Re: [PEIRCE-L] [CG] Artificial empathy by a central executive
John It seems to me that an emphasis on ’semantics rather than syntax’ sets up an analytic frame focusing only on entities operating within a mode of Secondness - and ignoring the mode of Thirdness operating in syntax.. Edwina > On Mar 11, 2024, at 3:27 PM, John F Sowa wrote: > > In my previous note, I forgot to include a link to the updated (March 8} > slides for my talk on March 6. Here is the URL: > https://ontologforum.s3.amazonaws.com/OntologySummit2024/TrackA/LLMs-are-clueless--JohnSowa_20240228.pdf > . > > I also received an offline note about a linguistic theory that emphasizes > semantics rather than syntax: > The method of Generative semantics by Seuren, > https://www.mpi.nl/sites/default/files/2020-07/Seuren_Abralin_Article_2020.pdf > . Other linguists and computational linguists have proposed, developed, > and/or implemented related versions. > > Methods that emphasize semantics have been used in conjunction with ontology > to correct and avoid the errors and hallucinations created by LLMs. For > critical applications, 99% correct can be a disaster. Nobody wants to fly > in an airplane that has a 1% chance of crashing. > > LLMs are very good for translating linear languages and notations. But when > accuracy is essential, precise semantics is much more important than elegant > syntax. > > I also want to emphasize Section 3. That begins with slide 32, which has the > title Neuro-Cognitive Cycles. The word 'cognitive' is much more general than > 'symbolic', since it includes images as well as linear notations for > language. Note slide 7, which shows an image in the mind of a policeman, and > the attempt by a man who is trying to reconstruct an image from a verbal > explanation. > > In slide 24, I added a picture of a baby who is using sign language. For > multi-dimensional topics, a sign language can be more detailed and precise > that a spoken language. > > This section also emphasizes Peirce's methods of reasoning in Slides 33 and > 34, and their applications in the remaining slides. Slide 35 on the Central > Executive, as defined by neuroscientists, shows how to avoid the errors, > hallucinations, and dangers created by the Large Language Models (LLMs): > Include a Central Executive, which has the responsibility and the power to > evaluate any proposed language or actions and revise or reject those that may > be erroneous or even dangerous. > > Also note slide 39 on "Wicked Problems"; slide 40, which explains "Why Humans > are not obsolete; and Slide 41, which asks whether there is "A Path to AGI?" > The answer to that question is joke by George Burns, which might be taken > seriously. > > That reminds me of a remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein: "It's possible to write > a book on philosophy that consists entirely of jokes." A Zen Buddhist could > write a book on religion that consists entirely of jokes. Depending on the > definition of 'joke', somebody might say that they have. > > John > ___ > CG mailing list -- c...@lists.iccs-conference.org > To unsubscribe send an email to cg-le...@lists.iccs-conference.org _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Higher-Order Logics (was Problems in mixing quantifiers with modal logic)
Jon, John, List: The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple questions about meaning of symbols and logics. Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual distinctions? How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects with logical premises OF ANY ORDER? I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast richness of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the roles of individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant. In other words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to disappearing... Cheers Jerry > On Mar 8, 2024, at 9:45 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > > Jeff, List: > > Indeed, as Don Roberts summarizes, "The Gamma part of EG corresponds, > roughly, to second (and higher) order functional calculi, and to modal logic. > ... By means of this new section of EG Peirce wanted to take account of > abstractions, including qualities and relations and graphs themselves as > subjects to be reasoned about" > (https://www.felsemiotica.com/descargas/Roberts-Don-D.-The-Existential-Graphs-of-Charles-S.-Peirce.pdf, > 1973, p. 64). Likewise, according to Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "In the Gamma > part Peirce proposes a bouquet of logics beyond the extensional, > propositional and first-order systems. Those concern systems of modal logics, > second-order (higher-order) logics, abstractions, and logic of multitudes and > collections, among others" (LF 2/1:28). Jay Zeman says a bit more about Gamma > EGs for second-order logic in his dissertation. > > JZ: There is also another suggestion, in 4.470, which is interesting but to > which Peirce devotes very little time. Here he shows us a different kind of > line of identity, one which expresses the identity of spots rather than of > individuals. This is an intriguing move, since it strongly suggests at least > the second order predicate calculus, with spots now acquiring > quantifications. Peirce did very little with this idea, so far as I am able > to determine, but it seems to me that there would not be too much of a > problem in working it into a graphical system which would stand to the higher > order calculi as beta stands to the first-order calculus. The continuity > interpretation of the "spot line of identity" is fairly clear; it maps the > continuity of a property or a relation. The redness of an apple is the same, > in a sense, as the redness of my face if I am wrong; the continuity of the > special line of identity introduced in 4.470 represents graphically this > sameness. This sameness or continuity is not the same as the identity of > individuals; although its representation is scribed upon the beta sheet of > assertion, its "second intentional" nature seems to cause Peirce to classify > it with the gamma signs. (https://isidore.co/calibre/get/pdf/4481, 1964, pp. > 31-32) > > The CP reference here is to the paragraph right before the one where Peirce > suggests the notation of a dotted oval and dotted line to assert a > proposition about a proposition (CP 4.471, 1903), similar to the first EG on > RLT 151 (1898), as John and I discussed recently > (https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2024-02/msg00141.html). Here is > what Peirce says (and scribes) in that text; the image is from LF 2/1:165, > with Peirce's handiwork on the right and Pietarinen's reproduction on the > left. > > CSP: Convention No. 13. The letters ρ0, ρ1, ρ2, ρ3, etc. each with a number > of hooks greater by one than the subscript number, may be taken as rhemata > signifying that the individuals joined to the hooks, other than the one > vertically above the ρ taken in their order clockwise are capable of being > asserted of the rhema indicated by the line of identity joined vertically to > the ρ. > Thus, Fig. 57 expresses that there is a relation in which every man stands to > some woman to whom no other man stands in the same relation; that is, there > is a woman corresponding to every man or, in other words, there are at least > as many women as men. The dotted lines between which, in Fig. 57, the line of > identity denoting the ens rationis is placed, are by no means necessary.  > > On the other hand, as I keep pointing out, Peirce's only stated purpose for > needing to add a new Delta part was "in order to deal with modals" (R L376, > 1911 Dec 6), so I doubt that it would have had anything to do with > higher-order logics. John Sowa seems to be convinced that Peirce had in mind > a more generalized situation/context logic using metalanguage, but so far, I > see no evidence for this in the extant 19 pages of that letter to Risteen. > Pietarinen speculates, "Perhaps he planned the Delta part on quantificational > multi-modal logics as can be d
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, List: CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals. JFS: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). Please do not put words in Peirce's mouth. Preserving the division without also preserving the details of "the better exposition of 1903" would make no sense. Going straight into a specification for the new Delta part without saying anything at all about the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts, having just stated the intention to "adhere to" that division, would likewise make no sense. Again, can you identify even *one sentence* from the entire extant letter to Risteen that is about EGs but *not *applicable to those other three parts, i.e., unique to Delta? JFS: Quine correctly said that modal logic was just a version of metalanguage about logic. That is Quine's opinion, apparently one that you share. However, it is by no means universal, even among logicians today, and there is no basis for claiming that *Peirce *would agree unless you can provide an exact quotation to that effect. Again, having made up your own mind, I suspect that you are reading that position back into his texts, including R L376. JFS: All the useful applications are based on some version of metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. It is a letter, not an article, and as far as I can tell, it neither states nor implies anything about the use of metalanguage instead of formal modal logic. Please provide an exact quotation to support your claim. JFS: Logics that use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no practical applications of any kind. Again, I would caution against making such sweeping and dismissive pronouncements. After all, there might very well be practical applications of formal modal logic that have not yet come to your attention or that get discovered in the future. In any case, according to Peirce, "True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). JFS: Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful revivals. His Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, because I have used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and early 21st C. No one can say for sure what Peirce had in mind for Delta EGs since he never spelled it out himself, unless there are more pages of R L376 somewhere out there, waiting to be discovered. I still see no evidence in the extant text of that letter nor elsewhere (including R 514) to support your conjecture that it was about adding metalanguage to Beta EGs, given that his only stated reason for needing "a *Delta *part" at all is "in order to deal with modals." It seems much more plausible that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions to replace his unsatisfactory broken cuts (1903) and tinctures (1906), such as the one that he introduces on R 339:[340r] (1909 Jan 7). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 10:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, > > I'll go into much more detail in the preview article, which I am now > working on. I'll just respond to the following point: > > JAS: Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the only > sentence in R L376 that mentions Delta--"The better exposition of 1903 > divided the system into three parts, distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, > and the Gamma, parts; a division I shall here adhere to, although I shall > now have to add a *Delta *part in order to deal with modals." > > I answered that before: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the > details of the 1903 logics. He is saying that he is preserving that > *DIVISION* into Alpha (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and > Gamma (something beyond Alpha and Beta). > > The most significant Gamma graphs are the the ones that represent the > second-order version of his 1885 Algebra of Logic. He had reviewed > Russell's logic of 1903, and he must have heard about (but didn't have time > to study) Whitehead & Russell's logic of 1910. Both of them discussed > higher-order logic (second order and higher), but not modal logic. > > During the years after 1903, Peirce mentioned the modal words in English > many, many times. And he experimented with new notations for modality, but > he never used or even mentioned his 1903 modal logic for any purpose. In > fact, he had only used it for a few examples in 1903. > > But the most
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Reading Peirce Reading Others
Jeff, List, Those are important questions: JBD: How important is it to consider the things Peirce is reading for the sake of understanding what he says? Let me start with a simple point. Can we understand what Peirce is explicitly saying about another author's views without reading the passages in their writings to which Peirce is referring? Unfortunately, that evidence doesn't exist. But I certainly agree with the following point: JBD: I think that (1) reading the texts and (2) reading what he is reading go hand in hand. That is, reading what he is reading is essential to understanding the texts--at least in those places where he is explicitly or implicitly referring to, drawing on, or reacting to the ideas of others. I would also emphasize Peirce's uncanny ability to anticipate future developments, especially in logic.. That is why I would add that a knowledge of developments in the century after Peirce is important for evaluating his contributions. Good sources for such evaluations are the talks presented at the Peirce Sesquicentennial in 1989 and the Centennial in 2014. The modern experts in fields that Peirce had pioneered emphasized many of his most significant insights, There are also many ongoing publications that address his contributions to the future. In any case, thanks for preparing that list of authors and the number of references to each. That list is worth saving and consulting as a guide to research. To understand what Peirce wrote at any point in time, it's important to look both forwards and backwards -- both in his own writings and in the writings of his predecessors and successors. Even authors who never read anything by Peirce were influenced by people who had and by people who rediscovered some of his ideas. Tarski and Gentzen, for example, were brilliant logicians, but it's inaccurate to say that Peirce had anticipated their work. In some important respects, he went beyond them. John From: "Jeffrey Brian Downard" Jon S, List, How important is it to consider the things Peirce is reading for the sake of understanding what he says? Let me start with a simple point. Can we understand what Peirce is explicitly saying about another author's views without reading the passages in their writings to which Peirce is referring? For the sake of satisfying my own curiosity, I've made a list of the number of pages in the CP that make reference to philosophers, scientists, mathematicians, and literary figures. Given the fact that the CP is only a small portion of his writings, it isn't comprehensive. What is more, it does not count the total number of references made to a given name, which is higher in many cases due to multiple references made on a single page. Nor does it take into consideration discussions of a view that continue for many pages without repetitive references to a specific name. Let us suppose for the sake of argument that the CP consists of about 10% of his writings and that they are a representative sample. Under this supposition (which is not accurate), we would need to multiply the numbers below by a factor of 10 in order to approximate the number of pages that involve references to the writings of others. Here is the list: Top 12: Aristotle 227 Kant 218 Hegel 121 Boole 95 Schröder 76 Scotus 66 Plato 60+ Euclid 58 Royce 57 William James 50 Cantor 50 Berkeley 50 Philosophy Pythagoras 12 Parmenides 3 Heraclitus 1 Democritus 5 Zeno 12 Plato, Platonic, Platonism 60+ Aristotle, Aristotelian, Aristotelis 227 Diogenes, Cynic 6 Plotinus, neoplatonic 2 Stoic 16 Boethius 25 (6 in text, 19 in fn) Augustine 11 John of Salisbury 14 Abelard 17 Scotus 66 Ockham 34 Roger Bacon 11 Aquinas 27 Francis Bacon 17 Hobbes 26 Descartes 39 Pascal 5 Spinoza 12 Leibniz 35 Locke 37 Berkeley 50 Hume 40 Reid 19 Kant, Kantian 218 Friedrich Schiller 2 Fichte 6 Schelling 8 Hegel, Hegelian 121 Bentham 13 James Mill 11 Whewell 21 John Stuart Mill 17 William Hamilton 32 Schopenhauer 3 Nietzsche 0 Ferdinand (FCS) Schiller 24 Royce 57 William James 50 Dewey 13 Husserl 3 Science Copernicus 9 Galileo 21 Tycho Brahe 4 Kepler 20 Newton 34 Faraday 5 Clausius 11 Thomson 10 Maxwell 10 Ricardo 4 Adam Smith 1 Comte 22 Spencer, Spencerian 27 Darwin 34 Agassiz 6 Oliver Wendell Holmes 2 Mathematics Pappus 1 Eudoxus 0 Euclid, Euclidean 58 Archimedes 7 Fermat 28 Desargues 1 Bernoulli 9 Playfair, 7 Euler, Euler’s, Eulerian 31 Projective geometry 11 William Rowan Hamilton 38 Gauss 11 Riemann 6 Boole, Boole’s, Boolean 95 DeMorgan 4 Jevons 33 Peano 4 Dedekind 17 Cantor, Cantorian, 50 Kempe 14 Listing 13 Schröder 76 Whitehead 3 Bertrand Russell 2 Literature Homer 1 Aeschylus 0 Sophocles 0 Lucretius 4 Dante 4 Shakespeare 9 Milton 4 Henry James 5 Sherlock Holmes 1 Emerson 6 Religious Jesus 11 Buddha 5 Mohammed 1 Holy Ghost 1 Moses 0 Confuscius 0 Brahma 1 It is remarkable, I think, that Peirce makes so many references to Aristotle and Kant. As far as I can
[PEIRCE-L] Logical Content of Graphical Signs (was Higher-Order Logics)
Jerry, List: Your questions as posed are extremely general, and their answers depend heavily on the particular context of interest. Peirce *assigns *specific logical content to certain signs in his Existential Graphs (EGs) and develops the transformation rules for them accordingly. In all parts, the blank sheet represents the universe of discourse, graphs scribed on it represent propositions that are asserted as true in that universe, juxtaposition represents coexistence in that universe (conjunction), and a scroll (double cut or ring-shaped shaded area) represents a consequence (material implication) from which a single cut or shaded area is derived as representing negation (implication of falsity/absurdity). In the Beta part, heavy lines of identity denote indefinite individuals and attached names denote general concepts being attributed to those individuals. In the Gamma part, there are various additional signs for various purposes, such as the broken cut for possible falsity (modal logic), the heavy line with dotted lines along both sides for quantifying predicates (second-order logic), and the dotted oval for treating a proposition as a subject that fills the blank in a rheme attached to the oval by a dotted line (metalanguage). As I keep emphasizing, we cannot know for sure what Peirce had in mind for the Delta part, other than that it would "deal with modals," unless and until new manuscript evidence turns up, such as the missing pages of R L376. My hypothesis is that he was considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal propositions involving possibility or necessity, such as the one that he introduces in his Logic Notebook (R 339:[340r], 1909 Jan 7). In that case, heavy lines represent "circumstances" or "times"--more formally, possible states of things (PSTs)--and attached letters represent propositions that would be true under those circumstances, at those times, or in those PSTs. The transformation rules for these "lines of compossibility" (my term) are different from the ones for the "lines of identity" (Peirce's term) in the Beta part because of the obvious and fundamental semiotic difference between describing *things *with names (rhemes/semes) and describing *states of things* with propositions (dicisigns/phemes). Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 8:01 AM Jerry LR Chandler < jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com> wrote: > Jon, John, List: > > The attempts to interpret the on going discussions leads to simple > questions about meaning of symbols and logics. > > Given a graphic object, how does one decipher the logical content of it? > > What types of semantics can be associated with what types of visual > distinctions? > > How many distinctions are to be associated with a graphic object? And how > are these distinctions associated with the forms embodied in the objects > with logical premises OF ANY ORDER? > > I pose these questions because as the discussion unfolds into the vast > richness of modal logics within the modern forms of symbolic logics, the > roles of individual minds in expressing semes appears to become dominant. > In other words, the boundaries between symbols and icons seems to > disappearing... > > Cheers > > Jerry > _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Letter to Risteen (was Higher-Order Logics)
John, Despite your earlier comment in a post addressed to me on March 6 where you wrote that "the important references are in the future, not the past" -- a remark which, in this matter of Delta EGs, I cannot say I much agree with insofar as it relates to Peirce's work -- it remains impossible for me, and I'd imagine others, to fully grasp your position on this issue that you've been clearly disagreeing with Jon on. In short, without your addressing Jon's repeated requests for Peirce quotations supporting your claims -- as well as a few examples of how you would represent (and reason about) modal propositions in your "candidate" for Delta EGs -- your contender for Delta graphs continues to be for me unclear, really, unfathomable. Of course those following this discussion look forward to reading the article which you are working on discussing Delta EGs. But it would be more than helpful to forum members if you'd offer some *quotations *and a few simple *examples* to clarify your views on the matter. Best, Gary On Tue, Mar 12, 2024 at 1:38 PM Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > John, List: > > CSP: The better exposition of 1903 divided the system into three parts, > distinguished as the Alpha, the Beta, and the Gamma, parts; a division I > shall here adhere to, although I shall now have to add a *Delta *part in > order to deal with modals. > > > JFS: Peirce is not saying that he is preserving the details of the 1903 > logics. He is saying that he is preserving that DIVISION into Alpha > (propositional logic), Beta (predicate logic), and Gamma (something beyond > Alpha and Beta). > > > Please do not put words in Peirce's mouth. Preserving the division without > also preserving the details of "the better exposition of 1903" would make > no sense. Going straight into a specification for the new Delta part > without saying anything at all about the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma parts, > having just stated the intention to "adhere to" that division, would > likewise make no sense. Again, can you identify even *one sentence* from > the entire extant letter to Risteen that is about EGs but *not *applicable > to those other three parts, i.e., unique to Delta? > > JFS: Quine correctly said that modal logic was just a version of > metalanguage about logic. > > > That is Quine's opinion, apparently one that you share. However, it is by > no means universal, even among logicians today, and there is no basis for > claiming that *Peirce *would agree unless you can provide an exact > quotation to that effect. Again, having made up your own mind, I suspect > that you are reading that position back into his texts, including R L376. > > JFS: All the useful applications are based on some version of > metalanguage, along the lines of the December 1911 article. > > > It is a letter, not an article, and as far as I can tell, it neither > states nor implies anything about the use of metalanguage instead of formal > modal logic. Please provide an exact quotation to support your claim. > > JFS: Logics that use the two operators for necessary and possible, have no > practical applications of any kind. > > > Again, I would caution against making such sweeping and dismissive > pronouncements. After all, there might very well be practical applications > of formal modal logic that have not yet come to your attention or that get > discovered in the future. In any case, according to Peirce, "True science > is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will > get studied without the aid of scientific men" (CP 1.76, c. 1896). > > JFS: Peirce has an unusually large percentage of successful revivals. His > Delta graphs are among them. I recognized their importance, because I have > used and worked with similar logics from the late 20th and early 21st C. > > > No one can say for sure what Peirce had in mind for Delta EGs since he > never spelled it out himself, unless there are more pages of R L376 > somewhere out there, waiting to be discovered. I still see no evidence in > the extant text of that letter nor elsewhere (including R 514) to support > your conjecture that it was about adding metalanguage to Beta EGs, given > that his only stated reason for needing "a *Delta *part" at all is "in > order to deal with modals." It seems much more plausible that he was > considering a new notation for representing and reasoning about modal > propositions to replace his unsatisfactory broken cuts (1903) and tinctures > (1906), such as the one that he introduces on R 339:[340r] (1909 Jan 7). > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Mon, Mar 11, 2024 at 10:14 PM John F Sowa wrote: > >> Jon, >> >> I'll go into much more detail in the preview article, which I am now >> working on. I'll just respond to the following point: >> >> JAS: Your quotation here omits the crucial first part of the
