[PEIRCE-L] some problems with language WAS all topics

[Helmut Raulien]

List,

I think that the language we have is not exact enough for discussing semiotics. Misunderstandings are produced, one after another. We should construct a more exact language, and use inexact terms no longer. Examples:

 

-The term "is": In taxonomy, classification, it is used for something being a subset or element of something else, like: "Humans are mammals". But in meronomy, composition, it is not used that way, nobody would say: "A piston is a motor". And: If anybody uses the term "is" in another way than identity, somebody else for sure will answer: "But it isn´t, because it cannot be reversed".

 

-The terms "external, internal, inside, outside": This is meronomy, but there are three kinds of meronomy: Spatiotemporal, spatial and temporal. See my last post about "semantic problems...".

 

-The term "To consist of", or "to have": The same. "A sign consists of blablabla, final interpretant, blablabla." But: There are signs, that do not have a final interpretant. How can that be? It can, because if there by "a sign" is meant "the concept of a sign", or "a sign from its beginning till its end", or "looking at the history of a completed sign", then it has a final interpretant, and all other parts too. But if by "a sign" is meant: "A snapshot of a sign as it is in the moment", then the final interpretant may not yet have occured, and one can say: "This sign does not consist of a final interpretant", or, "it does not have" one.

 

- The term "Relation": "Relation" means nothing, because there are thousands of kinds of relation, and to discuss whether something is an entity or a relation leads to nothing, as any entity is a relation too, because there is no such thing as a thing in itself. So everything is a relation, which makes this term useless.

 

I am going to stop nagging now. Sorry, but I felt like it.

Best,

Helmut

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., List:

Thank you, this is very helpful.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 11:54 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:

> Jon A.S., Clark, list,
>
> I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked
> with other commitments.
>
> My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which
> I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer
> article:  http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf
>
> The issues in those slides are the focus of what I was trying to say.
>
> Jon
>
>> As I understand it, diagrams are icons, at least predominantly;
>> but rather than its object's qualities, a diagram embodies
>> the significant relations among its parts.
>>
>
> That's fine.  I don't object to that way of talking about them.
> What I wanted to distinguish are icons derived from sensations
> and icons (or diagrams) constructed (or imagined) by further
> processing.
>
> Jon
>
>> In a sense, then, one can abstract a diagram from an image by
>> ignoring the singular determinations of the latter that have
>> no bearing on whatever general properties of the former are
>> significant for one's purposes.
>>
>
> I agree that is one way of deriving a diagram in imagination.
>
> Clark
>
>> I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of
>> realism/nominalism.
>>
>
> Yes.  I prefer realism, but my ppe.pdf slides avoid that distinction.
>
> JFS
>
>> Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram,
>>> and every particular is something we classify by relating it
>>> to some diagram ...
>>>
>>
> MG Murphey
>
>> Mr. Arthur Burks has termed the icon a "specific universal" since it
>> is a specific thing which can stand for any member of a class ...
>> For in constructing the icon, we do not construct one particular case
>> under the hypothesis, we rather construct any particular case under
>> the hypothesis.
>>
>
> Jon
>
>> Would you mind elaborating, perhaps including some specific examples?
>>
>
> There are many examples in the ppe.pdf slides:  Slides 9 & 10 for
> icons and diagrams.  Slide 20 to 31 show Euclid's diagrams (unchanged)
> used as diagrams in existential graphs.  Slide 39 for the role that
> icons play in generalized existential graphs.
>
> I don't really like the terms 'universal' and 'particular', which
> are not Peircean terms.  I discussed that issue in the article
> http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf
>
> But following is my rationale for using those words in that note:
>
>  1. In a generalized existential graph, a diagram with appropriate
> indexicals (links to lines of identities) can serve as the
> definition of a relation.
>
>  2. since relations are often used to represent universals, an icon
> with N attached links (indexicals) can be considered as a
> representation of an N-adic relation.
>
>  3. A very simple icon, such as a patch of red, when attached
> to a line of identity in an existential graph, may be used
> to represent a monadic predicate named 'is-red'.
>
>  4. In generalized existential graphs (as I define them in ppe.pdf),
> an icon (or diagram or image or whatever you want to call it)
> together with N "pegs" (connections to lines of identity) may be
> used anywhere that an N-adic relation may be used.
>
> John
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Invitation to attend a talk by Michael Shapiro, Thursday, April 13, 2017, Hotel Red Lion, Brooklyn, NY

[Gary Richmond]

List,

I am delighted to announce a talk by Michael Shapiro on "The Semiotics of
Multilingualism," arranged by Bev Corbin (Semiotics Web), and to be
delivered Thursday, April 13, 2017, from 6:00 to 8:00 PM. The venue is the
excellent Hotel Red Lion in Brooklyn, NY.

Michael is unquestionably one of the preeminent living linguists and,
perhaps, the only prominent linguist in the world whose work is deeply
informed by Peirce. Those of us who have heard him speak, for example, at
the Peirce Centennial at UMass, Lowell, in 2014 or, more recently, at
Columbia University, can say unhesitatingly that you will fully enjoy the
discussion of any topic Michael chooses to take up while learning much of
interest and value in the process. It is for these reasons, among others,
that Shapiro is a sought after invited speaker at colleges and universities
around the USA and beyond.

As many of you may know, Michael, a past president of *The Peirce Society*
as well as *The Semiotic Society of America*, is a long time member of this
forum. I recently recommended on this list the expanded second edition of
his book, *The Speaking Self: Language Lore and English Usage*, a
delightful book which I not infrequently pick up, always finding something
new and fascinating about English (and, occasionally, Russian) usage (one
could say the same about his blog). I might add on a personal note that
Michael is the founder and current president of a small group of NYC
Peirceans--including myself--who meet once a month for lunch and
philosophical discussion.

I hope many of you will join us for what is sure to be a remarkable event
this April 13th.

Best,

Gary R

Semiotics of Multilingualism


   - Thursday, April 13, 20176:00 PM to 8:00 PM
   CHANGE 
   -
   Hotel Red Lion
   


   1080 Broadway, Brooklyn NY 11217, Brooklyn, NY

   Michael Shapiro, Professor Emeritus of Slavic and Semiotic Studies,
   Brown University, Adjunct Professor, Society of Senior Scholars, Columbia
   University

   Michael Shapiro, Professor Emeritus of Slavic and Semiotic Studies at
   Brown and Adjunct Professor in the Society of Senior Scholars at Columbia,
   was born in Yokohama, spent World War II in Japan, and grew up speaking
   Russian, Japanese, and English. He earned degrees in Slavic Languages and
   Literatures at UCLA (A.B.,‘61) and Harvard (A.M.,‘62; Ph.D.‘65). Besides
   Brown and Columbia, he has taught at UCLA, Princeton, UC Berkeley,and Green
   Mountain College, and has given over one hundred public lectures to
   academic audiences in the United States and Europe. He is the author or
   co-author (with his late wife, the medievalist and Renaissance scholar
   Marianne Shapiro) of eleven books, including The Sense of Grammar: Language
   as Semeiotic (1983), Figuration in Verbal Art (1988), The Sense of Change:
   History as Theory (1991), and The Sense of Form in Literature and Language
   (2nd ed.,2009). He was elected President of the Charles S. Peirce Society
   in 1991 and of the Semiotic Society of America in 1992. An expanded second
   edition of his most recent book, The Speaking Self: Language Lore and
   English Usage, was just published by Springer.

   "DISCONTINUOUS LEXICA AND MULTILINGUALISM:A MISSING CHAPTER IN STANDARD
   ACCOUNTS OF LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE"

   It is a truism of linguistics that the grammars of native speakers are
   DISCONTINUOUS, which alludes to the principle of language competence
   encompassing the idea that no two persons have exactly the same grammar of
   the language they share as native speakers. To a very large extent,
   precisely what is discontinuous is their VOCABULARIES, their command of the
   lexical stock of the language. This whole topic constitutes a chapter
   missing from standard accounts of linguistic competence. Presented is some
   material that might go toward filling the lacuna. The focus is on the role
   multilingualism plays in characterizing the English-language competence of
   native or nearnative speakers. Along with examples from belles lettres, an
   illustrative case study, including longitudinal biographical data, is
   furnished by the speaker's own nuclear family of eight (parents, five
   children, governess), in which several European and Asian languages flesh
   out a picture of habitual multilingualism.

   Twitter Chat: @semioticsweb #semioticsweb #multilingual

   A link to a webcast will be posted to the meetup site a few minutes
   before the speakers begin.

   Springer Author Page:
   http://www.springer.com/us/book/9783319516813#aboutAuthors

   Amazon Author Page:
   
https://www.amazon.com/Michael-Shapiro/e/B001HQ5DKS/ref=sr_ntt_srch_lnk_2?qid=1486699150=8-2

   Language Lore: http://languagelore.net/

   Books by Marianne and Michael Shapiro:
   http://www.marianneandmichaelshapiro.com/

   SW - IA - OS 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

Welcome back!  Consider it a "get well" gift from Edwina and me. :-)

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 3:12 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, Jon, List,
>
> Will wonders never cease? To see the two of you, once so far apart in so
> many matters, find common ground on these few, albeit in my opinion,
> exceedingly important semeiotic distinctions, is most wonderful to behold.
>
> Indeed, I feel that together you have moved thinking--at least
> mine--regarding the nature of the sign quite a distance forward, perhaps
> beyond anything I've read in the literature--or, at very least, the
> condensed (succinct) form of posts to a forum such as this clarifies ideas,
> casting a bright light on such distinctions and definitions as you've been
> making. I should add in passing that I tend to strongly concur with those
> points upon which you appear to be in agreement.
>
> Perhaps what has facilitated my understanding of your--and any number of
> other cogent contributors-- recent exchanges (and in several threads) is my
> having read them pretty much in a couple sittings during the last couple of
> days. This hiatus in my reading posts and participating on the list was the
> result of my having been incapacitated most of this year, first with a
> problematic hip replacement early in January, a painful hairline fracture
> of my femur in February, a complete break of it early in March,
> necessitating a revision (redoing) of the hip replacement involving a
> difficult posterior approach (with more precautions, a long healing time,
> much more pain, etc.) Following a week in hospital, I spent the last three
> weeks in a rehabilitation center from which I was released yesterday. I
> still have a long way to go to complete recovery--but at least I'm at home!
>
> This is all by way of explaning why I've been so quiet on the list. I
> would like to add that I have been delighted to observe (at first,
> sporadically and, recently, steadily reading through threads) the high
> quality of discussion that has, in my opinion, characterized so much of
> list discussion these first few months of the year. I think Joe Ransdell
> would be pleased to see that his brain child, the peirce-l forum, continues
> to produce valuable philosophical/scientific/semeiotic work.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <(718)%20482-5690>*
>
> On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 2:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> Jon, list - this is my second reply to this post. After thinking a bit
>> about it - I'd say that I do agree with your point:
>>
>> Jon wrote: "I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an actual
>> interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible 
>> interpretants
>> that a Sign may produce.  In other words, the Immediate Interpretant is the
>> Sign's capacity to produce an actual interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic
>> Interpretant. "
>>
>> As a 'range of possible interpretants' - these are dependent on the
>> sign/representamen, which is in turn determined by the Dynamic/Immediate
>> Objects. So therefore, the Affects of these two, the DO and the IO,  and
>> their informational content,   will move on within the Representamen/sign
>> and thus, be part of and both determine and constrain the nature of the
>> Immediate Interpretant.
>>
>> So- therefore - I see - and accept, your analysis.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>

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[PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

It is very gratifying to make so much progress in (finally) understanding
each other better.  I am sincerely sorry that we were not able to get to
this point sooner.

ET:  I don't think I'm ready to reduce the Immediate Interpretant to a
potentiality held within the Representamen although - I see your point and
it seems valid.


I did not mean to imply that the Immediate Interpretant is "held within the
Representamen"; rather, it is within the Sign, which is a triad consisting
of the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant.

ET:  ... so my question is - as potential - is [the Immediate Interpretant]
always in a mode of Firstness? ...  If the Immediate Interpretant operates
as potentiality - then - how can it be within the other two modes?


It depends on what we mean by "mode."  In my working hypothesis, the
Immediate, Dynamic, and Final Interpretants are indeed manifestations of
1ns as possibility, 2ns as actuality, and 3ns as habituality,
respectively.  However, each is still divisible into its own trichotomy,
which corresponds to 1ns as feeling, 2ns as action, and 3ns as thought.  So
the Immediate Interpretant is the range of *possible* feelings
(Ejaculative), actions (Imperative), or thoughts (Significative) that the
Sign *may *produce; the Dynamic Interpretant is any *actual *feeling
(Sympathetic/Congruentive), action (Shocking/Percussive), or thought
(Usual) that the Sign *does *produce; and the Final Interpretant is a *habit
*of feeling (Gratific), action (To produce action), or thought (To produce
self-control) that the Sign *would *produce through repetition of various
Dynamic Interpretants.  Every Sign has an Immediate Interpretant within
itself, but some Signs never produce a Dynamic Interpretant, and some of
those Signs never produce a Final Interpretant.

Once again, the terminology here seems more directly applicable to
Sign-action involving human minds, rather than the physico-chemical and
biological realms.  I am open to suggestions for how to transfer the
concepts from one context to the other.  I suspect that the key is
remembering that Peirce *did not* confine feeling, action, and thought to
humans--or even just to living things.

ET:  The Interpretant in a Rhematic Indexical Legisign [a demonstrative
pronoun] is in a mode of Firstness. It is, I think, externalized by the
modes of Secondness and Thirdness in the other correlates. How does this
fit in with your outline?


My understanding of Peirce's three-trichotomy, ten-Sign classification--and
what I have found to be the nearly unanimous consensus in the secondary
literature that I have read--is that the third trichotomy does not divide
the Interpretant *itself*, but the *relation *between the Sign and its
Interpretant; i.e., *how *the Interpretant *represents *the Sign.

CSP:  Signs are divisible by three trichotomies:  first, according as the
sign in itself is a mere quality [Qualisign], is an actual existent
[Sinsign], or is a general law [Legisign]; secondly, according as the
relation of the sign to its Object consists in the sign's having some
character in itself [Icon], or in some existential relation to that Object
[Index], or in its relation to an Interpretant [Symbol]; thirdly, according
as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility [Rheme], or as a
sign of fact [Dicent], or as a sign of reason [Argument]. (EP 2:291-292;
1903)


Hence a Rhematic Indexical Legisign is a Sign that is a general law, which
is in some existential relation to its Object, and which is represented by
its Interpretant as a sign of possibility.  A demonstrative pronoun, such
as "this" or "that," is a Legisign because it is applicable to a wide
variety of situations, rather than being tied to one particular Object; but
whenever it is *actually *uttered, that replica is a Sinsign.  It is an
Index because it only has an Object by virtue of collateral experience that
draws attention to that Object, such as the utterer pointing at it.  It is
a Rheme because its Interpretant includes no information *about *its Object.

The possible modes of the Interpretant itself depend on where we insert
that trichotomy among the first three--which is something that Peirce never
clearly specified, with the result that it has been a topic of considerable
debate over the years, on this List and elsewhere.  I would suggest that it
must come *after *the Sign, since the Sign determines the Interpretant; and
it must come *before *the Sign-Interpretant relation, such that the two
correlates determine the relation.  In my working hypothesis, if it
comes *before
*the Sign-Object relation, then the Interpretant must be either an action
(2ns) or a thought (3ns); and if it comes *after *the Sign-Object relation,
then the Interpretant must be either a feeling (1ns) or an action (2ns).
Hence it is a matter of which we find more plausible--that the Interpretant
of a Rhematic Indexical Legisign can be a thought, or that it can be a
feeling.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, List,

Will wonders never cease? To see the two of you, once so far apart in so
many matters, find common ground on these few, albeit in my opinion,
exceedingly important semeiotic distinctions, is most wonderful to behold.

Indeed, I feel that together you have moved thinking--at least
mine--regarding the nature of the sign quite a distance forward, perhaps
beyond anything I've read in the literature--or, at very least, the
condensed (succinct) form of posts to a forum such as this clarifies ideas,
casting a bright light on such distinctions and definitions as you've been
making. I should add in passing that I tend to strongly concur with those
points upon which you appear to be in agreement.

Perhaps what has facilitated my understanding of your--and any number of
other cogent contributors-- recent exchanges (and in several threads) is my
having read them pretty much in a couple sittings during the last couple of
days. This hiatus in my reading posts and participating on the list was the
result of my having been incapacitated most of this year, first with a
problematic hip replacement early in January, a painful hairline fracture
of my femur in February, a complete break of it early in March,
necessitating a revision (redoing) of the hip replacement involving a
difficult posterior approach (with more precautions, a long healing time,
much more pain, etc.) Following a week in hospital, I spent the last three
weeks in a rehabilitation center from which I was released yesterday. I
still have a long way to go to complete recovery--but at least I'm at home!

This is all by way of explaning why I've been so quiet on the list. I would
like to add that I have been delighted to observe (at first, sporadically
and, recently, steadily reading through threads) the high quality of
discussion that has, in my opinion, characterized so much of list
discussion these first few months of the year. I think Joe Ransdell would
be pleased to see that his brain child, the peirce-l forum, continues to
produce valuable philosophical/scientific/semeiotic work.

Best,

Gary Richmond (writing as list moderator)



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 2:41 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

>
> Jon, list - this is my second reply to this post. After thinking a bit
> about it - I'd say that I do agree with your point:
>
> Jon wrote: "I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an actual
> interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible 
> interpretants
> that a Sign may produce.  In other words, the Immediate Interpretant is the
> Sign's capacity to produce an actual interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic
> Interpretant. "
>
> As a 'range of possible interpretants' - these are dependent on the
> sign/representamen, which is in turn determined by the Dynamic/Immediate
> Objects. So therefore, the Affects of these two, the DO and the IO,  and
> their informational content,   will move on within the Representamen/sign
> and thus, be part of and both determine and constrain the nature of the
> Immediate Interpretant.
>
> So- therefore - I see - and accept, your analysis.
>
> Edwina
>
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Sat 01/04/17 1:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> I really appreciate this discussion, which has been very enlightening.
> This time I am the one with a couple of quibbles, which I hope will prove
> to be minor.
>
> ET:  And yes, I DO fully agree with your comment that the
> sign/representamen must have the capacity to produce an Immediate
> Interpretant - even if it does not do so, at this moment in time.
>
>
> I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an actual interpretant
> that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible interpretants that a
> Sign may produce.  In other words, the Immediate Interpretant is the
> Sign's capacity to produce an actual interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic
> Interpretant.  Furthermore, the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant
> are internal to the Sign--i.e., the Sign itself is a triad consisting of
> the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant.  I suspect
> that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-Sign classification did not
> include the S-Oi or S-Ii relations as distinct trichotomies.
>
> ET:  The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but only in
> its nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the Sign-vehicle,
> then, it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is in a relationship
> with the sign.  Before that - it is simply an external Object.
>
>
> I would suggest that the Dynamic Object determines the Sign, rather than
> merely interacting with it.  In 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[John F Sowa]

Edwina, Stephen, list,

I don't disagree with the points you're addressing, but I'm
concerned about the proliferation of terminology.

Formal logic and linguistics (Chomsky, Montague, Kamp, Partee
and their PhD students) have had little success for AI and natural
language understanding.  The next generation of students adopted
statistics and neural networks.

I believe that Peirce's insights are an excellent foundation for
relating and integrating all those areas -- the new and the old.

We have an opportunity for bringing Peirce into the mainstream of
cognitive science (philosophy, psychology, linguistics, artificial
intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology).  Peirce was a
pioneer in developing the foundations for all those areas.

Edwina

And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an
action more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form
and behaviour than pure active imitation or direct copying.


Stephen

I am 100% with you on this. I just did a synonym search on imitation,
without luck. I think we need to invent a new word to more accurately
describe this replication and sharing of signs/behavior.


Some new words may be useful, but there's already an overabundance
of terminology from several millennia of philosophy, most of which
Peirce replaced with a new set of terms.  That is the theme of the
following article:

Signs and Reality
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf

Criterion for any new terminology:  Will it make Peirce's writings
more accessible to people who come from other traditions?

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px; }
 Jon, list - this is my second reply to this post. After thinking a
bit about it - I'd say that I do agree with your point:

Jon wrote: "I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never
an actual interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range of
possible interpretants that a Sign may produce.  In other words, the
Immediate Interpretant is the Sign's capacity to produce an actual
interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic Interpretant. "

As a 'range of possible interpretants' - these are dependent on the
sign/representamen, which is in turn determined by the
Dynamic/Immediate Objects. So therefore, the Affects of these two,
the DO and the IO,  and their informational content,   will move on
within the Representamen/sign and thus, be part of and both determine
and constrain the nature of the Immediate Interpretant. 

So- therefore - I see - and accept, your analysis. 

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 01/04/17  1:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I really appreciate this discussion, which has been very
enlightening.  This time I am the one with a couple of quibbles,
which I hope will prove to be minor.
 ET:  And yes, I DO fully agree with your comment that the
sign/representamen must have the capacity to produce an Immediate
Interpretant - even if it does not do so, at this moment in time. 
 I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an actual
interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible
interpretants that a Sign may produce.  In other words, the Immediate
Interpretant is the Sign's capacity to produce an actual
interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic Interpretant.  Furthermore, the
Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are internal to the
Sign--i.e., the Sign itself is a triad consisting of the
Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant.  I
suspect that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-Sign
classification  did not include the S-Oi or S-Ii relations as
distinct trichotomies.
 ET:  The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but
only in its nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the
Sign-vehicle, then, it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is
in a relationship with the sign.  Before that - it is simply an
external Object.
 I would suggest that the Dynamic Object  determines the Sign, rather
than merely interacting with it.  In other words, the Dynamic Object
is independent of the Sign in a certain sense, but the Sign is not
independent of the Dynamic Object in the same way; and similarly, the
Sign is independent of the Dynamic Interpretant in a certain sense (as
discussed above), but the Dynamic Interpretant is not independent of
the Sign in the same way.  I suspect that this is precisely why
Peirce's late 66-sign classification  did include the S-Od and S-Id
relations as distinct trichotomies.
 ET:  But then, since I also subscribe to a view that nothing at all
exists independently 'per se' and outside of networked semiosic
connections, then, if one follows this view throughit would
conclude that there is no such thing as a separate Object. All
'things' are in interaction with something else ... 
 Right, "separate" was too strong a word on my part; I agree that
every "thing" has real relations with other "things."  The Dynamic
Object has a peculiar kind of relation with the Sign, which has a
peculiar kind of relation with the Dynamic Interpretant.  However, I
would suggest that these are still relations that the Sign has with
two external "things," not relations that are somehow internal to the
Sign itself--i.e., the Sign (R-Oi-Ii), Dynamic Object, and Dynamic
Interpretant are the three correlates of a single triadic relation,
rather than the three components of a single triad. 
 I guess I should have made the thread title "Sign as Triad AND
Correlate of Triadic Relation," because that is the view on which I
seem to be settling now.  Again, what do you think?
 Thanks,
 Jon 
 On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 7:22 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jon, list - yes, there's a lot of agreement in our views. 

So, first, the Sign must have a Dynamic Object- at some time in its
experience. For example, that could be some chemical trigger that
does not affect the body for years, that is dormant internally as an
Immediate Object for years before moving into the Interpretant phase.

And yes, I DO fully  agree with your comment that the
sign/representamen must have the capacity to produce an Immediate
Interpretant - even if it does not do so, at this moment in time. 

And I would agree that the internal triad is thus basic - and the
external parts could be called correlates - and are not necessarily
found at the same time. Again, I refer to that 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jon, list - 

OK - I'll take each point.

1)You write: " I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is
never an actual interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range
of possible interpretants that a Sign may produce.  In other words,
the Immediate Interpretant is the Sign's capacity to produce an
actual interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic Interpretant."

EDWINA: Hmm. I'd have to think about this. I agree that it is never
an actual interpretant. I don't think I'm ready to reduce the
Immediate Interpretant to a potentiality held within the
Representamen although - I see your point and it seems valid.

. I accept the notion of the representamen's capacity to produce an
actual interpretant, the DI,  - but the way you are setting it up,
the Immediate Interpretant - which I acknowledge has no actual
existentiality [for that would require that it be external and have
some links to a mode of Secondness]remains purely potential -
i.e., so my question is - as potential - is it always in a mode of
Firstness?

Your suggestion of potentiality would fit in with Peirce's outline
in 8.314, where he writes that "The Immediate Interpretant is what
the Question expresses, all that it immediately expresses' [the
question was the Object]. This would suggest that the Immediate
Interpretant is closely linked to the Object. 

Again, he writes: "The Immediate Interpretant consists in the
Quality of the Impression that a sign is fit to produce, not to any
actual reaction" 8.315. And he further refers to the Immediate
Interpretant as in a "mode of Presentation' 8.344 - i.e., not in a
Mode of Being or actuality. 

Then, he describes the Immediate Interpretant as 'felt' 8.369 - and
acknowledges that it can be in any of the three modes: 'ejaculative
or merely giving utterance to feeling; imperative, including of
course, Interrogative; Significative. ".  So - my question is: If the
Immediate Interpretant operates as potentiality - then - how can it be
within the other two modes? 

Or would - these three modes be within the Relation that the
Representamen has in determining the Immediate Interpretant . In
other words - this would agree with your analysis. 

But is this the case? The Interpretant -  - in a Rhematic Indexical
Legisign [a demonstrative pronoun] is in a mode of Firstness. It is,
I think, externalized by the modes of Secondness and Thirdness in the
other correlates. How does this fit in with your outline?

Again - your analysis makes sense - but I'll have to think about it.


2) I think that we are merely quibbling over the word 'determines' -
which still has a whiff of authority to it, which I am aware was not
what Peirce meant. Otherwise - I agree with your outline.

3) Yes - I can accept 'Sign as Triad and Correlate of Triadic
Relation'. Good heavens - we are agreeing - and it's real, not a
factor of April 1st!

Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 01/04/17  1:46 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 I really appreciate this discussion, which has been very
enlightening.  This time I am the one with a couple of quibbles,
which I hope will prove to be minor.
 ET:  And yes, I DO fully agree with your comment that the
sign/representamen must have the capacity to produce an Immediate
Interpretant - even if it does not do so, at this moment in time. 
 I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an actual
interpretant that a Sign produces, but rather a range of possible
interpretants that a Sign may produce.  In other words, the Immediate
Interpretant is the Sign's capacity to produce an actual
interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic Interpretant.  Furthermore, the
Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are internal to the
Sign--i.e., the Sign itself is a triad consisting of the
Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant.  I
suspect that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-Sign
classification  did not include the S-Oi or S-Ii relations as
distinct trichotomies.
 ET:  The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but
only in its nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the
Sign-vehicle, then, it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is
in a relationship with the sign.  Before that - it is simply an
external Object.
 I would suggest that the Dynamic Object  determines the Sign, rather
than merely interacting with it.  In other words, the Dynamic Object
is independent of the Sign in a certain sense, but the Sign is not
independent of the Dynamic Object in the same way; and similarly, the
Sign is independent of the Dynamic Interpretant in a certain sense (as
discussed above), but the Dynamic Interpretant is not independent of
the Sign in the same 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Re: Sign as Triad vs. Correlate of Triadic Relation (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I really appreciate this discussion, which has been very enlightening.
This time I am the one with a couple of quibbles, which I hope will prove
to be minor.

ET:  And yes, I DO fully agree with your comment that the
sign/representamen must have the capacity to produce an Immediate
Interpretant - even if it does not do so, at this moment in time.


I would suggest that an Immediate Interpretant is never an *actual
*interpretant
that a Sign *produces*, but rather a range of *possible *interpretants that
a Sign *may *produce.  In other words, the Immediate Interpretant *is *the
Sign's capacity to produce an *actual *interpretant--i.e., a Dynamic
Interpretant.  Furthermore, the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant
are *internal *to the Sign--i.e., the Sign itself is a triad consisting of
the Representamen, Immediate Object, and Immediate Interpretant.  I suspect
that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-Sign classification *did not*
include the S-Oi or S-Ii relations as distinct trichotomies.

ET:  The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but only in
its nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the Sign-vehicle,
then, it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is in a relationship
with the sign.  Before that - it is simply an external Object.


I would suggest that the Dynamic Object *determines *the Sign, rather than
merely *interacting *with it.  In other words, the Dynamic Object is
independent of the Sign in a certain sense, but the Sign is *not *independent
of the Dynamic Object in the same way; and similarly, the Sign is
independent of the Dynamic Interpretant in a certain sense (as discussed
above), but the Dynamic Interpretant is *not *independent of the Sign in
the same way.  I suspect that this is precisely why Peirce's late 66-sign
classification *did *include the S-Od and S-Id relations as distinct
trichotomies.

ET:  But then, since I also subscribe to a view that nothing at all exists
independently 'per se' and outside of networked semiosic connections, then,
if one follows this view throughit would conclude that there is no such
thing as a separate Object. All 'things' are in interaction with something
else ...


Right, "separate" was too strong a word on my part; I agree that every
"thing" has real relations with other "things."  The Dynamic Object has a
peculiar *kind *of relation with the Sign, which has a peculiar *kind *of
relation with the Dynamic Interpretant.  However, I would suggest that
these are still relations that the Sign has with two *external *"things,"
not relations that are somehow *internal *to the Sign itself--i.e., the
Sign (R-Oi-Ii), Dynamic Object, and Dynamic Interpretant are the three
correlates of a single triadic relation, rather than the three components
of a single triad.

I guess I should have made the thread title "Sign as Triad AND Correlate of
Triadic Relation," because that is the view on which I seem to be settling
now.  Again, what do you think?

Thanks,

Jon

On Sat, Apr 1, 2017 at 7:22 AM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jon, list - yes, there's a lot of agreement in our views.
>
> So, first, the Sign must have a Dynamic Object- at some time in its
> experience. For example, that could be some chemical trigger that does not
> affect the body for years, that is dormant internally as an Immediate
> Object for years before moving into the Interpretant phase.
>
> And yes, I DO fully  agree with your comment that the sign/representamen
> must have the capacity to produce an Immediate Interpretant - even if it
> does not do so, at this moment in time.
>
> And I would agree that the internal triad is thus basic - and the external
> parts could be called correlates - and are not necessarily found at the
> same time. Again, I refer to that chemical affecting the body which might
> take years to have a real effect.
>
>  The Form or Dynamic Object is 'independent of the Sign' - but only in its
> nature as an Object. As soon as it interacts with the Sign-vehicle, then,
> it becomes a Dynamic Object and as such - it is in a relationship with
> the sign.  Before that - it is simply an external Object. That is, that
> chemical that affects the human or the tree...is only a Dynamic Object when
> it actually interacts with that human or that tree.
>
> But then, since I also subscribe to a view that nothing at all exists
> independently 'per se' and outside of networked semiosic connections, then,
> if one follows this view throughit would conclude that there is no such
> thing as a separate Object. All 'things' are in interaction with something
> else - even if it's merely one grain of sand in interaction with the water
> flowing over it. That chemical might not be a Dynamic Object to the human
> body but it is such with something else - let's say with the water.
>
> Edwina
>
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatic Theory Of Truth

[John F Sowa]

Jon A.S., Clark, list,

I started writing this note several days ago, but I got sidetracked
with other commitments.

My main interest (at the moment) is in the following slides, which
I presented in 2015, and which I am now developing into a longer
article:  http://www.jfsowa.com/talks/ppe.pdf

The issues in those slides are the focus of what I was trying to say.

Jon

As I understand it, diagrams are icons, at least predominantly;
but rather than its object's qualities, a diagram embodies
the significant relations among its parts.


That's fine.  I don't object to that way of talking about them.
What I wanted to distinguish are icons derived from sensations
and icons (or diagrams) constructed (or imagined) by further
processing.

Jon

In a sense, then, one can abstract a diagram from an image by
ignoring the singular determinations of the latter that have
no bearing on whatever general properties of the former are
significant for one's purposes.


I agree that is one way of deriving a diagram in imagination.

Clark

I think John’s point was largely orthogonal to the issue of realism/nominalism.


Yes.  I prefer realism, but my ppe.pdf slides avoid that distinction.

JFS

Every universal is a specification for some kind of diagram,
and every particular is something we classify by relating it
to some diagram ...


MG Murphey

Mr. Arthur Burks has termed the icon a "specific universal" since it
is a specific thing which can stand for any member of a class ...
For in constructing the icon, we do not construct one particular case
under the hypothesis, we rather construct any particular case under
the hypothesis.


Jon

Would you mind elaborating, perhaps including some specific examples?


There are many examples in the ppe.pdf slides:  Slides 9 & 10 for
icons and diagrams.  Slide 20 to 31 show Euclid's diagrams (unchanged)
used as diagrams in existential graphs.  Slide 39 for the role that
icons play in generalized existential graphs.

I don't really like the terms 'universal' and 'particular', which
are not Peircean terms.  I discussed that issue in the article
http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signs.pdf

But following is my rationale for using those words in that note:

 1. In a generalized existential graph, a diagram with appropriate
indexicals (links to lines of identities) can serve as the
definition of a relation.

 2. since relations are often used to represent universals, an icon
with N attached links (indexicals) can be considered as a
representation of an N-adic relation.

 3. A very simple icon, such as a patch of red, when attached
to a line of identity in an existential graph, may be used
to represent a monadic predicate named 'is-red'.

 4. In generalized existential graphs (as I define them in ppe.pdf),
an icon (or diagram or image or whatever you want to call it)
together with N "pegs" (connections to lines of identity) may be
used anywhere that an N-adic relation may be used.

John

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RE: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

>”And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an action 
>more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form and behaviour 
>than pure active imitation or direct copying.”

I am 100% with you on this. I just did a synonym search on imitation, without 
luck. I think we need to invent a new word to more accurately describe this 
replication and sharing of signs/behavior.

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Saturday, April 1, 2017 2:30 PM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'; Stephen 
Jarosek
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis 
(Was semantic problem with the term)

 

Stephen - interesting outline. 

 

I'd use the term 'Sign' [capital S] to mean, I think, what you mean by a 
'holon'.

 

And I agree with your notion of non-local  'entanglement' which I would refer 
to as 'informational networking'. It is also non-local.

 

And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an action more 
through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form and behaviour than 
pure active imitation or direct copying.

 

Edwina

-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Sat 01/04/17 3:48 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au sent:

List,

Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions 
that I work with:

1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living 
organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important 
category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation;

2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a 
mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell  , 
what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, 
materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.

 

In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s 
description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument 
there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a 
semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things 
that matter? 

This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is 
that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through 
entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its 
predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and 
it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be” 
through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance 
to firstness.

It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 
https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS


Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things 
that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most 
important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps 
central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with 
identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in 
those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is 
required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in 
human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation 
whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca 
 ] 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca 
 ; Jeffrey Brian 
Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 


Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them, 
the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness 

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating 
within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness

 

I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are 
vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of 
type etc. 

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this 
list.

 

I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you seem to 
suggest, and only later evolved 

Re: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Stephen - interesting outline. 
I'd use the term 'Sign' [capital S] to mean, I think, what you mean
by a 'holon'.
And I agree with your notion of non-local  'entanglement' which I
would refer to as 'informational networking'. It is also non-local.
And I'd also agree that imitation is vital, but I'd define such an
action more through the development of common GENERAL habits-of-form
and behaviour than pure active imitation or direct copying.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
 http://www.primus.ca 
 On Sat 01/04/17  3:48 AM , "Stephen Jarosek" sjaro...@iinet.net.au
sent:
List,
 Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting
assumptions that I work with:

 1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body.
Every living organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore,
IMITATION is an important category of pragmatism. Every organism
“learns how to be” through imitation;

 2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism
requires a mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

 3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

 4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell [1], what I observe is
less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, materialist
sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.
In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter
Peirce’s description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,”
so we have no argument there. But what about pragmatism, or the other
categories? From a semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or
molecule define the things that matter? 
 This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My
conjecture is that atoms and molecules “know” their proper
conduct, or properties, through entanglement. Entanglement is their
imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its predispositions
(secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and it will
act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to
be” through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in
the first instance to firstness.
 It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 

https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS
[2]
 Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining
the things that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is
perhaps the most important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase
that… imitation is perhaps central to overcoming entropy. A species
sharing identical mind-bodies with identical predispositions is one
thing, but there are so many possibilities in those predispositions
that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is required to
enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in human
cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures.
Imitation whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible
reality.
 sj
From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca [3]] 
 Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
 To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca [4]; Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Cc: Peirce-L
 Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological
Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)
 Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I
call them, the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness 

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness
operating within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness
I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of
them are vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of
matter, stability of type etc. 

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it
on this list.
I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as
you seem to suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I
think the triad is primal.
Edwina
 -- 
 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
  http://www.primus.ca [5] 
 On Fri 31/03/17 4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu [6] sent:

Edwina, Jon S, List, 
With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that,
for the sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how
degenerate forms of these relations might have grown into more
genuine forms of the relations.
As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be
putting it, simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow
together--or of how one simple element might have 

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

I forgot to mention some assumptions in my thought experiment:

1)  Identicality – to be perfectly identical is to be entangled;

2)  Recoherence – there is no such thing as decoherence –but there is 
recoherence when an atom/molecule reconnects with previous states.

 

From: Stephen Jarosek [mailto:sjaro...@iinet.net.au] 
Sent: Saturday, April 1, 2017 9:49 AM
To: tabor...@primus.ca; 'Jon Alan Schmidt'; 'Jeffrey Brian Downard'
Cc: 'Peirce-L'
Subject: RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 

List,

Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions 
that I work with:

1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living 
organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important 
category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation;

2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a 
mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell  , 
what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, 
materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.

 

In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s 
description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument 
there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a 
semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things 
that matter? 

This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is 
that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through 
entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its 
predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and 
it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be” 
through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance 
to firstness.

It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 
https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS


Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things 
that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most 
important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps 
central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with 
identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in 
those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is 
required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in 
human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation 
whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality.

sj

 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 


Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them, 
the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating 
within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness

 

I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are 
vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of 
type etc.

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this 
list.

 

I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you seem to 
suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I think the triad is 
primal.

 

Edwina


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On Fri 31/03/17 4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that, for the 
sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how degenerate forms of 
these relations might have grown into more genuine forms of the relations.

 

As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be putting it, 
simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow together--or of how one simple 
element might have preceded the other in some sense. Rather, using the more 
sophisticated classification of types of seconds and thirds that Peirce 
provides in a number of places, the question I'm asking is how things having 
the character of 

RE: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was semantic problem with the term)

[Stephen Jarosek]

List,

Regarding the Peircean categories in matter, here are the starting assumptions 
that I work with:

1)  First, a couple of definitions: A HOLON is a mind-body. Every living 
organism, as a mind-body, is a holon. Furthermore, IMITATION is an important 
category of pragmatism. Every organism “learns how to be” through imitation;

2)  The Peircean categories relate to holons. Pragmatism requires a 
mind-body in order to define the things that matter;

3)  An atom or a molecule is a holon;

4)  In the video Inner Life of the Cell  , 
what I observe is less chemical reactions (in the conventional, linear, 
materialist sense) than it is a whole ecosystem at the molecular level.

 

In the persistence of atoms and molecules across time, we encounter Peirce’s 
description of matter as  “mind hide-bound in habit,” so we have no argument 
there. But what about pragmatism, or the other categories? From a 
semiotic/pragmatic perspective, how does an atom or molecule define the things 
that matter? 

This is where entanglement (nonlocality) enters the picture. My conjecture is 
that atoms and molecules “know” their proper conduct, or properties, through 
entanglement. Entanglement is their imitation. A molecular “mind-body” has its 
predispositions (secondness, or association) and motivations (firstness), and 
it will act on them as per the video clip… but it can only “know how to be” 
through entanglement. Knowing how to be, I guess, relates in the first instance 
to firstness.

It is along these lines that I base my DNA entanglement thesis: 
https://www.academia.edu/29626663/DNA_ENTANGLEMENT_THE_EVIDENCE_MOUNTS


Imitation plays such an important role in pragmatism and defining the things 
that matter. Even for atoms and molecules. Imitation is perhaps the most 
important antidote to entropy… no let me rephrase that… imitation is perhaps 
central to overcoming entropy. A species sharing identical mind-bodies with 
identical predispositions is one thing, but there are so many possibilities in 
those predispositions that a shared consensus in behavior… imitation… is 
required to enable an ecosystem to hang together. We see this especially in 
human cultures… same mind-bodies, but totally different cultures. Imitation 
whittles down infinite possibility to pragmatic, tangible reality.

sj



 

From: Edwina Taborsky [mailto:tabor...@primus.ca] 
Sent: Friday, March 31, 2017 11:33 PM
To: Jon Alan Schmidt; tabor...@primus.ca; Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Physico-Chemical and Biological Semiosis (Was 
semantic problem with the term)

 


Jeff, list: I agree; I have written about how the relations - as I call them, 
the Six Relations of:

Firstness -as- Firstness, i.e., genuine Firstness

Secondness -as- Secondness; i.e., genuine Secondness

Thirdness-as-Thirdness, i.e., genuine Thirdness

Secondness-as-Firstness, i.e., degenerate Secondness, or Secondness operating 
within a mode also of Firstness

Thirdness-as Firstness, i.e., degenerate Thirdness

Thirdness-as- Secondness

 

I've written about how these Six Relations - and I agree that ALL of them are 
vital - operate to enable particular matter, diversity of matter, stability of 
type etc.

I could send you, off list, a paper on this. I don't see posting it on this 
list.

 

I would question, however, whether dyadic 'things' were primary, as you seem to 
suggest, and only later evolved to include the triad. I think the triad is 
primal.

 

Edwina


-- 
This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
largest alternative telecommunications provider. 

http://www.primus.ca 

On Fri 31/03/17 4:18 PM , Jeffrey Brian Downard jeffrey.down...@nau.edu sent:

Edwina, Jon S, List,

 

With the aim of sharpening the point, Peirce seems to suggest that, for the 
sake of explaining the cosmos, it is important to ask how degenerate forms of 
these relations might have grown into more genuine forms of the relations.

 

As such, the question is not simply one of how, as you seem to be putting it, 
simple firsts, second and thirds started to grow together--or of how one simple 
element might have preceded the other in some sense. Rather, using the more 
sophisticated classification of types of seconds and thirds that Peirce 
provides in a number of places, the question I'm asking is how things having 
the character of essential or inherential dyads might have evolved into 
relational dyads of diversity, or of how qualitative relational dyads might 
have evolved into dynamical dyads--and how more genuine types of triads might 
have evolved from those that were relatively vague.

 

This, I think, is a better way of framing the questions coming out of his work 
in phenomenology and semiotics. From this work, we are supposed to derive the 
resources needed to frame better hypotheses in metaphysics and, in turn, in the 
special sciences.

 

--Jeff

 

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] semantic problem with the term

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement:

Edwina, List,

Now I have an easier explanation of what I was meaning, based on topology and temporality regarding "internal" and "external".

If sign A is the spatiotemporal supersign, sign B the spatiotemporal subsign, meaning: Sign B is located inside sign A or spatially identical, and B is temporally a part of the slower A, then the connection from A to B is via A´s immediate interpretant being B´s dynamical object, because the immediate interpretant is also inside of A, as B is. While A´s Dyn.Int. is outside of A, and thus not available for B. Dyn.Obj.s like that are typically concepts, but think of others.

If sign A is the only-temporal supersign, sign B is the only-temporal subsign, meaning: Sign A is lasting for a longer time, while sign B takes place (within a classical temporal semiotic chain B1-B2-B3, connected in time by interpretants becoming representamens) at the same time, but B is located outside A, then the connection from A to B is via A´s dynamical interpretant being B´s dynamical object. It can only be A´s Dyn.Int, because this one is located outside A, just like B. For travelling from A to B, to cross space, the connection requires a manifestation of the Dyn.Int. in the form of matter or/and energy. Thus this kind of dyn.obj. is a material thing or a package of energy.

If A is spatially B´s supersign, because A´s influence, story, or set of results have spread and cover B, but not temporally, as B is temporally after A, and A´s interpreter no longer exists, then the connection is via A´s final interpretant being B´s dynamical object. It can only be the final interpretant, because this is the interpretant´s only part that is temporally outside A, that still can last if A´s interpreting system does not exist anymore, because it is that part of the interpretant that does not change anymore. Dynamical objects (for a "B", a subsign) like that are anything which has happened or been in the past.

Best,

Helmut

 




Edwina,

ok, but a concept which has been formed by the individual who thinks about it, or by the two people who are talking about this concept, is even more a work in progress, or, as you wrote, anticipatory, like an immediate interpretant. But it is a funny thing, self referentiality, a creative loop.

 

 31. März 2017 um 23:12 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


Helmut - a concept can be formed by an individual. It doesn't have to be formed by a group. The concept that the  two people are using is a dynamic object. Yes, their interaction, if there are two people discussing a common concept,  connects them to the wider community.

Edwina

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On Fri 31/03/17 4:26 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina,

The immediate interpretant is internal, but a concept is formed by a society, which the individuals are parts of. So perhaps they have access to what is internal of the society? I mean, when eg. two individuals talk about a common concept, this talk automatically makes them parts of the community, so the sign that is taking place in the community is sort of partially transparent for them, so  their two-persons-sign can be connected with the bigger and slower community-sign it is part of?

Best,

Helmut

 

 31. März 2017 um 22:04 Uhr
Von: "Edwina Taborsky"
 



Helmut - you asked:

Do you think, that also an immediate interpretant and a final one may become a dynamical object? My guess is, that immediate interpretants become concepts, dynamical interpretants become material things, and final interpretants become topics that have happened or been in the past (all for DynObjs).

My view is that the Immediate Interpretant is internal and thus, cannot become a dynamic object, which is external.  I don't see that an immediate Interpretant is a concept, which is to say, an intellectual construct. It could be an anticipatory form of what will be an objective form that is externalizing to be a Dynamic Interpretant, i.e., similar to an embryo. A dynamical Interpretant could be a material existentiality and also, a conceptual existentiality. I see a final interpretant as not a particular but a general.

Edwina
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On Fri 31/03/17 2:46 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




List,

Jeffrey, I too had problems with that. Now I think, that Peirce uses the term "habit" in a broader sense: Usually, when I hear or read "habit" I think of a gradual approximation process. This cannot be the case with conservation of energy, because exact conservation cannot be approached: If in all reactions, physical and chemical, only a little energy was lost or won, then the universe would freeze or explode in an instant, I guess. A similar problem is the fine tunedness of constants. But