RE: [PEIRCE-L] Elementary Relatives or Individual Relatives

[gnox]

Jeff,

 

This does clarify Peirce’s usage of terms like “individual relatives” and 
“elementary relatives,” as Jon’s post also does. Conceptually, though, it 
doesn’t show me anything I didn’t already see, at least when it comes to 
Peirce’s analysis of triadic relations in NDTR (and other late texts). So any 
comment I could make would only echo what Peirce says at the beginning of NDTR:

“The principles and analogies of Phenomenology enable us to describe, in a 
distant way, what the divisions of triadic relations must be. But until we have 
met with the different kinds a posteriori, and have in that way been led to 
recognize their importance, the a priori descriptions mean little; not nothing 
at all, but little. … It is only after much further arduous analysis that we 
are able finally to place in the system the conceptions to which experience has 
led us.”

 

So, on with the arduous analysis!

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] 
Sent: 3-Dec-15 13:01



Gary F., Jon, List, 

 

In a discussion of elementary relatives, you ask:  "Perhaps correlates which 
are not relations are 'individual relatives'?"  

 

Here is a nice passage from "On an Improvement in Boole's Calculus of Logic:  
"There are in the logic of relatives three kinds of terms which involve 
general suppositions of individual cases. The first are individual terms, 
which denote only individuals; the second are those relatives whose 
correlatives are individual: I term these infinitesimal relatives; the third 
are individual infinitesimal relatives, and these I term elementary relatives." 
CP 3.95

 

In the preceding paragraph, Peirce makes the following point:  "If we call a 
thought about a thing in so far as it is denoted by a term, a second intention, 
we may say that such a term as 'any individual man' is individual by second 
intention. The letters which the mathematician uses (whether in algebra or in 
geometry) are such individuals by second intention. Such individuals are one in 
number, for any individual man is one man; they may also be regarded as 
incapable of logical division, for any individual man, though he may either be 
a Frenchman or not, is yet altogether a Frenchman or altogether not, and not 
some one and some the other." This discussion of individual terms, 
infinitesimal relatives and elementary relatives is found in the context of a 
discussion of a system of formal logic.  I take this to be, first and foremost, 
an inquiry in mathematical logic.  

 

The crucial move, I take it, is that Peirce is building a mathematical system 
that has the character of a second intentional system of formal logic.  What 
happens when we include the kinds of abstractions that involve taking 
terms--like numbers--that are used first and foremost as pure indexes that are 
put into relations of one-to-one correspondence with some collection of 
individuals (such as a collection of spots on a page), and we then treat the 
mathematical signs themselves as individuals?  This abstractive move gives us 
an individual that has the character of an elementary relative.  It is 
elementary in the sense that it is not amenable to any further logical 
division.  That is, we can't logically divide the indexical "2" that was put 
into correspondence with a couple of individual spots on the page any further.  
It is an individual of a special sort.  While there may be, as Qunie suggests 
in Word and Object, rabbit time slices, there are no number time slices--are 
there?  This is true even when we are talking about a specific use of "2" as an 
index that is put into a relation of correspondence.

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard

Associate Professor

Department of Philosophy

Northern Arizona University

(o) 928 523-8354


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Gary F - I'll say the same to you - you get full marks for tenacity. Equally, 
your 'GaryF-isms' are not, in my view, correct analyses of Peirce. You are 
locked into the semantics (the trees) and don't see the broader picture (the 
semiosis). 

1) The genuine or  degenerate 'signs'  (again, you refer only to the 
Representamen) is operative in a 'genuine' or 'degenerate' way due to and only 
to the categorical mode of the Relation between the Representamen and the 
Object. You wrote:

GF: So you also reject Peirce’s “view” that “Of signs there are two different 
degenerate forms. … The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is 
the icon. … The other form of degenerate sign is to be termed an index. … We 
now come to the genuine sign, for which I propose the technical designation 
symbol” (EP2:306-7)? or that “Of these three genera of representamens, the Icon 
is the Qualitatively degenerate, the Index the Reactionally degenerate, while 
the Symbol is the relatively genuine genus” (EP2:163)? If so, your rejections 
are irrelevant to Peircean semiotic.

EDWINA:  What function do you see in these degenerate/genuine modes? WHY does 
Peirce define the Iconic Relation as 'degenerate'? Well? It's because it is 
operating in a mode of 3-1, with the Representamen in itself in a mode of 
Thirdness, and the Relation between the R-and-Object, in a mode of Firstness, 
ie. Thirdness-as-Firstness. The indexical Relation between the R-and-Object is 
3-2. The symbol relation is in a mode of Thirdness.

2) You seem to privilege only the full or 'genuine' categorical modes, ie. 
Thirdness as Thirdness, Firstness as Firstness, Secondness as Secondness. You 
seem to denigrate the 'mixed' modes, eg, Thirdness as Secondness. But - these 
mixed categorical modes are what enables interaction and  diversity. 

3) And again, I also reject your view that the "Qualisign is degenerate 
relative to the Sinsign and to the Legisign ". 
Why should a Representamen in the categorical mode of Firstness be 
'degenerate'? Or is it that the Legisign 'ought' to be, as the site of laws, in 
the mode of Thirdness, and any weakening of it (by its being in a mode of 
Firstness or Secondness) thereby weakens its rule-making powers. Now -  THAT I 
can accept. But you don't explain this. 

4) Again - how can a 'normal Qualisign' be disembodied? What's your meaning of 
this statement. I think I've asked this three times already.

5) Finally - you maintain that YOUR outline is The Only Correct View of Peirce. 
I, however, disagree with you - but - I don't declare that MY outline is the 
Correct View of Peirce. I am providing my view and my analysis, and consider 
that you are only and merely providing your view and your analysis - not The 
Only Correct View - but simply, your analysis. It ends there.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: g...@gnusystems.ca 
  To: 'Peirce-L' 
  Sent: Friday, December 04, 2015 8:46 AM
  Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, you certainly get full marks for tenacity!

   

  What we need in this thread, though, is closer attention to what Peirce 
actually said.

  In the responses interleaved below, that will be my focus.

   

  Gary f.

   

  From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
  Sent: 3-Dec-15 16:13



  ET: Gary F-  I'm aware that Peirce used the term 'sign' to refer to both the 
Representamen and the full triadic semiosic process. As you know, your 
confining the term to mean ONLY the Representamen, is a problem I have, not 
with Peirce, but with your outlines. I doubt that you and I will agree on this.

   

  GF: In this thread I am quoting from NDTR, where Peirce says that “A Sign is 
a representamen” (CP 2.242). Can you provide a quote from NDTR where Peirce 
says that a Sign is a full triadic semiosic process (or a “triad of relations”)?

   

  ET: I don't think that the term 'peculiar' naturally leads to its being 
defined as 'degenerate'.

   

  GF: Neither do I. I’m guessing at what Peirce means by “peculiar” in this 
context, and how this “peculiarity” might be related to degeneracy, precisely 
because Peirce does not mention degeneracy in NDTR, as he does elsewhere.

   

  ET: That's because I understand the terms 'genuine' and 'degenerate' to refer 
only to the modal categories. So, if the Relations between the three parts of 
the triad (Object-Representamen-Interpretant) are operating within the 
degnerate modes of (2-1, 3-1, 3-2) rather than the 'pure modes' (1-1, 2-2, 
3-3)...then, we can see them as 'degenerate relations'.

   

  I do not know what Peirce meant by 'these qualisigns are of a peculiar kind 
and only form a sign through being actually embodied" 2.245.  He might be 
saying that a Sinsign, which functions as a particularity, might have a 
qualitative relation (as well as a direct relation) with its Object in the mode 
of 2-1, or Secondness-as-Firstness. 

   

  GF: OK, that makes sense in the Taborskian 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] by way of answering your questions

[Michael Shapiro]

Jerry , List,This may not be a persuasive example but there's tons of similar examples from many languages which instantiate the pattern as I described it. Scientific terminology is a special case in any event.M.-Original Message-
From: Jerry LR Chandler 
Sent: Dec 4, 2015 2:58 PM
To: CSP 
Cc: Michael Shapiro 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] by way of answering your questions

Michael, List: A further question on how to interpret...On Nov 28, 2015, at 1:13 PM, Michael Shapiro wrote:The iconic motivation of this usage is twofold. First, less is shorter than fewer, thereby fitting it more adequately than its counterpart to its meaning, namely ‘lesser quantity’. Second, individuation as a semantic category is marked (more restricted in conceptual scope) than non-individuation, so that a drift toward non-individuation is a movement toward the unmarked member of the opposition, instantiating the general iconic (semeiotic) principle according to which language change favors replacement of marked units, categories, and contexts by unmarked ones."The example of "less" and "fewer" is not very persuasive for skeptic.To argue from a single example to a broad generalization is a bit optimistic, isn't it?Within the natural sciences, the trend appears to be opposite.  Words tend to take on more and more meaning or potential meanings as the networks of relatives and relations expand. In other words, the marking of units becomes more specific.Such words like "DNA" or cancer or diabetes grow richer in meaning - the conceptual scope is widening.Do you feel that these counter-examples are relevant to the general notion of drift or do multiple notions of drift exist for utterances from various categories of users?Cheersjerry  

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] by way of answering your questions

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Michael, List: 

A further question on how to interpret...
On Nov 28, 2015, at 1:13 PM, Michael Shapiro wrote:

> The iconic motivation of this usage is twofold. First, less is shorter than 
> fewer, thereby fitting it more adequately than its counterpart to its 
> meaning, namely ‘lesser quantity’. Second, individuation as a semantic 
> category is marked (more restricted in conceptual scope) than 
> non-individuation, so that a drift toward non-individuation is a movement 
> toward the unmarked member of the opposition, instantiating the general 
> iconic (semeiotic) principle according to which language change favors 
> replacement of marked units, categories, and contexts by unmarked ones."
> 

The example of "less" and "fewer" is not very persuasive for skeptic.

To argue from a single example to a broad generalization is a bit optimistic, 
isn't it?

Within the natural sciences, the trend appears to be opposite.  Words tend to 
take on more and more meaning or potential meanings as the networks of 
relatives and relations expand. 
In other words, the marking of units becomes more specific.
Such words like "DNA" or cancer or diabetes grow richer in meaning - the 
conceptual scope is widening.

Do you feel that these counter-examples are relevant to the general notion of 
drift or do multiple notions of drift exist for utterances from various 
categories of users?

Cheers

jerry

  
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[John Collier]

Jerry,

I was talking about the manifestations of first ness, not the concept of 
firstness, when I said that firstness has no structure. You are not talking 
about the manifestations of firstness if you think they have structure. You 
aren't talking about Peirce, here when  you say things like

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

Basically, that is irrelevant to what I was saying, and to Peirce's views on 
firstness (which I take to be definitive of the notion).

Unless you understand  this you are going to be asking questions without an 
answer because the presuppositions are false. It has nothing to do with my 
physcalism (which is not, actually, materialism I have come to believe). The 
physicalism stems from the Pragmatic Maxim, which makes any difference in 
meaning depend on a difference in possible experience together with Quine's 
idea that the physical is just what we can experience. I take it that the last 
is also Peirce's view, and he is no materialist. Basically, you err, as I see 
it, in making a distinction that implies no difference in meaning, however much 
it might seem to. It violates Peirce's prope-positivism, which he uses to 
deflate a lot of metaphysics.

Of course you can reject either the Pragmatic Maxim, or the notion of 
experience Peirce uses, or both, in  order to save your distinction. But then 
you aren't talking about Peirce's firsts when you say they have structure.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com]
Sent: Friday, 04 December 2015 11:32 PM
To: John Collier
Cc: Peirce-L; Clark Goble
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of 
units unify the unity.

List, John:


On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote:


Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
explain. See interspersed comments.
The message was only questions, with one except.
What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine.


I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where structures 
are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in itself without 
relations.

Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, 
featureless.

[John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when we 
get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds.

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

[John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
(qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in dicents. 
Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or horseness), but 
then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into qualities,

Well...
FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate.

But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his 
arguments.
Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in 
various forms of diagrams / mereology.  To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the 
critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms  / formal 
logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use.

CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related 
terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The 
goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that 
is recursive.  In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) 
premises for constructing consistent arguments.   The index is the central term 
in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices.  The construction 
of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately 
connected to the indices.  It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. 
 That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of 
the sin-sign into rhema  The proposed self-consistency of the sentences 
(propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns.

Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of 
legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new 
qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1.

In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises 
augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine 
terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics 
such that recursive calculations  would be consistent, complete and decidable.

As I have previously noted 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union of units unify the unity.

[Jerry LR Chandler]

List, John: 


On Dec 2, 2015, at 11:39 AM, John Collier wrote:

> Jerry, there is some very convoluted reasoning in this, but I will try to 
> explain. See interspersed comments.
> 
The message was only questions, with one except.
What reasoning you find convoluted is of your making, not mine.

> 
> I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in 
> itself without relations.

Firstness is a term. I see no reason to infer that it is structureless. Nor, 
featureless.

> [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when 
> we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 

Part-whole relations are a deep component of one's metaphysical perspective.

> [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's treatment of dicents, nouns are indices 
> (qualities and predicates in general are basically iconic, though), and hence 
> seconds at least. Stjernfelt argues that this is a consequence of grammar, 
> construed broadly, or alternatively and equivalently, by their role in 
> dicents. Can abstract the noun part to a quality (E.G., Platoness, or 
> horseness), but then this removestheir grammatical role and turns them into 
> qualities,

Well...
FS wrote a fine book. He is very knowledgable and articulate.

But, I disagree with the basic premise of his book and many, many of his 
arguments.
Technically, FS gives little attention to the logic concept of extension in 
various forms of diagrams / mereology.  To me, the nature of EXTENSION is the 
critical distinction between CSP's view of logic and other forms  / formal 
logics, such as the logics the physics / mathematics communities use.

CSP, in the three triads, is, in my opinion, laying out nine vaguely related 
terms, and his definitions of the interrelated meanings of these terms. The 
goal, if I may use this term, is a self-consistent style of argumentation that 
is recursive.  In other words, 8 terms are generalized (non-mathematical terms) 
premises for constructing consistent arguments.   The index is the central term 
in the diagram. Qualisigns are one of the origin of indices.  The construction 
of the logic of the rhema is critically based on logical premises intimately 
connected to the indices.  It plays a necessary role in the system of premises. 
 That is, any number of forms of indices can be inserted as representamen of 
the sin-sign into rhema  The proposed self-consistency of the sentences 
(propositions) arise from adherences to the appropriate legisigns. 
 
Yet, the open structure of these premises is so stated that the set of 
legisigns can be extended as new inquiry generates new sinsigns with new 
qualisigns and new indices. As CSP notes in 3.420-1.  

In modern propositional logic, one would probably use conditional premises 
augmented with hybrid and sortal logics to express the meaning of these nine 
terms in a way that would be consistent with mathematical logic and semantics 
such that recursive calculations  would be consistent, complete and decidable.

As I have previously noted here, I have used these semantics for pragmatic 
purposes. Rather clumsy, to say the least!

[JLRC]  If a molecule is a noun, is it a "firstness"? does it inherently have a 
structure?  Is modal logic necessary to describe the relationship between atoms 
and molecules? Is the inherence of "thing in itself" necessary for this 
relation?
> 
> [John Collier] No, see my last interjection.

Is a molecule divisible?   Or, is it a context dependent question?
 
> [John Collier] No, for the reasons above, if I understand what you mean here 
> by your use of 'metaphysical' which is a very broad term.

I phrased this question is such a way as to be consistent in multiple symbol 
systems.  If I understand your physical perspective, then I can easy understand 
why you answer in this way. 


Cheers

Jerry






> John Collier
> Professor Emeritus, UKZN
> http://web.ncf.ca/collier
> 
> From: Jerry LR Chandler [mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@me.com] 
> Sent: Wednesday, 02 December 2015 6:57 PM
> To: Peirce-L
> Cc: Clark Goble
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations - The union 
> of units unify the unity.
> 
> List, Clark:
> 
> On Dec 2, 2015, at 10:18 AM, Clark Goble wrote:
> 
> 
> I'm not quite sure why you are applying firstness to structure where 
> structures are inherently relations and firstness is inherently a thing in 
> itself without relations.
> 
> 
> From my perspective, this argument, ignores the nature of nature - that is, 
> of part whole relationships, known as mereology in logic and philosophy and 
> as "scaling" in physics.
> 
> [John Collier] Part-whole relations and mereology in general only arise when 
> we get to what Peirce calls existence, i.e., seconds. 
> 
> A noun is what?  a part of a sentence? an object? a singularity? a relative? 
> a grammatical structure?
> 
> [John Collier] Following Stjernfelt's 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] in case you were wondering

[Matt Faunce]

Michael, Peircers, 

Is the quality of music determined by the final opinion of that music? 

If 'yes', do all inquiries into its quality take into consideration the music's 
impact on people relative to their history? For example, Penderecki's Threnody 
for the Victims of Hiroshima, a very dissonant piece, might be rightly judged 
as excellent to those in the shadow of WWII but potentially not to future 
people after 500 years of peace (when, say, a Kyle Gann piece with his more 
sonorous intonations might be considered the greatest composition of the 20th 
century!) In considering change shouldn't we then say the quality of Threnody 
as played in one time period to the people with its history is incommensurable 
with the quality of the same piece as played to people with a very different 
history? 

If 'no' and if the piece's true quality is only that which I would be opined in 
the long run, then either (1) you must believe there is some principle limiting 
how much people can change relative to that music, keeping perceptual judgments 
in a corral, or (2) you believe people today who disagree with the final 
opinion have 'perverted' tastes, perhaps due to their perverted culture, (I'm 
using 'perverted' in the Buddhist sense of viparyasa*), or (3) you believe the 
music has inherent quality, that is, you believe its quality should be judged 
by the potential final opinion, that after the long run cancels out all 
transitory effects the music has had on people there will be some effect left 
to signify the music's quality. The third position without the principle of the 
first position is contrary to pragmatism because there would be no quality left 
to judge, (this is the Buddhist position.) If the first position is your 
stance, then what is that principle and how is it established?

The 'esthetics-ethics-logic triad is easily justified with pragmatism by doing 
away with 'the long run' and replacing it with historicism. How else can it be 
justified?

* viparyasa contains the root 'to throw'; it's also translated as 'overthrow', 
'inversion', 'perverseness', 'wrong notion', 'error', 'what can upset', 
'upside-down views', all which throw one off the path toward inward calm. 
Buddhist Thought in India, pg. 40. by Edward Conze

Matt

> On Dec 3, 2015, at 12:15 PM, Michael Shapiro  wrote:
> 
> Harmony, Linguistic and Musical
>  
> GLOSSARY
>  
> cacoglossic, adj.: exhibiting or characteristic of distorted or ungrammatical 
> speech
> cacophonic, adj. < cacophony, n.: harsh or discordant sound; dissonance
> dialogism, n.: the principle that all utterances (and hence all 
> communication) acquiremeaning only in the context of a dialogue to which they 
> contribute and in which the presence and contributions of other voices (or 
> other discourses, languages, etc.) are inescapably implied, with the result 
> that meaning and expression cannot be reduced to a single system or subjected 
> to a single authority; the embodiment of this principle in a form of 
> expression, esp. a literary text
> figurative, adj.: transferred in sense from literal or plain to abstract or 
> hypothetical (as by the expression of one thing in terms of another with 
> which it can be regarded as analogous)
> lexically, adv. < lexical, adj.: of or relating to words, word formatives, or 
> the vocabulary of a language as distinguished from its grammar and 
> construction
> Peirce: Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914), American logician and scientist
> triadic, adj. < triad, n.: a union or group of three, esp. of three closely 
> related persons, beings, or things
>  
> My hero, Charles Peirce, rightly says that logic exists in the 
> service of ethics, and ethics in the service of aesthetics. Following this 
> triadic characterization of the foundations of knowledge, both language and 
> music, in order to be good and beautiful, must be underpinned by 
> well-formedness, alias logic. Thus even a child’s grammatically and lexically 
> well-formed utterance is to be deemed superior to an adult’s cacoglossic one, 
> just as the harmonically grammatical commercial jingle always puts the 
> typically cacophonic piece of contemporary classical music to shame.
>  In this matter, my favorite pre-Socratic philosopher, Heraclitus 
> “The Obscure” (of “No man ever steps in the same river twice” fame), has 
> something pertinent to say.
> One of Heraclitus’ most famously enigmatic fragments goes like 
> this:
>  
> Οὐ ξυνίασι ὅκως διαφερόμενον ἑωυτῷ ὁμολογέει·
> 
> παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη ὅκωσπερ τόξου καὶ λύρης.
> Ou xyniasin hokōs diaferomenon heoutoi homologeei 
> palintropos harmoniē hokōsper toxou kai lyres.
>  
> (“They do not comprehend how a thing agrees at variance with 
> itself [literally how being brought apart it isbrought together with 
> itself]; it is an attunement turning back on itself, like that of the bow and