01:38, David Shaw ds...@jabberwocky.com wrote: On Jul 2, 2011, at 3:37 PM, Chris Poole wrote: Hi, I changed the order of preferred ciphers and hash functions using setpref. My public key has changed, but not the fingerprint. That is correct. Changing the various preferences does not change the fingerprint. The fingerprint remains constant no matter what you do to the key (changed/new preferences, new subkeys, new user IDs, etc). Is the done thing now to ask anyone with the key to pull the latest version? (I've already updated the keyserver version.) You can ask them to update, if you like. It's up to you if the change you made to the preferred list is important enough. Some people refresh their keys periodically anyway. David ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Change key prefs; few questions
Hi, I changed the order of preferred ciphers and hash functions using setpref. My public key has changed, but not the fingerprint. Is the done thing now to ask anyone with the key to pull the latest version? (I've already updated the keyserver version.) Thanks ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Temporarily remember passphrase?
Thanks. I have gpg 1.4.11 on a Mac. I ended up using the `--multifile` option, without starting gpg-agent directly. It seems to do exactly what I want (presumably doing some caching in the background for me). One small issue, which I can't see from the man page: is there a way to specify the passphrase cache time? I was decrypting a large number of files ( 12,000), and about half way through I was asked for my passphrase again. I assume the cache had expired. On Fri, May 20, 2011 at 1:27 AM, Grant Olson k...@grant-olson.net wrote: On 5/19/2011 7:07 AM, Chris Poole wrote: Hi I often decrypt several files in quick succession (with a simple script). Is it possible to have gpg remember my passphrase, only very temporarily? (Perhaps for 10 seconds or so.) I've looked into gpg-agent, and tried using the --use-agent option with gpg, but I can't find much documentation on the matter, or even whether or not this is the best approach. Yes you want to use gpg-agent. What OS are you on? You might need to install gpg2 if you're on Linux or Mac. -- Grant ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Temporarily remember passphrase?
Hi I often decrypt several files in quick succession (with a simple script). Is it possible to have gpg remember my passphrase, only very temporarily? (Perhaps for 10 seconds or so.) I've looked into gpg-agent, and tried using the --use-agent option with gpg, but I can't find much documentation on the matter, or even whether or not this is the best approach. Thanks Chris Poole ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
libgcrypt git repository
Is this an error on my part. I went to git pull on the latest trunk for gnupg and during configure discovered a newer libgcrypt (=1.5.0) libksba (=1.2.0) was needed. However a git pull resulted in the following error: $ git clone git://git.gnupg.org/libgcrypt/trunk libgcrypt Initialized empty Git repository in /path/to/libgcrypt/.git/ fatal: The remote end hung up unexpectedly $ git clone git://git.gnupg.org/libksba/trunk libksba Initialized empty Git repository in /path/to/libksba/.git/ fatal: The remote end hung up unexpectedly TIA -- __ Chris Ruff email: jcr...@gmail.com gpg key: 0xDD55B6FC gpg fgpr: 1BA1 71D7 ADA7 1E8B 1623 A43D 283B 2F81 BDD5 B810 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: Did I just fry my smartcard?
On Sun, 2011-01-30 at 12:03 +0100, Werner Koch wrote: On Sat, 29 Jan 2011 19:54, k...@grant-olson.net said: gpg: detected reader `SCM SCR 3310 [CCID Interface] 00 00' gpg: pcsc_connect failed: sharing violation (0x801b) Another process has locked the reader. Most likely this is either a gpg 1 or an scdaemon. grant@johnsmallberries:~$ gpg-connect-agent scd apdu 00 44 00 00 ERR 100663351 Invalid value SCD Same reason as above; just different error messages. Figure out which process has locked the reader and kill it. Then try again. You should also add the options debug-ccid-driver debug 2048 log-file /foo/bar/scdaemon.log - to ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.log . + to ~/.gnupg/scdaemon.conf Shalom-Salam, Werner -- __ Chris Ruff email: jcr...@gmail.com gpg key: 0xDD55B6FC gpg fgpr: 1BA1 71D7 ADA7 1E8B 1623 A43D 283B 2F81 BDD5 B810 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
Re: clearsign failed: Bad signature
On Sat, 2010-12-11 at 14:57 +0100, Olav Seyfarth wrote: My key: OpenPGP SmartCard v2 key 0x6AE1EF56 (3072 Bit RSA) Card 0005 0222 Why can't I use SHA256/SHA512 with this card? | enable-dsa2 is set and showpref lists The documentation for OpenPGP v2 smartcard states that only RIPEMD-160 SHA-1 are supported as a digest algorithm at this point in time. You'll have to change your digest prefs accordingly to use the card. excert from doc: Cards with Version 2.0 support RIPEMD-160 and SHA-1 only and may check it, so other hash algorithms cannot be used. Although I assume it should say =2.0. Feedback from others if this was a typo in teh doc and should be =2.0? -- __ Chris Ruff email: jcr...@gmail.com gpg key: 0xDD55B6FC gpg fgpr: 1BA1 71D7 ADA7 1E8B 1623 A43D 283B 2F81 BDD5 B810 ___ Gnupg-users mailing list Gnupg-users@gnupg.org http://lists.gnupg.org/mailman/listinfo/gnupg-users
