[PEIRCE-L] REALITY: A JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE Volume 1, Number 1: The Philosophy of Realism

[Gary Richmond]

FYI: REALITY: A JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE Volume 1, Number 1: The
Philosophy of Realism (including two Peircean-semiotic focused articles). GR

FULL ISSUE PDF NOW AVAILABLE and completely FREE! (Print-on-demand
availability coming soon):

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[image: 2020-Vol1_Iss1-Mockup-1]
*From
the Editorial Introduction:*

This first issue of Reality—*The Philosophy of Realism*—like most
publications and especially those of a collaborative effort, signifies
innumerable hours of effort.  The goal of our journal is simple: to
reinvigorate an intelligent discussion about realism as a philosophical
approach.  By a realist approach, we mean not simply as pertains to
theories of knowledge, but rather a kind of thinking that perfuses itself
throughout all philosophical inquiries: all questions of truth, of meaning
and purpose, of good, of human action, the political, the physical and the
metaphysical, of thought and thing, and anything else about which one might
ask, “What does this *mean*?”  To clarify this pursuit of reality, and
expound on its importance, our first issue asks the question: what
*is* realism?
It is an important question, not simply for our purposes here, but for
philosophy as a whole, and thus an important question for all human
beings.  Without maintenance of a sound answer—which must be sustained
dialogically—philosophy wilts into one or another sophistical theory that
begins by denying some aspect of the real; and a small error in the
beginning becomes great in the end.

To safeguard against such slippery slopes, we take a cue from the first
philosopher of the Western tradition, Socrates, and seek to define our
terms: “what is reality?”

VOLUME 1, NUMBER 1 – THE PHILOSOPHY OF REALISM


DIGITAL EDITION [PDF]


Content online:

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION: REALITY AS KATHARSIS

Daniel C. Wagner and Brian Kemple.

Article: POLITICAL SCIENCE AND REALISM

 – Francisco E. Plaza [PDF

].

An examination of theoretically-constituted political realism as capable of
contributing to the common good.
Response: CLASSICAL REALISM IN A DEMOCRATIC CONTEXT
–
Brian Jones [PDF

].

Article: REALITY AND THE MEANING OF EVIL
 –
Kirk Kanzelberger [PDF

]

What does it mean to say that “evil is *really* only a privation”?  What is
the reality thereby specified?  A shift in our understanding is needed.
Response: MADE OF FLAME AND AIR
 –
Michael Dodds, OP [PDF

].

Article: SIGNS AND REALITY
 – Brian
Kemple [PDF

].

An advocation for “semiotic realism” as the means to re-establishing
realism as the preeminent philosophical approach.
Response: THE ANALOGY OF *RES*-ALITY
 –
Matthew Minerd [PDF

]

Article: THE LOGICAL TERMS OF SENSE REALISM
–
Daniel Wagner [PDF

].

On the sense-perceptive realism of Aristotle and Aquinas, offering a
Thomistic-Aristotelian and phenomenological defense of the position contra
late medieval and modern nominalism.
Response: THE PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF SENSE REALISM

–
James D. Capehart [PDF

].

   - ISSUES 

Published by Editorial Team

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Daniel L. Everett]

Jeff,

Having reviewed Logic and Spiritualism I am once again reminded that I wish I 
had discovered Peirce much earlier in my career. My Dark Matter of the Mind is 
to my mind compatible with Peirce. If I were to reframe parts of it, I would 
have brought Peirce’s concept of “habit” into the mix. As I wrote that book, I 
was primarily thinking of William James and Michael Polanyi (and Aristotle) as 
representing earlier positions similar to my own

Peirce’s/Reid’s commonsensism is a position I find appealing. With one big 
caveat. Neither of them was a student of culture. I believe that Peirce’s work 
is compatible with the findings of modern cross-cultural research (psychology, 
anthropology, linguistics, etc), but that one needs to recognize that 
common-sense, while found in all cultures, is not identical in all cultures. 
Like Peirce, I am a Darwinian, so I would not say a priori what could not be 
innate. But I do believe that the evidence shows that concepts are not innate 
(of course many, many disagree), but that often when Peirce referred to 
phylogenetic habits, some of these can be reframed as “apperceptional/cultural 
habits” that begin in the womb, rather than in the genes.

I am working on a chapter for a current book project on Peirce as the founder 
of the best theory of cognitive sciences available. And certainly Logic and 
Spiritualism is a building block of what I see as Peircean Cognitive Science. 

Back to the problem of knowledge I had mentioned earlier, though, if all 
thought is semiosis then to account for knowledge that is anti-Whorfian (which 
in fact is crucial for scientific progress), then we can have objects and 
interpretations that lead us to fill the empty space of the sign/representamen. 
Thus when Murray Gell-Mann borrowed the term “quark” from Joyce, to name a 
particle he had the particle (the object) and its behavior and fit in his 
theory (interpretation) so plugged in a representamen. Much science seems to 
work in this anti-Whorfian manner.  

Taken at face value Whorf would have been a good Peircean - if we lack a sign 
we lack the thought that goes with it. But that is an oversimplification of 
Peirce’s position I believe. 

As I try to point out in my How Language Began and on-going work with 
archaeologist Larry Barham (U of Liverpool), what distinguishes the genus Homo 
from other animals is the ability to create symbols freely, subject to cultural 
constraints. Science, culture and Peirce himself (a creator of many symbols) 
illustrates this. 

Thus Descartes, Plato, Chomsky and others (as I point out in Dark Matter of the 
Mind) miss out on the real bases for cognitive science. As Marc Champagne makes 
clear in his excellent monograph, modern cognitive science borrowed from 
Peirce, but stopped short (thus Jerry Fodor borrowed type and token, but 
crucially not tone, thus leaving his theory of the mind doa - my view). 

I look forward to corrections.

Dan

> On Mar 5, 2020, at 12:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> Dan, List,
> 
> 
> 
> Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another 
> that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following 
> discussion of time to be of special interest:
> 
> 
> 
> "Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587
> 
> 
> 
> If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the 
> character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing 
> to take it up with you.
> 
> 
> 
> --Jeff
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> 
> From: Dan Everett 
> Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM
> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>  
> This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, 
> pragmatics, and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a 
> very hot topic these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due 
> to participate in a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One 
> of the phiosophers whose work on the language of time is most influential is 
> Reichenbach. 30 years ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory 
> of linguistic time (tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. 
> Link to two versions: https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , 
> https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ).
> However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean 
> perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) 
> an “Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things 
> which are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the 
> language of the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time 
> words. Other examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color 
> words but can 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Daniel L. Everett]

Many thanks, Jeff. 

Dan

> On Mar 5, 2020, at 12:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> Dan, List,
> 
> 
> 
> Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another 
> that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following 
> discussion of time to be of special interest:
> 
> 
> 
> "Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587
> 
> 
> 
> If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the 
> character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing 
> to take it up with you.
> 
> 
> 
> --Jeff
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> 
> From: Dan Everett 
> Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM
> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>  
> This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, 
> pragmatics, and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a 
> very hot topic these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due 
> to participate in a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One 
> of the phiosophers whose work on the language of time is most influential is 
> Reichenbach. 30 years ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory 
> of linguistic time (tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. 
> Link to two versions: https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , 
> https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ).
> However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean 
> perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) 
> an “Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things 
> which are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the 
> language of the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time 
> words. Other examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color 
> words but can easily distinguish colors if asked to perform certain tasks. 
> And some have no numerals in their language but can do some simple numerical 
> tasks (another paper of mine: 
> https://langcog.stanford.edu/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf)
> 
> Thus in Peircean theory we have on the one hand the theory of what time is 
> with the recognition that different languages will choose to slice up time in 
> different ways. On the other hand, we have societies which appear to have no 
> signs for a particular category but who nevertheless can undertake some 
> actions that reveal tacit knowledge of tasks without linguistic signs (a 
> book-lengh study here: 
> https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X)
> 
> So I am not only grateful for what has been said in these few extremely 
> useful posts, but any further discussions or pointers would be most welcome.
> 
> Dan Everett
> 
> 
>> On Mar 5, 2020, at 1:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Hello Jon, List,
>> 
>> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
>> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
>> you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
>> Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.
>> 
>> --Jeff
>> 
>> 
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>> 
>> 
>> From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>>  
>> List:
>> 
>> Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List 
>> exchanges over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  
>> After a lot of reading and thinking about the mathematical, 
>> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I 
>> decided to post the following and see if it prompts any further discussion.
>> 
>> In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates that 
>> have occurred within the philosophy of time since its publication, John 
>> Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time."  His basic claim is that 
>> time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, 
>> and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious 
>> rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, and future only at 
>> different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's implicit assumption is 
>> that time is a series of discrete positions, which are what he calls 
>> moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular moment.  In 
>> other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, 
>> which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.
>> 
>> Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  
>> Positions 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Dan, List,


Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another 
that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following 
discussion of time to be of special interest:


"Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587


If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the 
character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing 
to take it up with you.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Dan Everett 
Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, pragmatics, 
and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a very hot topic 
these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due to participate in 
a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One of the phiosophers 
whose work on the language of time is most influential is Reichenbach. 30 years 
ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory of linguistic time 
(tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. Link to two versions: 
https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , 
https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ).
However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean 
perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) an 
“Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things which 
are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the language of 
the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time words. Other 
examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color words but can 
easily distinguish colors if asked to perform certain tasks. And some have no 
numerals in their language but can do some simple numerical tasks (another 
paper of mine: https://langcog.stanford.edu/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf)

Thus in Peircean theory we have on the one hand the theory of what time is with 
the recognition that different languages will choose to slice up time in 
different ways. On the other hand, we have societies which appear to have no 
signs for a particular category but who nevertheless can undertake some actions 
that reveal tacit knowledge of tasks without linguistic signs (a book-lengh 
study here: 
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X)

So I am not only grateful for what has been said in these few extremely useful 
posts, but any further discussions or pointers would be most welcome.

Dan Everett


On Mar 5, 2020, at 1:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hello Jon, List,

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List exchanges 
over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  After a lot 
of reading and thinking about the mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, 
and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I decided to post the following and see 
if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper that established the 
parameters for many of the debates that have occurred within the philosophy of 
time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of 
Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory 
to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he 
alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 
and future only at different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's 
implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are 
what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular 
moment.  In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential 
subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  Positions 
in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as 
measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can only 
distinguish arbitrarily because 

[PEIRCE-L] Fwd: Call for papers / Punctum 6 (2) / Semiotics of Political Communication

[Gary Richmond]

Forwarded, FYI. Gary Richmond
https://tinyurl.com/uge57ly
H.S.S. NEWS
Call for papers / Punctum 6 (2) / Semiotics of Political Communication
NEWS OF H.S.S.
 04 MARCH
2020

   -
   


   -
   


   -
   


   -
   


[image: Call for papers / Punctum 6 (2) / Semiotics of Political
Communication]

In the last few decades the field of political communication is
characterized by an increasing degree of pluralization and fluidity. The
large-scale crisis of long-established political agents (e.g. traditional
political parties, the European Union) has proceeded together with the rise
of a wide array of new parties, NGOs and social movements. The media
ecosystem, on the other hand, marked by the hybrid interplay of legacy and
digital media, has become distinctively polycentric, multi-voiced and
participative. Political identities and communities, finally, have become
notably more fluid and inconstant, signaling major shifts in the terms and
forms of political representation. The basic premise of our invitation to
investigate the changing semiotic nature of contemporary politics is Pertti
Ahonen’s assertion that “politics is always a communicative enterprise”,
inherently embedded in narration, symbolism, representation and
signification. Having in mind a comprehensive understanding of political
agency (including national and supra-national entities, political parties
and NGOs, social movements and activist organizations) and with a specific
historical focus on the post-Cold War period, we invite contributions (case
studies or theoretical articles) that address the semiotic labor involved
in contemporary political communication by investigating verbal and/or
non-verbal political discourse across all the different communication
modes, media and practices. Specifically, contributions may concern one or
more of the axes below:

   - political campaigns, debates and rhetoric
   - political symbols, logos, images, music/songs and narratives
   - political ritual, aesthetics and performativity
   - political leadership, charisma and style
   - political cartoons, comics, murals and graffiti
   - political identities and ideologies

Prospective authors should submit an abstract of 250-300 words by mail to
the editor, Gregory Paschalidis (pasch...@jour.auth.gr ), including their
affiliation and contact information. Acceptance of the abstract does not
guarantee publication, given that all research articles will be subjected
to the journal’s double peer review process.

*Timeline:*
Deadline for abstracts: April 20, 2020
Notification of acceptance of the abstract: April 30, 2020
Deadline for submission of full papers: August 31, 2020
Reviewers’ report: October 19, 2020
Final revised papers due: November 30, 2020
Publication: Volume 6, Number 2 (December 2020)

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[image: Image]

"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

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