Auke, List: Thanks for confirming that Peirce identified *exactly three* interpretants in the quoted passage. As I already noted, both Johansen and the EP editors align the intended or intentional interpretant with the immediate interpretant, and the communicational interpretant with the final interpretant, thus either implicitly or explicitly aligning the effectual interpretant with the dynamical interpretant. This last assignment is pretty obvious, since at about the same time--every single quotation or citation in this post is from 1906--Peirce elsewhere defines the dynamical interpretant as "the actual effect of the Sign"; namely, "that which the Sign produces in the Quasi-mind that is the Interpreter by determining the latter to a feeling, to an exertion, or to a Sign" (CP 4.536).
The other two assignments happen to be precisely where I disagree with most of the secondary literature, and I presented my reasoning on the List a couple of years ago. I now offer it again, but with some adjustments to reflect my current views; believe it or not, I have changed my mind about some things over time. EP 2:555n2 implies that its listed associations are all based on Peirce's Logic Notebook (R 339:412[275r], 414[276r], 422-425[283r-286r]), but it turns out that he never actually mentions the intentional, effectual, and communicational interpretants *at all* in that manuscript. Fortunately, he does make some relevant remarks right after briefly defining the normal, dynamic, and immediate interpretants. CSP: I have thus omitted the *intended* interpretant. So far as the intention is betrayed in the Sign, it belongs to the immediate Interpretant. So far as it is not so betrayed, it may be the Interpretant of *another* sign, but it is in no sense the interpretant of *that* sign. (R 339:414[276r]) Peirce thus explains the switch from "intended" on one page (275r <https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search&ref=13309>, dated March 31) to "immediate" on the next (276r <https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search&ref=13311>, dated April 2). It was only a few weeks previously (March 9) that in a letter to Lady Welby he had defined the intentional interpretant as "a determination of the mind of the utterer" as quoted below. Apparently he realized that, as such, it obviously cannot be an interpretant of the sign that the utterer is *currently* uttering; instead, it must be an interpretant of a *previous* sign determined by the same dynamical object. >From that standpoint, the intentional interpretant is another *dynamical *interpretant--the *antecedent* sign whose own dynamical interpretant is the sign now being uttered. On the other hand, a few months later (August 27) Peirce characterized two of the ten divisions of signs as being "according to the *Purpose* of the Eventual Interpretant" and "according to the Nature of the Influence the Sign is *intended* to exert" (R 339:424[285r <https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search&ref=13321>]; emphases added). The latter is the familiar trichotomy for the relation of the sign to its *final* interpretant as rheme/dicisign/argument, here crossed out and replaced with seme/pheme/delome. In that sense, then, the intentional interpretant is the *final *interpretant--the effect that the utterer *intends *the sign to have on the interpreter, and thus the effect that the sign *would *have on the interpreter under ideal circumstances. As for the communicational interpretant, it is important to pay careful attention to how Peirce describes the mind of which it is a determination. CSP: This mind may be called the *commens. *It consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should fulfill its function ... Thus the Form conveyed is always a determination of the dynamical object of the *commind.* (EP 2:478) The essential ingredient of the utterer is the dynamical object, which determines the sign; the essential ingredient of the interpreter is the dynamical interpretant, which the sign determines; and the essential ingredient of the commens is the sign itself, which welds the utterer and interpreter into one quasi-mind (CP 4.551). Put another way, the sign serves as "a Medium for the communication of a Form" (EP 2:544n22) from the dynamical object to the dynamical interpretant, both of which are *external* to the sign itself. However, any determination of the commens must be *internal* to the sign. Therefore, the communicational interpretant is the *immediate *interpretant, "the interpretant as it is revealed in the right understanding of the Sign itself" (CP 4.536). Moreover, recall that Peirce's eventual names for the division according to the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant are hypothetic/categorical/relative, and that these correspond to the number of lines of identity in an existential graph. Peirce describes the sheet on which such graphs are scribed as "the Quasi-mind in which the Graphist and Interpreter are at one ... a Pheme of all that is tacitly taken for granted between the Graphist and Interpreter, from the outset of their discussion" (CP 4.553). The sheet itself thus corresponds directly to the commens, so again the communicational interpretant is the *immediate *interpretant. Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Apr 26, 2020 at 4:51 AM <a.bree...@chello.nl> wrote: > Jon Alan, List, > > JAS: How many different interpretants does Peirce identify in the passage > quoted below (EP 2:478, 1906)? > > There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the > mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination > of the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or > say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which > the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any > communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It > consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and > interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should > fulfill its function. > > -- > > LETS set up a dictionary: > > Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the > utterer > > the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination of the mind of the > interpreter > > the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which the > minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any > communication should take place > > AND shorten the quote accordingly: > > There is the Intentional Interpretant, the Effectual Interpretant, > and the Communicational Interpretant, or say the Cominterpretant. > > NOW, since there are exactly and only three interpretants in your view > (immediate, dynamical and final/normal), which terms would you substitute > at the different occurences? > > Best, > > Auke > > Op 26 april 2020 om 2:54 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com>: > > Auke, List: > > How many different interpretants does Peirce identify in the passage > quoted below (EP 2:478, 1906)? Does he mention any additional > interpretants in that particular letter? Are there any manuscripts > whatsoever where Peirce explicitly identifies more than three interpretants > in the same analysis? If not, why conclude that there are more than three, > just because he uses different names in different lists of exactly three? > How is this more justified than viewing Peirce as experimenting over time > with different names for the same three interpretants? Note that these are > questions, not assertions; I am inviting *persuasion* that Auke's > approach is more warranted than mine. On the other hand, all the recent > List discussions were initially prompted by Robert Marty's paper > introducing the podium diagram, which (based on the three categories) > implies that one sign *must *have exactly two objects and exactly three > interpretants. Where does such an analysis supposedly go wrong? > > Besides, limiting the interpretants to exactly three is by no means a > novel proposal. As long ago as 1993, Jorgen Dines Johansen stated in his > book, *Dialogic Semiosis: An Essay on Signs and Meaning*, "The most > important divisions of the interpretant are the immediate, the dynamical, > and the final" (p. 173). He then aligned some of the alternative names > accordingly--essential and intended with immediate; communicational, > rational, and ultimate logical with final. Five years later, the editors > of Volume 2 of *The Essential Peirce* similarly associated intentional, > impressional, and initial with immediate; effectual, factual, middle, and > dynamic with dynamical; and communicational, normal, habitual, and eventual > with final (p. 555 n. 2). I disagree with a couple of these specific > assignments, but the point is that it is quite common in the secondary > literature to understand Peirce as having identified exactly three > interpretants, while varying considerably in what he called them. > > Again, "the gamma part of semiotics" is an aspect of *Auke's *speculative > grammar, not Peirce's own; just as the immediate object/interpretant > pertaining to a type, the dynamical object/interpretant pertaining to a > token, and the final interpretant pertaining to the sign itself are aspects > of *my *speculative grammar, not Peirce's own. Nevertheless, our > different speculative grammars are both recognizably *Peircean*. As with > Robert, I sincerely appreciate Auke's scholarship--especially, as he > mentions below, our mutual dedication to studying Peirce's unpublished > texts--even though we have reached some different conclusions when it comes > to the details. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Apr 25, 2020 at 8:02 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl> > wrote: > > Gary f., list, > > I understand to have hit on a great devide between groups of listers. As > far as JAS is concerned, I already indicated my objections, and I already > indicated that I value it highly that he took the trouble to seriously read > the unpublished pages. I seldom meet a person that, as I did, took the > trouble. > > I suggested already to look at this from a semiotical point of view: > > Well, this is nice meat for a semioticean. How is such a misunderstanding > possible? > > -- > > Curiously enough this example fits in nicely with the discussion about the > total number of interpretants Peirce distinguished. > > 1906|Letters to Lady Welby|EP 2:478 > > There is the Intentional Interpretant, which is a determination of the > mind of the utterer; the Effectual Interpretant, which is a determination > of the mind of the interpreter; and the Communicational Interpretant, or > say the Cominterpretant, which is a determination of that mind into which > the minds of utterer and interpreter have to be fused in order that any > communication should take place. This mind may be called the commens. It > consists of all that is, and must be, well understood between utterer and > interpreter, at the outset, in order that the sign in question should > fulfill its function. > > --- > > Here we are in, what I call, the gamma part of semiotics. Demanding its > own identification of differences between interpretants. This cannot simply > be reduced to: immediate, normal and final interpretant. > > Auke > >
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