Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread helpcrypto helpcrypto
Just to sum up:

-TPM (fail?)
-Intel IPT (seem to be a draft and only for intel?)
-SC (Welcome 1970)
-Virtual/Cloud wallets (obscure?)
-A mobile device to replace sc (standard?)

IMHO, SC are old enough/well known to continue existing for quite
long, until someone brings a new/better/big idea.
Also, considering how governments are involved in technology, probably
many countries will adopt them, like eID, DNIe, and so in the next
years.
In 1024bit mode, of course.
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread Martin Paljak
On Wed, Sep 5, 2012 at 12:57 PM, helpcrypto helpcrypto
helpcry...@gmail.com wrote:
 Also, considering how governments are involved in technology, probably
 many countries will adopt them, like eID, DNIe, and so in the next
 years.
 In 1024bit mode, of course.

Huh, I'd guess (hope) nobody would be deploying *RSA* below 2048 bits
(smart cards doing 3k and 4k are also slowly emerging) and elliptic
curves are already becoming a viable option (in commodity software) as
well..

There's also a bunch of applications and use cases where the new age
vision of wave your phone around is not a good idea (for example I'd
better avoid taking my smartphone out unless I want/have to, and using
crowded public transport is not one of the places I'd like to do
it...)

And IMHO device-attached containers (TPM, Intel etc) are totally
different from transportable key-containers (like smart cards or USB
tokens)

Martin
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread helpcrypto helpcrypto
 Huh, I'd guess (hope) nobody would be deploying *RSA* below 2048 bits
 (smart cards doing 3k and 4k are also slowly emerging) and elliptic
 curves are already becoming a viable option (in commodity software) as
 well..

The most advanced i have seen here so far is 2048 :P

 There's also a bunch of applications and use cases where the new age
 vision of wave your phone around is not a good idea (for example I'd
 better avoid taking my smartphone out unless I want/have to, and using
 crowded public transport is not one of the places I'd like to do
 it...)

 And IMHO device-attached containers (TPM, Intel etc) are totally
 different from transportable key-containers (like smart cards or USB
 tokens)

So, IYHO, whats the better option?
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread J.Witvliet


-Original Message-
From: opensc-devel-boun...@lists.opensc-project.org 
[mailto:opensc-devel-boun...@lists.opensc-project.org] On Behalf Of helpcrypto 
helpcrypto
Sent: Wednesday, September 05, 2012 1:29 PM
To: opensc-devel@lists.opensc-project.org
Subject: Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual 
Smart Card

 Huh, I'd guess (hope) nobody would be deploying *RSA* below 2048 bits
 (smart cards doing 3k and 4k are also slowly emerging) and elliptic
 curves are already becoming a viable option (in commodity software) as
 well..

The most advanced i have seen here so far is 2048 :P

They (4K, ECC) are there for a couple of years, see:
http://www.infineon.com/dgdl/Infineon+Chip+Card+and+Security+ICs+Portfolio-Overview_neu.pdf?folderId=db3a3043243b5f170124a48543c040a0fileId=db3a3043243b5f170124a4898a2440a4


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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread Anders Rundgren
On 2012-09-05 13:29, helpcrypto helpcrypto wrote:
 Huh, I'd guess (hope) nobody would be deploying *RSA* below 2048 bits
 (smart cards doing 3k and 4k are also slowly emerging) and elliptic
 curves are already becoming a viable option (in commodity software) as
 well..
 
 The most advanced i have seen here so far is 2048 :P
 
 There's also a bunch of applications and use cases where the new age
 vision of wave your phone around is not a good idea (for example I'd
 better avoid taking my smartphone out unless I want/have to, and using
 crowded public transport is not one of the places I'd like to do
 it...)

 And IMHO device-attached containers (TPM, Intel etc) are totally
 different from transportable key-containers (like smart cards or USB
 tokens)
 
 So, IYHO, whats the better option?

As I wrote, the majority of eIDs will be used as secure bootstrap of
credential clones so there really is no option here although BSI
probably claims something else.

Anders

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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread Martin Paljak
On Wed, Sep 5, 2012 at 2:29 PM, helpcrypto helpcrypto
helpcry...@gmail.com wrote:

 And IMHO device-attached containers (TPM, Intel etc) are totally
 different from transportable key-containers (like smart cards or USB
 tokens)

 So, IYHO, whats the better option?

Do you want my Humble or Honest opinion ? :)

It shall depend on the use case. I doubt that there will ever be a
single, universal keychain, but many. VPN authentication with device
based (TMP etc) keys which get auto-provisioned and a movable
identity in the form of an eID smart card for digital signatures or
cross-domain authentication have different requirements. Key
containers for encryption is yet another story.

And embedded keystores (phones, vpn devices, whatnot) that need a
provisioning scheme is also quite obvious, with the smartphone scene
creating the firsthand need for it.

Martin

As always, there's no golden bullet solution.
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread helpcrypto helpcrypto
 Do you want my Humble or Honest opinion ? :)
None. Hacker one :P


 It shall depend on the use case. I doubt that there will ever be a
 single, universal keychain, but many. VPN authentication with device
 based (TMP etc) keys which get auto-provisioned and a movable
 identity in the form of an eID smart card for digital signatures or
 cross-domain authentication have different requirements. Key
 containers for encryption is yet another story.

 And embedded keystores (phones, vpn devices, whatnot) that need a
 provisioning scheme is also quite obvious, with the smartphone scene
 creating the firsthand need for it.

 Martin

 As always, there's no golden bullet solution.

I think the perfect solution will be DNA. In fact, i gave you the
one-billion idea:

A mouse/keyboard/device with a DNA sequencing/reader system which
sends your public DNA profile.
A simple way of matching your public DNA with your thoughts, memories
and personality, to match both.
As you can guess, that works as a keypair

You develop it. For tomorrow. Free.
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-09-05 Thread NdK
Il 05/09/2012 13:29, helpcrypto helpcrypto ha scritto:

 The most advanced i have seen here so far is 2048 :P
I bought (but haven't yet had time to experiment with) Cryptomate64:
http://www.acs.com.hk/index.php?pid=productprod_sections=0id=CRYPTOMATE64

See my message dated 2012/05/23.

Doesn't cost too much (less than 50€, and a lot is due to shipment).

I'm even thinking about using a Raspberry PI to handle it and export
functions via Ethernet.
Another possible (and maybe WAY cheaper, in medium volumes) alternative
would be to use a cut down Android phone (take one the cheapest one,
remove or don't install radios, write a custom firmware and bootloader,
and you'll have a cheap token that can handle RSA16384, EC, OTP even
when disconnected from a PC, and pretty much everything you can think of).
Non-stripped old smartphones are already quite cheap, way cheaper than
any other comparable solution. And if you ask a supplier for a lot w/o
radios they should come at bargain price... The SIM slot could easily
host a crypto smartcard to unlock credentials stored in the device (on a
microSD, maybe).

BYtE,
 Diego.
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-08-20 Thread Martin Paljak
On Sun, Aug 19, 2012 at 8:15 PM, Anders Rundgren
anders.rundg...@telia.com wrote:

 Who would buy a $100 solution if they can get one for free?
 I don't think even the SIM will survive.

IIRC it was apple who wants to make a phone self-register. Meaning
there are no parts to add or remove from the phone and you pair it to
your operator online. The question IMHO is how much do telcos want
to give up the freedom of controlling access to their networks...

But in the long run you are probably right.

Martin
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-08-20 Thread Peter Stuge
Martin Paljak wrote:
 IIRC it was apple who wants to make a phone self-register. Meaning
 there are no parts to add or remove from the phone and you pair it to
 your operator online. The question IMHO is how much do telcos want
 to give up the freedom of controlling access to their networks...

Prepaid SIMs in the US are locked to the phone they ship with, upon
activation in the store.


//Peter
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[opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-08-19 Thread Anders Rundgren
On 2012-08-17 22:32, Jean-Michel Pouré - GOOZE wrote:
 It also means that the card middleware will be a part of the OS.
 
 This will boost the smartcard technology to a wider public, which are
 good news. It is essential to have the smartcard or token in the hand /
 in the pocket. You computer cannot stand in your pocket. Only your
 mobile phone.
 

The original idea was indeed that you carried your token in your pocket.

This idea is challenged by the fact that we have so many and independent
logins.  Since each login typically translates to a token (using current
smart card technology), you would eventually need very big pockets.

Virtual smart cards have unlimited capacity and doesn't occupy space in
your pocket either.

Does this for example make eIDs or company smart cards useless? Not all!

You use your token as a secure bootstrap for getting a cloned credential
onto a device, be it a phone or laptop.  This concept is by no means
new or unique.  The Swedish BankID CA have already issued more than 10M
certificates in this fashion to consumers where the consumer typically
uses an already deployed OTP token as bootstrap.

The only problem is that BankID and friends have to write their own client
software since the to 99% US-dominated platforms do not support consumer-PKI.

Since traditional smart cards do not support on-line provisioning to end-
users, virtual smart cards appear to be the only workable solution.

Anders


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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-08-19 Thread NdK
Il 19/08/2012 10:14, Anders Rundgren ha scritto:

 Virtual smart cards have unlimited capacity and doesn't occupy space in
 your pocket either.
Then an USB token paired with some form of unsecure storage and have
RSA capabilities and a button or a small keypad (display w/
touchscreen?) to enter consent/authorization code in a way that can't be
intercepted/forged by software would be even better.

The unsecure storage could be easily encrypted under a private key
that then gets encrypted under any number of token public keys, so no
single point of failure exists and that storage can easily be
shared/copied to any number of tokens. (IIRC, something along this line
should/could be in next OpenPGP token).

This way you would have benefits of both virtual (practically
unlimited number of certs/keys: if you use a 32G uSD as storage you'd
have to spend your life receiving certs before filling it...) and real
smart cards (bring it wherever you like, having full control). If such a
token would be issued by govs (so coming with a universally trusted
cert to certify that extra keys are generated by the token), it would be
the really universal card.

I don't like those vendor lock-ins. Maybe I saw too many burnt mobos,
or just 'cause I prefer AMDs :), or simply it seems another way to
introduce crippled boot feature and have users be happy with that (a
virtual smart card, implemented in SW, requires some form of
certified boot, so it only works with a certified OS), or
reintroduce the dear old TPM (that have been cracked[1], BTW)... On the
other hand, a token/card is platform-agnostic...


[1]
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9151158/Black_Hat_Researcher_claims_hack_of_chip_used_to_secure_computers_smartcards

BYtE,
 Diego.
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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-08-19 Thread NdK
Il 19/08/2012 15:50, Anders Rundgren ha scritto:

 Everything you write is fine and probably correct as well.
 The only fly in the soup is that *it is not happening*.
I think it will be just like the TPM: when enough people will realize
what it is, it won't get accepted by the public.
It's not long since restricted boot 'failed' and memory isn't so short.

 The smart card community has failed creating a cheap a readily
 available token that can be provisioned on-line while for example
 iPhone and Android already ships with built-in enrollment software.
It's still WIP: look at OpenKMS...

 However, there will always be a small market that prefers something
 special.
That's for sure :)

 I'm rather talking about the 99.999% that believes cost and availability
 matter.  I also think that the poor GUI support offered by smart cards
 will make these look quite dated compared to virtual smart cards having
 cool logotypes and stuff.
SCs *are really* dated as concept. Old, messy interface, conflicting
high-level standards (so many that everybody uses his own)...
That's why a token or even a small calculator format w/ USB
connectivity (and a standardized 'KISS' interface over the USB bus)
would be better.
Such a device could easily cost less than $100 (you can already find
Android tablets w/ 7 display and cap ts at about $65, with wifi or even
GSM connectivity! -- probably the only really needed piece of software
needed could be a driver to use the SIM reader as a CAD, plus some glue).

BYtE,
 Diego.

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Re: [opensc-devel] Secure Credential Cloning. Was: Intel's Virtual Smart Card

2012-08-19 Thread Anders Rundgren
On 2012-08-19 18:55, NdK wrote:
 Il 19/08/2012 15:50, Anders Rundgren ha scritto:
 
 Everything you write is fine and probably correct as well.
 The only fly in the soup is that *it is not happening*.
 I think it will be just like the TPM: when enough people will realize
 what it is, it won't get accepted by the public.
 It's not long since restricted boot 'failed' and memory isn't so short.
 
 The smart card community has failed creating a cheap a readily
 available token that can be provisioned on-line while for example
 iPhone and Android already ships with built-in enrollment software.
 It's still WIP: look at OpenKMS...
 
 However, there will always be a small market that prefers something
 special.
 That's for sure :)
 
 I'm rather talking about the 99.999% that believes cost and availability
 matter.  I also think that the poor GUI support offered by smart cards
 will make these look quite dated compared to virtual smart cards having
 cool logotypes and stuff.
 SCs *are really* dated as concept. Old, messy interface, conflicting
 high-level standards (so many that everybody uses his own)...
 That's why a token or even a small calculator format w/ USB
 connectivity (and a standardized 'KISS' interface over the USB bus)
 would be better.
 Such a device could easily cost less than $100 (you can already find
 Android tablets w/ 7 display and cap ts at about $65, with wifi or even
 GSM connectivity! -- probably the only really needed piece of software
 needed could be a driver to use the SIM reader as a CAD, plus some glue).

Who would buy a $100 solution if they can get one for free?
I don't think even the SIM will survive.

Anders

 
 BYtE,
  Diego.
 
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