> On Oct 24, 2016, at 6:15 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
> wrote:
> 
> CG:  I’d say it’s quite a bit earlier than that, although again I think a lot 
> depends upon what we mean by the terms.
> 
> Fisch argued, convincingly I think, that Peirce did not accept the reality of 
> possibilities until about 1896.

I confess it’s been so long that I had to check my notes. I know that the 
Monist article of 1897 refers to his nominalistic view of possibility the prior 
year. Although Short dates the change to a year earlier on the basis of 1.420. 
It’s after then that every sign has an interpretant but allows it to be 
possible. This then changes signs to the possibility of being interpreted 
rather than being interpreted. (Which seems relevant for Edwina’s points)

Even though Peirce’s realism about modalism isn’t until the mid 1890’s, he was 
a realist about generals before then. The key move in the 1890’s is to relate 
modalism with generals.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/40321020?seq=1

I’m trying to understand Edwina’s objections and I think it’s to the 
actual/potential distinction. (Please correct me if I’m wrong Edwina)  Most 
platonists treat both as real (and often even treat possibilities as more real) 
but I think Edwina rejects modal realism. 

I confess it’s due to Peirce’s view on modalism prior to his mature phase that 
keeps me primarily reading his later works. That said I think the ground work 
and elements of his later modal realism is within his earlier work. It’s 
honestly surprising it took so long for him to change on that point. After all 
his account of truth seems to lead logically to modal realism.




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