Re: Contact at archive.org

2018-02-07 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On Wed, Feb 07, 2018 at 01:23:26PM +1100, Ben McGinnes wrote:
> Hello,
>   If there's anyone involved with archive.org's systems team
> lurking around here, I'd appreciate being contacted off list.

I knew there was a reason I stayed on this list even after departing
the ISP, hosting and domain registration space and this, right here,
is it.

Thanks one and all for demonstrating real networking, in all senses of
the term.


Regards,
Ben

P.S.  To my fellow GPG users: Don't worry about the revelation that
  there's a GPG dev in such a cryptographically ignorant (not to
  mention mathematics denying) and rights eroded country as
  Australia.  I deliberately stay away from the libgcrypt
  component of GPG for all the reasons that might come to mind
  (and maybe one or two others).  There's plenty else to work on
  anyway.  ;)

-- 
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Contact at archive.org

2018-02-06 Thread Ben McGinnes 
Hello,
If there's anyone involved with archive.org's systems team
lurking around here, I'd appreciate being contacted off list.


Regards,
Ben

-- 
|  GPG Made Easy (GPGME) Python 3 API Maintainer, GNU Privacy Guard |
| GPG key: 0x321E4E2373590E5D  http://www.adversary.org/ben-key.asc |
| GPG key fpr:  DB47 24E6 FA42 86C9 2B4E  55C4 321E 4E23 7359 0E5D  |
| https://www.gnupg.org/  https://securetheinternet.org/|


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Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables

2017-06-02 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On Fri, Jun 02, 2017 at 05:52:43PM +0300, Denys Fedoryshchenko wrote:
>
> https://www.nanog.org/list
> 6. Postings of political, philosophical, and legal nature are prohibited.
> It is quite clear.

That's a fair point.

The crypto dev world does have a tendency to veer into two of those
three (political and legal) with a little more regularity, usually by
necessity.  So I do tend to weave in and out of those "off" topics
without getting too hung up on the creeping FUD in some quarters.  At
times they'll even have practical requirements which need addressing;
which is why somewhere in one of my GPGME branches there's a completed
ITAR questionairre - definitely political, very legal and absolutely
required in order to continue the technical work at all.

I'd be surprised if there were not similar types of issues affecting
some aspects of various networks.  Most likely pertaining to
international routes and even more likely subject to confidentiality
agreements of various types (not just everyone's favourite bugbear of
national security).

> I do not deny networks sometimes are deeply affected by political
> factors, but current discussion is pure FUD, based on very
> questionable MSM source.  IMHO any sane person wont like to receive
> this trash in his mailbox in list, that supposed to be
> politics-free, as there is enough of this garbage in internet.

And it's the role of NANOG to make sure all that FUD gets where the
conspiracists intended it to go.  Isn't it great ... :)

> Thanks for the hint, fixed, i use this domain only for old maillist
> subscriptions,
> so i missed that, after i migrated SMTP to my private server.

I entirely understand, I've been tweaking mine a fair bit recently,
weighing up the local Postfix instance vs. not having as great a
control over the network as I'd like and ultimately deciding to run it
all through the MX.  I noticed it because I was double-checking return
headers to be sure my own systems are doing, more or less, what
they're supposed to.  Especially since the current MX is set the way
it is for technical, legal and political reasons (basically the mail
server is in a jurisdiction with *far* greater privacy protections
than my own country).


Regards,
Ben


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Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables

2017-06-02 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On Fri, Jun 02, 2017 at 10:28:38AM +0300, Denys Fedoryshchenko wrote:
>
> American diplomats are doing also all sort of nasty stuff in
> Russia(and not only),

Yes they have and for a very long time.

> but that's a concern of the equivalent of FBI/NSA/etc, not operators
> public discussion places, unless it really affect operators anyhow.
> Just amazing, how NANOG slipped into pure politics.

The network(s) have been political for a very long time and will only
become more so as time passes.  Remember, the engineers wishing for
the purity of technical discussion are usually the same ones crying
that, "information wants to be free."

Well, no matter.  You want purely technical, okay, let's start with
authorised mail hosts.

You need to add 144.76.183.226/32 to the SPF record for visp.net.lb,
which is currently triggering softfails everywhere.  It might be wise
to explicitly state whether or not it is just 144.76.183.226/32 in the
SPF record for nuclearcat.com given the deny all instruction for that
domain.


Regards,
Ben

-- 
|  GPG Made Easy (GPGME) Python 3 API Maintainer, GNU Privacy Guard |
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Re: Russian diplomats lingering near fiber optic cables

2017-06-01 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On Thu, Jun 01, 2017 at 07:15:12PM -0700, Joe Hamelin wrote:
>
> The Seattle Russian Embassy is in the Westin Building just 4 floors
> above the fiber meet-me-room and five floors above the NRO tap room.
> They use to come ask us (an ISP) for IT help back in '96 when they
> would drag an icon too far off the screen in Windows 3.11. We were
> on the same floor.

So when Flynn & Friends in the Trump Transition Team were trying to
establish that back channel link to Vladimir Putin they should've just
wandered into the nearest colo facility ... okay, then.  I guess they
did it the other way because they wanted the trench coats.


Regards,
Ben


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Re: GeoIP database issues and the real world consequences

2016-04-13 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 08:08:29AM +0300, Hank Nussbacher wrote:
> On 12/04/2016 00:41, Ricky Beam wrote:
> > On Mon, 11 Apr 2016 12:55:11 -0400, Chris Boyd
> >  wrote:
> >> Interesting article.
> >>
> >> http://fusion.net/story/287592/internet-mapping-glitch-kansas-farm/
> > ...
> >
> > "Until you reached out to us, we were unaware that there were issues..."
> >
> > Bull! I can dig up dozens (if not hundreds) of emails from coworkers
> > and customers who have complained to MaxMind about their asinine
> > we-don't-have-a-frakin-clue results. They've known for years! They're
> > paid for a definitive answer, not an "unknown", which is why the
> > default answer is the same near-the-center-of-the-country lat/lon. He,
> > personally, may have had no idea, but MaxMind The Company did/does.
> >
> 
> Its called class action lawsuit.

Yep.  It's also effectively the inverse of the Streisand Effect since
the news articles (and hopefully law suit) can only help people in
that situation since it's the only way they'd get wide enough coverage
of the issue to warn amateur sleuths that any trail that leads there
is a dead end.

It really says it all when the local sherriff says that his job now
includes defending the house against all other law enforcement, state
and federal.  It's good that they're doing it, but ridiculous that
they have to.


Regards,
Ben




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Re: How to begin making my own ISP?

2011-09-16 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 17/09/11 7:34 AM, Charles N Wyble wrote:
 On 09/16/2011 04:28 PM, hass...@hushmail.com wrote:
 On Fri, 16 Sep 2011 16:02:39 -0400 Markus unive...@truemetal.org 
 wrote:

 I didn't receive any such email, sorry. Try resending it if you 
 still have it ?
 
 Maybe hushmail blocked it? :)

That's not outside the realms of possibility, especially if the sender
was using OpenPGP.  Hushmail does many odd things with its
implementation (e.g. still no support for PGP/MIME or even SHA-2).


Regards,
Ben



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Re: NANOG List Update - Moving Forward

2011-07-14 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 13/07/11 11:37 PM, Richard Kulawiec wrote:
 On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 04:13:10PM +0200, Mattias Ahnberg wrote:
 I might have missed some discussion; but why are we moving
 away from mailman, and what software is in the new system?
 
 Seconded.  Mailman is presently the gold standard for mailing list
 management

Apparently the main exception to this is where you're running multiple
lists with similar names, such as when creating lists for multiple
languages (e.g. annou...@example.com, annou...@it.example.com,
annou...@jp.example.com, etc.).  This is the problem the Document
Foundation found itself with and they opted for mlmmj (with the
exception of one list which does use Mailman), but it has other issues
and I definitely wouldn't want to see NANOG go down that path.  Since
NANOG doesn't need to deal with the similar names/multilingual
problem, that shouldn't be an issue.


Regards,
Ben



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Re: NANOG List Update - Moving Forward

2011-07-14 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 15/07/11 12:24 AM, Alex Ryu wrote:
 That issue can be resolved by changing email addresses for multiple
 language support by using announce...@example.com,
 anounce...@example.com ?

Yeah, that's how I'd get around it.  I think the Document Foundation
had some other issues, like wanting addresses to be consistent across
a large number of subdomains and I can see their point with it.
Obviously it's not a case that NANOG has to deal with.


Regards,
Ben



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Re: Found: Who is responsible for no more IP addresses

2011-01-28 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 28/01/11 7:03 AM, Jay Ashworth wrote:
 Let me clarify:
 
 The original question was (so far as I could see): Was Fox making up the
 quote where Vint took the blame for IPv4 exhaustion?
 
 The answer, of course, was no, they didn't; lots of people have the quote.

If you want to see and hear footage of him repeating this and
explaining, his keynote address to Linux Conf Australia is here:

http://linuxconfau.blip.tv/file/4683393/


Regards,
Ben



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Re: Mastercard problems

2010-12-09 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 9/12/10 7:49 PM, William Pitcock wrote:
 On Thu, 2010-12-09 at 18:34 +1100, Ben McGinnes wrote:
 On 9/12/10 8:04 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
 On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 3:06 PM, Philip Dorr tagn...@gmail.com wrote:
 The problem is that they were also slashdotted.  The logs would also have a
 large number of unrelated.

 pro-tip: the tool has a pretty easy to spot signature.

 What is that signature?

 
 The tool makes HTTP/1.0 requests, most browsers make HTTP/1.1 requests.

Is there anything else to it, or just the protocol version?


Regards,
Ben



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Re: Mastercard problems

2010-12-08 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 9/12/10 8:04 AM, Christopher Morrow wrote:
 On Wed, Dec 8, 2010 at 3:06 PM, Philip Dorr tagn...@gmail.com wrote:
 The problem is that they were also slashdotted.  The logs would also have a
 large number of unrelated.
 
 pro-tip: the tool has a pretty easy to spot signature.

What is that signature?


Regards,
Ben



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Re: wikileaks dns (was Re: Blocking International DNS)

2010-12-02 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 3/12/10 3:05 PM, Ken Chase wrote:
 All our topics of discussion are merging... (soon: does
 Wikileaks run on 208V? :)
 
 http://www.everydns.com/
 
 right hand side.
 
 (sorry to shift the discussion off of uucp... long live
 sizone.uucp...)

There is a list of mirror sites here:

http://wikileaks.info/

There are three IPv4 addresses listed for the cablegate site:
91.194.60.90, 91.194.60.112 and 204.236.131.131.  Of these, the first
one is not responding (from Australia), the third is an Amazon IP and
won't host the site now.  The second one is responding, but is not up to
date with the full release so far (it has 294 cables, up to November 30).

I'm surprised they don't have a proper mirror using a .se, .ch or .is
domain.


Regards,
Ben



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Re: wikileaks unreachable

2010-11-28 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 29/11/10 1:06 PM, kmedc...@dessus.com wrote:
 Uh... huh?
 
 Just so we are all straight and clear - wikileaks hit is not a
 'Distributed' DoS, its a simple DoS - I dont use intermediaries or
 botnets. Sun Nov 16 - 15:28 EST
 
 That would be just about 2 weeks ago.
 
 Actually, the last time November 16th fell on a Sunday would have been in 
 2008.
 
 So fifty-four weeks ago ...

106 weeks ago.  You need more caffeine.  ;)


Regards,
Ben



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Re: Tools for teaching users online safety

2010-10-27 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 27/10/10 3:01 PM, Joly MacFie wrote:
 Also the FTC has set up a comprehensive site to protect kids, including a
 guide for parents on kid's use of social networks.
 
 http://www.onguardonline.gov/

The Australian version has kids, parents and libraries as the primary focus:

http://www.cybersmart.gov.au/

I'm sure it's pretty similar otherwise (except for the links to report
offensive websites for the national blacklist).


Regards,
Ben



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Re: NTP Server

2010-10-24 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 24/10/10 5:44 PM, Peter Lothberg wrote:
 
 How do you knew that your local NTP server knew what time it is?  (for sure)

By polling as many stratum 1 and 2 time servers as possible.  Having
your own stratum 2 server(s) beats nebulous NTP servers out in the big
bad Internet every time.


Regards,
Ben



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Re: New hijacking - Done via via good old-fashioned Identity Theft

2010-10-07 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 8/10/10 10:00 AM, Leen Besselink wrote:
 
 k...@domain.tld for when you have a personal domain
 key-u...@domain.tld for when you have a server which understand address
 extensions

Actually I think it's user+...@domain.tld for the second one.  At least
that's what I've seen for Postfix.  Not so sure about other MTAs.


Regards,
Ben



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Re: New hijacking - Done via via good old-fashioned Identity Theft

2010-10-06 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 7/10/10 12:08 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
 so ... should domains associated with asn(s) and addr block allocations
 be subject to some expiry policy other than it goes into the drop pool
 and one of {enom,pool,...} acquire it (and the associated non-traffic
 assets) for any interested party at $50 per /24?

Interesting idea, but how do you apply it to ccTLD domains with widely
varying policies.  All it takes is whois records being legitimately
updated to use domain contacts using a ccTLD domain to circumvent.
Sounds like more of a stop-gap measure.


Regards,
Ben




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Re: New hijacking - Done via via good old-fashioned Identity Theft

2010-10-06 Thread Ben McGinnes 
On 7/10/10 6:28 AM, Eric Brunner-Williams wrote:
 On 10/6/10 10:34 AM, Owen DeLong wrote:

 Number resources are not and should not be associated with domain
 resources at the policy level. This would make absolutely no sense
 whatsoever.
 
 hmm. ... are not ... so the event complained of ... didn't happen?

The key issue here is more the should not aspect, which I agree with,
but that these records are frequently used by netops to verify a
request.  There really needs to be a greater standardised level of due
diligence regarding advertisement requests that checks more than whether
a request is coming from a seemingly legitimate email address.


Regards,
Ben



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