Jeff, Having reviewed Logic and Spiritualism I am once again reminded that I wish I had discovered Peirce much earlier in my career. My Dark Matter of the Mind is to my mind compatible with Peirce. If I were to reframe parts of it, I would have brought Peirce’s concept of “habit” into the mix. As I wrote that book, I was primarily thinking of William James and Michael Polanyi (and Aristotle) as representing earlier positions similar to my own
Peirce’s/Reid’s commonsensism is a position I find appealing. With one big caveat. Neither of them was a student of culture. I believe that Peirce’s work is compatible with the findings of modern cross-cultural research (psychology, anthropology, linguistics, etc), but that one needs to recognize that common-sense, while found in all cultures, is not identical in all cultures. Like Peirce, I am a Darwinian, so I would not say a priori what could not be innate. But I do believe that the evidence shows that concepts are not innate (of course many, many disagree), but that often when Peirce referred to phylogenetic habits, some of these can be reframed as “apperceptional/cultural habits” that begin in the womb, rather than in the genes. I am working on a chapter for a current book project on Peirce as the founder of the best theory of cognitive sciences available. And certainly Logic and Spiritualism is a building block of what I see as Peircean Cognitive Science. Back to the problem of knowledge I had mentioned earlier, though, if all thought is semiosis then to account for knowledge that is anti-Whorfian (which in fact is crucial for scientific progress), then we can have objects and interpretations that lead us to fill the empty space of the sign/representamen. Thus when Murray Gell-Mann borrowed the term “quark” from Joyce, to name a particle he had the particle (the object) and its behavior and fit in his theory (interpretation) so plugged in a representamen. Much science seems to work in this anti-Whorfian manner. Taken at face value Whorf would have been a good Peircean - if we lack a sign we lack the thought that goes with it. But that is an oversimplification of Peirce’s position I believe. As I try to point out in my How Language Began and on-going work with archaeologist Larry Barham (U of Liverpool), what distinguishes the genus Homo from other animals is the ability to create symbols freely, subject to cultural constraints. Science, culture and Peirce himself (a creator of many symbols) illustrates this. Thus Descartes, Plato, Chomsky and others (as I point out in Dark Matter of the Mind) miss out on the real bases for cognitive science. As Marc Champagne makes clear in his excellent monograph, modern cognitive science borrowed from Peirce, but stopped short (thus Jerry Fodor borrowed type and token, but crucially not tone, thus leaving his theory of the mind doa - my view). I look forward to corrections. Dan > On Mar 5, 2020, at 12:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > wrote: > > > Dan, List, > > > > Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another > that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following > discussion of time to be of special interest: > > > > "Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587 > > > > If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the > character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing > to take it up with you. > > > > --Jeff > > > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > From: Dan Everett <danleveret...@gmail.com> > Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time > > This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, > pragmatics, and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a > very hot topic these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due > to participate in a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One > of the phiosophers whose work on the language of time is most influential is > Reichenbach. 30 years ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory > of linguistic time (tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. > Link to two versions: https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , > https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ). > However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean > perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) > an “Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things > which are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the > language of the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time > words. Other examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color > words but can easily distinguish colors if asked to perform certain tasks. > And some have no numerals in their language but can do some simple numerical > tasks (another paper of mine: > https://langcog.stanford.edu/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf) > > Thus in Peircean theory we have on the one hand the theory of what time is > with the recognition that different languages will choose to slice up time in > different ways. On the other hand, we have societies which appear to have no > signs for a particular category but who nevertheless can undertake some > actions that reveal tacit knowledge of tasks without linguistic signs (a > book-lengh study here: > https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X) > > So I am not only grateful for what has been said in these few extremely > useful posts, but any further discussions or pointers would be most welcome. > > Dan Everett > > >> On Mar 5, 2020, at 1:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> >> wrote: >> >> Hello Jon, List, >> >> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, >> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do >> you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? >> Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. >> >> --Jeff >> >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> >> From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM >> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time >> >> List: >> >> Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List >> exchanges over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time. >> After a lot of reading and thinking about the mathematical, >> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I >> decided to post the following and see if it prompts any further discussion. >> >> In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates that >> have occurred within the philosophy of time since its publication, John >> Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that >> time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, >> and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious >> rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, and future only at >> different times--is viciously circular. McTaggart's implicit assumption is >> that time is a series of discrete positions, which are what he calls >> moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular moment. In >> other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, >> which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations. >> >> Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous. >> Positions in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, >> such as measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can >> only distinguish arbitrarily because "moment melts into moment. That is to >> say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be >> the same" (CP 7.656, 1903). An event is "an existential junction of >> incompossible facts" (CP 1.492; c. 1896); as Peirce later elaborates ... >> >> CSP: The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that >> which in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in >> representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical >> law of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not >> a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of >> being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where >> contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence >> whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary >> determinations in existence. (CP 1.494; c. 1896) >> >> In logic, existential subjects (i.e., concrete things) and their abstract >> qualities are denoted by terms--or, respectively, lines of identity and >> labeled spots in existential graphs--while states of things are signified >> bypropositions (statements). A fact is the state of things signified by a >> true proposition. >> >> CSP: Space, like Time, is a general respect to whose determinations >> realizations are relative. Only, in the case of space, the realizations >> instead of being of states of things signified by propositions are of >> objects representable by terms of propositions. Namely, if a proposition be >> so analyzed as to throw all general characters into the predicate,--as when >> we express 'all men are mortal' as 'whatever exists is either not a man or >> is mortal,'--then, if the universe of discourse is a collection of objects >> of a certain kind called things, each individual thing denoted by a subject >> of the proposition (reckoning as 'subjects' not only the subject nominative >> but the direct, indirect, and prepositional objects) each such individual >> exists and has such characters as it has, relatively to some determination >> of space. (NEM 3:1077; c. 1905) >> >> CSP: A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such >> a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it ... A fact is so >> highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly >> represented in a simple proposition ... (CP 5.549, EP 2:378; 1906). >> >> An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things >> that is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs. An >> existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain >> fact is realized, but then it receives a contradictory determination, such >> that a negation of that fact is realized. The continuous flow of time, which >> we directly perceive (NEM 3:59-60; c. 1895), is what facilitates this. >> >> CSP: Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations >> of which states of things otherwise impossible may be realized. Namely, if P >> and Q are two logically possible states of things, (abstraction being made >> of time) but are logically incompossible, they may be realized in respect to >> different determinations of time. (NEM 3:1074; c. 1905) >> >> Hence time is also not itself an existential subject, and >> past/present/future are not abstract qualities that inhere in >> instants/moments or events as existential subjects. Instead, time is a real >> law that governs existential subjects, and past/present/future are "the >> three general determinations of Time" (CP 5.458, EP 2:357; 1905, emphasis >> mine)--lapses at which different states of things are realized (cf. NEM >> 3:1074-1077; c. 1905), not individual determinations of the same >> instant/moment or event. In short, the two authors agree that time does not >> exist, but McTaggert wrongly concludes from this that time cannot be real, >> while Peirce maintains that existence is not coextensive with reality. >> >> CSP: Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other >> characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. >> Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of >> which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, >> independently of any assertion about them. (CP 6.349; 1902) >> >> He also recognizes a third mode of being in accordance with his conviction >> that "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of >> logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" >> (CP 1.487; c. 1896). >> >> CSP: Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in >> metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and >> as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens >> having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, >> reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting in >> a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of being. >> The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies >> in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing >> qualities and things together. (CP 1.515; c. 1896) >> >> The state of things in the present is always one of indefinitely gradual >> change, as ongoing events bring different abstract qualities and concrete >> things together, such that the indeterminate possibilities and conditional >> necessities of the future become the determinate actualities of the past >> (cf. CP 5.459, EP 2:357-8; 1905). Time is real because this process and its >> results are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite >> group of minds thinks about them. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
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