Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
Dear Clark, Thanks for your response. What you say below is correct if we accept the meanings of dissipative and equilibrium structures as you define them in your mind, and this applies to Benjamin's previous response as well. But the point I was making in my admittedly provocative email was based on the meanings of dissipative and equilibrium structures carefully defined in irreversible thermodynamics by workers such as I. Prigogine (1917-2003) and his school in Brussels and Austin, for which Prigogine was awarded the Nobel Prize for Chemistry in 1977. Anything that disappears in a physical system upon removing energy supply can be identified with dissipative structures, such as the flame of a candle, images on a computer screen, words coming out of the mouth of a person, melodies coming out of a piano, action potential of neurons, the airplane trajectories in the sky, semiosis between persons or between neurons, etc. Conversely, anything that remains unchanged when energy supply is removed would be equilibrium structures, such as an artificial candle or flower, the photograph of a computer screen with images, words written down on a piece of paper (which lasts a much longer time than a spoken word can after it leaves the vocal cord of the speaker), melodies encoded in sheet music, etc. By denying the distinction between equilibrium and dissipative structures in semiotics or philosophical discourse in general, one is denying the fundamental role that energy plays in these disciplines and hence the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms (or underpinnings) supporting such mental activities. It may be useful, therefore, to distinguish between two types of semiotics (or the study of signs) the classical semiotics wherein no energy consideration is necessary, and the neo-semiotics wherein the role of energy dissipation is fundamental, since No energy, no semiosis. (072814-1) which may be viewed as the First Law of Semiotics, in analogy to the First law of Thermodynamics. Coining these two terms, classical vs. neo-semiotics, conceptualizes the dual necessity for semiosis, i.e., the continuity (as expressed in semiotics) and the discontinuity (as expressed in classical vs. neo-), just as the terms, classical physics and new physics conceptualize the continuity of the Newtonian physics and its discontinuity occasioned by the concept of energy quantization, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, and Einsteins relativity. Finally, I would like to suggest the following two statements for possible discussions: Peirces semiotics is a major component of the (072814-2) classical semioticswhile biosemiotics is a major component of the neo-semiotics. Just as classical physics and new physics can co-exist (072814-3) in physics so classical semiotics (e.g., the Peirce-L) and neo-semiotics (e.g., biosemiotics) may be able to co-exist in the semiotics of future. With all the best. Sung ___ Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. A perhaps pedantic quibble. I think philosophy has been conducted with writing really just since the modern era and even then only on a large scale in more recent centuries. Its just that the major works of philosophy that we have recorded are written. However I think for a large portion of our history (and perhaps arguably even today or at least until the advent of email) philosophy was dialogical in nature. Of course I think theres a continuum between what you call equilibrium and dissipative (Im a bit unsure what you mean by equilibrium - apologies if youve clarified this before. Im behind in reading the list) Writing is frequently lost after all, we reinterpret its meanings as new contexts are introduced, etc. And of course old recordings degrade over time. Even data stored on hard drive loses data and can become corrupt. At the end all we have are traces of the original dialog. To follow Derrida (although he makes his point in an annoyingly petulant way) all we have are traces rather than some pure presence of communication we call speech. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Invigorating Philosophy with Natural Propositions
Sorry I’ve not had time to contribute much the past weeks. A few thoughts below. On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: We could say that PPs are miners of Peirce because in his work they find realizations that deserve to be replicated in the philosophical community, in many other human communities, and ultimately in the Earth community. So while the PS is after the Whole Truth about Peirce, the PP is mining Peirce for functional components of the Whole Truth (about life, the universe and everything, if we may use this language). I think this is an excellent and insightful analysis. I also think that confusion between the aims and assertions of the PS and PP leads to a bit of miscommunication on the list. I regularly notice (and am guilty of it myself) people replying to claims with some piece of Peircean orthodoxy as if that answers things. Yet Peirce of course changed his views over time and there’s no reason to assume Peirce is correct on particular points. Now I tend to think Peirce is correct more often than perhaps some, but we should remember to focus on argument and not merely orthodoxy. While it really falls under your PS category I’d add a corollary that many people are interested in expanding Peirce to areas he didn’t focus on, while still largely maintaining a commitment to Peirce’s views. I think I’ve done that as I’ve attempted to put Peirce, Heidegger, and other continental phenomenologists like Levinas in a kind of virtual conversation. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Invigorating Philosophy with Natural Propositions
In that category of areas where Peirce is not regarded as important, I would list theology. Though seemingly simple it is convincingly logical, as he suggests, that ultimately evil is contained within good. This and related CP theological statements thrust us into mysteries we cannot resolve, but better mystery than false suppositions. *@stephencrose https://twitter.com/stephencrose* On Mon, Jul 28, 2014 at 2:17 PM, Clark Goble cl...@lextek.com wrote: Sorry I've not had time to contribute much the past weeks. A few thoughts below. On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: We could say that PPs are *miners* of Peirce because in his work they find realizations that deserve to be replicated in the philosophical community, in many other human communities, and ultimately in the Earth community. So while the PS is after the Whole Truth *about Peirce*, the PP is mining Peirce for functional components of the Whole Truth (about life, the universe and everything, if we may use this language). I think this is an excellent and insightful analysis. I also think that confusion between the aims and assertions of the PS and PP leads to a bit of miscommunication on the list. I regularly notice (and am guilty of it myself) people replying to claims with some piece of Peircean orthodoxy as if that answers things. Yet Peirce of course changed his views over time and there's no reason to assume Peirce is correct on particular points. Now I tend to think Peirce is correct more often than perhaps some, but we should remember to focus on argument and not merely orthodoxy. While it really falls under your PS category I'd add a corollary that many people are interested in expanding Peirce to areas he didn't focus on, while still largely maintaining a commitment to Peirce's views. I think I've done that as I've attempted to put Peirce, Heidegger, and other continental phenomenologists like Levinas in a kind of virtual conversation. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Invigorating Philosophy with Natural Propositions
Clark, I think you're right about the confusion that sometimes leads to miscommunication. Yes, we should focus on argument - but problems can arise especially when we think that Peirce is right on some point, because then there may be two arguments involved: one about whether some proposition or other is actually asserted by Peirce, and another about whether that proposition is true in a broader universe of discourse. And sometimes there's a third argument at work, about whether Peirce's linguistic expression of his point is an optimal statement of that point, in some context or other. But that gets to be like peeling an onion. No wonder we weep. J It's usually clear enough from the context which type or argument is intended, but not always, so we should clarify that where necessary. gary f. From: Clark Goble [mailto:cl...@libertypages.com] Sent: 28-Jul-14 11:07 AM Sorry I've not had time to contribute much the past weeks. A few thoughts below. On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:24 AM, Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca wrote: We could say that PPs are miners of Peirce because in his work they find realizations that deserve to be replicated in the philosophical community, in many other human communities, and ultimately in the Earth community. So while the PS is after the Whole Truth about Peirce, the PP is mining Peirce for functional components of the Whole Truth (about life, the universe and everything, if we may use this language). I think this is an excellent and insightful analysis. I also think that confusion between the aims and assertions of the PS and PP leads to a bit of miscommunication on the list. I regularly notice (and am guilty of it myself) people replying to claims with some piece of Peircean orthodoxy as if that answers things. Yet Peirce of course changed his views over time and there's no reason to assume Peirce is correct on particular points. Now I tend to think Peirce is correct more often than perhaps some, but we should remember to focus on argument and not merely orthodoxy. While it really falls under your PS category I'd add a corollary that many people are interested in expanding Peirce to areas he didn't focus on, while still largely maintaining a commitment to Peirce's views. I think I've done that as I've attempted to put Peirce, Heidegger, and other continental phenomenologists like Levinas in a kind of virtual conversation. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
(Sorry for any repeats - I accidentally sent several emails from the wrong account so they didn’t make it to the list) On Jul 26, 2014, at 7:28 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Peircean scholars and philosophers in general seem to find it difficult (or trivial) to distinguish between the two categories of structures, equilibrium and dissipative, probably because most philosophies have been done with written, not spoken, words since the invention of writing. A perhaps pedantic quibble. I think philosophy has been conducted with writing really just since the modern era and even then only on a large scale in more recent centuries. It’s just that the major works of philosophy that we have recorded are written. However I think for a large portion of our history (and perhaps arguably even today or at least until the advent of email) philosophy was dialogical in nature. Of course I think there’s a continuum between what you call equilibrium and dissipative (I’m a bit unsure what you mean by equilibrium - apologies if you’ve clarified this before. I’m behind in reading the list) Writing is frequently lost after all, we reinterpret its meanings as new contexts are introduced, etc. And of course old recordings degrade over time. Even data stored on hard drive loses data and can become corrupt. At the end all we have are traces of the original dialog. To follow Derrida (although he makes his point in an annoyingly petulant way) all we have are traces rather than some pure presence of communication we call speech. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] [biosemiotics:6231] Re: biosemiotics is the basis for
On Jul 25, 2014, at 8:01 PM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: As you know, Prigogine (1917-2003) divided all structures in the Universe into two classes equilibrium structures (ES) and dissipative structures (DS) [1, 2]. ESs do not but DSs do need to dissipate free energy for them to exist. I think the ES-DS theory of Prigogine can be applied to linguistics and semiotics generally. Thus, we can recognize two classes of words --- (i) written words belonging to ES, and (ii) spoken words belonging to DS. Written words cannot perform any work since they do not have any energy. They are like a hammer, an ES, which cannot move matter until an agent inputs some energy into it by, say, lifting and ramming it down on the head of a nail. But spoken words, being sound waves (which are DSs), can perform work because they possess energy and hence can move matter, for example, causing the ear drum to vibrate. Apologies for not reading this before that last post. I’d just say that according to this definition I don’t think there are any pure ES. The very idea of equilibrium suggests this since it would entail that ES is really multiple DS that create a quasi-permanent patter but whose parts sometimes change. This would be in Peircean terms a habit. On Jul 28, 2014, at 10:47 AM, Sungchul Ji s...@rci.rutgers.edu wrote: Conversely, anything that remains unchanged when energy supply is removed would be equilibrium structures, such as an artificial candle or flower, the photograph of a computer screen with images, words written down on a piece of paper (which lasts a much longer time than a spoken word can after it leaves the vocal cord of the speaker), melodies encoded in sheet music, etc. I’m not trying to be pedantic in what follows because I think it a key issue. We have to qualify this with “when a particular energy supply is removed.” This is key since of course we aren’t dealing with a closed system except in very artificial thought experiments. The implications of this are quite important and demand we consider the thermodynamics far more holistically. This then leads to the points I raised earlier. Whenever we talk about equilibrium we are always really talking about equilibrium in a particular context and period. What you say is fine for that. But when we move from these more artificial chemical examples to the broader examples of writing and speech that context matters and matters a lot. The obvious example is the equilibrium of magnetic tape. In practice we always end up with semi-permanent equilibrium. By denying the distinction between equilibrium and dissipative structures in semiotics or philosophical discourse in general, one is denying the fundamental role that energy plays in these disciplines and hence the fundamental neurobiological mechanisms (or underpinnings) supporting such mental activities. Hopefully I clarified why there is at best a continuum between these two categories. And indeed I’d question whether true equilibrium of the sort you specify is truly possible except as a regulative theoretical concept. (Much like the ideal gas law ends up being an idealization) Semiotically this is very important because contamination is always going on. As in physics and chemistry we can do theoretical or empirical perturbation analysis to see how well a system can withstand “noise” and maintain its equilibrium. However these are often statistical and there usually is a point of external energy where the system starts to break down. This energy can be external or internal (say the very stability of particular chemicals over time) When one moves from physics and chemistry to more broad semiotics this principle becomes quite important since equilibrium is maintained by a kind of replication of the sign system as it undergoes semiotic process. Yet (and this is key for Peirce’s semiotics) there is always a gap between object and interpretant in this process. For Peirce this is best conceived by way of the Epicurean notion of swerve. Peirce uses this by way of analogy I think. (Others might disagree) However regardless of how one takes Peirce’s ontology, I think the notion of this sign gap is a tremendously significant in semiotics. Effectively to deny this gap is to claim the legendary transcendental sign which is key to certain philosophies - especially many Platonic ones. I think a major theme of semiotics in the second half of the 20th century, regardless of jargon, is the denial of such a transcendental sign. Effectively this is the denial, in your terminology, of a pure equilibrium structure. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on Reply List or Reply All to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L in the BODY of the message. More at
