Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology
Dear Kirsti, End of this dicussion in my part. Nothing bothers me. But I do have one very general comment: In any discussion of any subject of any kind, avoid using the word 'you'. It always diverts attention away from the subject and toward the person being addressed. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
There are all sorts of theories and I think those to do with empathy can rest alongside studies that show, as one from Harvard recently did, hat affluent millennials would be receptive to a police state. I am with Wittgenstein on theories (not for them) and with Peirce in dismissing the blanket doubt of Descartes. We ebb and flow but generally evolve. Slowly, fallibly, with some trust in continuity. amazon.com/author/stephenrose On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 7:00 PM, wrote: > List, > > > > Gene’s post in this thread had much to say about “empathy” — considered as > something that can be measured and quantified for populations of students, > so that comments about trends in “empathy” among them can be taken as > meaningful and important. > > > > I wonder about that. > > > > My wondering was given more definite shape just now when I came across > this passage in a recent book about consciousness by Evan Thompson: > > [[ In practice and in everyday life … we don’t infer the inner presence of > consciousness on the basis of outer criteria. Instead, prior to any kind of > reflection or deliberation, we already implicitly recognize each other as > conscious on the basis of empathy. Empathy, as philosophers in the > phenomenological tradition have shown, is the direct perception of another > being’s actions and gestures as expressive embodiments of consciousness. We > don’t see facial expressions, for example, as outer signs of an inner > consciousness, as we might see an EEG pattern; we see joy directly in the > smiling face or sadness in the tearful eyes. Moreover, even in difficult or > problematic cases where we’re forced to consider outer criteria, their > meaningfulness as indicators of consciousness ultimately depends depends on > and presupposes our prior empathetic grasp of consciousness. ]] > > —Thompson, Evan. *Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in > Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy* (Kindle Locations 2362-2370). > Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition. > > > > If we don’t “infer the inner presence of consciousness on the basis of > outer criteria,” but perceive it directly *on the basis of empathy*, how > do we infer the inner presence (or absence) of empathy itself? In the same > way, i.e. by *direct perception*, according to Thompson. I think Peirce > would say that these attributions of empathy (or consciousness) to others > are *perceptual judgments* — not percepts, but quite beyond (or beneath) > any conscious control, and . We *feel* it rather than reading it from > external indications. To use Thompson’s example, we can measure the > temperature by reading a thermometer, using a scale designed for that > purpose. But we can’t measure the feeling of *warmth* as experienced by > the one who feels it. > > > > Now, the statistics cited by Gene may indeed indicate something important, > just as measures of global temperature may indicate something important. > But what it does indicate, and what significance that has, depends on the > nature of the devices used to generate those statistics. And I can’t help > feeling that *empathy* is more important than anything *measurable* by > those means. > > > > (I won’t go further into the semiotic nature of perceptual judgments here, > but I have in *Turning Signs*: http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#Perce.) > > > > > Gary f. > > > - > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > > - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
List, Gene's post in this thread had much to say about "empathy" - considered as something that can be measured and quantified for populations of students, so that comments about trends in "empathy" among them can be taken as meaningful and important. I wonder about that. My wondering was given more definite shape just now when I came across this passage in a recent book about consciousness by Evan Thompson: [[ In practice and in everyday life . we don't infer the inner presence of consciousness on the basis of outer criteria. Instead, prior to any kind of reflection or deliberation, we already implicitly recognize each other as conscious on the basis of empathy. Empathy, as philosophers in the phenomenological tradition have shown, is the direct perception of another being's actions and gestures as expressive embodiments of consciousness. We don't see facial expressions, for example, as outer signs of an inner consciousness, as we might see an EEG pattern; we see joy directly in the smiling face or sadness in the tearful eyes. Moreover, even in difficult or problematic cases where we're forced to consider outer criteria, their meaningfulness as indicators of consciousness ultimately depends depends on and presupposes our prior empathetic grasp of consciousness. ]] -Thompson, Evan. Waking, Dreaming, Being: Self and Consciousness in Neuroscience, Meditation, and Philosophy (Kindle Locations 2362-2370). Columbia University Press. Kindle Edition. If we don't "infer the inner presence of consciousness on the basis of outer criteria," but perceive it directly on the basis of empathy, how do we infer the inner presence (or absence) of empathy itself? In the same way, i.e. by direct perception, according to Thompson. I think Peirce would say that these attributions of empathy (or consciousness) to others are perceptual judgments - not percepts, but quite beyond (or beneath) any conscious control, and . We feel it rather than reading it from external indications. To use Thompson's example, we can measure the temperature by reading a thermometer, using a scale designed for that purpose. But we can't measure the feeling of warmth as experienced by the one who feels it. Now, the statistics cited by Gene may indeed indicate something important, just as measures of global temperature may indicate something important. But what it does indicate, and what significance that has, depends on the nature of the devices used to generate those statistics. And I can't help feeling that empathy is more important than anything measurable by those means. (I won't go further into the semiotic nature of perceptual judgments here, but I have in Turning Signs: http://www.gnusystems.ca/TS/blr.htm#Perce.) Gary f. - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology
I agree with off-list comments to Gary that the post was inappropriate, and I believe Gary acted appropriately. In my view, the post aiming to chastise John was directly inflammatory and counter-productive to the purpose of the list. -- Franklin On Jun 20, 2017 5:08 PM, "Jerry Rhee" wrote: > Dear list: > > > > I appreciate Gary and list-moderators' earnest willfulness to maintain > Ransdell’s original intention. It can be viewed as a thankless but > beautiful responsibility. > > > > With respect to kirsti’s comment: > > > > "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't > know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and > expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." > > *These remarks were seen by one lister as "denigrating" and by another as > "untoward." I agreed and wrote Kirsti off-list.* > > > I agree that it is denigrating and untoward. However, the despising, the > disgust, reveals something of our nature and for that, I am thankful. For > if only taken as denigrating and untoward, then what purpose does it serve? > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 4:03 PM, wrote: > >> Gary, list, >> >> First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and >> authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of >> anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. - >> Which I apologized. >> >> After the suprise I do feel offended. I was critisized for my tenor and >> tone. >> >> Is there anything more personal, more 'ad hominem', as that? >> >> I wish the person or persons not liking my responses would take it up on >> list, or post it to me. >> >> I do not understand how or why anything on P-list should be to anyone's >> likings. >> >> End of this dicussion in my part. >> >> Kirsti >> >> >> Gary Richmond kirjoitti 20.6.2017 23:30: >> >>> Kirsti, list, >>> >>> As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be >>> the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and >>> moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered >>> to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as >>> Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks, >>> see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit): >>> >>> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM [1] >>> >>> if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I >>> highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from >>> time to time. >>> >>> In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these >>> passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these). >>> >>> CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS >>> >>> - >>> >>> It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: >>> philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed >>> and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in >>> this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not >>> to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing >>> which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself >>> by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because >>> there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it >>> is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take >>> that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect >>> intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular >>> time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should >>> be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests >>> and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to >>> rectify the problem on-list. >>> >>> GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly contacted by three members of the list who found especially this passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic: Kirsti had written: "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." THESE REMARKS WERE SEEN BY ONE LISTER AS "DENIGRATING" AND BY ANOTHER AS "UNTOWARD." I AGREED AND WROTE KIRSTI OFF-LIST. >>> >>> WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING >>> >>> - >>> >>> >>> Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt >>> to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with >>> it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral, >>> legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge >>> you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly >>> special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several reasons >>> for this: >>> >>> (1) None of us reall
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
On 6/20/2017 11:58 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: Are you taking the side: "machines are innocent, blame individual persons' ??? No, that's not what I said or implied. You said that you agreed with Gene, and I was also agreeing with Gene: On 6/15/2017 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: What "would motivate [AI systems] to kill us?" Rationally-mechanically infantilized us. There are many machines that are designed for neutral purposes, such as cars and trucks. They can be used for good or evil. Many machines are deliberately designed for evil purposes. For example, land mines, chemical weapons, nuclear bombs... Those are inherently evil. But they have no more intentionality than a thermostat. The evil is in the human design and use. People talk about the possibility that machines might evolve intentionality. But there are no examples today. The only examples that anyone has suggested are systems that learn to be evil. For example, a puppy's natural instinct is to be a loving companion. But it could be trained to be vicious. That's all I was trying to say. And I thought that I was agreeing with Gene. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology
Dear list: I appreciate Gary and list-moderators' earnest willfulness to maintain Ransdell’s original intention. It can be viewed as a thankless but beautiful responsibility. With respect to kirsti’s comment: "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." *These remarks were seen by one lister as "denigrating" and by another as "untoward." I agreed and wrote Kirsti off-list.* I agree that it is denigrating and untoward. However, the despising, the disgust, reveals something of our nature and for that, I am thankful. For if only taken as denigrating and untoward, then what purpose does it serve? Best, Jerry R On Tue, Jun 20, 2017 at 4:03 PM, wrote: > Gary, list, > > First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and > authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of > anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. - > Which I apologized. > > After the suprise I do feel offended. I was critisized for my tenor and > tone. > > Is there anything more personal, more 'ad hominem', as that? > > I wish the person or persons not liking my responses would take it up on > list, or post it to me. > > I do not understand how or why anything on P-list should be to anyone's > likings. > > End of this dicussion in my part. > > Kirsti > > > Gary Richmond kirjoitti 20.6.2017 23:30: > >> Kirsti, list, >> >> As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be >> the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and >> moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered >> to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as >> Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks, >> see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit): >> >> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM [1] >> >> if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I >> highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from >> time to time. >> >> In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these >> passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these). >> >> CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS >> >> - >> >> It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: >> philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed >> and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in >> this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not >> to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing >> which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself >> by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because >> there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it >> is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take >> that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect >> intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular >> time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should >> be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests >> and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to >> rectify the problem on-list. >> >> GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly >>> contacted by three members of the list who found especially this >>> passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic: >>> Kirsti had written: >>> >>> "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't >>> know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice >>> and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." >>> >>> THESE REMARKS WERE SEEN BY ONE LISTER AS "DENIGRATING" AND BY >>> ANOTHER AS "UNTOWARD." I AGREED AND WROTE KIRSTI OFF-LIST. >>> >> >> WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING >> >> - >> >> >> Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt >> to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with >> it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral, >> legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge >> you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly >> special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several reasons >> for this: >> >> (1) None of us really knows yet what the most humane and productive >> communicational mores will turn out to be for communication of this >> sort: it is continually surprising, and if anything is certain here it >> is that our initial hunches tend to be unreliable. The list manager is >> more likely to understand enough about the dynamics of this particular >> list than anyone else, and has also had enough experience of these >> things to have learne
Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology
Gary, list, First: I did not feel offended, I felt surprised. The expertice and authority of John F. Sowa were so clear to me that I could not think of anyone,least John, to take any offence in my stating my view so bluntly. - Which I apologized. After the suprise I do feel offended. I was critisized for my tenor and tone. Is there anything more personal, more 'ad hominem', as that? I wish the person or persons not liking my responses would take it up on list, or post it to me. I do not understand how or why anything on P-list should be to anyone's likings. End of this dicussion in my part. Kirsti Gary Richmond kirjoitti 20.6.2017 23:30: Kirsti, list, As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks, see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit): http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM [1] if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from time to time. In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these). CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS - It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to rectify the problem on-list. GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly contacted by three members of the list who found especially this passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic: Kirsti had written: "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." THESE REMARKS WERE SEEN BY ONE LISTER AS "DENIGRATING" AND BY ANOTHER AS "UNTOWARD." I AGREED AND WROTE KIRSTI OFF-LIST. WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING - Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral, legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several reasons for this: (1) None of us really knows yet what the most humane and productive communicational mores will turn out to be for communication of this sort: it is continually surprising, and if anything is certain here it is that our initial hunches tend to be unreliable. The list manager is more likely to understand enough about the dynamics of this particular list than anyone else, and has also had enough experience of these things to have learned what is likely to be the most effective response to something problematic. (2) It is the list manager who is ultimately responsible for the list, as regards institutional accountability. Speaking directly to this: I need to have these things under my own control if I am to handle judiciously the problems that can arise in such connections. I am open to advice and counsel at all times and try not to act imperiously. But there is no way that I can effectively delegate my responsibility to the list members, which would be essential if the members were themselves to participate in the management of the list other than as informal advisors in off-list discussion. (3) It is probably because everybody on the list understands (at least unreflectively) that no list members as such have any special right to regulate or moderate the conduct of others as list members that criticisms of one another that suggest directly or indirectly that someone is not of the proper sort to be on the list because of what they post are highly inflammatory and are the cause
Re: [PEIRCE-L] An apology
Kirsti, list, As list moderator and co-manager I try to follow what I consider to be the exemplary notions expressed by the founder and first manager and moderator of peirce-l, Joseph Ransdell, concerning what he considered to be best practices on the list. I may not always be as successful as Joe was in this, but I try to do the best I can. For Joe's remarks, see: HOW THE FORUM WORKS (scroll down a bit): http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/PEIRCE-L/PEIRCE-L.HTM if you are new to the list or have not read them for some time, I highly recommend (re)reading Joe's remarks, something I do myself from time to time. In the current matter I would especially recommend reading these passages (I've inserted a very few of my own comments into these). CAVEAT ABOUT CORRECTING OTHERS -- It is expected that criticism will be vigorous and diligently pursued: philosophy is understood here to be essentially a critically directed and self-controlled conversation. But there is one important caveat in this connection: If you feel that some messages being posted are not to the purpose of the list or that there is something someone is doing which should be discouraged, do NOT attempt to rectify that yourself by posting a message to that effect to the list in general. Because there is so little overt or formal moderation by the list manager, it is natural to suppose that the individual members can and should take that role as needed. But this rarely if ever produces the effect intended, regardless of how reasonable it may seem at a particular time. Contact me instead off-list and we will see what can or should be done, if anything, without generating a chain reaction of protests and counter-protests, which are the typical result of attempting to rectify the problem on-list. GR: Following the practice Joe advised here, I was properly contacted by three members of the list who found especially this passage in a message from Kirsti addressed to John problematic: Kirsti had written: "This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through." These remarks were seen by one lister as "denigrating" and by another as "untoward." I agreed and wrote Kirsti off-list. WHY THE LIST MANAGER SHOULD DO THE CORRECTING -- Should you contact the person yourself first, off-list, in an attempt to rectify their way of participating rather than bothering me with it? Although you do of course have a right—professional, moral, legal, whatever—to do this, and it may seem best to you, let me urge you to contact me first, nonetheless, unless there is some truly special and urgent reason to the contrary. There are several reasons for this: (1) None of us really knows yet what the most humane and productive communicational mores will turn out to be for communication of this sort: it is continually surprising, and if anything is certain here it is that our initial hunches tend to be unreliable. The list manager is more likely to understand enough about the dynamics of this particular list than anyone else, and has also had enough experience of these things to have learned what is likely to be the most effective response to something problematic. (2) It is the list manager who is ultimately responsible for the list, as regards institutional accountability. Speaking directly to this: I need to have these things under my own control if I am to handle judiciously the problems that can arise in such connections. I am open to advice and counsel at all times and try not to act imperiously. But there is no way that I can effectively delegate my responsibility to the list members, which would be essential if the members were themselves to participate in the management of the list other than as informal advisors in off-list discussion. (3) It is probably because everybody on the list understands (at least unreflectively) that no list members as such have any special right to regulate or moderate the conduct of others as list members that criticisms of one another that suggest directly or indirectly that someone is not of the proper sort to be on the list because of what they post are highly inflammatory and are the cause of most so-called "flame wars". Contrary to what one might think, "flame wars" do NOT begin because people, excited by ideas, sometimes go too far and say things they shouldn't. Errors like this are to be expected in a new discussion medium and they are easily corrected by apology and retraction immediately thereafter. Anybody who participates vigorously in this medium will make errors of judgment like this, and those familiar with the medium do not condemn one another for it. They do expect, though, that those who are at odds with one another in this way be both generous in their tolerance of the other when excess occurs and in their readiness to make verb
[PEIRCE-L] An apology
Dear John, I sincerely apologize for any negative feelings my latest mail addressed to you may have caused. I have been reprimanded by list managers that my tenor and tone are not tolerated. In a democratic list, so I am told. There have been three complaints. Off-list. So I'm told. My rare praises have been out-of-place and unfounded too. So I have been told as well. Hereby I publicly apologize for both kinds of responses. Regards, Kirsti kirst...@saunalahti.fi kirjoitti 10.11.2016 15:51: John, list, Most important points you take up, John. Time-sequences between stories do not apply. - The big-bang is just a story,one on many just as possible stories. Time-scales are just as crucial with the between - issue as are storywise arising issues. There are no easy ways out ot the time-scale issues. Best, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 9.11.2016 21:25: Edwina, Kirsti, list, ET I wish we could get into the analysis of time in more detail. I came across a short passage by Gregory Bateson that clarifies the issues. See the attached Bateson79.jpg, which is an excerpt from p. 2 of a book on biosemiotics (see below). Following is the critical point: GB thinking in terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea anemones... A story is a little knot or complex of that species of connectedness which we call relevance. This observation is compatible with Peirce, but CSP used the term 'quasi-mind' to accommodate the species-bias of most humans: CP 4.551 Admitting that connected Signs must have a Quasi-mind, it may further be declared that there can be no isolated sign. Moreover, signs require at least two Quasi-minds; a Quasi-utterer and a Quasi- interpreter; and although these two are at one (i.e., are one mind) in the sign itself, they must nevertheless be distinct. In the Sign they are, so to say, welded. Accordingly, it is not merely a fact of human Psychology, but a necessity of Logic, that every logical evolution of thought should be dialogic. Re time: We have to distinguish (1) time as it is in reality (whatever that may be); (2) time in our stories (which include the formalized stories called physics); (3) the mental sequence of thought; and (4) the logical sequence (dialogic) of connected signs. ET The question is: Are the Platonic worlds BEFORE or AFTER the so-called Big Bang? I read them as AFTER while Gary R and Jon S [not John S] read them as BEFORE. In my reading, before the Big Bang, there was Nothing, not even Platonic worlds. This question is about time sequences in different kinds of stories: the Big Bang story about what reality may be; and Platonic stories about ideal, mathematical forms. The time sequence of a mathematical story is independent of the time sequence of a physical story. We may apply the math (for example, the definitions, axioms, and proofs of a Platonic form) to the construction of a physical story. But that application is a mapping between two stories. The term 'prior to' is meaningful only *within* a story, not between stories. In short, our "commonsense" notion of time is an abstraction from the stories we tell about our experience. The time sequences in two different stories may have some similarities, but we must distinguish three distinct sequences: the time sequences of each story, and the time sequence of the mapping, which is a kind of meta-story. JFS Does anyone know if [Peirce] had written anything about embedding our universe in a hypothetical space of higher dimension? KM I am most interested in knowing more on this. David Finkelstein, p. 277 of the reference below: Peirce seems to have included geometry in his evolutionism, at least in principle... [He] seems not to have responded to the continuously- evolving physical geometry of Riemann and Clifford... nor to Einstein's conceptual unification of space and time. In any case, I think that the notion of time as an abstraction from stories -- imaginary, factual, or theoretical -- provides a way of relating different views. It also allows for metalevel reasoning that can distinguish and relate different kinds of stories that have independent time scales and sequences. John From Google books: _A Legacy for Living Systems: Gregory Bateson as Precursor to Biosemiotics_ edited by Jesper Hoffmeyer, Springer, 2008: https://books.google.com/books?id=dcHqVpZ97pUC&pg=PA246&lpg=PA246&dq=Order+is+simply+thought+embodied+in+arrangement&source=bl&ots=DQUnZlvOYu&sig=X8bH0YAG597uwjyedB4dSf2BuC0&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwizyZD88JrQAhVENxQKHeEeBwoQ6AEIHTAA#v=onepage&q=Order%20is%20simply%20thought%20embodied%20in%20arrangement&f=false David R. Finkelstein, _Quantum Relativity: A Synthesis of the Ideas of Heisenberg and Einstein_, Springer, 1996. https://books.google.com/books?id=OvjsCAAAQBAJ&pg=PA277&lpg=PA277&dq=peirce+relativity&source=bl&ots=0r
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Kirsti, ... I have a sense of what Peirce meant by the “Logic of Science” and what Dewey meant by calling Logic the “Theory of Inquiry”. Maybe that's logic in the narrow nerdy sense and not Logic in the Grandest All-Fired Metaphysical Sense, but it's long been enough for me, ever since I said farewell to the foundational crises of my youth and set to work on tools to help us reason. That is what logic means to me. Regards, Jon On 6/20/2017 12:25 PM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: > Jon, > I like your tenor, but do not quite agree. > > Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say. But logic? > > In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down. > But it is an ongoing process, with no predictable end. > > Now we live in late modern or early post modern times. > Just to give a vague sense of what I mean by 'modern'. > With this, I mostly follow Foucault's analysis. > > There is a fierce fight going on internationally within logic. - > The very position of formal logic is at stake. > > The fight really is not about what logically is valid or not. > Nor is it about which kind of logic gets science on with it's task. > It is about taking hold of university departments as fortresses. > > About getting rid all all kinds of 'weed'. > > We in the Peirce list are lucky and fortunate to have John F. Sowa and you. > > Kirsti > Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 17.6.2017 07:00: John, Kirsti, List ... The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative. Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win out in the long run. And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair. It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives. A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials as a descriptive science. So logic may deal with abstractions from language but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language. Regards, Jon On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Kirsti and Jon A. Kirsti Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake. Jon ditto amen qed si. Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic. They are related by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic. The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a very low opinion of language. Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder. He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts." My "correction" to Frege: "We must break the domination of analytic philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world." For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf Kirsti, CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake. Yes. Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework. He studied the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail. Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from language. The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development. Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not as a replacement for language. In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell. But Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW. Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell. I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf Kirsti I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a limited degree. I certainly agree with that point. When I said that dictionaries were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion. Please remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for several dictionaries. But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time. Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations. See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer Adam Kilgarriff: https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf John -- inquiry into inquiry: https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ academia: https://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey oeiswiki: https://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Aw
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Jon, I like your tenor, but do not quite agree. Yes, linguistics has changed just as you say. But logic? In my view, the very grounds of modern logic are groumbling down. But it is an ongoing process, with no predictable end. Now we live in late modern ot early post modern times. Just to give a vague sense of what I mean by ' modern'. With this, I mostly follow Foucault's analysis. There is a fierce fight going on internationally within logic. - The very position of formal locic is at stake. The fight really is not about what locically is valid or not. Nor is it about which kind of locic gets science on with it's task. It is about taking hold of university departments as fortresses. About getting rid all all kinds of 'weed'. We in the Peirce list are lucky and fortunate to have John F. Sowa and you. Kirsti Jon Awbrey kirjoitti 17.6.2017 07:00: John, Kirsti, List ... The most important difference between linguistics and logic is that linguistics is descriptive while logic is normative. Yes, some grammarians try to treat grammar as prescriptive, but most in modern times have given up on that and realize that usage will have its day and win out in the long run. And even when grammar appears to dictate form it does so only on the plane of signs, sans objects, and so remains a flat affair. It is only logic that inhabits all three dimensions O × S × I of sign relations, inquiring into how we ought to conduct our transactions with signs in order to realize their objectives. A normative science has different aims even when it looks on the same materials as a descriptive science. So logic may deal with abstractions from language but it is more than abstract linguistics — it is an augmentation of language. Regards, Jon On 6/16/2017 10:55 PM, John F Sowa wrote: Kirsti and Jon A. Kirsti Logic is not linguistics, and should not be replaced, not even partly, by linguistics. Even though there are a host of philosophers, quite famous ones even, which have made that mistake. Jon ditto amen qed si. Logic and linguistics are two branches of semiotic. They are related by the Greek word 'logos', which may refer to either language or logic. The most serious mistakes were made by Frege and Russell, who had a very low opinion of language. Frege (1879) made a horrible blunder. He tried to "break the domination of the word over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through the use of language often almost unavoidably arise concerning the relations between concepts." My "correction" to Frege: "We must break the domination of analytic philosophy over the human spirit by laying bare the misconceptions that through ignorance of goals, purposes, and intentions unavoidably arise concerning the relations of agents, concepts, and the world." For more detail, see http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/signproc.pdf Kirsti, CSP did not make that mistake. Wittgenstein did not make that mistake. Yes. Unlike Frege and Russell, Peirce did his homework. He studied the development of logic from the Greeks to the Scholastics in detail. Aristotle developed formal logic as a *simplified* abstraction from language. The Stoics and Scholastics continued that development. Peirce continued to treat logic as an abstraction from language, not as a replacement for language. In his first book, Wittgenstein followed Frege and Russell. But Frank Ramsey, who had studied Peirce's writings, discussed Peirce with LW. Wittgenstein's later theory of language games is more compatible with Peirce than with his mentors, Frege and Russell. I discuss those issues in http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/rolelog.pdf Kirsti I remain firmly with my stance, that dictionaries may not replace reading CSP. - Even though they may be of help sometimes. To a limited degree. I certainly agree with that point. When I said that dictionaries were useful, I meant as a *starting point* for discussion. Please remember that Peirce himself wrote thousands of definitions for several dictionaries. But no definition can be definitive for all applications for all time. Professional lexicographers are the first to admit the limitations. See the article "I don't believe in word senses" by the lexicographer Adam Kilgarriff: https://arxiv.org/pdf/cmp-lg/9712006.pdf John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: AI
Hah. The minute I sent my message on no response, I got John's response. This time, John, I have to say: Wrong, wrong, wrong, You just don't know what you are talking about. - just walking on very thin ice and expecting your fame on other fields with get you through. It is not that some identifiable person is needed to put AI into inhuman action. Nor is it needed that this kind of mishap originates in any identifiable "machine". You know better! In any net, everything is connected with every other 'thing'. Just as you said on the philosphy of CSP. Life is net-like. Are you taking the side: "machines are innocent, blame individual persons' ??? If so, you are not seeing the forest, just the trees. Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 16.6.2017 06:15: On 6/15/2017 1:10 PM, Eugene Halton wrote: What "would motivate [AI systems] to kill us?" Rationally-mechanically infantilized us. Yes. That's similar to what I said: "The most likely reason why any AI system would have the goal to kill anything is that some human(s) programmed [or somehow instilled] that goal into it." these views seem to me blindingly limited understandings of what a machine is, putting an artificial divide between the machine and the human rather than seeing the machine as continuous with the human. I'm not denying that some kind of computer system might evolve intentionality over some long period of time. There are techniques such as "genetic algorithms" that enable AI systems to improve. But the word 'improve' implies value judgments -- a kind of Thirdness. Where does that Thirdness come from? For genetic algorithms, it comes from a reward/punishment regime. But rewards are already a kind of Thirdness. Darwin proposed "natural selection" -- but that selection was based on a reward system that involved energy consumption (AKA food). And things that eat (such as bacteria) already exhibit intentionality by seeking and finding food, as Lynn Margulis observed. As Peirce said, the origin of life must involve some nondegenerate Thirdness. There are only two options: (1) Some random process that takes millions or billions of years produces something that "eats". (2) Some already intelligent being (God? Demiurge? Human?) speeds up the process by programming (instilling) some primitive kind of Thirdness and lets natural selection make improvements. But as I said, the most likely cause of an evil AI system is some human who deliberately or accidentally put the evil goal into it. I would bet on Steve Bannon. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: [biosemiotics:9235] Rupert Sheldrake TED Talk
Gene, The most important message ever in Peirce-list is this one you posted! I repeat: ever! I am literally schocked by the fact, that I am the first to respond. This late. Am I conversing with human beings? - Or just kinds of extensions to automatization of everyday life & "common sense" moulded into it? The news you are sharing, Gene, are even more alarming than climate change. Because this proceeds more rapidly, for instance. I have no deep trust in tests of empathy etc. But even a poor tests do catch this kind of change. in these proportions. Are you folks happy with this? - Not moving your eyelid? If this is the situation in US, something like it happens almost all over the world. But, just a moment, this list may not be about what CSP was concerned about. This list may nowadays be concerned just about AI. And how to (mis)use CSP to those purposes. Hey, fellows, there is life to attend to! Kirsti Eugene Halton kirjoitti 12.6.2017 19:40: In the past generation in the United States, empathy among college students, as measured by standardized tests, has dropped about 40% according to a 2010 University of Michigan study, with the largest drop occurring after the year 2000. This is the new normal. Should we now suppose the previous norm to be paranormal, above or beyond the norm? Other standardized tests show that Narcissism has gone up for this age group, as would be expected, since Narcissism involves empathy deficiency. Could there be a day when empathy is regarded as a paranormal phenomenon? Imagine that society where rigorous experiments on the subjects show no signs of empathy above chance, because the society has systematically self-altered itself to diminish or virtually extinguish a passion older than humanity itself. Of course all of this involves socialization and especially parenting. Imagine a society where frequent empathic touch and gaze between parent and young children is regarded as paranormal, because the norms reveal very little empathic touch or gaze. Harlow’s monkey experiments showed what this would be like. A society shaped by a rational-mechanical bureaucratic mindset is likely to manifest it not only in its norms of parenting and social interaction, but tacitly in its science and technology as well, despite the best intentions and technical methods. The passions tend to be denigrated in such a world. In mid-twentieth century “the new synthesis” in genetics, as Julian Huxley called it, showed a determinist perspective in which socialization, experience, and Lamarckian-like phenomena, such as Peirce’s idea of “evolutionary love,” evolution by Thirdness, were unacceptable, perhaps again, literally “paranormal.” Epigenetics and related developments in biology have shown the limitations of "the new synthesis." I grant that Sheldrake attempted rigorous experiments with original designs, which I'd like to look further into, including the dog ones. On the upside I can see that the dog experiments at least included beings living more from their passions. It throws a light on the more typical experimental assumptions: Why would we think that randomized untrained subjects from the humanly diminished altered state of a rational-mechanical bureaucratic society performing cognitive tasks would provide rigorous objective data in experiments on phenomena such as telepathy? Gene Halton On Mon, Jun 12, 2017 at 10:41 AM, Jerry LR Chandler wrote: List: Kirsti’s very solid post is worthy of a very careful read, although I not state the case so forcefully. In general, although I have not studied Sheldrake’s work as closely as she, I have followed it for several decades from the perspective of biochemical dose-response relationships. In general, I find his scientific logic sound. Historically, quantitative scientific measurements of phenomena can proceed decades or centuries before a quantitative theories of how the phenomena can be symbolized. A clear example of the factual measurements before quantitative explanations are genetic phenomena. Inheritable traits appear as if by magic. Another example, the need for specific vitamins in diets and the influence of hormones on behavior. CSP grounds his view of realism on the facts associated with quali-signs, sin-signs and legi-signs, in illation to possible measurement. Scientific theories are necessarily grounded in such facts, either qualitative of quantitative. It (observation) is what it is, regardless of assertions about the formal logics of mathematics. Sheldrake's statements about scientific “dogmas” contain some grains of truth but are not well stated from either a chemical, mathematical or logical point of view. Sheldrake is certainly NOT applying a Procrustian bed to observations in order to accommodate his personal philosophy. Cheers Jerry On Jun 12, 2017, at 6:33 AM, kirst...@saunalahti.fi wrote: John, Actually Sheldrake was able to test a hypothesis (wh
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Rheme and Reason
Thank you, John (again) for clearing up the issue with utmost clarity! Gratefully, Kirsti John F Sowa kirjoitti 18.6.2017 16:39: On 6/17/2017 5:45 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: The term "positive" is the word that Peirce uses to describe the character of the philosophical sciences--as well as the special sciences. They are positive (and not merely ideal) in that they study real things and not idealizations. In the 19th century, the term 'positive' was popularized by Auguste Comte and Ernst Mach. In the 20th c, it was adopted by the Vienna Circle in the form of logical positivism. As Peirce used the term, it was part of a much richer system. But the 20th c version was an extreme nominalism that lost all the subtlety of Peirce's use. The most extreme was Carnap, the most brilliant of the Circlers. To the end of his life, he claimed that the laws of physics were just summaries of observation data. The following remark by Clarence Irving Lewis (in a letter to Hao Wang in 1960) is an excellent summary of Carnap's philosophical method: It is so easy... to get impressive 'results' by replacing the vaguer concepts which convey real meaning by virtue of common usage by pseudo precise concepts which are manipulable by 'exact' methods — the trouble being that nobody any longer knows whether anything actual or of practical import is being discussed. Wang earned his PhD at Harvard with Quine as his thesis adviser, but he found Lewis more congenial. He quoted that excerpt on page 116 of Wang, Hao (1986) Beyond Analytic Philosophy: Doing Justice to What We Know, MIT Press. Wittgenstein visited the Vienna Circle a few times, but he found Carnap's attitude so abhorrent that he refused to attend if Carnap was there. Peirce would have found it equally repulsive. If he had known that the word 'positive' would be "hijacked" by Carnap, Peirce would have disowned it. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Deely & Apel
Hello Brad, A very interesting theme you have taken on. A challenging one, too. Apel and Deely come from very different traditions. I guess about all listers have read Deely (on Peirce), but none to my knowledge has read Apel (on Peirce). Except me. - I'd like to know if there are some other seasoned listers with an interest in the views of Apel on CSP. Early on I took the habit of avoiding any reading of interpretations on any classic texts before I had got the feel of understanding the classic in question on its own right. (Invented many kinds of tests to my correct understanding in the way.) Now you have taken the job of comparing two eminent writers with a very, very different background and standpoints. Different traditions of thought. If you are seaching for earlier publications comparing Deely's interpretations and those of Apel, I suspect there is none to find. How come you got interested in Apel? - I am a European philospher, so of course I do know Apel, and not only on CSP. My best, Kirsti Määttänen Tampere University, Finland Brad Venner kirjoitti 15.6.2017 20:19: Hi, all. My name is Brad Venner - I'm a new list subscriber. I'd like to put together a paper comparing the approaches of John Deely and Karl-Otto Apel, in memorium of their recent passing (Deely in Jan 2017; Apel in May 2017). I'm thinking of focusing on their history of philosophy projects as a frame. Both credit Peirce as the originator of a new philosophical age. Apel considers three major phases of "first philosophy" (ontology, transcendental subject, transcendental semiotics) while Deely considers four (ancient, latin, modern, post-modern). Thus Deely splits the ancient age into Greek and Latin phases. This difference seems related to their overall emphasis on Peirce's influences - Apel emphasizes the Kantian influences, while Deely emphasizes the Latin influences. Apel's term "transcendental semiotics" caries this Kantian/Latin distinction. I haven't found any such direct comparisons in the literature so far, which concerns me a little, since it almost certainly reflects my ignorance of philosophy (I'm a professional statistician). If anyone has any relevant references that I've missed, or related ideas that you know of, I'd appreciate if you would post them to the list. Thanks! - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
