Many thanks, Jeff. Dan
> On Mar 5, 2020, at 12:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> > wrote: > > > Dan, List, > > > > Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another > that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following > discussion of time to be of special interest: > > > > "Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587 > > > > If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the > character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing > to take it up with you. > > > > --Jeff > > > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > From: Dan Everett <danleveret...@gmail.com> > Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM > To: Jeffrey Brian Downard > Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time > > This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, > pragmatics, and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a > very hot topic these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due > to participate in a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One > of the phiosophers whose work on the language of time is most influential is > Reichenbach. 30 years ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory > of linguistic time (tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. > Link to two versions: https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , > https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ). > However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean > perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) > an “Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things > which are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the > language of the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time > words. Other examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color > words but can easily distinguish colors if asked to perform certain tasks. > And some have no numerals in their language but can do some simple numerical > tasks (another paper of mine: > https://langcog.stanford.edu/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf) > > Thus in Peircean theory we have on the one hand the theory of what time is > with the recognition that different languages will choose to slice up time in > different ways. On the other hand, we have societies which appear to have no > signs for a particular category but who nevertheless can undertake some > actions that reveal tacit knowledge of tasks without linguistic signs (a > book-lengh study here: > https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X) > > So I am not only grateful for what has been said in these few extremely > useful posts, but any further discussions or pointers would be most welcome. > > Dan Everett > > >> On Mar 5, 2020, at 1:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> >> wrote: >> >> Hello Jon, List, >> >> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, >> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do >> you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? >> Each seems to involve somewhat different methods. >> >> --Jeff >> >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> >> >> From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> >> Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM >> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu >> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time >> >> List: >> >> Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List >> exchanges over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time. >> After a lot of reading and thinking about the mathematical, >> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I >> decided to post the following and see if it prompts any further discussion. >> >> In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates that >> have occurred within the philosophy of time since its publication, John >> Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time." His basic claim is that >> time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, >> and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious >> rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, and future only at >> different times--is viciously circular. McTaggart's implicit assumption is >> that time is a series of discrete positions, which are what he calls >> moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular moment. In >> other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, >> which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations. >> >> Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous. >> Positions in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, >> such as measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can >> only distinguish arbitrarily because "moment melts into moment. That is to >> say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be >> the same" (CP 7.656, 1903). An event is "an existential junction of >> incompossible facts" (CP 1.492; c. 1896); as Peirce later elaborates ... >> >> CSP: The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that >> which in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in >> representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical >> law of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not >> a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of >> being is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where >> contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence >> whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary >> determinations in existence. (CP 1.494; c. 1896) >> >> In logic, existential subjects (i.e., concrete things) and their abstract >> qualities are denoted by terms--or, respectively, lines of identity and >> labeled spots in existential graphs--while states of things are signified >> bypropositions (statements). A fact is the state of things signified by a >> true proposition. >> >> CSP: Space, like Time, is a general respect to whose determinations >> realizations are relative. Only, in the case of space, the realizations >> instead of being of states of things signified by propositions are of >> objects representable by terms of propositions. Namely, if a proposition be >> so analyzed as to throw all general characters into the predicate,--as when >> we express 'all men are mortal' as 'whatever exists is either not a man or >> is mortal,'--then, if the universe of discourse is a collection of objects >> of a certain kind called things, each individual thing denoted by a subject >> of the proposition (reckoning as 'subjects' not only the subject nominative >> but the direct, indirect, and prepositional objects) each such individual >> exists and has such characters as it has, relatively to some determination >> of space. (NEM 3:1077; c. 1905) >> >> CSP: A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such >> a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it ... A fact is so >> highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly >> represented in a simple proposition ... (CP 5.549, EP 2:378; 1906). >> >> An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things >> that is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs. An >> existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain >> fact is realized, but then it receives a contradictory determination, such >> that a negation of that fact is realized. The continuous flow of time, which >> we directly perceive (NEM 3:59-60; c. 1895), is what facilitates this. >> >> CSP: Time is a certain general respect relative to different determinations >> of which states of things otherwise impossible may be realized. Namely, if P >> and Q are two logically possible states of things, (abstraction being made >> of time) but are logically incompossible, they may be realized in respect to >> different determinations of time. (NEM 3:1074; c. 1905) >> >> Hence time is also not itself an existential subject, and >> past/present/future are not abstract qualities that inhere in >> instants/moments or events as existential subjects. Instead, time is a real >> law that governs existential subjects, and past/present/future are "the >> three general determinations of Time" (CP 5.458, EP 2:357; 1905, emphasis >> mine)--lapses at which different states of things are realized (cf. NEM >> 3:1074-1077; c. 1905), not individual determinations of the same >> instant/moment or event. In short, the two authors agree that time does not >> exist, but McTaggert wrongly concludes from this that time cannot be real, >> while Peirce maintains that existence is not coextensive with reality. >> >> CSP: Existence, then, is a special mode of reality, which, whatever other >> characteristics it possesses, has that of being absolutely determinate. >> Reality, in its turn, is a special mode of being, the characteristic of >> which is that things that are real are whatever they really are, >> independently of any assertion about them. (CP 6.349; 1902) >> >> He also recognizes a third mode of being in accordance with his conviction >> that "Metaphysics consists in the results of the absolute acceptance of >> logical principles not merely as regulatively valid, but as truths of being" >> (CP 1.487; c. 1896). >> >> CSP: Just as the logical verb with its signification reappears in >> metaphysics as a Quality, an ens having a Nature as its mode of being, and >> as a logical individual subject reappears in metaphysics as a Thing, an ens >> having Existence as its mode of being, so the logical reason, or premise, >> reappears in metaphysics as a Reason, an ens having a Reality, consisting in >> a ruling both of the outward and of the inward world, as its mode of being. >> The being of the quality lies wholly in itself, the being of the thing lies >> in opposition to other things, the being of the reason lies in its bringing >> qualities and things together. (CP 1.515; c. 1896) >> >> The state of things in the present is always one of indefinitely gradual >> change, as ongoing events bring different abstract qualities and concrete >> things together, such that the indeterminate possibilities and conditional >> necessities of the future become the determinate actualities of the past >> (cf. CP 5.459, EP 2:357-8; 1905). Time is real because this process and its >> results are as they are regardless of what any individual mind or finite >> group of minds thinks about them. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but >> to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of >> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
