Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Edwina, list, I never meant to imply that language determines thought in toto. So far as all thought is in signs, and a language represents a system of signs, and signs determine other signs, then it must be admitted that language determines signs and, since all thought is in signs, this means that language determines (some) thoughts. That doesn't mean that every thought anyone ever has is determined by a given language. It does mean that to a significant extent, our thoughts are determined by the language in which we express many of our thoughts, because those thoughts are to a great extent interpretants of that language. I find it absurd that my position has been represented as 'sociolinguistic relativism or determinism'. If you read what I said in attempting to respond to Sunchul's query regarding language, I discussed the different ways in which one could mean language, which included the consideration of logic as the language of thought, as well as considering that language, taken in a very broad sense, could include all the kinds of signs there are. Moreover, I never agreed that human language is an appropriate way to think of reasoning; in fact, I emphatically denied it, and was giving good reason for why logic, which does engage in the analysis of thought, could never be reduced to a study of human language. -- Franklin --- On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 12:03 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Franklin Ransom is using a discredited analysis of language, referred to > as sociolinguistic relativism or determinism, where language defines the > knowledge base; i.e., language determines thought. Followers of this linear > causality are such as Whorf-Sapir, and Basil Bernstein. It doesn't stand up > to empirical analysis. But it enjoyed its own limelight within the works > of various people who saw language or culture as determinant of thought, > and even, there were some who suggested that some languages should be > eradicated (eg native) because the language was defined as 'primitive' > and prevented the users from thinking 'in a modern or scientific way'. > > Instead, the human brain creates language and thus, can express anything > by coming up with new terms and expressions. > > Edwina > > - Original Message - > *From:* Clark Goble > *To:* Peirce-L > *Sent:* Monday, December 14, 2015 11:48 AM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > > On Dec 14, 2015, at 3:08 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > > On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the > things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the > development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific > terminology is not a development shared by every human language. > > Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from > two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for > the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda > writes > > " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity." > > "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology > speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly > industrialized society. *There are no primitive languages*. Virtually > no linguist today would disagree with this statement." > > > I don’t know about that quote in particular. However a decade or so back > Michael Tomasello had a fascinating book on the evolution of language in *The > Cultural Origins of Human Cognition. *While he doesn’t speak of it in > Peircean terms he creates a model where it appears a certain kind of > thirdness in terms of interpretation of signs develops. Once that evolves > then he sees language’s capabilities as being largely there and develops > fast. It’s been a while since I read it but I think he keeps the > traditional dating of the evolution of language to around 80,000 - 100,000 > years. The evolution after that is really developing the language and > culture once you have the capability. > > I know he has a newer text based upon some lectures he gave called *The > Origins of Human Communication* although I’ve not read that one. > > -- > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu wi
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Matt, list, Can you give your source for this? I cannot. I confess that my statement was not well-thought out. I did not mean to imply anything about the possibility of developing scientific terminology in any given human language. What I meant "about the development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific terminology" is thinking about the case of where we find ourselves today, in the state in which scientific terminology has actually developed to the point it has. Obviously not every human language in history has developed to the point of having the terminology that the sciences today command. For example, the use of Latin words for developing terms identifying species in biology, and the whole host of such terms that have been developed. Or the development of mathematical language to the point where physical theories like the general and special theories of relativity can be articulated. I take it for granted though that it is widely acknowledged that human languages do differ with respect to the rules of construction and the things that can be said. If there has not been a vocabulary established in a given language for discussing projective geometry, people speaking only that language won't be able to say things about it without going through the work of developing a system of terminology in order to say things about it, or by translating from another language. My essential point though was just to point out that trying to look to human language as a model for representing reasoning, or the subject matter of logic, is an ill-considered and ill-advised venture, precisely because there is so much difference between human languages. It's not as though a universal human language has been discovered by linguists, so I raised concerns about Sungchul's reliance on 'human language' as his model for representing reasoning. If one is to accept Sunchul's approach, we would have to admit that there are different kinds of reasoning, one for each human language, and logic would cease to be a general science of reasoning, and would become indistinguishable from linguistics. -- Franklin On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 5:08 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > On 12/13/15 6:24 PM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > Human languages differ with respect to the rules of construction and the > things that can be said, and they also develop and evolve over time; the > development of a language to the point where it can articulate scientific > terminology is not a development shared by every human language. > > Can you give your source for this? I remember reading the opposite from > two different linguists. Michael Shapiro is one. (I'd have to search for > the exact statements, but the keyword I'd use is 'passkey'.) Edward Vajda > writes > > " Human language is unlimited in its expressive capacity." > > "Today, it is quite obvious that people living with Stone Age technology > speak languages as complex and versatile as those spoken in the most highly > industrialized society. *There are no primitive languages*. Virtually > no linguist today would disagree with this statement." > > -- > Matt > > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Matt, list, So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. This is still a poor way of stating the matter. The token is not a type; but your statement, as worded, suggests that it is. There is smoke as a token, and there is smoke as a type. The token and the type are not the same thing. The token, in being related to other tokens, is not thereby a type. The token is an instance of a type, and the type is what refers to all the instances. A token, rightly, only refers to the 'here and now', and not to other tokens like it, which are other 'here and now's'. But your point is taken: "I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a perceptual judgment." -- Franklin -- On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 3:17 AM, Matt Faunce wrote: > On 12/13/15 9:38 AM, Franklin Ransom wrote: > > > Matt wrote: > > EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas percepts >> don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you have a >> perceptual judgment. So, smoke, as understood as being a type, e.g., >> relating to other instances of smoke, is a perceptual judgment. > > > Smoke, qua type, is not a perceptual judgment. A perceptual judgment is > not the general element, but includes the general as its predicate. > > > I meant that the token of a type 'smoke' is a perceptual judgment. I hoped > that would've been understood from the context, e.g., my clause "relating > to *other instances* of smoke," as an instance is a token, not a > generality. As usual, I could've written it better. Then I continued to > give my argument for the fact that there can be no token in perception > without that token being of a type, concluding with "If this is correct > then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns." Let me add bracketed > insertions to my first paragraph to clarify what I meant: > > EP2.227: "perceptual judgments contain general elements," whereas > percepts don't. So, if you have a general type (legisign) in mind then you > have a perceptual judgment. So, [the token of] smoke [in your mind], as > understood as being a type, e.g., relating to other instances of smoke, is > a perceptual judgment. > > I continued... > > Any dichotomy made within a percept is a perceptual judgment. One very >> basic dichotomy is 'me and not me'. The judgment 'x is not me' is judging x >> to be the general class of 'not me'. The judgment 'x is not y' is to >> generalize x by thinking it belongs to the general class of not y. For >> example, let's say 'x is not y' is 'the dark part* of my percept is >> different from the light part'; this is a way of typifying x, the dark >> side, as 'not y', 'not of the same type as the light part.' >> >> In merely seperating the tone of dark from the tone of light, the tone of >> dark becomes a token of the type 'not the tone of light'. I can't imagine >> there can be a token that's not also a type of this most basic kind. If >> this is correct then all perceptual judgments are dicisigns. >> >> Your question about how the categories fit into this analysis is a good >> one. >> >> * Here I mean the word 'dark' as only indicating the mere tone >> (qualisign), i.e., before 'dark' is typified with other instances of dark. >> Similarly, 'x is not y' etc., need not be verbalized propositions. It seems >> to me that this basic level of dicisign precedes the sinsign, in that 'x', >> 'the dark tone' only comes as a result of the distinction (this basic level >> generalization) >> > Matt > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
John, list, I agree about Peirce’s difference with Lewis wrt the a priori. I don’t see > how that is related to the issue of the effability of percepts, though. Because Lewis views percepts (the "given") as ineffable, he requires the introduction of the pragmatic a priori in order to interpret them so as to give us experience, and from there empirical knowledge becomes possible. Peirce rejects the introduction of the pragmatic a priori in order to interpret percepts. The percepts themselves are a part of what goes into the perceptual judgments about them, which means that they are effable, i.e. they can be put into words, because they can be interpreted in signs at the level of perceptual judgments. My concern is that, since all thought is in signs, either percepts are > thoughts and they have secondness and thirdness as well as firstness (I > have called them existence and interpretation, respectively, recently here > and argued that only distinction, among experiences, is self-contained in > all of these respects, or else they are not thoughts. If they are not > thoughts, then I question whether it makes sense to refer to them as > determinate contents of experiences. I'm not sure that if they are not thoughts, that means they cannot be determinate contents of experiences. I suppose I would expect that if a perceptual judgment is an experience, and has a percept for its content, then the percept would be a determinate content of an experience. But I'm not interested in arguing that they are not thoughts. It comes to mind for me that Peirce tends to think of thoughts in the way that some medieval thinkers did, as objective, and that it is thinking which is subjective. If this is right, then I don't find it problematic to think of percepts as thoughts. Up to this point I had already felt it acknowledged that percepts have Secondness, and there was a question recently as to whether Firstness (vagueness) applies to percepts as well. It is pretty clear now that Firstness does, and I find it difficult to deny that Thirdness does. If we suppose that a phenomenon has the three Categories applicable to it, how are we to deny that a percept is a phenomenon? Is it supposed to simply be a part of a phenomenon? Maybe the idea is that a phenomenon is a percept plus perceptual judgment, such that the perceptual judgment is what represents the Thirdness found in the phenomenon. I'm not really so sure about this though, since Peirce suggested that a percept can be a sign, which directly implies that Thirdness does apply to it. I think there is a difference between the Thirdness of the percept and the Thirdness found in a perceptual judgment. But I also think that the percept in part determines the Thirdness of the perceptual judgment. So, the percept is effable, helping to determine how it is interpreted in thought, just as it helps to determine how its object is interpreted in thought. Of course, the object helps to determine the percept which represents it, which means the object is itself effable. Or, as I should prefer to put it, the object is not simply knowable with respect to some transcendental structure of understanding that is alien to the object itself; rather, the object in itself is knowable, and will force understanding of it to conform to it. 'Effability' goes all the way down to the object itself, and so obviously the same goes for percepts of it, and perceptual judgments of it, and (I know it goes without saying) more developed signs of it. -- Franklin - On Mon, Dec 14, 2015 at 2:42 AM, John Collier wrote: > Franklin, List, > > > > I agree about Peirce’s difference with Lewis wrt the a priori. I don’t see > how that is related to the issue of the effability of percepts, though. > > > > You are arguing below that each percept has its own individuality. I have > no quarrel with that. My concern is that, since all thought is in signs, > either percepts are thoughts and they have secondness and thirdness as well > as firstness (I have called them existence and interpretation, > respectively, recently here and argued that only distinction, among > experiences, is self-contained in all of these respects, or else they are > not thoughts. If they are not thoughts, then I question whether it makes > sense to refer to them as determinate contents of experiences. It seems to > me that Quine, Sellars and Lewis share my concerns. Though their arguments > are somewhat different I think there is a convergence of their inferences > towards what Lewis called ineffability. The main problem generated is for > the grounds of empirical claims, which become very much more fluid than in > most versions of empiricism and positivism. I don’t see that Peirce avoids > this in any interesting way, nor does it seem to me that, given his > fallibilism and also his view that all thought is in signs, he should avoid > it. > > > > I would argue that the grounds for knowledge a
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hi Gary R, You wrote : "As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters (121915-1) as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 classes." I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion: (1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the word "sign" in "qualisign" ? (2) The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is only one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or the 10 classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two kinds of signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, although he used the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as physicists use the same word "particles" for both *quarks* and *baryons.* They are both particles but physicists discovered that protons and neutrons are not fundamental particles but are composed of triplets of more fundamental particles called quarks. (3) I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to have contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different names (belatedly) for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "*elementary signs*" for the 9 types and the "*composite signs*" for the 10 classes of signs as I recommended in [biosemiotics:46]. The former is monadic and incomplete as a sign, while the latter is triadic and hence complete as a sign. Again this situation seems similar to the relation between quarks and baryons: Quarks are incomplete particles in that they cannot be isolated outside baryons whereas baryons (which are composed of three quarks) are complete particles since they can be isolated and experimentally measured. All the best. Sung On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Sung, list, > > When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not > possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a > part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic > iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To > designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] > because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic." > http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html > > As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do > not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing > signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 > classes. > > What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that > is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign > (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it > simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a > 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe). > > Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point > clear before there was any further confusion. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > >> Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, >> >> I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the >> 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in >> order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of >> the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as >> "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. >> However, >> >> "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to >> feel it.(121915-1) >> For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and >> applied one of them to it." >> >> Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which >> renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index >> or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the >> character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not >> lose that character if there were no interpretant". >> >> By extension, I wonder if we can say that >> >> "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a >> sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2) >> >> >> Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1). >> >> >> Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding >> confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Sung, list, When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic." http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 classes. What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe). Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point clear before there was any further confusion. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji wrote: > Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, > > I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the > 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in > order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of > the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as > "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. > However, > > "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to > feel it.(121915-1) > For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and > applied one of them to it." > > Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which > renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index > or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the > character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not > lose that character if there were no interpretant". > > By extension, I wonder if we can say that > > "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a > sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2) > > > Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1). > > > Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding > confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e., > 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs: > > "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are > experimentally measurable; (121915-3) > Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but only > the latter can be > used as a means of communicating information." > > In [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of signs > as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs > as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being > composed of elementary quarks. > > A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year to you all ! > > Sung > > > > > On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond > wrote: > >> Jeff, Gary F. list, >> >> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example >> of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more >> complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> >>> Hello Gary F., List, >>> >>> In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts >>> of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential >>> characters of a more complete sign." How should we understand this >>> distinction between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign >>> that are less complete? >>> >>> --Jeff >>> >>> >>> >>> Jeffrey Downard >>> Associate Professor >>> Department of Philosophy >>> Northern Arizona University >>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>> >>> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca] >>> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM >>> To: 'PEIRCE-L' >>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >>> >>> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. However, "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to feel it.(121915-1) For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and applied one of them to it." Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant". By extension, I wonder if we can say that "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2) Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1). Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e., 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs: "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are experimentally measurable; (121915-3) Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but only the latter can be used as a means of communicating information." In [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of signs as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being composed of elementary quarks. A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year to you all ! Sung On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Jeff, Gary F. list, > > I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example > of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more > complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < > jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > >> Hello Gary F., List, >> >> In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of >> a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters >> of a more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction >> between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are >> less complete? >> >> --Jeff >> >> >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca] >> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM >> To: 'PEIRCE-L' >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >> >> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” >> EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this >> thread has been referring to, so far. >> >> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at >> some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the >> manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius >> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or >> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” >> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is >> Peirce’s.— gary f. >> >> On the Foundations of Mathematics >> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining >> rendered as italics] >> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think >> is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The >> word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor >> to analyze it. >> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular >> replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is >> the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not >> clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though >> they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more >> complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of >> determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately >> producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never >> contribu
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Jeff, Gary F. list, I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Hello Gary F., List, > > In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of > a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters > of a more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction > between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are > less complete? > > --Jeff > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca] > Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM > To: 'PEIRCE-L' > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” > EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this > thread has been referring to, so far. > > Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at > some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the > manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius > Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or > refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” > which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is > Peirce’s.— gary f. > > On the Foundations of Mathematics > MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining rendered > as italics] > §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think is > so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The word > and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor to > analyze it. > It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular > replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is > the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not > clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though > they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more > complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of > determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately > producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never > contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On > the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause > appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although > there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be > because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present > condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of > feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a > sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore > essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign. > Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a > real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of > definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the > sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under > “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must be that it is one > thing to really be and another to be represented, or else it must be that > there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no denial that every > real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so, there > must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a > sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any > replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real > object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though > it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever > the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of > itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that > proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even > if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficiently complete, > there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely, to the > ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a > sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of parts of that > universe. Se
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
Hello Gary F., List, In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are less complete? --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca] Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM To: 'PEIRCE-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this thread has been referring to, so far. Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is Peirce’s.— gary f. On the Foundations of Mathematics MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining rendered as italics] §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor to analyze it. It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign. Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must be that it is one thing to really be and another to be represented, or else it must be that there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no denial that every real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so, there must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficiently complete, there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely, to the ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of parts of that universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a sign need not refer to all the real objects to which the sign itself refers, but must, at least, refer to the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to an object of its sign in an indefinite manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was a man, and Enoch was translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was translated.’ Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, in case the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an interpretant of the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the first sign does not specially refer, but only
