Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
On Mon, 19 Aug 2002, Tim Thorne wrote: > I'm not even sure if shutting listen4ever down is on the RIAA agenda. > Wouldn't the easiest course of action be to file suit against Verisign > and have their DNS nuked? that would be the logical approach. or they could get an order against the usg and block it at A.root-servers. no need to bring in a private company when the usg root can block all queries to it. the best approach may be to hit the usg dept of commerce with the order - they control the root. it maybe difficult for verisign as the registrar for listen4ever.com is MELBOURNE IT, so the US government maybe the fast track method to square this. regards joe baptista
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
Marshall Eubanks <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >SO, wouldn't canceling China Telecom BGP through AT&T CW and UUnet do >nothing except cause some BGP advertisement changes at Internap ? I'm not even sure if shutting listen4ever down is on the RIAA agenda. Wouldn't the easiest course of action be to file suit against Verisign and have their DNS nuked? Tim
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
> Or maybe, the four providers named are the same 4 being used by Internap at > that node, so effectively terminating the announcement from all 4 directions > to Internap solves the problem. There is a "historical" precedent that supports this theory. For those who can set their Way-Back Machines far enough to remember, Opus once had a brief career as a paparazzi. While photographing Madonna, he was punched in the node by Sean Penn. The camera manufacturer was sued, though, on the basis that they had the money. The application of logic to this situation is laudable; as many of you know, I'm a big fan of logic myself. It would seem, though, that the brand of logic being applied at the RIAA is not technology logic (our favorite, clearly), but a logic designed to encompass as many people in their definition of infringement as they can. The more entities they can encompass, the more "control" they can exert. Shutting down a specific website probably has much less appeal than establishing a precedent to force backbones to filter. What's truly sad in this case is that if the RIAA (and MPAA) would spend a little bit of time listening to what people want and thinking about how to implement it, instead of furiously entrenching themselves in the 1970s, *real* content delivery as the next "killer app" might lift our little corner of the tech industry out of the muck. If they spend all their energy playing whack-a-mole, though, they'll just continue to contribute to the stagnation (and hopefully progress will pave them over sooner rather than later). kc pointed out some very thoughtful commentary by Janis Ian on this topic, URLs are: http://www.janisian.com/article-internet_debacle.html http://www.janisian.com/article-fallout.html The notion of a "risk-free" trial of the content delivery business concept using the out-of-print catalog is very appealing. Stephen
RE: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
Or maybe, the four providers named are the same 4 being used by Internap at that node, so effectively terminating the announcement from all 4 directions to Internap solves the problem. Just an idea. DJ > -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of > Marshall Eubanks > Sent: Monday, August 19, 2002 12:56 PM > To: Sean Donelan > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones > > > > A question : > > Doesn't Internap use BGP as part of its load balancing ? Don't they > sell / market this service ? Isn't each Internap node connected to > 4 > providers ? > > SO, wouldn't canceling China Telecom BGP through AT&T CW and UUnet do > nothing except cause some BGP advertisement changes at Internap ? > > Marshall > > Sean Donelan wrote: > > > On Fri, 16 Aug 2002, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: > > > >>Ok here's a question, why are they sueing AT&T, CW, and UU? I see > >>Listen4ever behind 4134 (China Telecom), who I only see buying transit > >>through InterNAP. Wouldn't it be simpler for them to sue > InterNAP? I guess > >>it would sure be nice precedent, if they could make some big tier 1 > >>providers do their bidding to filter whoever they want whenever > they want. > >> > > > > The problem with BGP is you only see the "best" path more than one hop > > away. The network in question is reachable through transit > providers other > > than InterNAP, such as Concert. > > > > http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/17/business/media/17MUSI.html > > > > The New York Times says the companies named in the suit are AT&T > > Broadband (not AT&T's backbone?), Cable & Wireless, Sprint Corporation > > and UUNet technologies. > > > > "David Farber, a University of Pennsylvania computer scientist and an > > early architect of the Internet, filed an affidavit in the > case, saying > > it would be relatively easy for the Internet companies to block the > > Internet address of the Web site without disrupting other traffic. > > > > "It's not a big hassle," Mr. Farber said. "There's no way to stop > > everybody, but a substantial number of people will not be able to get > > access." > > > > > > > > > -- > Regards > Marshall Eubanks > > This e-mail may contain confidential and proprietary information of > Multicast Technologies, Inc, subject to Non-Disclosure Agreements > > > T.M. Eubanks > Multicast Technologies, Inc > 10301 Democracy Lane, Suite 410 > Fairfax, Virginia 22030 > Phone : 703-293-9624 Fax : 703-293-9609 > e-mail : [EMAIL PROTECTED] > http://www.multicasttech.com > > Test your network for multicast : > http://www.multicasttech.com/mt/ > Status of Multicast on the Web : > http://www.multicasttech.com/status/index.html > > >
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
A question : Doesn't Internap use BGP as part of its load balancing ? Don't they sell / market this service ? Isn't each Internap node connected to > 4 providers ? SO, wouldn't canceling China Telecom BGP through AT&T CW and UUnet do nothing except cause some BGP advertisement changes at Internap ? Marshall Sean Donelan wrote: > On Fri, 16 Aug 2002, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: > >>Ok here's a question, why are they sueing AT&T, CW, and UU? I see >>Listen4ever behind 4134 (China Telecom), who I only see buying transit >>through InterNAP. Wouldn't it be simpler for them to sue InterNAP? I guess >>it would sure be nice precedent, if they could make some big tier 1 >>providers do their bidding to filter whoever they want whenever they want. >> > > The problem with BGP is you only see the "best" path more than one hop > away. The network in question is reachable through transit providers other > than InterNAP, such as Concert. > > http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/17/business/media/17MUSI.html > > The New York Times says the companies named in the suit are AT&T > Broadband (not AT&T's backbone?), Cable & Wireless, Sprint Corporation > and UUNet technologies. > > "David Farber, a University of Pennsylvania computer scientist and an > early architect of the Internet, filed an affidavit in the case, saying > it would be relatively easy for the Internet companies to block the > Internet address of the Web site without disrupting other traffic. > > "It's not a big hassle," Mr. Farber said. "There's no way to stop > everybody, but a substantial number of people will not be able to get > access." > > > -- Regards Marshall Eubanks This e-mail may contain confidential and proprietary information of Multicast Technologies, Inc, subject to Non-Disclosure Agreements T.M. Eubanks Multicast Technologies, Inc 10301 Democracy Lane, Suite 410 Fairfax, Virginia 22030 Phone : 703-293-9624 Fax : 703-293-9609 e-mail : [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.multicasttech.com Test your network for multicast : http://www.multicasttech.com/mt/ Status of Multicast on the Web : http://www.multicasttech.com/status/index.html
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
At 03:07 PM 8/17/2002 -0700, Vadim Antonov wrote: >On 17 Aug 2002, Paul Vixie wrote: >> I want to know what the homeland security department is likely to do >> about all this, not what is good/bad for the citizens of hostile >> nations or even nonhostile nations. > >Likely nothing, unless they are complete incompetents. The point is: >there's no feasible way to achieve any gains by restricting access on >per-country basis. I doubt they are complete incompetents, but they are politicians. Sometimes people who are interested in a sound-bite or press-release do things which look, at least in retrospect, as stupid so they can garner some instant public reaction. IOW: They may know it will not do any good, but they may do it any way for a front-page headline. Or at least to look like they are doing something. At least that is my fear. -- TTFN, patrick
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
On 17 Aug 2002, Paul Vixie wrote: > How long, in this new era of homeland security, can we expect it to last? > How long before someone has to say "I'm sorry, I can't peer with you or sell > you transit because you have downstreams or peers inside the axis of evil"? The question has already been asked. If ISPs are interested in how it is answered, they should participate. Technology is neutral for the most part. Firewalls can keep bad people out of your systems, they can also block your access to the Washington Post news site. The reason people trust public libraries is librarians, not fancy technology. The reason people trust ISPs is
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
On 17 Aug 2002, Paul Vixie wrote: > Am I the only one who finds it odd that it's illegal to export crypto > or "supercomputers" to certain nations or to sell such goods with > prior knowledge that the goods are going to be resold in those > nations... or even to travel to certain nations... yet no law > prohibits establishing a link and a BGP session to ISP's within those > nations, or to ISP's who are known to have links and BGP sessions to > ISP's within those nations? Well... it is not always legal. The "trade with the enemy" act may prohibit ISPs from connecting with countries on the list. In the old times I had a discussion on the subject with Steve Goldstein (regarding Iran). > I'm not sure I'd be opposed to it, since economic blockades do appear > to have some effect, and since data is a valuable import/export > commodity. I think homeland security is a good thing if it means a > mandate for IPsec, DNSSEC, edge RPF, etc... but if we *mean* it, then > why are US packets able to reach ISP's in hostile nations? This is silly, because: a) no one can deny connectivity to "bad guys". You can merely create a minor annoyance to them, in form of having to use a proxy somewhere in Europe. b) all you can really achieve is to restrict access for their populace; effectively making the job of "bad guys" easier (hint: governments in non-friendly countries do agressive filtering of access to Western networks themselves). It is a known phenomenon that given the Western cultural dominance in the net, it is one of the best pro-Western propaganda tools around. Propaganda (in the right direction) is good, because if you can convince someone to come to your side, you don't have to kill him to prevail. I can only hope that H.S. Dept will see it this way. > I want to know what the homeland security department is likely to do > about all this, not what is good/bad for the citizens of hostile > nations or even nonhostile nations. Likely nothing, unless they are complete incompetents. The point is: there's no feasible way to achieve any gains by restricting access on per-country basis. It is a lot more useful to suppress the enemy propaganda by going after its sources which are easily located. I would suggest going after CNN first [sarcasm implied]. --vadim
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
> > The record labels don't want to give you that choice. If you read the > > complaint you'll notice the record companies never attempted to contact > > the immediate upstream ISP in China. ... Well, maybe the record industry doesn't want to interfere with the 'anti-copy' oriented Chinese authorities. Unlike the US, China tightly controls regular xerox copy machines, book printers and other so called 'free press' which could easily be subverted to rob copyright holders left an right. I think the RIAA and the like are right to attack the problem at its source: Free Speech. Well, you may still be able to voice your opinion, as long as you pay for it.
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Digital data is much easier to move that the physical items of economic blockades which are also restricted not only by customs but by them appearing on accounts etc which should declare enough info to show a business was acting illegally by sending to a blockaded nation. In telecoms (inc ISP) you can simply shift the data through a couple of intermediaries and circumvent the restriction. With IP, the blockaded nation can even source IPs that make it look as tho its from another nation - who will find out. If its on CDROM again just send through an intermediary, its small and easy enough, not exactly a logistics puzzle.. And I really dont see the point on restricting software (crypto) which is freely and publically available in one country (ie US) - its so easy to get the technology into the restricted countries. Just a waste of bureaucratic cash and keeping someone in a job somewhere imho. Why waste time, effort and cash on things so futile! Stick to economic sanctions which are enforcable! Steve On 17 Aug 2002, Paul Vixie wrote: > > [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Sean Donelan) writes: > > > The record labels don't want to give you that choice. If you read the > > complaint you'll notice the record companies never attempted to contact > > the immediate upstream ISP in China. ... > > Am I the only one who finds it odd that it's illegal to export crypto or > "supercomputers" to certain nations or to sell such goods with prior > knowledge that the goods are going to be resold in those nations... or > even to travel to certain nations... yet no law prohibits establishing > a link and a BGP session to ISP's within those nations, or to ISP's who > are known to have links and BGP sessions to ISP's within those nations? > > How long, in this new era of homeland security, can we expect it to last? > How long before someone has to say "I'm sorry, I can't peer with you or sell > you transit because you have downstreams or peers inside the axis of evil"? > > I'm not sure I'd be opposed to it, since economic blockades do appear to > have some effect, and since data is a valuable import/export commodity. I > think homeland security is a good thing if it means a mandate for IPsec, > DNSSEC, edge RPF, etc... but if we *mean* it, then why are US packets able > to reach ISP's in hostile nations? > > (My bet is that within 6.5 minutes of this message going out, there will be > at least one public flame on the topic of "how freedom of information is > the only way to bring down a totalitarian regime". Save it, please -- I can > write, have written, and will write that whitepaper myself. This is not > the same topic. I want to know what the homeland security department is > likely to do about all this, not what is good/bad for the citizens of > hostile nations or even nonhostile nations.) > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: PGPfreeware 5.0i for non-commercial use Charset: noconv iQB1AwUBPV6yVFwK6AZ3LKU5AQEjvwL/V3zd7TZjs7DZNVrj2ESKG0nKhVkxpj3a TT+LVJ0QTpu6v0AXL0gOvjD9WkDTQJ2ub8zOSZnGXSIlRD+RLDZ1TWbN4EiV35+D Ec7jzVbIxVGvFI2uLhJ9keiNTCecqfW8 =kqF1 -END PGP SIGNATURE-
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Sean Donelan) writes: > The record labels don't want to give you that choice. If you read the > complaint you'll notice the record companies never attempted to contact > the immediate upstream ISP in China. ... Am I the only one who finds it odd that it's illegal to export crypto or "supercomputers" to certain nations or to sell such goods with prior knowledge that the goods are going to be resold in those nations... or even to travel to certain nations... yet no law prohibits establishing a link and a BGP session to ISP's within those nations, or to ISP's who are known to have links and BGP sessions to ISP's within those nations? How long, in this new era of homeland security, can we expect it to last? How long before someone has to say "I'm sorry, I can't peer with you or sell you transit because you have downstreams or peers inside the axis of evil"? I'm not sure I'd be opposed to it, since economic blockades do appear to have some effect, and since data is a valuable import/export commodity. I think homeland security is a good thing if it means a mandate for IPsec, DNSSEC, edge RPF, etc... but if we *mean* it, then why are US packets able to reach ISP's in hostile nations? (My bet is that within 6.5 minutes of this message going out, there will be at least one public flame on the topic of "how freedom of information is the only way to bring down a totalitarian regime". Save it, please -- I can write, have written, and will write that whitepaper myself. This is not the same topic. I want to know what the homeland security department is likely to do about all this, not what is good/bad for the citizens of hostile nations or even nonhostile nations.) -- Paul Vixie
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
On Sat, 17 Aug 2002, Sean M. Doran wrote: > Hm, why stop with just backbone networks? > > Why shouldn't edge networks, corporate networks, and household > networks chip in to uphold civil judgements against infringers? The record labels don't want to give you that choice. If you read the complaint you'll notice the record companies never attempted to contact the immediate upstream ISP in China. Instead of following international treaties for the service of process, which would take "months," they are forum shopping for a "less burdensome" (to them, more burdensome to everyone else) forum. It is much easier to get on a "blackhole list" than it is to get off of one. If you are a non-US ISP, you could find your address space null routed by major US backbones without notice to you. Even if you later get rid of the customer, how does the non-US ISP get off the US court imposed blacklist? Will China Telecom, or the Chinese government need to hire a US lawyer to petition the US court for permission to have address space assigned by APNIC to China routed? Will RIPE and APNIC issue additional address space to a non-US ISP because their previous address space became unroutable due to US court orders? Will backbones be expected to only null route addresses within the court's area of jurisdiction? Worldcom, AT&T, Sprint and C&W operate world-wide routing domains. How far will the US court's order "leak?" Will Canada and Europe still be able to reach www.listen4ever.com in China over the portions of the companies backbones not located in US jurisdiction? Likewise when German and French courts order backbone providers with assets in those jurisdictions to block access to illegal websites, how far will those orders leak? AOL/CompuServe has experienced this in Germany already. Dr. Farber's statements to the contrary, I don't think this is trivial to implement. We have experience with AGIS, Napster, RBLs, etc.
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
Hm, why stop with just backbone networks? Why shouldn't edge networks, corporate networks, and household networks chip in to uphold civil judgements against infringers? Surely I should not object if the RIAA insists that I block access of my small collection of computers to hosts which exist solely to distribute infringing material? Surely Dr Farber has already volunteered to adjust his own border filtering, since it is no great inconvenience to do so, the case is clear-cut, and this bad law is still on the books and therefore should continue to be followed. Sean.
Re: Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
> "David Farber, a University of Pennsylvania > computer scientist and an > early architect of the Internet, filed an > affidavit in the case, saying > it would be relatively easy for the Internet > companies to block the > Internet address of the Web site without > disrupting other traffic. Dave farber's explanation in his IP list regarding the affidavit. > -Original Message- > From: Dave Farber [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Saturday, August 17, 2002 5:23 AM > To: ip > Subject: IP: Record Labels Want 4 Internet Providers toBlock > Music Site > > > Since I provided an affidavit to this filing, I thought a bit > of explanation > might be illuminating. > > I have long resisted and will continue to resist the attempts of > organizations to block access to the net in an attempt to restrict the > freedom of speech and the fair use of information on the internet. > > I am strongly opposed to any attempt to control the fair use access to > music, text, pubs etc. This does not seem to the issue in this case. > > This case was interesting for several reasons to me. First > the site is an > egregious example of a site that exists only to hold > copyrighted music and > offers a unreachable contact address and false advertisements > in an attempt > to look proper. Second, the aim of the case is the backbone > suppliers not > the local ISPs. > > I have always felt that the law we have on the books should > be followed > until the law is changed by the congress or the courts unless > there is a > much much higher ethical imperative that holds. > > This case seemed to be to be a good case to test the issues > raised by DMCA > ( a law I believe was fatally flawed in concept and should be > repealed) > part dealing with copyrighted material on off-shore sites. > > I will be happy to send any Iper the affidavit on request. > The affidavit > addressed a set of technical issues and did so in a very > limited context. > > Dave __ Do You Yahoo!? HotJobs - Search Thousands of New Jobs http://www.hotjobs.com
Dave Farber comments on Re: Major Labels v. Backbones
On Fri, 16 Aug 2002, Richard A Steenbergen wrote: > Ok here's a question, why are they sueing AT&T, CW, and UU? I see > Listen4ever behind 4134 (China Telecom), who I only see buying transit > through InterNAP. Wouldn't it be simpler for them to sue InterNAP? I guess > it would sure be nice precedent, if they could make some big tier 1 > providers do their bidding to filter whoever they want whenever they want. The problem with BGP is you only see the "best" path more than one hop away. The network in question is reachable through transit providers other than InterNAP, such as Concert. http://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/17/business/media/17MUSI.html The New York Times says the companies named in the suit are AT&T Broadband (not AT&T's backbone?), Cable & Wireless, Sprint Corporation and UUNet technologies. "David Farber, a University of Pennsylvania computer scientist and an early architect of the Internet, filed an affidavit in the case, saying it would be relatively easy for the Internet companies to block the Internet address of the Web site without disrupting other traffic. "It's not a big hassle," Mr. Farber said. "There's no way to stop everybody, but a substantial number of people will not be able to get access."
