Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Edwina, When I was talking about model-relative theories of reality, I was definitely *not* advocating a kind of cognitive relativism. > we have to consider that some models more accurately represent this external reality than others - and also, Peirce did feel that we could, among the 'community of scholars', over time - reach a more and more accurate representation of this reality... Yes. When I listed those many different models in my previous note, I was not claiming that they were contradictory. All I said is that each one emphasized aspects of reality that the others did not consider The results of chemical experiments, as they were described in 19th c. books, are just as valid today as they were then: Na + CL -> NaCl + Heat. The fact that physicists today can calculate the amount of heat by quantum mechanics does not invalidate the old results. For most purposes, the amount of heat is easier to measure that to calculate. Similarly, Newtonian mechanics is just as reliable as relativity and quantum mechanics for the motions of common objects on the earth's surface. And engineers continue to use it because the calculations are simpler. > we must not move into 'cognitive relativism' so to speak, where we simply accept a diversity of models and their cognitive interpretations without evaluating them for their realism. Certainly. But the most accurate model of physics -- quantum electrodynamics -- is so complex, that engineers almost never use it -- except for extreme cases, such as computing what happens in a nuclear explosion. See the attached file -- CP8_187.txt for some quotations. Note the passage that begins "Now the different sciences deal with different kinds of truth ; mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually existing state of the universe is a third..." John CP 8.187. Confining ourselves to science, inference, in the broadest sense, is coextensive with the deliberate adoption, in any measure, of an assertion as true. For deliberation implies that the adoption is voluntary; and consequently, the observation of perceptual facts that are forced upon us in experience is excluded. General principles, on the other hand, if deliberately adopted, must have been subjected to criticism; and any criticism of them that can be called scientific and that results in their acceptance must involve an argument in favor of their truth. My statement was that an inference, in the broadest sense, is a deliberate adoption, in any measure, of an assertion as true. The phrase "in any measure" is not as clear as might be wished. "Measure," here translates modus. The modes of acceptance of an assertion that are traditionally recognized are the necessary, the possible, and the contingent. But we shall learn more accurately, as our inquiry proceeds, how the different measures of acceptance are to be enumerated and defined. Then, as to the word "true," I may be asked what this means. Now the different sciences deal with different kinds of truth ; mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually existing state of the universe is a third; but all those different conceptions have in common something very marked and clear. We all hope that the different scientific inquiries in which we are severally engaged are going ultimately to lead to some definitely established conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure. Agreement with that ultimate proposition that we look forward to, agreement with that, whatever it may turn out to be, is the scientific truth. CP 8.188. Perhaps there will here be no harm in indulging in a little diagrammatic psychology after the manner of the old writers' discussions concerning the primum cognitum; for however worthless it may be as psychology, it is not a bad way to get orientated in our logic. No man can recall the time when he had not yet begun a theory of the universe, when any particular course of things was so little expected that nothing could surprise him, even though it startled him. The first surprise would naturally be the first thing that would offer sufficient handle for memory to draw it forth from the general background. It was something new. Of course, nothing can appear as definitely new without being contrasted with a background of the old. At this, the infantile scientific impulse, what becomes developed later into various kinds of intelligence, but we will call it the scientific impulse because it is science that we are now endeavoring to get a general notion of, this infantile scientific impulse must strive to reconcile the new to the old. The first new feature of this first surprise is, for example, that it is a surprise; and the only way of accounting for that is that there had been before an expectation. Thus it is that all knowledge begins by the discovery that there has been an erroneous expectation of which we had before hardly been conscious. Each
Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Edwina, I agree with that point, and I believe that Peirce would too: > we have to consider that some models more accurately represent this external reality than others - and also, Peirce did feel that we could, among the 'community of scholars', over time - reach a more and more accurate representation of this reality. But Peirce also recognized that no finite list of discrete symbols could capture the full richness, complexity, and continuity of any aspect of the universe. If we view "reality" through microscopes and telescopes of greater and greater power, we get totally different "model-based views" at each order of magnitude from electrons to galaxies. Even at a human level, a physicist, chemist, biologist, geologist, physician, pharmacist, linguist, anthropologist, engineer, lawyer, banker, real-estate developer, and poet would have radically different models and ways of describing the same scene. And if you gave them the same instruments for viewing the scene, they would still have widely different models at each level. For that matter, those roles I mentioned above are not mutually exclusive. The same person, for different purposes, could apply widely different models. John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
Jeff, Jon, Dan... For the past few months, I have been busy with some critical deadlines and activities that limited my participation in email discussions. But I'd like to comment on the many possible views of reality. Two points by Peirce: 1. Reality is independent of anything we may think about it. Although there are many different ways of thinking and talking about time, there is enough commonality among all those views to indicate that time is real in some sense. 2. There are three fundamental universes of discourse: possibilities, actualities, and necessities. Even if some view(s) might banish time from some way of talking about what actually exists at the current moment, it could still be real in thinking and talking about memories, plans, hopes, and fears. And for current discussions in science, I'd like to mention "model-dependent realism", as discussed by Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow in their 2010 book, _The Grand Design_. They "argue that the quest to discover a final theory may in fact never lead to a unique set of equations. Every scientific theory, they write, comes with its own model of reality, and it may not make sense to talk of what reality actually is." That quotation come from a review in https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-elusive-thoery-of-everything/ . Many physicists have objected to that view because it would mean that further progress in physics is impossible. Others have argued that it might only be impossible with current technology, and new methods might be discovered at some time in the future -- perhaps even the far distant future. But the notion of model-dependent realism could also be extended to linguistics, phenomenology, and anthropology. Every language, culture, and individual has implicit models that determine the ways of interpreting experiences and talking about them. The experiences may be caused by something actual, but the connection to their language may be obscure . For a summary of some of the issues, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-dependent_realism John - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
[PEIRCE-L] Re: Differential Propositional Calculus
Cf: Differential Propositional Calculus : Discussion 1 At: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2020/03/12/differential-propositional-calculus-%e2%80%a2-discussion-1/ || The most fundamental concept in cybernetics is that of "difference", || either that two things are recognisably different or that one thing || has changed with time. || || W. Ross Ashby : An Introduction to Cybernetics || ( http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/books/IntroCyb.pdf ) Re: Cybernetics Communications https://groups.google.com/d/topic/cybcom/8QIMPmPhvjU/overview Re: Klaus Krippendorff https://groups.google.com/d/msg/cybcom/8QIMPmPhvjU/cES14-ANAwAJ KK: To me, differences are the result of drawing distinctions. They don't exist unless you actively draw them. So, the act of drawing distinctions is more fundamental than the differences thereby created. I often return to that line from Ashby. This time I thought it made an apt segue from the scene of propositional calculus, where universes of discourse are ruled by collections of distinctive features, to the differential extension of propositional calculus, which enables us to describe trajectories within and transformations between our logical universes. So I agree with Klaus Krippendorff about "which came first", the distinctions drawn or the states distinguished in space or time. The primitive character of distinctions is especially salient in this setting since our formalism for propositional calculus is built on the forms of distinction pioneered by C.S. Peirce and augmented by George Spencer Brown. Resource * Differential Propositional Calculus https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Propositional_Calculus_%E2%80%A2_Overview * Part 1 https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Propositional_Calculus_%E2%80%A2_Part_1 * Part 2 https://oeis.org/wiki/Differential_Propositional_Calculus_%E2%80%A2_Part_2 Regards, Jon - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
