date:20200426

John, List:

Thanks for confirming the complete absence of any concrete evidence to
support the allegations against me, which instead are grounded entirely in
transparently uncharitable interpretations of my List posts over the
years.  The assertion that my "actions speak louder than [my] words" is
almost laughable since the only interactions that we have ever had, and
likely will ever have, are strictly by means of exchanging words (and
occasional illustrations) on our computer screens.  With that in mind, let
me attempt to settle this matter once and for all.

   - I do not claim that my conclusions in general, or my version of
   semeiotic in particular, are exactly what Peirce intended.  My conclusions
   are *my own*, not Peirce's; and my speculative grammar is *my own*, not
   Peirce's.  Any reading of my posts to the contrary is mistaken.
   - My objective is not to develop a definitive reconstruction of Peirce's
   semeiotic, let alone his comprehensive system of thought.  Rather, I seek
   to understand his ideas accurately and formulate *my own* synthesis
   accordingly.  Again, any reading of my posts to the contrary is mistaken.
   - Nevertheless, I reject as patently absurd the notion that Peirce wrote
   absolutely nothing that can be taken as definitive.  It is possible to
   distinguish statements that are consistent with his writings from those
   that are not.  In fact, this task is *necessary *for robust scholarship
   within the community of inquirers.

Please interpret my List contributions going forward accordingly and handle
any future disagreements by *making better arguments* on the substance,
rather than incessantly complaining about my methodology.  After all, I am
hardly the only List participant who "fight[s] tooth and nail to defend" my
views, and at least I have a track record--even if some will never
acknowledge it--of being open to well-founded persuasion.  From now on, it
*will* go without saying for all my posts that they are expressions of my
personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's writings.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 5:39 PM John F. Sowa  wrote:

> Jon,
>
> The short answer to your question is "Always".   I admit that you do not
> use those metalevel terms to describe what you're doing, but your actions
> speak louder than your words.
>
> JAS>  When have I ever declared that my "conclusion is what Peirce
> intended"?
>
> In every debate, you use your slender thread of quotations as the  primary
> and sometimes the only criterion for making a decision.  You dismiss other
> quotations of Peirce as not valid for one reason or another, and you don't
> consider the century of work after Peirce as relevant. Peirce insisted on
> fallibilism, and his ideas were constantly growing.  Note the tentative
> tone in his letters to Lady Welby.  Note the many versions of his attempts
> to write something definitive.  His ideas were never static, and he was
> constantly debating his positions with himself and his colleagues.
>
> JAS> When have I ever described my objective as "developing a definitive
> reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic"?
>
> You don't describe it, but you act as if you have such a reconstruction in
> mind.  When anybody suggests an alternative that is different from the one
> you chose, you fight tooth and nail to defend the one you had been
> considering.
>
> JAS:  When have I ever maintained that my "version [of semeiotic] is what
> Peirce intended"?
>
> When you post a barrage of quotations by Peirce that you believe refute
> the position that the other person has proposed.  You don't accept their
> quotations by Peirce, and you don't allow new evidence from more recent
> developments that Peirce could not have known.
>
> As just one example, Peirce preferred the gospel by John the Evangelist
> (and so do I).  Many theologians believe that there is strong evidence for
> the equation Theos = Logos = Dharma = Tao (or Dao). For example, the
> translation of the New Testament to Chinese uses 'Dao' as the translation
> of  'Logos'.  One might quibble with that translation for various reasons.
> But to reject it out of hand is inexcusable.
>
> JAS> John's slides linked below are a good example of this, translating
> some of Peirce's ideas into the concepts and terminology of modern logic.
> Why is such an approach acceptable for him in a conference presentation,
> but not for me in an e-mail list
> discussion?   Again, *why the double standard?
>
> Because in mathematics and logic, there is no double standard.  There is
> one and only one absolutely precise criterion that determines whether or
> not two expressions are exact translations of one another:  a formal proof.
>
> Peirce was a mathematician from early childhood and a logician from the
> age of 13.  For the first-order subse

Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Gary R., Edwina, List:

I agree that Peirce was not at all a Platonist, but nevertheless uses the
expression "Platonic idea" in a peculiar way.  The passages that come to my
mind are where he describes Platonic ideas as the constituents of the first
universe of experience.

CSP:  Some words shall herein be capitalized when used, not as vernacular,
but as terms defined. Thus, an "idea" is the substance of an actual unitary
thought or fancy; but "Idea,"--nearer Plato's idea of *ἰδέα*,--denotes
anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully
represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent
it. ...
Of the three Universes of Experience familiar to us all, the first
comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet,
pure mathematician, or another *might *give local habitation and a name
within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact that their Being
consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in anybody's Actually
thinking them, saves their Reality. (CP 6.452&455, EP 2:434&435, 1908)


They are thus *real *possibilities (1ns), but not forms that *exist *in
some immaterial realm.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 4:41 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Edwina, List,
>
> Edwina wrote: Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out and
> read it more thoroughly.// But I'm not sure if it will change my mind! I
> don't, for example, understand Firstness as comparable to the Platonic idea.
>
> Thank you for considering reading my paper, Edwina. As for changing your
> mind, well, I don't expect to do that in any significant way on topics
> we've discussed in the past.
>
> However, as to how Peirce uses the expression "Platonic idea," well maybe,
> just *maybe*, I can make a little headway in that. Well, at most a dent.
> OK, a dimple :-) But it will take more time than I've available this
> weekend, so this will be the briefest of sketches.
>
> Suffice it to say for starters that, as Joe Ransdell and many others have
> argued, Peirce was *not *a Platonist; and I certainly agree. He was,
> rather, and as he explicitly saw himself, principally Aristotelian in his
> basic philosophical outlook, that is, he saw himself as essentially a
> scientist and logician, and he deplored Platonism in pretty much all its
> forms as nominalistic.
>
> Parenthetically, Joe also argued, well I think, that there were deep
> Socratic veins in Peirce's philosophy: the *dialogic* aspect of it, so
> crucial to his notion of a scientific community. See: Ransdell's paper:
> "Sciences as Communicational Communities"
> https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHYSICS.HTM
>
> But that's a topic for another time; and it should go without saying that
> "Socratic" in Joe's sense is not "Platonic" in the nominalist's sense.
>
> Yet, in various places in his work in semeiotic as well as in mathematics
> and metaphysics, Peirce used the expression "Platonic idea" in a
> particular, one might even say 'peculiar', way given his general distaste
> for Platonism. For example, takes this passage:
>
> CSP: The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object,
> not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have
> sometimes called the ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be
> understood in a sort of Platonic sense. . . (CP 2.228, in a fragment dated
> c. 1887).
>
>
> GR: And he not infrequently comments, as in this snippet, to the effect
> that there is a "Platonic world of pure forms with which mathematics is
> always dealing" (CP 4.118).
>
> GR: Also, in some of his late metaphysical musing he reflects that from a
> certain "point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with all
> its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
> determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. . ." (CP 6.192)
>
> GR: So what I'm suggesting is, that as opposed to nominalistic Platonism
> which he abhorred -- and whether or not you agree with any of the
> particular ideas set forth in the snippets above -- that Peirce had a
> specific use for the term "Platonic idea" by which he means, as a technical
> term suggest by the snippets above, the 'world' "of pure forms in which
> mathematics" deals, the *qualisignific *and *iconic *in semeiotic, the
> "ground" of a sign in his earliest semeiotic explorations, etc. One perhaps
> it such ways can get a sense or an image of what Peirce means by a
> "Platonic idea."
>
> GR: Well, whether I've changed our mind in this matter at all, it's the
> way I see it: Peirce was certainly not a Platonist, but used the term
> "Platonic idea" in the special sense just described.
>
> ET: And I simply don't see that representamen, can function in a mode of
> Firstness, - other than as a qualisign -  where all

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Helmut, Edwina, List:

I personally find it misleading to say that the dynamical object does
not *exist
*on its own, because this wrongly implies that it *requires *a sign to
represent it in order to exist.  On the contrary, the dependence is the
other way around--a sign has no being on its own, but must be determined by
a dynamical object.  On the other hand, I acknowledge that something does
not *function *as a dynamical object unless and until it determines a sign
to represent it.

I also personally find it misleading to say that a sign is *composed *of a
sign, an object, and an interpretant.  Again, these are three distinct
*correlates
*of a genuine triadic relation, not three parts of a single whole.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 11:03 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Supplement: And if you ask: "What does a rhematic iconic qualisign consist
> of?", and the answer is "Rheme, icon, and qualisign", you might argue that
> now you are talking about a composition, but effectively the way of
> composition applies to all signs, so you really are talking about a special
> kind of this general composition, so about a class of composition, so about
> a class.
> Edwina, List,
>
> I think, if yoiu ask: "What kind of sign is it?", then you might get the
> answer: "A Qualisign", you regard the sign as class now, and in this
> respect there is no triadicity (but mostly degenerateness). But if you ask:
> "What is a sign (better: Sign or Sign triad) composed of?", then you get
> the answer: "Sign, object, interpretant", or "Sign itself (aka
> sign-sign-relation), sign-object-relation, and sign-interpretant relation",
> and you are talking about a composition. If you ask: "How many sign classes
> are there?", and the answer is "10", you are talking about a complete
> group, which is a composition.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
> 26. April 2020 um 17:32 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky" 
> wrote:
>
> Helmut - Could you explain to me the difference between a Qualisign, which
> in a specific instance, is a 'feeling of heat' as a 'composition' vs a
> 'class' of such instances? Isn't the composition of this particular example
> - the same as it is in the 'class'?
>
> I am aware that a 'class' would refer to ALL such instances where all
> three relations in the triad are in the category of Firstness, but, why do
> you seem to infer that ONE example of such a class means that one can't
> 'assign all three categorical modes'.
>
> Sorry- but you've lost me on this!
>
> Edwina
>
> On Sun 26/04/20 11:22 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> Edwina, List,
>
> sorry for my overlapping posts. I think for assigning all three categorial
> modes from a triad, this only works with compositions, not with classes.
> "rhematic iconic qualisign" is a class, 1-1-1. It is a class of a
> composition, but a class. A class is not a categorial triad. The groups of
> 10, 28, and 66 sign classes are compositions of classes of compositions, so
> compositions, and the complete triadicity applies to them (to these
> groups). "S-O-I" too is a composition, also "SS-SO-SI". To both the
> complete triadicity applies, due to the level consisting of 3, 6, 10,
> 15,...28...66... completely triadically arranged characters.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
> 26. April 2020 um 17:02 Uhr
> "Edwina Taborsky"
> wrote:
>
> Helmut - no, in my view, the object - which to be accurate, should better
> be referred to as the DO [Dynamic Object] when it's in the triad - doesn't
> exist 'per se' - on its own.
>
> It only 'exists' within that triadic interaction - and its nature when
> 'grabbed' so to speak,  in that interaction is to provide input data which
> is transformed/mediated by the Representamen/sign and thus 'interpreted' as
> an Interpretant.
>
> So- what is the categorical mode of the relation between the DO and the R?
> We see from the ten classes that it can be in any of the three modal
> categories. Three of the ten have the input from the DO in a mode of
> Firstness; four are in a mode of Secondness and three in a mode of
> Thirdness. That is - the interaction between the Representamen and the DO
> can lose data!
>
> So, for example, in a Qualisign, where the relation between R and DO is in
> a mode of Firstness - and the result is a 'feeling of heat'.this
> particular triad hasn't picked up that the feeling of heat comes from a
> red-hot stove burner.
>
> Edwina
>
>

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Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Edwina, Helmut, List:

It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is an
expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's
writings.

An example of Edwina coming across as having a "rigid box" is her
insistence on always treating 1ns/2ns/3ns as "categorical modes,"
regardless of the context.  Peirce makes much broader use of them,
beginning in phenomenology where we find "the purest conceptions" of them
as "quality, reaction, and mediation" (CP 1.530, 1903).  He even suggests
that "it is not right to call these categories conceptions; they are so
intangible that they are rather tones or tints upon conceptions" (CP 1.353,
1885).  In mathematics and logic, they correspond to
valencies--monadic/dyadic/triadic--and this is how they can be applied in
semeiotic to the sign as 1ns, the object as 2ns, and the interpretant as
3ns.  While all three correlates are *monadic* in themselves, the object is
in a *dyadic *relation with the sign regardless of whether the latter ever
actually determines an interpretant, while the interpretant is necessarily
in a *triadic *relation with both the object and the sign.

Put another way, the sign is the *first *correlate of the genuine triadic
relation of *representing*, because it is what *does *the representing; the
object is the *second *correlate, because it is *that which* the sign
represents; and the interpretant is the *third *correlate, because it is *that
to which* the sign represents the object.  With this in mind, I am puzzled
by the claim that "the modal categories refer to the relationships not the
monadic characters."  As the following passage by Peirce states plainly,
the first trichotomy of his 1903 taxonomy is not for any *relationship*,
but rather for the sign *in itself* as a monadic correlate.  Instead, the
third dyadic relationship involved in the overall triadic relationship is
that between the object and the interpretant, which does not have its own
separate trichotomy because (as Helmut already noted) it is the *same
*relationship
as the one between the object and the sign.

CSP:  A *Representamen *is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the
Second Correlate being termed its *Object*, and the possible Third
Correlate being termed its *Interpretant*, by which triadic relation the
possible Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of *the same
triadic relation to the same Object*, and for some possible Interpretant.
A *Sign *is a Representamen of which some Interpretant is a cognition of a
mind. Signs are the only representamens that have been much studied.
Signs are divisible by three trichotomies: first, according as *the sign in
itself* is a mere quality, is an actual existent, or is a general law;
secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its Object consists in
the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation
to that Object, or in its relation to an Interpretant; thirdly, according
as its Interpretant represents it as a sign of possibility, or as a sign of
fact, or a sign of reason.(CP 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903, bold added)


I am also puzzled by the statement, "I don't see that the 'three universes
of experience' are the same as the 'three modal categories'."  Peirce
discusses "three universes of experience" in "A Neglected Argument for the
Reality of God" (CP 6.455, EP 2:435, 1908), but I assume that Edwina
instead has in mind the "three Universes, which are distinguished by three
Modalities of Being"--namely, possibles, existents, and necessitants (EP
2:478-479, 1908).  Peirce goes on to divide *all ten* of his later
trichotomies--six for monadic correlates, three for dyadic relations, and
one for the triadic relation--into these three universes, including the
same three from 1903, so they evidently match up *directly *with the
"categorical modes."

Regarding a triangle vs. "umbrella spokes" as alternative diagrams, I
consider both to be potentially misleading.  The triangle is less
objectionable if its three sides are arrows pointing from the object to the
sign, from the sign to the interpretant, and from the object to the
interpretant, especially if the last of these is dashed rather than solid.
These then represent the dyadic relations of *determination*--the object
determines the sign to determine the interpretant.  Three spokes wrongly
imply teridentity (CP 4.406, 1903), such that the sign, object, and
interpretant would be different abstract qualities of a single concrete
thing.  I personally prefer existential graphs like those attached; the top
one is the basic relation of mediating, the middle one incorporates the two
relations of determining, and the bottom one shows the process of
semeiosis producing a series of interpretants with the same object.

Finally, I reiterate that the only distinction Peirce ever makes between a
sign and a representamen is quoted above and repeated later the same
year--"A *Sign *is a Representamen with a mental In

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Helmut, List:

Peirce did not go beyond what is labeled below as "level 4," with ten
trichotomies.  It is not "skipping levels" to obtain 28 sign classes from
six trichotomies and 66 sign classes from ten trichotomies, this is just
the mathematical result of applying the rule of determination to *any *number
of trichotomies logically arranged in a linear order.  N trichotomies
always produce (N+1)(N+2)/2 classes.

In my view, possible/existent/necessitant for the interpretants correspond
to emotional/energetic/logical, not intentional/effectual/communicational.
I just explained my understanding of the latter interpretants in the other
thread.  Peirce explicitly divides each of immediate/dynamical/final into
possible/existent/necessitant, so they cannot be the same trichotomy.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 8:33 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Suppsupplement: For me, intentional/effectual/communicational seems a
> quite fundamental and easy-to-understand distinction, more easy than
> immediate/dynamic/final (interpretant). But I do not see an identity:
> Intention is not always conveyed correctly by the sign, and final
> interpretant has truth-, and completeness- values assigned to it, while a
> communication not necessarily is true and complete.
> Possible/existent/necessitant I think, fits better to
> immediate/dynamic/final.
>
> But all this is just 3d-level-10-trichotomies. I have not understood now,
> how the skips from 3d to 7th level (28 trichotomies), and from there to the
> 11th level (66 trichotomies) take place. But I will try to find out.
> Supplement: Is possible/existent/necessitant in case of interpretant the
> same as intentional/effectual/communicational ?
> Jon, List,
>
> Thank you! Interesting, that by this way of combining characters with
> relations between them also the numbers 10, 28, and 66 are met. I wonder
> why that is so.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
> 26. April 2020 um 03:41 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> Helmut, List:
>
> What is described below is not the "tree structure" that Peirce outlined
> in his Logic Notebook entry of November 1, 1909, but rather a variation of
> the podium diagram that Robert Marty proposed in his recent paper.  The
> first number indicates the correlate--sign (1), object (2), or interpretant
> (3).  The second number indicates "immediate" as a possibility internal to
> the sign (1), "dynamical" as an actuality external to the sign (2), or
> "final" as a conditional necessity (3).  The third number indicates
> correspondence to a monadic correlate (1), a dyadic relation (2), or a
> triadic relation (3).
>
> At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic
> relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant
> is the third correlate (3).  However, the second and third trichotomies of
> Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and
> interpretant *themselves*, but rather their *relations *with the sign (CP
> 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary
> R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent.  Arranging them
> logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP
> 2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs.
>
> At level 3, categorial analysis requires one sign (1.1) to have two
> objects (immediate=2.1, dynamical=2.2) and three interpretants
> (immediate=3.1, dynamical=3.2, final=3.3).  Dividing each of these six
> correlates (hexad) into possible/existent/necessitant (Edwina's "categorial
> modes" of 1ns/2ns/3ns), arranging them logically in a linear order (again,
> Robert and I only differ on which interpretants come fourth and sixth), and
> applying the rule of determination results in 28 classes of signs.
>
> At level 4, there are not three objects and six interpretants, but rather
> the same two objects and three interpretants, plus three dyadic relations
> (including the two from the 1903 taxonomy) and one triadic relation,
> yielding Peirce's ten trichotomies--S (1.1.1), Oi (2.1.1), Od (2.2.1), Od-S
> (2.2.2), Ii (3.1.1), Id (3.2.1), S-Id (3.2.2), If, (3.3.1), S-If (3.3.2),
> and Od-S-If (3.3.3).  Dividing each of these into
> possible/existent/necessitant, arranging them logically in a linear order,
> and applying the rule of determination results in 66 classes of signs.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 1:09 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to
>> be applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three
>> interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where
>> you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and
>> so on:
>>
>> level
>> characters
>> num

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Fwd: an observation

Auke, List:

Thanks for confirming that Peirce identified *exactly three* interpretants
in the quoted passage.  As I already noted, both Johansen and the EP
editors align the intended or intentional interpretant with the immediate
interpretant, and the communicational interpretant with the final
interpretant, thus either implicitly or explicitly aligning the effectual
interpretant with the dynamical interpretant.  This last assignment is
pretty obvious, since at about the same time--every single quotation or
citation in this post is from 1906--Peirce elsewhere defines the dynamical
interpretant as "the actual effect of the Sign"; namely, "that which the
Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the
latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign" (CP 4.536).

The other two assignments happen to be precisely where I disagree with most
of the secondary literature, and I presented my reasoning on the List a
couple of years ago.  I now offer it again, but with some adjustments to
reflect my current views; believe it or not, I have changed my mind about
some things over time.  EP 2:555n2 implies that its listed associations are
all based on Peirce's Logic Notebook (R 339:412[275r], 414[276r],
422-425[283r-286r]), but it turns out that he never actually mentions the
intentional, effectual, and communicational interpretants *at all* in that
manuscript.  Fortunately, he does make some relevant remarks right after
briefly defining the normal, dynamic, and immediate interpretants.

CSP:  I have thus omitted the *intended* interpretant. So far as the
intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate
Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant
of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that* sign.
(R 339:414[276r])


Peirce thus explains the switch from "intended" on one page (275r
,
dated March 31) to "immediate" on the next (276r
,
dated April 2).  It was only a few weeks previously (March 9) that in a
letter to Lady Welby he had defined the intentional interpretant as "a
determination of the mind of the utterer" as quoted below.  Apparently he
realized that, as such, it obviously cannot be an interpretant of the sign
that the utterer is *currently* uttering; instead, it must be an
interpretant of a *previous* sign determined by the same dynamical object.
>From that standpoint, the intentional interpretant is another
*dynamical *interpretant--the
*antecedent* sign whose own dynamical interpretant is the sign now being
uttered.

On the other hand, a few months later (August 27) Peirce characterized two
of the ten divisions of signs as being "according to the *Purpose* of the
Eventual Interpretant" and "according to the Nature of the Influence the
Sign is *intended* to exert" (R 339:424[285r
];
emphases added).  The latter is the familiar trichotomy for the relation of
the sign to its *final* interpretant as rheme/dicisign/argument, here
crossed out and replaced with seme/pheme/delome.  In that sense, then, the
intentional interpretant is the *final *interpretant--the effect that the
utterer *intends *the sign to have on the interpreter, and thus the effect
that the sign *would *have on the interpreter under ideal circumstances.

As for the communicational interpretant, it is important to pay careful
attention to how Peirce describes the mind of which it is a determination.

CSP:  This mind may be called the *commens. *It consists of all that is,
and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the
outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function ...
Thus the Form conveyed is always a determination of the dynamical object of
the *commind.* (EP 2:478)


The essential ingredient of the utterer is the dynamical object, which
determines the sign; the essential ingredient of the interpreter is the
dynamical interpretant, which the sign determines; and the essential
ingredient of the commens is the sign itself, which welds the utterer and
interpreter into one quasi-mind (CP 4.551).  Put another way, the sign
serves as "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22) from the
dynamical object to the dynamical interpretant, both of which are *external*
to the sign itself.  However, any determination of the commens must be
*internal* to the sign.  Therefore, the communicational interpretant
is the *immediate
*interpretant, "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right
understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536).

Moreover, recall that Peirce's eventual names for the division according to
the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant are
hypothetic/categorical/relative, and that these correspond to the number of
lines of identity in a

Re: [PEIRCE-L] an observation

2020-04-26 Thread Jerry LR Chandler

> On Apr 26, 2020, at 5:39 PM, John F. Sowa  wrote:
> 
> Because in mathematics and logic, there is no double standard.  There is one 
> and only one absolutely precise criterion that determines whether or not two 
> expressions are exact translations of one another:  a formal proof.

I am not aware of any broadly accepted method that applies to all formal proofs 
for exact expressions as “translations".
I consider these two sentences to represent an unwarranted opinion.  
My experience forces me to conclude that the nature of proof is highly 
dependent on the selection of the lexical fields uses to compose propositions. 
And, I read CSP texts, on the trichotomies as emerging from the same scientific 
concerns intrinsic to the communicative capacities of various symbols systems. 

Gila Sher’s recent book, Epistemic Friction, An Essay on Knowledge, Truth and 
Logic, Oxford Univ Press, in Chapter 8 (Truth) and Chapter 10, An Outline of a 
Foundation for Logic develops a somewhat similar line of textual argumentation 
(that I concur with).  The important difference is that she addresses (very 
adroitly) the specific reasons that relate logical symbols to mathematical 
symbols.

One critical reason for the double standards used in mathematics/logic is the 
recent proactive introduction of the terms reflexive, symmetric and transitive 
as mathematical concepts.  The capacity for calculations can be placed in 
jeopardy when these three terms are used in mathematical / logical 
propositions. 

Cheers

Jerry 

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Re: Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - thanks for your reply - and that we can continue to
dialogue despite our differences!

As for the Platonic ideas, yes, I'm aware of those references in
Peirce, but I see the Platonic Form in two ways. First, in itself as
a triadic Sign, a pure Argument; ie, it's a purely intellectual
construct - the genuine pure 'mind'. So - it's not in Firstness but
Thirdness.

 And there is another concept, which might fit in with what Peirce
was talking about when he wrote " in reference to a sort of idea,
which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen". Using
this term of 'ground', I'd compare it with some modern research in
physics, biology, AI, etc - where it's called the 'basin of
attraction' ,which is understood as a critical point or site in a
dynamic complex system which functions as an attractor, as almost a
fixed point of attractionwhere input data moves toward this
attractor and bonds to it [we can understand the attractor as the
action-of-forming-habits]. I can certainly see this 'Platonic idea'
within this analysis! But I'd still see this 'attractor' as
functioning within a mode of Thirdness. 

My use of the terms 'input/output' etc are hardly mechanistic but
fit into the research world of AI and of course, in biology. I'd say
that 60% of the conference papers I gave over the past years have
been within the AI community - and to introduce Peircean concepts -
which are very functional in that area - it is best to use their
vocabulary. As for biosemiotics - certainly, the terms are used in
understanding how cells gather and integrate input information and
transform it into their own identity and their interactions. I've
used the terms in societal analysis as well - again, for the reason
that introducing the Peircean concepts is best achieved, I feel, by
using the terminology that people are familiar with. 

As for who has picked up those terms just from me - - I've no idea,
since I never bother to check up on people who have read or
referenced my work. 

Edwina
 On Sun 26/04/20  5:41 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List,
 Edwina wrote: Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out
and read it more thoroughly.//  But I'm not sure if it will change my
mind! I don't, for example, understand Firstness as comparable to the
Platonic idea.
 Thank you for considering reading my paper, Edwina. As for changing
your mind, well, I don't expect to do that in any significant way on
topics we've discussed in the past. 
 However, as to how Peirce uses the expression "Platonic idea," well
maybe, just maybe, I can make a little headway in that. Well, at most
a dent. OK, a dimple :-) But it will take more time than I've
available this weekend, so this will be the briefest of sketches.
 Suffice it to say for starters that, as Joe Ransdell and many others
have argued, Peirce was  not a Platonist; and I certainly agree. He
was, rather, and as he explicitly saw himself, principally
Aristotelian in his basic philosophical outlook, that is, he saw
himself as essentially a scientist and logician, and he deplored
Platonism in pretty much all its forms as nominalistic. 
 Parenthetically, Joe also argued, well I think, that there were deep
Socratic veins in Peirce's philosophy: the  dialogic aspect of it, so
crucial to his notion of a scientific community. See: Ransdell's
paper: "Sciences as Communicational
Communities"https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHYSICS.HTM
[1]
 But that's a topic for another time; and it should go without saying
that "Socratic" in Joe's sense is not "Platonic" in the nominalist's
sense. 
 Yet, in various places in his work in semeiotic as well as in
mathematics and metaphysics, Peirce used the expression "Platonic
idea" in a particular, one might even say 'peculiar', way given his
general distaste for Platonism. For example, takes this passage: 
  CSP: The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that
object, not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea,
which I have sometimes called the ground of the representamen. "Idea"
is here to be understood in a sort of Platonic sense. . . (CP 2.228,
in a fragment dated c. 1887).
  GR: And he not infrequently comments, as in this snippet, to the
effect that there is a "Platonic world of pure forms with which
mathematics is always dealing" (CP 4.118). 
 GR: Also, in some of his late metaphysical musing he reflects that
from a certain "point of view we must suppose that the existing
universe, with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or
an arbitrary determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. .
." (CP 6.192)
 GR: So what I'm suggesting is, that as opposed to nominalistic
Platonism which he abhorred -- and whether or not you agree with any
of the particular ideas set forth in the snippets above -- that
Peirce had a specific us

Re: [PEIRCE-L] an observation

2020-04-26 Thread John F. Sowa




Jon,
The short answer to your question is "Always".   I
admit that you do not use those metalevel terms to describe what you're
doing, but your actions speak louder than your words.
JAS>  When
have I ever declared that my "conclusion is what Peirce
intended"?
In every debate, you use your slender thread of
quotations as the  primary and sometimes the only criterion for making a
decision.  You dismiss other quotations of Peirce as not valid for one
reason or another, and you don't consider the century of work after Peirce
as relevant. Peirce insisted on fallibilism, and his ideas were constantly
growing.  Note the tentative tone in his letters to Lady Welby.  Note the
many versions of his attempts to write something definitive.  His ideas
were never static, and he was constantly debating his positions with
himself and his colleagues. 

JAS> When have I ever described
my objective as "developing a definitive reconstruction of Peirce's
semeiotic"?
You don't describe it, but you act as if you have
such a reconstruction in mind.  When anybody suggests an alternative that
is different from the one you chose, you fight tooth and nail to defend
the one you had been considering.  
  JAS:  When have I ever
maintained that my "version [of semeiotic] is what Peirce
intended"?
When you post a barrage of quotations by Peirce that
you believe refute the position that the other person has proposed.  You
don't accept their quotations by Peirce, and you don't allow new evidence
from more recent developments that Peirce could not have known.
As
just one example, Peirce preferred the gospel by John the Evangelist (and
so do I).  Many theologians believe that there is strong evidence for the
equation Theos = Logos = Dharma = Tao (or Dao). For example, the
translation of the New Testament to Chinese uses 'Dao' as the translation
of  'Logos'.  One might quibble with that translation for various
reasons.  But to reject it out of hand is inexcusable.
JAS>
John's slides linked below are a good example of this, translating some of
Peirce's ideas into the concepts and terminology of modern logic.  Why is
such an approach acceptable for him in a conference presentation, but not
for me in an e-mail list 
discussion?   Again, *why the double
standard?
Because in mathematics and logic, there is no double
standard.  There is one and only one absolutely precise criterion that
determines whether or not two expressions are exact translations of one
another:  a formal proof.
Peirce was a mathematician from early
childhood and a logician from the age of 13.  For the first-order subset
of logic (Alpha and Beta graphs),  Peirce's algebraic notation of 1885 and
every version of EGs from 1897 to the end had formally precise
translations to one another.  They also had formally precise translations
to and from the FOL subsets of  Frege. Schroeder, Peano, Whitehead,
Russell...   When I say that two expressions are formally identical, I am
using the same criteria as Peirce and every logician  and mathematician
before and after.
Please read Peirce's low opinion of the reasoning
methods of metaphysicians and his recommendation that they adopt the
methods of mathematics.
John
Jon,The short answer to your question is "Always".   I admit that you do not use those metalevel terms to describe what you'r doing, but your actions speak louder than your words.JAS>  When have I ever declared that my "conclusion is what Peirce intended"?In every single argument, you use your slender thread of quotations as the  primary and sometimes the only criterion for making a decision.  You dismiss other quotations by Peirce as not valid for one reason or another, and you don't consider the century of work after Peirce as relevant.Peirce insisted on fallibilism, and his ideas were constantly growing.  Note the tentative tone in his letters to Lady Welby.  Note his many versions of his attempts to write something definitive.  His ideas were never static, and he was constantly debating his positions with himself and his colleagues.   Note his > When have I ever described my objective as "developin
 g a definitive> reconstruction of Peirce's semeiotic"?  When have I ever maintained that> my> "version [of semeiotic] is what Peirce intended"?  When have I ever> denied that my "conclusions are [my] own, not Peirce's"?  When have I ever> "construct[ed] a long thread of quotations ... and derive[d] some rigid> conclusion that [I] claim[] is what Peirce intended"?  Please provide> *specific> *quotes from me to back up *each *of these serious allegations. > Otherwise,> I request a retraction and an apology.> > On the contrary, I have explicitly acknowledged that my speculative> grammar> is *not *identical to Peirce's, and I have even pointed out some> *specific *differences--such> as abandoning the 66-sign taxonomy based on a linear ordering of the ten> trichotomies, as well as associating th
 e immediate object/interpretant> with> a type, the dynamical object/interpretant with a to

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-26 Thread Gary Richmond

Jon, Helmut, List,

Jon wrote:

JAS: At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic
relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant
is the third correlate (3).  However, *the second and third trichotomies of
Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and
interpretant **themselves, but rather their relations **with the sign* (CP
2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary
R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent.  Arranging them
logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP
2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs. [Emphasis added by
GR]

Thank you for your favorable response to my post. I was, however, a bit
taken aback by your "quibble" above that "the second and third trichotomies
of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object
and interpretant *themselves*, but rather their *relations *with the sign."

I was just about to furiously plunge into my CP and EP, esp. the former
which I recalled had sections titled something like "A Second Trichotomy"
and "A Third Trichotomy" where I was sure my analysis would be supported.
But then, a fraction of a moment later, I thought, of course Jon is right,
and that is why, for example, I "corrected" Peirce's "*Dicent* Indexical
Sinsign " to read "Dicent(*ic*) Indexical  Sinsign." For, indeed, the
adjectival form of the 2nd and 3rd trichotomies better shows their *relations
*to the sign when naming its class, the sign itself always expressed in a
noun.

So in describing trichotomic sign classes, although Peirce didn't
consistently do so, it seems better to characterize each sign -- as to the
2nd and 3rd trichotomies -- as iconic, indexical, or symbolic; and
rhematic, dicentic, or argumentative (although one never sees the very last
one, 'argumentative', for the obvious reason that only one of the 10
classes of signs *is* an Argument.

Indeed, it has been argued, correctly I think, that there are no pure
icons, indices, or symbols. The status of arguments, propositions, and
terms would seem to be somewhat more problematic until you consider that *as
*signs they are all legisigns.

I hope to have more to say in regard to your other recent posts, but won't
get to that today. Meanwhile, thanks for your correction.

Best,

Gary R

"Time is not a renewable resource." gnox

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*

Virus-free.
www.avg.com

<#m_-8133813589029369546_DAB4FAD8-2DD7-40BB-A1B8-4E2AA1F9FDF2>

On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 9:41 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Helmut, List:
>
> What is described below is not the "tree structure" that Peirce outlined
> in his Logic Notebook entry of November 1, 1909, but rather a variation of
> the podium diagram that Robert Marty proposed in his recent paper.  The
> first number indicates the correlate--sign (1), object (2), or interpretant
> (3).  The second number indicates "immediate" as a possibility internal to
> the sign (1), "dynamical" as an actuality external to the sign (2), or
> "final" as a conditional necessity (3).  The third number indicates
> correspondence to a monadic correlate (1), a dyadic relation (2), or a
> triadic relation (3).
>
> At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic
> relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant
> is the third correlate (3).  However, the second and third trichotomies of
> Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and
> interpretant *themselves*, but rather their *relations *with the sign (CP
> 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary
> R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent.  Arranging them
> logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP
> 2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs.
>
> At level 3, categorial analysis requires one sign (1.1) to have two
> objects (immediate=2.1, dynamical=2.2) and three interpretants
> (immediate=3.1, dynamical=3.2, final=3.3).  Dividing each of these six
> correlates (hexad) into possible/existent/necessitant (Edwina's "categorial
> modes" of 1ns/2ns/3ns), arranging them logically in a linear order (again,
> Robert and I only differ on which interpretants come fourth and sixth), and
> applying the rule of determination results in 28 classes of signs.
>
> At level 4, there are not three objects and six interpretants, but rather
> the same two objects and three interpretants, plus three dyadic relations
> (including the two from the 1903 taxonomy) and one triadic relation,
> yielding Peirce's ten

Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-26 Thread robert marty

Helmuth, Gary, list

1.   In response to Helmuth I wonder what tree structure he refers to since
there is not even a structure in his scheme. No relationship between levels
is defined and the levels themselves are not.

What Helmuth does is simply to consists simply of operating on sets of
n-tuples to make sets of (n+1)-tuples by applying the following rule:

X = {1,2,3}, to any n-tuple (xn 1.x,x2, ., xn) of Xn  we associate all
 (n+1)-tuples (x1,x2, ., xn, xn'1) of Xn+1 that check the condition xn+1
≤x


If we call T this operator we obtains, starting from the set {3} and the
arbitrary initial condition (posed by Helmuth)

T ({(3)} = {(1),(2),(3)}

and following

T({(1),(2),(3)} ) = {(1.1); (2.1), (2.2); (3,1). (3,2), (3,3)}

And so on

This is to show that Helmuth only makes sets and that there is no natural
tree. If there is no tree there is no tree problem ... Helmuth therefore
generates sets of possible n-adic signs.



2- On the other hand Jon wants to introduce bifurcations in the
continuation of the determinations of a decasign, what make up real
trees... I was able to show him that this is a lot of problems even though
I think it can be done ; because the freedom of researchers is limitless.
It remains to give meaning and usefulness to this epistemological adventure
which seems to me quite difficult although the adage "no pain, no gain" is
still valid ...



3- The bridge



However I am able to build a formal bridge between this way of obtaining
classes of n- signs and my algebraic formalization based on protosigns
which, I think, correspond well to the representamens of Peirce (but this
is another debate). Here's his diagram (in which I bold the "levels" and I
put in bold italic class numbers



*1* (3)   *1*

*2* (1), (2), (3)   *3*

   *3* (1.1); (2.1), (2.2); (3,1). (3,2), (3,3)   *6*

   *4* (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1), (2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1) (3.2.2).
(3.3.1), (3.3.2), (3.3.3)  *10*



The precision that Helmuth brings in his following message will help me a
lot to understand what is happening, that Gary's message illustrates also
and I also I am thinking on this occasion of the works of Priscila Farias
and Joao Queiroz (
https://www.academia.edu/557626/A_diagrammatic_approach_to_Peirces_classifications_of_signs?email_work_card=view-paper)
:



Helmuth  quote : "I *meant the composition of a triad of sign. I assume the
structure of the trees applies to composition, not classification. The 6,
10, 28, 66, or how many sign classes are class compositions (possible) at a
certain level of analysis."*



A remark on the first sentence that is valid only at level 4. The second
evokes a "tree structure" that does not seem to me to meet any definition.
However,  it has the merit of saying that this method does not concern the
 classifications, that is to say,  I think,  the relationships (called
affinities by Peirce) between classes of signs.

In fact what he calls "compositions" are protosigns (pure forms) with
forgetting the determinations and his method is a way to operate a
trichotomic machine as I do, but invisibly and forgetting the
determinations : the invisible hand ...  These classifications are implicit
in all diagrams produced in large quantities by researchers ;  because the
trichotomic machine operate within the back office, producing valid classes
of signs.

This is because in the definition of 1,542 which seems to be a widely
shared reference :

*"My definition of a representamen is as follow : A REPRESENTAMEN is a
subject of a triadic relationship TO a second, called its OBJECT, FOR a
third, called is INTERPRETANT, this triadic relationship being such that
the REPRESENTAMEN determines* * its interpretant to stand in the same
triadic relationship to the same object for some interpretant"*



there is only one determination mentioned. But I have shown a long time ago
that, from 1905, Peirce has incorporated in almost all its definitions the
fact that the object O determines the sign S which determines the
Interpretant I, so as to put I in relation to O. Formally this supports
this idea that it's the composition of these two determinations that create
the  triad.

My principle of explanation for proposing the construction of a bridge will
be:



Starting from triads that are represented  - following Peirce- by
triangles with
the categories in the corners I consider the oblique sides as
determinations, like this one for example, with an arrow of 3 to 2 and
other of 2 to 1 (that I can not or do not know how to do but that you can
imagine !).




   3  1




2



The bridge here it is:

I resume the suite of "compositions" by simply making a lag without impact
by starting at level 0 instead of level 1 (I change origin, they are
ordinals)

  *0 * (3)   *1*

*  1 * (1), (2), (3)   *3*

  *2 *(1.1); (2.1), (2.2); (3,1). (3,2), (3,3)   *6*

*  3*  (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1), (2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1) (3.2.2).
(3.3.1), (3

Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

2020-04-26 Thread Gary Richmond

Edwina, List,

Edwina wrote: Thanks for the paper, Gary - I'll have to print it out and
read it more thoroughly.// But I'm not sure if it will change my mind! I
don't, for example, understand Firstness as comparable to the Platonic idea.

Thank you for considering reading my paper, Edwina. As for changing your
mind, well, I don't expect to do that in any significant way on topics
we've discussed in the past.

However, as to how Peirce uses the expression "Platonic idea," well maybe,
just *maybe*, I can make a little headway in that. Well, at most a dent.
OK, a dimple :-) But it will take more time than I've available this
weekend, so this will be the briefest of sketches.

Suffice it to say for starters that, as Joe Ransdell and many others have
argued, Peirce was *not *a Platonist; and I certainly agree. He was,
rather, and as he explicitly saw himself, principally Aristotelian in his
basic philosophical outlook, that is, he saw himself as essentially a
scientist and logician, and he deplored Platonism in pretty much all its
forms as nominalistic.

Parenthetically, Joe also argued, well I think, that there were deep
Socratic veins in Peirce's philosophy: the *dialogic* aspect of it, so
crucial to his notion of a scientific community. See: Ransdell's paper:
"Sciences as Communicational Communities"
https://arisbe.sitehost.iu.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/ransdell/PHYSICS.HTM

But that's a topic for another time; and it should go without saying that
"Socratic" in Joe's sense is not "Platonic" in the nominalist's sense.

Yet, in various places in his work in semeiotic as well as in mathematics
and metaphysics, Peirce used the expression "Platonic idea" in a
particular, one might even say 'peculiar', way given his general distaste
for Platonism. For example, takes this passage:

CSP: The sign stands for something, its object. It stands for that object,
not in all respects, but in reference to a sort of idea, which I have
sometimes called the ground of the representamen. "Idea" is here to be
understood in a sort of Platonic sense. . . (CP 2.228, in a fragment dated
c. 1887).


GR: And he not infrequently comments, as in this snippet, to the effect
that there is a "Platonic world of pure forms with which mathematics is
always dealing" (CP 4.118).

GR: Also, in some of his late metaphysical musing he reflects that from a
certain "point of view we must suppose that the existing universe, with all
its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an arbitrary
determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world. . ." (CP 6.192)

GR: So what I'm suggesting is, that as opposed to nominalistic Platonism
which he abhorred -- and whether or not you agree with any of the
particular ideas set forth in the snippets above -- that Peirce had a
specific use for the term "Platonic idea" by which he means, as a technical
term suggest by the snippets above, the 'world' "of pure forms in which
mathematics" deals, the *qualisignific *and *iconic *in semeiotic, the
"ground" of a sign in his earliest semeiotic explorations, etc. One perhaps
it such ways can get a sense or an image of what Peirce means by a
"Platonic idea."

GR: Well, whether I've changed our mind in this matter at all, it's the way
I see it: Peirce was certainly not a Platonist, but used the term "Platonic
idea" in the special sense just described.

ET: And I simply don't see that representamen, can function in a mode of
Firstness, - other than as a qualisign -  where all three nodes/relations
are in the categorical mode of Firstness. Of the ten classes, this is the
only one where the representamen/sign is in that mode of Firstness.

GR: We will *never* agree on this, I am quite certain. I just argued it in
consideration of my table of trikons, so I won't repeat myself here. I will
only add for now that a Sign when seen as a *possibility*, which Peirce
will remark that it is, is an expression of 1ns as, almost immediately (so
to speak), will be its Interpretant Sign, etc., etc. A Sign is a
possibility, possibilities are 1nses, therefore. . .

ET: I don't see how the sign/representamen, which has an enormous 'Mind'
task to do in the semiosic process could 'add' information all on its own,
if it's just in that mode of Firstness….to produce and Interpretant in a
mode of Thirdness! That's adding a whole lot of energy/information! Where
does it get it from? // Usually, within the triadic semiosic process - the
output [Interpretant] has the same of less data/information than the input
[Object].

GR: This is something else we are likely never to agree upon. Your
input/output model has always seemed to me to be idiosyncratic.  Now
there's nothing inherently wrong with that, as Ben Udell has convinced me;
although I don't see other semeioticians -- including biosemioticians -- as
having picked up and employed your model (please correct me if I'm wrong).
Much more importantly, I consider it to be mechanistic/energetic (2ns) and
temporal, never fully semeiotic, that is, never ess

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Supplement: And if you ask: "What does a rhematic iconic qualisign consist of?", and the answer is "Rheme, icon, and qualisign", you might argue that now you are talking about a composition, but effectively the way of composition applies to all signs, so you really are talking about a special kind of this general composition, so about a class of composition, so about a class.

Edwina, List,

I think, if yoiu ask: "What kind of sign is it?", then you might get the answer: "A Qualisign", you regard the sign as class now, and in this respect there is no triadicity (but mostly degenerateness). But if you ask: "What is a sign (better: Sign or Sign triad) composed of?", then you get the answer: "Sign, object, interpretant", or "Sign itself (aka sign-sign-relation), sign-object-relation, and sign-interpretant relation", and you are talking about a composition. If you ask: "How many sign classes are there?", and the answer is "10", you are talking about a complete group, which is a composition.

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 17:32 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Helmut - Could you explain to me the difference between a Qualisign, which in a specific instance, is a 'feeling of heat' as a 'composition' vs a 'class' of such instances? Isn't the composition of this particular example - the same as it is in the 'class'?

I am aware that a 'class' would refer to ALL such instances where all three relations in the triad are in the category of Firstness, but, why do you seem to infer that ONE example of such a class means that one can't 'assign all three categorical modes'.

Sorry- but you've lost me on this!

Edwina

On Sun 26/04/20 11:22 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

sorry for my overlapping posts. I think for assigning all three categorial modes from a triad, this only works with compositions, not with classes. "rhematic iconic qualisign" is a class, 1-1-1. It is a class of a composition, but a class. A class is not a categorial triad. The groups of 10, 28, and 66 sign classes are compositions of classes of compositions, so compositions, and the complete triadicity applies to them (to these groups). "S-O-I" too is a composition, also "SS-SO-SI". To both the complete triadicity applies, due to the level consisting of 3, 6, 10, 15,...28...66... completely triadic characters.

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 17:02 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Helmut - no, in my view, the object - which to be accurate, should better be referred to as the DO [Dynamic Object] when it's in the triad - doesn't exist 'per se' - on its own.

It only 'exists' within that triadic interaction - and its nature when 'grabbed' so to speak, in that interaction is to provide input data which is transformed/mediated by the Representamen/sign and thus 'interpreted' as an Interpretant.

So- what is the categorical mode of the relation between the DO and the R? We see from the ten classes that it can be in any of the three modal categories. Three of the ten have the input from the DO in a mode of Firstness; four are in a mode of Secondness and three in a mode of Thirdness. That is - the interaction between the Representamen and the DO can lose data!

So, for example, in a Qualisign, where the relation between R and DO is in a mode of Firstness - and the result is a 'feeling of heat'.this particular triad hasn't picked up that the feeling of heat comes from a red-hot stove burner.

Edwina

On Sun 26/04/20 10:52 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

Although I see, that it is necessary to speak clearly, I think, saying, that e.g. the sign-object-relation is 2ns, then the object is not, must not be correct. All in all the object is only an object, when a sign denotes it as such. Before it only is some thing or entity. The interpretant too does not exist without the sign. So the sign not only mediates between the object and the interpretant, but also sort of creates both, isnt it so? So the object as such implies the relation between itself and the sign. So, if the sign-object-relation is 2ns, the object might well also be, or not?

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might be haphazard comments..as I read through

1] Again- I have trouble with accepting your position that the three 'elements' of the triadic sign: are 'in' a particular categorical mode; namely; the representamen/sign in the mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns.

As Peirce notes: "Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic relationships and three monadic characters" 6.331. My view is that the modal categories refer to the relationships not the monadic characters. And "Signs...are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject, and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connextion with the former" 6.344.

First - I happen to reject the triangle a

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 17:32 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Sorry- but you've lost me on this!

Edwina

On Sun 26/04/20 11:22 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 17:02 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Helmut - no, in my view, the object - which to be accurate, should better be referred to as the DO [Dynamic Object] when it's in the triad - doesn't exist 'per se' - on its own.

Edwina

On Sun 26/04/20 10:52 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might be haphazard comments..as I read through

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

 

Helmut - Could you explain to me the difference between a Qualisign,
which in a specific instance, is a 'feeling of heat' as a
'composition' vs a 'class' of such instances? Isn't the composition
of this particular example - the same as it is in the 'class'?

I am aware that a 'class' would refer to ALL such instances where
all three relations in the triad are in the category of Firstness,
but, why do you seem to infer that ONE example of such a class means
that one can't 'assign all three categorical modes'. 

Sorry- but you've lost me on this!

Edwina
 On Sun 26/04/20 11:22 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 Edwina, List,   sorry for my overlapping posts. I think for
assigning all three categorial modes from a triad, this only works
with compositions, not with classes. "rhematic iconic qualisign" is a
class, 1-1-1. It is a class of a composition, but a class. A class is
not a categorial triad. The groups of 10, 28, and 66 sign classes are
compositions of classes of compositions, so compositions, and the
complete triadicity applies to them (to these groups). "S-O-I" too is
a composition, also "SS-SO-SI". To both the complete triadicity
applies, due to the level consisting of 3, 6, 10, 15,...28...66...
completely triadic characters.   Best, Helmut  26. April 2020 um
17:02 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

Helmut - no, in my view, the object - which to be accurate, should
better be referred to as the DO [Dynamic Object] when it's in the
triad - doesn't exist 'per se' - on its own. 

It only 'exists' within that triadic interaction - and its nature
when 'grabbed' so to speak,  in that interaction is to provide input
data which is transformed/mediated by the Representamen/sign and thus
'interpreted' as an Interpretant. 

So- what is the categorical mode of the relation between the DO and
the R? We see from the ten classes that it can be in any of the three
modal categories. Three of the ten have the input from the DO in a
mode of Firstness; four are in a mode of Secondness and three in a
mode of Thirdness. That is - the interaction between the
Representamen and the DO can lose data! 

So, for example, in a Qualisign, where the relation between R and DO
is in a mode of Firstness - and the result is a 'feeling of
heat'.this particular triad hasn't picked up that the feeling of
heat comes from a red-hot stove burner. 

Edwina 
 On Sun 26/04/20 10:52 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:  
Edwina, List,   Although I see, that it is necessary to speak clearly,
I think, saying, that e.g. the sign-object-relation is 2ns, then the
object is not, must not be correct. All in all the object is only an
object, when a sign denotes it as such. Before it only is some thing
or entity. The interpretant too does not exist without the sign. So
the sign not only mediates between the object and the interpretant,
but also sort of creates both, isnt it so? So the object as such
implies the relation between itself and the sign. So, if the
sign-object-relation is 2ns, the object might well also be, or not?  
Best, Helmut  26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky"
 wrote:  

  Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might
be haphazard comments..as I read through 

1] Again- I have trouble with accepting your position that the three
'elements' of the triadic sign: are 'in' a particular categorical
mode; namely; the representamen/sign in the mode of 1ns, the object
in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns. 

As Peirce notes: "Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic 
relationships and three monadic characters" 6.331. My view is that
the modal categories refer to the relationships not the monadic
characters. And "Signs...are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject,
and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connextion
with the former" 6.344. 

First - I happen to reject the triangle as the image of the Peircean
triad. I prefer the 'umbrella spokes (1.347) for the reason that I see
the Peircean semiosis as a dynamic, active, ever-interactive and
expanding network, where there is no such thing as a 'static triad'
but instead, our world consists of a constantly interactive
'mind-as-matter' where triads form as expressions of this
'mind-as-matter within interactions with other triads...and the
'elements' in these triads themselves take on different functions in
these interactions. A DI [dynamic interpretant] can be a DO [dynamic
object] in another interaction. 

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function
as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new
identity as a Dynamic Object. 

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation,
evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality
as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice 

2] I  don't see how the moda

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Sorry, my last sentence should be: "...completely triadically arranged characters". The single characters are not triadic, as they are mostly degenerate, because they are sort of classes again.

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 17:02 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Helmut - no, in my view, the object - which to be accurate, should better be referred to as the DO [Dynamic Object] when it's in the triad - doesn't exist 'per se' - on its own.

Edwina

On Sun 26/04/20 10:52 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might be haphazard comments..as I read through

First - I happen to reject the triangle as the image of the Peircean triad. I prefer the 'umbrella spokes (1.347) for the reason that I see the Peircean semiosis as a dynamic, active, ever-interactive and expanding network, where there is no such thing as a 'static triad' but instead, our world consists of a constantly interactive 'mind-as-matter' where triads form as expressions of this 'mind-as-matter within interactions with other triads...and the 'elements' in these triads themselves take on different functions in these interactions. A DI [dynamic interpretant] can be a DO [dynamic object] in another interaction.

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new identity as a Dynamic Object.

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation, evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice

2] I don't see how the modal categories, which refer to the form/nature/organization of the relations between the three 'elements/monads' of the triad can be used to identity the/monads themselves. That's a key 'sticking point' to my understanding of your analysis.

That is - I don't see that the 'three universes of experience' are the same as the 'three modal categories'.

3] Therefore - I don't see how the mediative process of the representamen/sign is 'basically' in a categorical mode of 1ns- when its function as mediation is to 'establish connections', to transform

Aw: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 17:02 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Helmut - no, in my view, the object - which to be accurate, should better be referred to as the DO [Dynamic Object] when it's in the triad - doesn't exist 'per se' - on its own.

Edwina

On Sun 26/04/20 10:52 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might be haphazard comments..as I read through

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new identity as a Dynamic Object.

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation, evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice

That is - I don't see that the 'three universes of experience' are the same as the 'three modal categories'.

3] Therefore - I don't see how the mediative process of the representamen/sign is 'basically' in a categorical mode of 1ns- when its function as mediation is to 'establish connections', to transform input data into 'output meaning' so to speak. Firstness has no capacity to do this.

I think that your concept that Firstness is comparable to Platonic Forms/Ideas is different from Peirce's description of Fi

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

 

Helmut - I think one has to be very careful what we mean by 'sign'.
Are we referring to the triad [which I capitalize as Sign] or to the
mediative process [which I, to differentiate, refer to as the
representamen].

The Interpretant can become a DO - in triadic interaction within
another triad. It's knowledge/information content can affect the
representamen, causing that monad to change its habits. 

I wouldn't say that the new triad always refers to the same object.
It could - having increased its knowledge base within the
Representamen such that one understands the object better than
before.  It could also connect to other DOs. bringing the information
with it, within the R,  to make one understand these other objects
better.

Edwina
 On Sun 26/04/20 11:08 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
Supplement: This view seems problematic, because when the
interpretant becomes a sign again, this new sign refers to the same
object. But I would say, it reconstructs the object. This
new-but-same object is same with the old one, but not identical: At
least the immediate object has probably changed. With a physical
sign, the dynamical object probably too. If people go to sleep and
restart their conversation next morning, the object has not existed
while they were sleeping (lest they dreamt of it), but is
reconstructed in the morning. Not so?   Edwina, List, Although I
see, that it is necessary to speak clearly, I think, saying, that
e.g. the sign-object-relation is 2ns, then the object is not, must
not be correct. All in all the object is only an object, when a sign
denotes it as such. Before it only is some thing or entity. The
interpretant too does not exist without the sign. So the sign not
only mediates between the object and the interpretant, but also sort
of creates both, isnt it so? So the object as such implies the
relation between itself and the sign. So, if the sign-object-relation
is 2ns, the object might well also be, or not?   Best, Helmut  26.
April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

  Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might
be haphazard comments..as I read through 

1] Again- I have trouble with accepting your position that the three
'elements' of the triadic sign: are 'in' a particular categorical
mode; namely; the representamen/sign in the mode of 1ns, the object
in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns. 

As Peirce notes: "Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic 
relationships and three monadic characters" 6.331. My view is that
the modal categories refer to the relationships not the monadic
characters. And "Signs...are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject,
and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connextion
with the former" 6.344. 

First - I happen to reject the triangle as the image of the Peircean
triad. I prefer the 'umbrella spokes (1.347) for the reason that I see
the Peircean semiosis as a dynamic, active, ever-interactive and
expanding network, where there is no such thing as a 'static triad'
but instead, our world consists of a constantly interactive
'mind-as-matter' where triads form as expressions of this
'mind-as-matter within interactions with other triads...and the
'elements' in these triads themselves take on different functions in
these interactions. A DI [dynamic interpretant] can be a DO [dynamic
object] in another interaction. 

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function
as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new
identity as a Dynamic Object. 

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation,
evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality
as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice 

2] I  don't see how the modal categories, which refer to the
form/nature/organization of the relations between the three
'elements/monads' of the triad can be used to identity the/monads
themselves. That's a key 'sticking point' to my understanding of your
analysis. 

That is - I don't see that the 'three universes of experience' are
the same as the 'three modal categories'. 

3] Therefore - I don't see how the mediative process of the
representamen/sign is 'basically' in a categorical mode of 1ns- when
its function as mediation is to 'establish connections', to 
transform input data into 'output meaning' so to speak. Firstness has
no capacity to do this. 

I think that your concept that Firstness is comparable to Platonic
Forms/Ideas is different from Peirce's description of Firstness.
--which is 'without reference to anything else'. The Platonic Forms
to my understanding are abstract while Peircean Firstness is a
'positive', ie, not an intellectual experience. Now, if we understand
the first 'universe of experience to consist of "all mere Ideas, those
airy nothings to which the mind of poet,  pure math

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Supplement: This view seems problematic, because when the interpretant becomes a sign again, this new sign refers to the same object. But I would say, it reconstructs the object. This new-but-same object is same with the old one, but not identical: At least the immediate object has probably changed. With a physical sign, the dynamical object probably too. If people go to sleep and restart their conversation next morning, the object has not existed while they were sleeping (lest they dreamt of it), but is reconstructed in the morning. Not so?

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might be haphazard comments..as I read through

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new identity as a Dynamic Object.

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation, evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice

That is - I don't see that the 'three universes of experience' are the same as the 'three modal categories'.

I think that your concept that Firstness is comparable to Platonic Forms/Ideas is different from Peirce's description of Firstness. --which is 'without reference to anything else'. The Platonic Forms to my understanding are abstract while Peircean Firstness is a 'positive', ie, not an intellectual experience. Now, if we understand the first 'universe of experience to consist of "all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local habitation...Their very airy-nothingness etc 6.455. But this experience, to me, is a result of a semiosic triad; it's within the realm of the Interpretants - and is not the same as the modal category of Firstness, which is ' immediate consciousness' 1.361, or spontaneity or chance or 'freedom ..a 'quality of feeling' 5.66, 'total feeling 1.531.

4] Then - since I see the triad as in constant movement; with a DI becoming a DO; with the mediation itself constantly changing - then, I don't understand how one can define the triad's categorical nature so firmly! My view of the categories is that they refer only to interactions between 'elements' ; not to the elements themselves.

Re: Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

 

Helmut - no, in my view, the object - which to be accurate, should
better be referred to as the DO [Dynamic Object] when it's in the
triad - doesn't exist 'per se' - on its own. 

It only 'exists' within that triadic interaction - and its nature
when 'grabbed' so to speak,  in that interaction is to provide input
data which is transformed/mediated by the Representamen/sign and thus
'interpreted' as an Interpretant. 

So- what is the categorical mode of the relation between the DO and
the R? We see from the ten classes that it can be in any of the three
modal categories. Three of the ten have the input from the DO in a
mode of Firstness; four are in a mode of Secondness and three in a
mode of Thirdness. That is - the interaction between the
Representamen and the DO can lose data! 

So, for example, in a Qualisign, where the relation between R and DO
is in a mode of Firstness - and the result is a 'feeling of
heat'.this particular triad hasn't picked up that the feeling of
heat comes from a red-hot stove burner. 

Edwina
 On Sun 26/04/20 10:52 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 Edwina, List,   Although I see, that it is necessary to speak
clearly, I think, saying, that e.g. the sign-object-relation is 2ns,
then the object is not, must not be correct. All in all the object is
only an object, when a sign denotes it as such. Before it only is some
thing or entity. The interpretant too does not exist without the sign.
So the sign not only mediates between the object and the interpretant,
but also sort of creates both, isnt it so? So the object as such
implies the relation between itself and the sign. So, if the
sign-object-relation is 2ns, the object might well also be, or not?  
Best, Helmut  26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

  Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might
be haphazard comments..as I read through 

1] Again- I have trouble with accepting your position that the three
'elements' of the triadic sign: are 'in' a particular categorical
mode; namely; the representamen/sign in the mode of 1ns, the object
in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns. 

As Peirce notes: "Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic 
relationships and three monadic characters" 6.331. My view is that
the modal categories refer to the relationships not the monadic
characters. And "Signs...are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject,
and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connextion
with the former" 6.344. 

First - I happen to reject the triangle as the image of the Peircean
triad. I prefer the 'umbrella spokes (1.347) for the reason that I see
the Peircean semiosis as a dynamic, active, ever-interactive and
expanding network, where there is no such thing as a 'static triad'
but instead, our world consists of a constantly interactive
'mind-as-matter' where triads form as expressions of this
'mind-as-matter within interactions with other triads...and the
'elements' in these triads themselves take on different functions in
these interactions. A DI [dynamic interpretant] can be a DO [dynamic
object] in another interaction. 

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function
as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new
identity as a Dynamic Object. 

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation,
evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality
as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice 

2] I  don't see how the modal categories, which refer to the
form/nature/organization of the relations between the three
'elements/monads' of the triad can be used to identity the/monads
themselves. That's a key 'sticking point' to my understanding of your
analysis. 

That is - I don't see that the 'three universes of experience' are
the same as the 'three modal categories'. 

3] Therefore - I don't see how the mediative process of the
representamen/sign is 'basically' in a categorical mode of 1ns- when
its function as mediation is to 'establish connections', to 
transform input data into 'output meaning' so to speak. Firstness has
no capacity to do this. 

I think that your concept that Firstness is comparable to Platonic
Forms/Ideas is different from Peirce's description of Firstness.
--which is 'without reference to anything else'. The Platonic Forms
to my understanding are abstract while Peircean Firstness is a
'positive', ie, not an intellectual experience. Now, if we understand
the first 'universe of experience to consist of "all mere Ideas, those
airy nothings to which the mind of poet,  pure mathematician, or
another might give local habitation...Their very airy-nothingness
etc 6.455.  But this experience, to me, is a  result of a semiosic
triad; it's within the realm of the Interpretants - and is not the
same as the modal category of Firstness,

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

Edwina, List,

Best,

Helmut

26. April 2020 um 15:57 Uhr
"Edwina Taborsky"
wrote:

Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might be haphazard comments..as I read through

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new identity as a Dynamic Object.

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation, evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice

That is - I don't see that the 'three universes of experience' are the same as the 'three modal categories'.

5] I do, however, understand your argument in your paper - where you view the 'universal categories' as somehow different in nature from the 'existential categories'. I agree with this difference - but it seems to me that you merge the two...That is, I see the universes as referring to my experience of a whole triad; not to just one of the monadic elements of the triad.

That's where it's at - at the moment. We are still apart in our views [no problem with that, of course].

Edwina

On Sat 25/04/20 5:07 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:

Helmut, Edwina, List,

Helmut asked: (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?)

And Edwina responded:

I certainly don't agree that the sign/represen

Re: Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R - I'll continue with my comments on your post...these might
be haphazard comments..as I read through 

1] Again- I have trouble with accepting your position that the three
'elements' of the triadic sign: are 'in' a particular categorical
mode; namely; the representamen/sign in the mode of 1ns, the object
in 2ns, the interpretant in 3ns.

As Peirce notes: "Every triadic relationship involves three dyadic 
relationships and three monadic characters" 6.331. My view is that
the modal categories refer to the relationships not the monadic
characters. And "Signs...are triadic; since a sign denotes a subject,
and signifies a form of fact, which latter it brings into connextion
with the former" 6.344. 

First - I happen to reject the triangle as the image of the Peircean
triad. I prefer the 'umbrella spokes (1.347) for the reason that I see
the Peircean semiosis as a dynamic, active, ever-interactive and
expanding network, where there is no such thing as a 'static triad'
but instead, our world consists of a constantly interactive
'mind-as-matter' where triads form as expressions of this
'mind-as-matter within interactions with other triads...and the
'elements' in these triads themselves take on different functions in
these interactions. A DI [dynamic interpretant] can be a DO [dynamic
object] in another interaction. 

This means that at one second, a Dynamic Interpretant can function
as such; and yet, can be connecting with another triad in a new
identity as a Dynamic Object. 

And - the agenda is to enable expansion of complexity, adaptation,
evolution. I think the closed triangle doesn't 'imagize' this reality
as well as the spokes'. But that's a matter of choice

2] I  don't see how the modal categories, which refer to the
form/nature/organization of the relations between the three
'elements/monads' of the triad can be used to identity the/monads
themselves. That's a key 'sticking point' to my understanding of your
analysis. 

That is - I don't see that the 'three universes of experience' are
the same as the 'three modal categories'. 

3] Therefore - I don't see how the mediative process of the
representamen/sign is 'basically' in a categorical mode of 1ns- when
its function as mediation is to 'establish connections', to 
transform input data into 'output meaning' so to speak. Firstness has
no capacity to do this.

I think that your concept that Firstness is comparable to Platonic
Forms/Ideas is different from Peirce's description of Firstness.
--which is 'without reference to anything else'. The Platonic Forms
to my understanding are abstract while Peircean Firstness is a
'positive', ie, not an intellectual experience. Now, if we understand
the first 'universe of experience to consist of "all mere Ideas, those
airy nothings to which the mind of poet,  pure mathematician, or
another might give local habitation...Their very airy-nothingness
etc 6.455.  But this experience, to me, is a result of a semiosic
triad; it's within the realm of the Interpretants - and is not the
same as the modal category of Firstness, which is  ' immediate
consciousness' 1.361, or spontaneity or chance or 'freedom ..a
'quality of feeling' 5.66, 'total feeling 1.531. 

4] Then - since I see the triad as in constant movement; with a DI
becoming a DO; with the mediation itself constantly changing - then,
I don't understand how one can define the triad's categorical nature
so firmly! My view of the categories is that they refer only to
interactions between 'elements' ; not to the elements themselves. 

5] I do, however, understand your argument in your paper - where you
view the 'universal categories' as somehow different in nature from
the 'existential categories'.  I agree with this difference - but it
seems to me that you merge the two...That is, I see the universes as
referring to my experience of a whole triad; not to just one of the
monadic elements of the triad. 

That's where it's at - at the moment. We are still apart in our
views [no problem with that, of course].

Edwina
 On Sat 25/04/20  5:07 PM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Helmut, Edwina, List,
 Helmut asked: (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and
interpretant 3ns?)

And Edwina responded: 
I certainly don't agree that the sign/representamen is [always?] in
a categorical mode of 1ns, the object in 2ns, the interpretant in
3ns.

Do you mean the order of the semiosic process? This has nothing to
do with the categories, for, as Peirce outlined in the ten classes,
the triadic 'nodes' can be in any of the modal categories.  How about
a Sign in 1-1-1, a rhematic iconic qualisgin, where all three nodes
are in a mode of 1ns?Edwina and I have disagreed on this matter
forever, it would seem. I see things very differently than she does.
Consi

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

 

 
 



Suppsupplement: For me, intentional/effectual/communicational seems a quite fundamental and easy-to-understand distinction, more easy than immediate/dynamic/final (interpretant). But I do not see an identity: Intention is not always conveyed correctly by the sign, and final interpretant has truth-, and completeness- values assigned to it, while a communication not necessarily is true and complete.

 

Possible/existent/necessitant I think, fits better to immediate/dynamic/final.

 

But all this is just 3d-level-10-trichotomies. I have not understood now, how the skips from 3d to 7th level (28 trichotomies), and from there to the 11th level (66 trichotomies) take place. But I will try to find out.

 
 

Supplement: Is possible/existent/necessitant in case of interpretant the same as intentional/effectual/communicational ?



Jon, List,

 

Thank you! Interesting, that by this way of combining characters with relations between them also the numbers 10, 28, and 66 are met. I wonder why that is so.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

26. April 2020 um 03:41 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 



Helmut, List:

 

What is described below is not the "tree structure" that Peirce outlined in his Logic Notebook entry of November 1, 1909, but rather a variation of the podium diagram that Robert Marty proposed in his recent paper.  The first number indicates the correlate--sign (1), object (2), or interpretant (3).  The second number indicates "immediate" as a possibility internal to the sign (1), "dynamical" as an actuality external to the sign (2), or "final" as a conditional necessity (3).  The third number indicates correspondence to a monadic correlate (1), a dyadic relation (2), or a triadic relation (3).

 

 

At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant is the third correlate (3).  However, the second and third trichotomies of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and interpretant themselves, but rather their relations with the sign (CP 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent.  Arranging them logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP 2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs.

 

At level 3, categorial analysis requires one sign (1.1) to have two objects (immediate=2.1, dynamical=2.2) and three interpretants (immediate=3.1, dynamical=3.2, final=3.3).  Dividing each of these six correlates (hexad) into possible/existent/necessitant (Edwina's "categorial modes" of 1ns/2ns/3ns), arranging them logically in a linear order (again, Robert and I only differ on which interpretants come fourth and sixth), and applying the rule of determination results in 28 classes of signs.

 

At level 4, there are not three objects and six interpretants, but rather the same two objects and three interpretants, plus three dyadic relations (including the two from the 1903 taxonomy) and one triadic relation, yielding Peirce's ten trichotomies--S (1.1.1), Oi (2.1.1), Od (2.2.1), Od-S (2.2.2), Ii (3.1.1), Id (3.2.1), S-Id (3.2.2), If, (3.3.1), S-If (3.3.2), and Od-S-If (3.3.3).  Dividing each of these into possible/existent/necessitant, arranging them logically in a linear order, and applying the rule of determination results in 66 classes of signs.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 1:09 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




List,

 

I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and so on:

 

level  characters                                              number of characters

 

1   (3)                                                    1

2  (1);(2);(3)                                                  3

3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2); (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)                                                  6

4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2); (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)    10

 

The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at level 11 you have 66.

 

Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) thi

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure

 

 
 

Supplement: Is possible/existent/necessitant in case of interpretant the same as intentional/effectual/communicational ?



Jon, List,

 

Thank you! Interesting, that by this way of combining characters with relations between them also the numbers 10, 28, and 66 are met. I wonder why that is so.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

26. April 2020 um 03:41 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 



Helmut, List:

 

What is described below is not the "tree structure" that Peirce outlined in his Logic Notebook entry of November 1, 1909, but rather a variation of the podium diagram that Robert Marty proposed in his recent paper.  The first number indicates the correlate--sign (1), object (2), or interpretant (3).  The second number indicates "immediate" as a possibility internal to the sign (1), "dynamical" as an actuality external to the sign (2), or "final" as a conditional necessity (3).  The third number indicates correspondence to a monadic correlate (1), a dyadic relation (2), or a triadic relation (3).

 

 

At level 2, the sign is the first correlate (1) of a genuine triadic relation, while the object is the second correlate (2) and the interpretant is the third correlate (3).  However, the second and third trichotomies of Peirce's famous 1903 taxonomy are not divisions according to the object and interpretant themselves, but rather their relations with the sign (CP 2.242-243, EP 2:290-291, 1903); this is my only quibble with Gary R.'s response earlier today, which is otherwise excellent.  Arranging them logically in a linear order and applying the rule of determination (EP 2:481,1908) results in the familiar 10 classes of signs.

 

At level 3, categorial analysis requires one sign (1.1) to have two objects (immediate=2.1, dynamical=2.2) and three interpretants (immediate=3.1, dynamical=3.2, final=3.3).  Dividing each of these six correlates (hexad) into possible/existent/necessitant (Edwina's "categorial modes" of 1ns/2ns/3ns), arranging them logically in a linear order (again, Robert and I only differ on which interpretants come fourth and sixth), and applying the rule of determination results in 28 classes of signs.

 

At level 4, there are not three objects and six interpretants, but rather the same two objects and three interpretants, plus three dyadic relations (including the two from the 1903 taxonomy) and one triadic relation, yielding Peirce's ten trichotomies--S (1.1.1), Oi (2.1.1), Od (2.2.1), Od-S (2.2.2), Ii (3.1.1), Id (3.2.1), S-Id (3.2.2), If, (3.3.1), S-If (3.3.2), and Od-S-If (3.3.3).  Dividing each of these into possible/existent/necessitant, arranging them logically in a linear order, and applying the rule of determination results in 66 classes of signs.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 1:09 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




List,

 

I still do not understand, why the tree-structure should not be able to be applied to the sign characters, meaning, there are more than three interpretants due to the level of analysis. Starting from level 1, where you have one class/character, a thirdness, on level two you have three, and so on:

 

level  characters                                              number of characters

 

1   (3)                                                    1

2  (1);(2);(3)                                                  3

3  (1.1); (2.1),(2.2); (3.1).(3.2),(3.3)                                                  6

4 (1.1.1); (2.1.1); (2.2.1),(2.2.2); (3.1.1); (3.2.1).(3.2.2); (3.3.1),(3.3.2),(3.3.3)    10

 

The number of classes/characters is the former number of characters plus the number of the new level. At level 7 you have 28 characters, and at level 11 you have 66.

 

Apart from sign classes and sign characters (is it agreed now, that sign is 1ns, object 2ns, and interpretant 3ns?) this tree-structure according to Peirce also applies for consciousness (Primisense, Altersense, Medisense), analysed by him up to the 3d level.

 

This eternal tree-structure should be possible to apply to all things that underly the categories, otherwise the categories would not be categorical, and thus not categories, I think.

 

Best,

Helmut





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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: tree-structure