Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts? Depends. Are numbers real even when not embedded within matter/concepts? After all there are numbers that have never been formally thought yet it’s pretty common today to think them real. Even Quine says that so long as you can quantify over it then it’s real. So were fractional numbers real say 50,000 years ago? I’d say yes simply because they could *potentially* be embedded. That is their reality isn’t due to their embeddedness but their potential embeddedness. > My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong. Ah, sorry. I assumed it was. (Mine is actually physics but I minored in philosophy in school and philosophy was easier to keep up with than physics once I left formal academics) > I don't have 6.612 in my collection. Those few pages are missing! https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf The passage is primarily about the existence of chance and explanations. It’s a fantastic if long passage dealing with a lot of Peirce’s foundational ontology including the relationship of consciousness to chance (swerve). He also makes a fascinating argument against the conservation of energy. (With no reference to Noether although she didn’t publish her theorem until 1918 so that makes sense) > And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or > whatever term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The categories, > as I understand them, are basic modes of organization of Matter-Mind and do > so - within the semiosic triad. I don’t recall how Peirce deals with time on this matter. Typically the way this is dealt with (and this goes back to antiquity) is to say there is a logical order and not a temporal order. So emanations within Platonism are logical emanations not a temporal creation. While he doesn’t really formally discuss this, I’d say 6.12-6.18 is also primarily a discussion of logical order and not temporal cosmology. I’d add it’s worth reading on where Peirce discusses Being and Nothingness. > Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state of > 'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of the > womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by > the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle > of habit there would have been a second flash > > Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or 'was > real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original chaos, > therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere > indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411. > I think Peirce would agree with that. But then so too would the platonists I’m familiar with. Peirce says in 6.612 "I go back to a chaos so irregular that in strictness the word existence is not applicable to its merely germinal state of being…” > The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have > nothing to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy. And Firstness > cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy’. Well I was with you up until you said they “have nothing to do with the pre-matter/mind state-of-indeterminacy.” I think they have lot to do with it. But they aren’t the same thing. Firstness is a type of indeterminacy but it is not the same indeterminacy as the earlier nothing. Equally hasty is his oft-repeated objection that my absolute chance is something ultimate and inexplicable. I go back to a chaos so irregular that in strictness the word existence is not applicable to its merely germinal state of being; and here I reach a region in which the objection to ultimate causes loses its force. But I do not stop there. Even this nothingness, though it antecedes the infinitely distant absolute beginning of time, is traced back to a nothingness more rudimentary still, in which there is no variety, but only an indefinite specificability, which is nothing but a tendency to the diversification of the nothing, while leaving it as nothing as it was before. What objectionable ultimacy is here? The objection to an ultimate consists in its raising a barrier across the path of inquiry, in its specifying a phenomenon at which questions must stop, contrary to the postulate, or hope, of logic. But what question to which any meaning can be attached am I forbidding by my absolute chance? If what is demanded is a theological backing, or rational antecedent, to the chaos, that my theory fully supplies. The chaos is a state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Universes and Categories (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Edwina, Auke, listers, I wish to point out some key issues involved in my earlier post, connected with Edwina's comments 24.10.2016 Edwina Taborsky kirjoitti 24.10.2016 16:51: ET: > "Kirsti, I like your outlines of embryos and the 'firstness' of Feelings. [I think that more research should be done on the bonding in utero between multiple birth embryos, i.e., twins, triplets etc]. ... .. your example of the heartbeat of the mother affecting the embryo-fetus is a good one. " You seem to think that the issue is empirical. And that the example of the syncopic rhythm of heartbeat is just an example, one of many possible empirical examples. That is definitely NOT the case. First, it is to be duly noted that I was speaking of FEELING - not feelingS. Also, I was speaking of EXPERIENCE, not experienceS. FeelingS and experienceS are something for psychology to study, whereas Feeling and Experience are philosophical (logical ) categories. The problems involved in these cannot be solved by empirical investigations. The rhythm of heartbeat is not "just an example". It presents a demonstration, as such an argument with just as much persuasive force as a geometrical demonstration (c.f. Euclides). No one with a sound mind and common sense can deny it, after any serious consideration. – It presents something which is necessarily so. Well, then : Does it follow from deductive inference? Is abduction involved? How about probable inference? - This line of questioning just does not make sense in this case. How about the division into metaphysics and logic? - Or the modern nominalist dichotomy between epistemology and ontology? The latter just cannot be applied . From the very historical start it was established as a dichotomy . It makes no sense to even try. Peirce in his triadic category system presents us metaphysics ( as one side of one coin (or 'sheet' , if you wish) AND logic. To Peirce meaning IS effect. - It does not just HAVE effects. Signs do have effects, but only in the case that they have BECOME meaningful for some minds (or something mind-like, which may be ineffete mind). Thus some kind of experience is necessarily involved. Signs may be singled out. Even classified. Not so with meaning. From the experiential standpoint of an embryo and a fetus, the rhythm of heatbeat doen NOT appear AS the mother's heartbeat. – No nametag involved! In order to understand this, one has to be able to take the experiential standpoint of an embryo, then a fetus as the starting point. This is something one has to train oneself. – This skill has to be has to be acquired by training oneself . Preferably daily and for decades. CSP did so. So have I. This is a practical logical task, just as is mathematical training. Husserl with his bracketing was simply wrong. Presenting an impossible task. But Husserl was an outgrowth of a previous error. That of taking conscience as the all there is to human mind. As far as I know neither Husserl or Kant never saw the unconscious mind as a philosophical problem. The notion is implied, however, but only through NEGATION. To Kant, there were perceptions not strong enough to deserve a place in consciousness. (Too feeble). Husserl not even that. As you know, CSP was engaged with experimental work (with Jastrow). This work he continued throughout his life in the form of everyday experimentation. (Which appears to me the primary way he gained his insight on dogs, babes, ( even slime-moulds) on the working of the instintive mind. I also started my work with experimental investigations. With a series of experiments using the Uznadze experiment. So I do have solid experimental evidence of the unity of the senses. The Tbilisi school has acquired thousands of experimental results pointing to the same effect. An effect we are not conscious of, but which can be experimentally shown beyond any doubt. Of this research of mine there are several publications in English. But not available in the internet. Out of these I then developed a method for phenomenological experimentation. Then a variety of methods. Applicapble to everyday experimentation. – BUT a word of warning: It does take time and toil. Not for minds preferring sheer play with words. CSP points out the phenomenological work takes a lot of mathematical toil. And laments that people ask him to give proof of his theory, but as he proceedes to offer it, they get bored and leave. – Too much toil! Something similar happened when I was offering a demonstration of my method in text analysis & interpretation using Kaina Stoicheia. Someone got irritated on the slowness and meticulousness. Took hurried steps forwards. – So I left the discussion. Well, enough for now. Best, Kirsti Määttänen - Original Message - From: To: "Auke van Breemen" Cc: Sent: Monday, October 24, 2016 9:20 AM Subject
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
Clark - you wrote: "Well I was with you up until you said they “have nothing to do with the pre-matter/mind state-of-indeterminacy.” I think they have lot to do with it. But they aren’t the same thing. Firstness is a type of indeterminacy but it is not the same indeterminacy as the earlier nothing." Yes - I fully agree with you. I think one has to be very careful in how the same word can have a different contextual meaning. Firstness is a type of indeterminacy but..exactly right - it's not the same indeterminacy as the earlier nothing. My point when I wrote that was that the original indeterminacy could not be defined as a State of Firstness. That's because, in my reading, the three categories refer to phenomena. Peirce calls them 'elements'[logical elements]; they are interdependent [1.353] - which is also why I have trouble with suggesting that Firstness is, in itself, operative in the pre-universe state. And yes- I can see that the below quote makes sense: The chaos is a state of intensest feeling, although, memory and habit being totally absent, it is sheer nothing still. Feeling has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling. Now the welding of this feeling to the great whole of feeling is accomplished only by the reflection of a later date Again, Firstness as feeling 'has existence only so far as it is welded into feeling'. And since the categories are interdependent, then..the other categories necessarily function as well. Edwina - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: Edwina Taborsky ; Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, October 25, 2016 10:56 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism On Oct 24, 2016, at 5:46 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: Aren't Plato's Forms 'real' - even when NOT embedded within matter/concepts? Depends. Are numbers real even when not embedded within matter/concepts? After all there are numbers that have never been formally thought yet it’s pretty common today to think them real. Even Quine says that so long as you can quantify over it then it’s real. So were fractional numbers real say 50,000 years ago? I’d say yes simply because they could *potentially* be embedded. That is their reality isn’t due to their embeddedness but their potential embeddedness. My field is not philosophy - so I have no knowledge of Armstrong. Ah, sorry. I assumed it was. (Mine is actually physics but I minored in philosophy in school and philosophy was easier to keep up with than physics once I left formal academics) I don't have 6.612 in my collection. Those few pages are missing! https://colorysemiotica.files.wordpress.com/2014/08/peirce-collectedpapers.pdf The passage is primarily about the existence of chance and explanations. It’s a fantastic if long passage dealing with a lot of Peirce’s foundational ontology including the relationship of consciousness to chance (swerve). He also makes a fascinating argument against the conservation of energy. (With no reference to Noether although she didn’t publish her theorem until 1918 so that makes sense) And I don't see any of the categories as 'existent' or operational or whatever term one uses, before the emergence of Matter-Mind. The categories, as I understand them, are basic modes of organization of Matter-Mind and do so - within the semiosic triad. I don’t recall how Peirce deals with time on this matter. Typically the way this is dealt with (and this goes back to antiquity) is to say there is a logical order and not a temporal order. So emanations within Platonism are logical emanations not a temporal creation. While he doesn’t really formally discuss this, I’d say 6.12-6.18 is also primarily a discussion of logical order and not temporal cosmology. I’d add it’s worth reading on where Peirce discusses Being and Nothingness. Prior to the emergence of Matter-Mind, I don't see the universe as a state of 'Firstness'. But - as nothing. After all, in 1-412, Peirce says: "out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash Therefore, the way I read the above is NOT that Firstness 'existed' or 'was real' within that 'womb of indeterminacy. As he writes, "The original chaos, therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411. I think Peirce would agree with that. But then so too would the platonists I’m familiar with. Peirce says in 6.612 "I go back to a chaos so irregular that in strictness the word existence is not applicable to its merely germinal state of being…” The three categories are fundamental principles of the world. But have nothing to do with the pre-Matter/Mind state-of-indeterminacy. And Firstness cannot be defined as 'indeterminacy’.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Clark, List: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below. As we have > previously discussed under the heading of Peirce's Cosmology, he explicitly > referred to multiple "Platonic worlds" as one of the stages preceding the > emergence of this actual universe of existence. I have suggested that the > former correspond to the coalescing chalk marks on the blackboard, which then > serve as a whiteboard for the "discontinuous mark" that represents the latter. I’m slowly working through the posts I missed. Allow me to repost the relevant quote. This is 6.202-209. I think you quoted the paragraph referring to platonism. (See the other quotes at the bottom of this post too that differ from this version) I’ll try to relate this to the other comments later this evening. However having the original sources undoubtedly helps the discussion. Permit me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical system as a whole called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only enters as subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to secure to thirdness its really commanding function, I find it indispensable fully [to] recognize that it is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness would not have anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call my theory Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity. I would not object to Tritism. And if anybody can prove that it is trite, that would delight me [in] the chiefest degree. All that I have been saying about the beginnings of creation seems wildly confused enough. Now let me give you such slight indication, as brevity permits, of the clue to which I trust to guide us through the maze. Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This is something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that which it stands for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions. This blackboard is a continuum of possible points; while that is a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of possible dimensions of a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or something of that sort. There are no points on this blackboard. There are no dimensions in that continuum. I draw a chalk line on the board. This discontinuity is one of those brute acts by which alone the original vagueness could have made a step towards definiteness. There is a certain element of continuity in this line. Where did this continuity come from? It is nothing but the original continuity of the blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous. What I have really drawn there is an oval line. For this white chalk- mark is not a line, it is a plane figure in Euclid's sense -- a surface, and the only line there, is the line which forms the limit between the black surface and the white surface. Thus the discontinuity can only be produced upon that blackboard by the reaction between two continuous surfaces into which it is separated, the white surface and the black surface. The whiteness is a Firstness -- a springing up of something new. But the boundary between the black and white is neither black, nor white, nor neither, nor both. It is the pairedness of the two. It is for the white the active Secondness of the black; for the black the active Secondness of the white. Now the clue, that I mentioned, consists in making our thought diagrammatic and mathematical, by treating generality from the point of view of geometrical continuity, and by experimenting upon the diagram. We see the original generality like the ovum of the universe segmentated by this mark. However, the mark is a mere accident, and as such may be erased. It will not interfere with another mark drawn in quite another way. There need be no consistency between the two But no further progress beyond this can be made, until a mark will stay for a little while; that is, until some beginning of a habit has been established by virtue of which the accident acquires some incipient staying quality, some tendency toward consistency. This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity. It must have its origin in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality. Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
> On Oct 25, 2016, at 9:43 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > I’m slowly working through the posts I missed. Allow me to repost the > relevant quote. This is 6.202-209. I think you quoted the paragraph referring > to platonism. (See the other quotes at the bottom of this post too that > differ from this version) I’ll try to relate this to the other comments later > this evening. However having the original sources undoubtedly helps the > discussion. I should note the time of the quote. The form in CP 6 is from 1892-93 and thus is before he fully embraces modal realism. however reading it one clearly sees the roots of what is to come. Nearly as soon as I posted it I realized the second set of quotes was also in CP 6 and is CP 6.192-196. My apologies. This thus dates to the same era despite sounding very much like modal realism. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Clark, List: CP 6.185-213 is the manuscript text for the eighth and final Cambridge Conferences lecture and actually dates from 1898, not 1892-1893--thus coming *after* Peirce became a full-blown three-category realist, according to Fisch. The PDF that you linked is how it appears in the stand-alone volume containing those lectures, *Reasoning and the Logic of Things*, edited by Ketner and Putnam. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 10:48 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 9:43 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > I’m slowly working through the posts I missed. Allow me to repost the > relevant quote. This is 6.202-209. I think you quoted the paragraph > referring to platonism. (See the other quotes at the bottom of this post > too that differ from this version) I’ll try to relate this to the other > comments later this evening. However having the original sources > undoubtedly helps the discussion. > > I should note the time of the quote. The form in CP 6 is from 1892-93 and > thus is before he fully embraces modal realism. however reading it one > clearly sees the roots of what is to come. > > Nearly as soon as I posted it I realized the second set of quotes was also > in CP 6 and is CP 6.192-196. My apologies. This thus dates to the same era > despite sounding very much like modal realism. > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Clark, List: For convenience, here is what I posted in the previous thread on Peirce's Cosmology about this passage, prompted by the similar illustration of a mark on a blackboard in an earlier lecture of the same series. Is there a plausible way to integrate the two mentions of a blackboard into a single diagram? Could it be that the one in NEM 4.345 (RLT 162-163) corresponds to "a Platonic world" in CP 6.203-208 (RLT 261-263)? In other words ... - The "clean blackboard" represents "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" [3ns] (CP 6.203). - The initial chalk mark represents "a springing up of something new" [1ns] whose continuity "is nothing but the original continuity of the blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous" (CP 6.203). - Persistent groups of such chalk marks represent "reacting systems" [2ns] that result when "the generalizing tendency [3ns] builds up new habits from chance occurrences [1ns]" (CP 6.206). - Some of these "reacting systems" aggregate together into multiple "Platonic worlds" (CP 6.207-208). - Eventually, "a discontinuous mark" [2ns] is differentiated out of one of them as "this [determinate] Universe of Actual Existence" (CP 6.208, NEM 4.345). What I have in mind here is Peirce's notion that every part of a true continuum is itself a true continuum. Since each Platonic world is represented by a merged collection of marks on the blackboard, the latter is *also *a blackboard; or perhaps we should distinguish it, for the sake of clarity, by calling it a "whiteboard" whose own continuity is derived from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. It is then "a discontinuous mark" on the whiteboard, which is itself a merged collection of white marks on the original clean blackboard, that represents "this Universe of Actual Existence." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 10:43 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > On Oct 24, 2016, at 10:55 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > Clark, List: > > At this point, it seems appropriate to shift this conversation to the > spin-off thread that I started last week based on Ben Novak's post and the > ones to which he was responding, which I have reproduced below. As we have > previously discussed under the heading of Peirce's Cosmology, he explicitly > referred to multiple "Platonic worlds" as one of the stages preceding the > emergence of this actual universe of existence. I have suggested that the > former correspond to the coalescing chalk marks on the blackboard, which > then serve as a whiteboard for the "discontinuous mark" that represents the > latter. > > > I’m slowly working through the posts I missed. Allow me to repost the > relevant quote. This is 6.202-209. I think you quoted the paragraph > referring to platonism. (See the other quotes at the bottom of this post > too that differ from this version) I’ll try to relate this to the other > comments later this evening. However having the original sources > undoubtedly helps the discussion. > > Permit me further to say that I object to having my metaphysical system as > a whole called Tychism. For although tychism does enter into it, it only > enters as subsidiary to that which is really, as I regard it, the > characteristic of my doctrine, namely, that I chiefly insist upon > continuity, or Thirdness, and, in order to secure to thirdness its really > commanding function, I find it indispensable fully [to] recognize that it > is a third, and that Firstness, or chance, and Secondness, or Brute > reaction, are other elements, without the independence of which Thirdness > would not have anything upon which to operate. Accordingly, I like to call > my theory Synechism, because it rests on the study of continuity. I would > not object to Tritism. And if anybody can prove that it is trite, that > would delight me [in] the chiefest degree. > > All that I have been saying about the beginnings of creation seems wildly > confused enough. Now let me give you such slight indication, as brevity > permits, of the clue to which I trust to guide us through the maze. > > Let the clean blackboard be a sort of diagram of the original vague > potentiality, or at any rate of some early stage of its determination. This > is something more than a figure of speech; for after all continuity is > generality. This blackboard is a continuum of two dimensions, while that > which it stands for is a continuum of some indefinite multitude of > dimensions. This blackboard is a continuum of possible points; while that > is a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or is a continuum of > possible dimensions of a continuum of possible dimensions of quality, or > something of that sort. There are no points on this blackboard. There are > no dimensions in that continuum. I draw a chalk lin
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
> On Oct 25, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CP 6.185-213 is the manuscript text for the eighth and final Cambridge > Conferences lecture and actually dates from 1898, not 1892-1893--thus coming > after Peirce became a full-blown three-category realist, according to Fisch. > The PDF that you linked is how it appears in the stand-alone volume > containing those lectures, Reasoning and the Logic of Things, edited by > Ketner and Putnam. > Yeah I was confused on that. I have Reasoning and the Logic of Things and knew the delivery date. But the introduction for the CP 6 put the date as earlier. So I started to think it was a preliminary text. (I’m at work so I don’t have access to my library - I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or RLT rather than CP for reasons like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out the dates - although perhaps that’s me) Thanks for clearing that up. That explains why it’s so modal realist. > Is there a plausible way to integrate the two mentions of a blackboard into a > single diagram? Could it be that the one in NEM 4.345 (RLT 162-163) > corresponds to "a Platonic world" in CP 6.203-208 (RLT 261-263)? In other > words ... > The "clean blackboard" represents "a continuum of some indefinite multitude > of dimensions" [3ns] (CP 6.203). > The initial chalk mark represents "a springing up of something new" [1ns] > whose continuity "is nothing but the original continuity of the blackboard > which makes everything upon it continuous" (CP 6.203). > Persistent groups of such chalk marks represent "reacting systems" [2ns] that > result when "the generalizing tendency [3ns] builds up new habits from chance > occurrences [1ns]" (CP 6.206). > Some of these "reacting systems" aggregate together into multiple "Platonic > worlds" (CP 6.207-208). > Eventually, "a discontinuous mark" [2ns] is differentiated out of one of them > as "this [determinate] Universe of Actual Existence" (CP 6.208, NEM 4.345). I think it does given the explicit reference to platonism. > What I have in mind here is Peirce's notion that every part of a true > continuum is itself a true continuum. Since each Platonic world is > represented by a merged collection of marks on the blackboard, the latter is > also a blackboard; or perhaps we should distinguish it, for the sake of > clarity, by calling it a "whiteboard" whose own continuity is derived from > and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. It is then "a > discontinuous mark" on the whiteboard, which is itself a merged collection of > white marks on the original clean blackboard, that represents "this Universe > of Actual Existence." Yes I think this is right. It gets at the issues we’ve been discussing. Although I hasten to add I’ve not read the full exchange from last week yet. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's neoPlatonism
> On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot > depends upon what we mean by the terms. > > Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality of > possibilities until about 1896. I confess it’s been so long that I had to check my notes. I know that the Monist article of 1897 refers to his nominalistic view of possibility the prior year. Although Short dates the change to a year earlier on the basis of 1.420. It’s after then that every sign has an interpretant but allows it to be possible. This then changes signs to the possibility of being interpreted rather than being interpreted. (Which seems relevant for Edwina’s points) Even though Peirce’s realism about modalism isn’t until the mid 1890’s, he was a realist about generals before then. The key move in the 1890’s is to relate modalism with generals. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40321020?seq=1 I’m trying to understand Edwina’s objections and I think it’s to the actual/potential distinction. (Please correct me if I’m wrong Edwina) Most platonists treat both as real (and often even treat possibilities as more real) but I think Edwina rejects modal realism. I confess it’s due to Peirce’s view on modalism prior to his mature phase that keeps me primarily reading his later works. That said I think the ground work and elements of his later modal realism is within his earlier work. It’s honestly surprising it took so long for him to change on that point. After all his account of truth seems to lead logically to modal realism. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Clark, List: CG: I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or RLT rather than CP for reasons like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out the dates - although perhaps that’s me) It is not just you--I have come to despise not only the arbitrarily jumbled topical arrangement of the Collected Papers, but also the need to find just the right footnote in order to determine the date of any particular passage, which is often associated with an earlier paragraph than the one of interest. Those dates are not entirely reliable, either. A good example of the problems that can arise is a fairly recent (and very interesting) paper on "A Neglected Argument" that still dated CP 6.486-491 to 1910, despite the EP footnotes explaining that this is actually the *first *(unpublished) additament that Peirce wrote in 1908; and treated CP 6.492-493 as part of the original article written in 1908, even though the accompanying footnote states plainly that it is "From an unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 11:45 AM, Clark Goble wrote: > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 10:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CP 6.185-213 is the manuscript text for the eighth and final Cambridge > Conferences lecture and actually dates from 1898, not 1892-1893--thus > coming *after* Peirce became a full-blown three-category realist, > according to Fisch. The PDF that you linked is how it appears in the > stand-alone volume containing those lectures, *Reasoning and the Logic of > Things*, edited by Ketner and Putnam. > > Yeah I was confused on that. I have *Reasoning and the Logic of Things* and > knew the delivery date. But the introduction for the CP 6 put the date as > earlier. So I started to think it was a preliminary text. (I’m at work so I > don’t have access to my library - I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or > RLT rather than CP for reasons like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out > the dates - although perhaps that’s me) Thanks for clearing that up. That > explains why it’s so modal realist. > > Is there a plausible way to integrate the two mentions of a blackboard > into a single diagram? Could it be that the one in NEM 4.345 (RLT 162-163) > corresponds to "a Platonic world" in CP 6.203-208 (RLT 261-263)? In other > words ... > >- The "clean blackboard" represents "a continuum of some indefinite >multitude of dimensions" [3ns] (CP 6.203). >- The initial chalk mark represents "a springing up of something new" >[1ns] whose continuity "is nothing but the original continuity of the >blackboard which makes everything upon it continuous" (CP 6.203). >- Persistent groups of such chalk marks represent "reacting systems" >[2ns] that result when "the generalizing tendency [3ns] builds up new >habits from chance occurrences [1ns]" (CP 6.206). >- Some of these "reacting systems" aggregate together into multiple >"Platonic worlds" (CP 6.207-208). >- Eventually, "a discontinuous mark" [2ns] is differentiated out of >one of them as "this [determinate] Universe of Actual Existence" (CP 6.208, >NEM 4.345). > > I think it does given the explicit reference to platonism. > > What I have in mind here is Peirce's notion that every part of a true > continuum is itself a true continuum. Since each Platonic world is > represented by a merged collection of marks on the blackboard, the latter > is *also *a blackboard; or perhaps we should distinguish it, for the sake > of clarity, by calling it a "whiteboard" whose own continuity is derived > from and dependent on that of the underlying blackboard. It is then "a > discontinuous mark" on the whiteboard, which is itself a merged collection > of white marks on the original clean blackboard, that represents "this > Universe of Actual Existence." > > Yes I think this is right. It gets at the issues we’ve been discussing. > Although I hasten to add I’ve not read the full exchange from last week yet. > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
> On Oct 25, 2016, at 11:53 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or RLT rather than CP for reasons > like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out the dates - although perhaps > that’s me) > > It is not just you--I have come to despise not only the arbitrarily jumbled > topical arrangement of the Collected Papers, but also the need to find just > the right footnote in order to determine the date of any particular passage, > which is often associated with an earlier paragraph than the one of interest. > Those dates are not entirely reliable, either. A good example of the > problems that can arise is a fairly recent (and very interesting) paper on "A > Neglected Argument" that still dated CP 6.486-491 to 1910, despite the EP > footnotes explaining that this is actually the first (unpublished) additament > that Peirce wrote in 1908; and treated CP 6.492-493 as part of the original > article written in 1908, even though the accompanying footnote states plainly > that it is "From an unpaginated fragment, c. 1896." > I just wish RLT was available electronically as a PDF or ePub/Mobi. Right now I always have to go to my hard copy. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Dear list: Then for what reason is CP if it is simply an "arbitrarily jumbled topical arrangement of the Collected Papers"? To arrange papers with solely that purpose appears silly to me. Perhaps something is being missed or ignored. For example, what if our purpose is to find a resolution to a battle of names (*c.f.*, *Cratylus*, 438d-439b). How are we to refer to the sections of interest or ought we to reference the entire essay, of which there may be different versions? That is, is it not simpler to say: CP 5.189 is better than CP 6.469 and better than CP 5.402? I suppose we could simply google phrases, nowadays... All the best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 1:33 PM, Clark Goble wrote: > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 11:53 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt > wrote: > > CG: I usually prefer to quote from EP 2 or RLT rather than CP for reasons > like this. (It’s just a pain to figure out the dates - although perhaps > that’s me) > > > It is not just you--I have come to despise not only the arbitrarily > jumbled topical arrangement of the Collected Papers, but also the need to > find just the right footnote in order to determine the date of any > particular passage, which is often associated with an earlier paragraph > than the one of interest. Those dates are not entirely reliable, either. > A good example of the problems that can arise is a fairly recent (and very > interesting) paper on "A Neglected Argument" that still dated CP 6.486-491 > to 1910, despite the EP footnotes explaining that this is actually the > *first *(unpublished) additament that Peirce wrote in 1908; and treated > CP 6.492-493 as part of the original article written in 1908, even though > the accompanying footnote states plainly that it is "From an unpaginated > fragment, c. 1896." > > > I just wish RLT was available electronically as a PDF or ePub/Mobi. Right > now I always have to go to my hard copy. > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
> On Oct 25, 2016, at 2:38 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Then for what reason is CP if it is simply an "arbitrarily jumbled topical > arrangement of the Collected Papers"? > To arrange papers with solely that purpose appears silly to me. > Perhaps something is being missed or ignored. > > For example, what if our purpose is to find a resolution to a battle of names > (c.f., Cratylus, 438d-439b). How are we to refer to the sections of interest > or ought we to reference the entire essay, of which there may be different > versions? > > That is, is it not simpler to say: > CP 5.189 is better than CP 6.469 and better than CP 5.402? The CP was a fantastic work by Harvard in the day. Up to that point people typically had to go to Harvard and go through the collections to read most of Peirce. (Derrida famously had to go to Harvard for a year to read much of Peirce back in the 50’s) The CP enabled people to actually get the lesser known (and arguably more important) works of Peirce. So it’s been a huge benefit but has the limits of being that first work and organized somewhat thematically. The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition is arguably much better. But it’s not yet as widely available, so far as I’m aware isn’t in an electronic edition yet, and is only up to volume 6 which deals with his writings from 1886-1890. Since for most of us it is his post mid 90’s work that is most valuable that means we’ll have to wait a while to use the series or stick with the EP. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metaphysics and Nothing (was Peirce's Cosmology)
Dear Clark, list: Well, perhaps it can happen faster if they get some more funding as Peirce's popularity and awareness of his contribution grows. Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Oct 25, 2016 at 9:11 PM, CLARK GOBLE wrote: > > On Oct 25, 2016, at 2:38 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > > Then for what reason is CP if it is simply an "arbitrarily jumbled > topical arrangement of the Collected Papers"? > To arrange papers with solely that purpose appears silly to me. > Perhaps something is being missed or ignored. > > For example, what if our purpose is to find a resolution to a battle of > names (*c.f.*, *Cratylus*, 438d-439b). How are we to refer to the > sections of interest or ought we to reference the entire essay, of which > there may be different versions? > > That is, is it not simpler to say: > CP 5.189 is better than CP 6.469 and better than CP 5.402? > > > The CP was a fantastic work by Harvard in the day. Up to that point people > typically had to go to Harvard and go through the collections to read most > of Peirce. (Derrida famously had to go to Harvard for a year to read much > of Peirce back in the 50’s) The CP enabled people to actually get the > lesser known (and arguably more important) works of Peirce. So it’s been a > huge benefit but has the limits of being that first work and organized > somewhat thematically. > > The Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition is arguably > much better. But it’s not yet as widely available, so far as I’m aware > isn’t in an electronic edition yet, and is only up to volume 6 which deals > with his writings from 1886-1890. Since for most of us it is his post mid > 90’s work that is most valuable that means we’ll have to wait a while to > use the series or stick with the EP. > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
