[PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Listers I would like to approach this section about Kee's discussion of the 'proof of pragmatism' backwards--from experience to theory. I came into my understanding of pragmatism in this way and still find it difficult to analyze from the other direction. I've many years of practical experience with these concepts (15 of the nearly 40 years pre any knowledge that they WERE concepts, let alone Peircean). This experience still shapes the way I am most able to think clearly about these issues. In 1975, circumstances that left me without any other materials with which to teach junior and senior language arts students forced me to make use of a set of unused workbooks called, "Creative Analysis," by Albert Upton. Once my students and I made it through the first three sections of that workbook, we all (me included) had learned to qualify (affective, sensory, rational), to analyze based upon diagrams developed by deliberate qualitative choices and to understand and apply the immensely complex construct that Upton simply called "Signs." So, I feel that everyone should know that I am not a 'real' philosopher-my only credentials are that I was able to write my first book (and everything else) in isolation (I have still never met a formally trained Peircean in the flesh). I started my first book pre-searchable discs, using only my limited collection (3 anthologies) of Peirce's writings, a few well-answered questions from Dr. Ransdell, Cathy Legg (and some amiable Deweyans) and what I knew (know) from Creative Analysis, as well as a non-verbal assessment of Peirce-based non-verbal inference patterns, which I also did not know was based on Peirce. If Howard Callaway had not read an early snippet from the manuscript and suggested I send it to Rodopi via him when it was complete & if John Shook had not refereed that manuscript and accepted it for publication, that first book would probably still be just a manuscript. If I had not made an online (and now actual and close) friend of Jayne Tristan (a Deweyan) who vetted my manuscript for philosophical trigger words-like "necessary," I would probably have made a complete fool of myself. (I still worry a lot about that, but should probably just say dayenu here). Thus, it is from this perspective of an aging and experience-based amateur that I invite Peirce-l to join me in this excellent adventure. Kee's points out that any ".proof should begin with phaneroscopy and then run through the normative sciences." I understand this as meaning that the proof of pragmatism begins with a close examination of the qualities (potential as well as actual) of phanera (as facts and occurrences). Peirce says that an occurrence is "a slice of the Universe [that] can never be known or even imagined in all its infinite detail" and that every fact within every occurrence is "inseparably combined with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the fact itself" (Rosenthal, 1994, pp. 5-6). Peirce points out that a fact, which can be extracted from this swarm of circumstances by means of thought, is only so much of reality as can be represented by a proposition (Rosenthal, 1994, p. 5). One aspect of preparing a proposition for testing is determining which factors within the swarm of circumstances matter and which do not. It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration. Since Peirce allows for comparison & contrast, as well as sorting (and by implication) diagrammatic thinking (as a perceptual, rather than a logical judgment) in this non-normative branch of philosophy, it seems there is much "work" that a phenomenologist can do here before engaging the normative sciences, in particular, logic as semiotic (the semiotic paradigm) to craft the theoretical construct. It seems to me that the individual "strands" of the rope are discovered and explored within phaneroscopy, based upon their qualities and their possible relevance to something &/or one another. Only then would they be tested against norms before being added to the rope-like braid that Kees describes. I wonder how many others also see the 'Proof' beginning in phenomenology in this sense of discerning? In another sense? Or do some of you see it beginning somewhere else altogether? - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Phyllis, list, Thanks for your thoughtful and clear post. I'm a fellow "unreal" philosopher, but differ from you in that I've no professional occasion of connection with Peirce's thought at all. I remember years ago finding a discussion of the ways in which people mean things that they say, and it occurred to me that the ways seemed to correspond, ingeniously, to at least of some of Peirce's 10 trichotomies of signs in a letter to Lady Welby, and then I noticed that you were the author or one of the authors (this was long ago and I don't now know what article I was reading). Anyway, I'll attempt to form a few thoughts. I just skimmed some of Jeremiah McCarthy's Version 2*.*0 of "An Account of Peirce's Proof of Pragmatism" http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/mccarthy/proof2.htm, so I may have been influenced by it. I'd say that (as McCarthy points out), for Peirce's proof of pragmatism (on which I'm no expert), one needs to know his ways of thinking. Insofar as one does not know his phaneroscopic categories, one will need to study them, and so, to the outsider pursuing the proof, they'll seem like part of the proof - a preparation at least. For Peirce, all (cenoscopic) philosophy, pure or applied, is phaneroscopic analysis. So one needs to think in a framework where phaneroscopy and, in particular, Peirce's tri-categorial phaneroscopy, is the philosophical basis of philosophy; this sets things up for Peirce to argue that logical goodness is a species of moral goodness, and moral goodness is a species of the most general goodness: esthetic goodness. So I agree with you that the proof of pragmatism needs to begin in phaneroscopy, in the sense that all Peircean philosophy so begins, and also as a present-day practical matter, in the sense that people interested in the proof don't always know Peirce's phanerscopy and categories well. Well, my experience with basic categorial thinking, even before I first read Peirce, has been that basic philosophical categories don't shed much light except in exchange for at least a little light shed upon them. To the extent that that's true, even for Peirceans the proof will take one back to the categories for some exploration. Best, Ben On 4/28/2014 5:17 PM, Phyllis Chiasson wrote: Listers I would like to approach this section about Kee's discussion of the 'proof of pragmatism' backwards--from experience to theory. I came into my understanding of pragmatism in this way and still find it difficult to analyze from the other direction. I've many years of practical experience with these concepts (15 of the nearly 40 years pre any knowledge that they WERE concepts, let alone Peircean). This experience still shapes the way I am most able to think clearly about these issues. In 1975, circumstances that left me without any other materials with which to teach junior and senior language arts students forced me to make use of a set of unused workbooks called, "Creative Analysis," by Albert Upton. Once my students and I made it through the first three sections of that workbook, we all (me included) had learned to qualify (affective, sensory, rational), to analyze based upon diagrams developed by deliberate qualitative choices and to understand and apply the immensely complex construct that Upton simply called "Signs." So, I feel that everyone should know that I am not a 'real' philosopher—my only credentials are that I was able to write my first book (and everything else) in isolation (I have still never met a formally trained Peircean in the flesh). I started my first book pre-searchable discs, using only my limited collection (3 anthologies) of Peirce's writings, a few well-answered questions from Dr. Ransdell, Cathy Legg (and some amiable Deweyans) and what I knew (know) from Creative Analysis, as well as a non-verbal assessment of Peirce-based non-verbal inference patterns, which I also did not know was based on Peirce. If Howard Callaway had not read an early snippet from the manuscript and suggested I send it to Rodopi via him when it was complete & if John Shook had not refereed that manuscript and accepted it for publication, that first book would probably still be just a manuscript. If I had not made an online (and now actual and close) friend of Jayne Tristan (a Deweyan) who vetted my manuscript for philosophical trigger words—like "necessary," I would probably have made a complete fool of myself. (I still worry a lot about that, but should probably just say /dayenu/ here). Thus, it is from this perspective of an aging and experience-based amateur that I invite Peirce-l to join me in this excellent adventure. Kee's points out that any "…proof should begin with phaneroscopy and then run through the normative sciences." I understand this as meaning that the proof of pragmatism begins with a close examination of the qualities (potential as well as actual) of phanera (as facts and oc
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Phyllis, List, Thank you, first, for sharing your personal pragmatic story. It brought up many thoughts for me beginning with how Peirce commented that pragmatism is merely the formalizing of critical commonsensism as we move from a logica utens to a logica docens. In addition, your remark that you don't consider yourself to be a 'real' philosopher reminded me that the very democratic structure of this forum was conceived by Joe Ransdell with a sense that, from the standpoint of cenoscopic philosophy, we are all at least potential philosophers, and that academic philosophy is not the be-all and end-all of philosophical pragmatism, while academic philosophy has its own dangers and pitfalls, something Joe spoke of informally, for example, in email messages to Ben and me, and wrote of more formally. As Joe conceived it, the Peirce forum was to be a place where anyone interested in the work of Peirce could discuss his philosophy. Furthermore, my own experience in college teaching was, for example, to teach a course titled "Critical Thinking" (which is *not *a course in formal logic) from this cenoscopic standpoint, and informally, that is, as critical commonsensism, logic not yet brought to the formal development whereas pragmatism is placed within methodeutic in semeiotic. In a word, I think it is valuable that thinkers like yourself seem to find pragmatic principles alive and valuable, and even long before they've formally studied Peirce and pragmaticism. So, I'm very much looking forward to discussing these and other related matters with you and others, including how we pragmatically educate our young people, like you grandson, to become excellent critical thinkers. As for the proofs of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology and continuing into the normative sciences, that some of the later articles in EP2 are structured and titled along these lines by Nathan Houser, has for some time now aided me in considering Peirce's requirement that he* prove* his own brand of pragmatism unlike the other pragmatists who felt no such compulsion. In EP2 Nathan was, unfortunately, but understandably, not able to address Peirce's proof employing Existential Graphs. However, Peirce's discussion of "the valency of concepts" and his informal proof of the Reduction Thesis in MS 908, which Nathan gives the title, "The Basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy," seems to me already to anticipate the case that is to be made by Peirce that the strongest proof comes from EGs. There's much more to be said in this matter, but for now I'll conclude with an except from MS 908 which I hope we'll have occasion to discuss as it connects deeply to this matter of the proof of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology. *[U]nless the Phaneron were to consist entirely of elements altogether uncombined mentally, in which case we should have no idea of a Phaneron (since this, if we have the idea, is an idea combining all the rest), which is as much as to say that there would be no Phaneron, its esse being percipi if any is so; or unless the Phaneron were itself our sole idea, and were utterly indecomposable, when there could be no such thing as an interrogation and no such things as a judgment [. . .], it follows that if there is a Phaneron [. . .] or even if we can ask whether there be or no, there must be an idea of combination (i.e., having combination for its object thought of). Now the general idea of a combination must be an indecomposable idea. For otherwise it would be compounded and the idea of combination would enter into it as an analytic part of it. It is, however quite absurd to suppose an idea to be a part of itself, and not the whole. Therefore, if there is a Phaneron, the idea of combination is an indecomposable element of it. This idea is a triad; for it involves the ideas of a whole and of two parts [. . .] Accordingly there will necessarily be a triad in the Phaneron. (EP2:363-4).* This "idea is a triad" is almost immediately followed by valental diagrams of medads, monads, dyads, triads, pentads, and hexads by way of examples illustrating the Reduction Thesis. Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 5:17 PM, Phyllis Chiasson wrote: > Listers > > I would like to approach this section about Kee's discussion of the 'proof > of pragmatism' backwards--from experience to theory. I came into my > understanding of pragmatism in this way and still find it difficult to > analyze from the other direction. I've many years of practical experience > with these concepts (15 of the nearly 40 years pre any knowledge that they > WERE concepts, let alone Peircean). This experience still shapes the way I > am most able to think clearly about these issues. > > In 1975, circumstances that left me without any other materials with which > to teach junior and senior language arts students forced me to make use o
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Phyllis, List, To be honest, I am not sure I see a proof of pragmatism in this section (7.2). Rather, I see a justification for pragmatism being that it was constructed using the pragmatic maxim. As far as I understand it, this essentially means that signs are only meaningful if they can be translated into thought-signs that have an effect on belief (and, thereby, also possibly on actions). If I may jump ahead a touch to section 7.3, the example of transubstantiation is used to demonstrate how a concept can be devoid of meaning because it has no practical consequences. As far as I understand this section, the reason why it is said to have no practical consequences is because no change in the phaneron occurs to signal a shift. This perhaps goes back to an implied proof of pragmatism that Phyllis alluded to with her vivid and useful description of her pre-Peircean cultivation of phaneroscopic abilities, "It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration." Now, the fact that I do not see the issue of transubstantiation as an example of the pragmatic maxim applied suggests strongly to me that I am missing something important here. My objection here is that it is more than the mere qualities get involved in the development of higher grades of clarity of a concept. What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person? Tokens of these types are also part of the phaneron when receiving communion, but somehow only the qualities of the wine and bread are considered relevant. It would seem that this example is suggesting that knowledge of substance cannot be gained through dynamic objects mediated by symbols but only through immediate objects. Perhaps the issue is that only beliefs that are fixed by the method of science are considered to be pragmatic, and since the belief in transubstantiation is fixed by authority, it is excluded. That idea doesn't seem to fit, however, especially given the connection of the pragmatism to abduction. If the question is to whether the belief would have any practical consequences, I'm not sure why the answer would be no since any proposition that asserts the truth of transubstantiation also asserts a whole host of other beliefs which must also be accepted, which in itself leads to practical consequences on thought and action. I'd really appreciate explanations that may possibly lead to some clarification. Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 3:46 PM, Gary Richmond wrote: > Phyllis, List, > > Thank you, first, for sharing your personal pragmatic story. It brought up > many thoughts for me beginning with how Peirce commented that pragmatism is > merely the formalizing of critical commonsensism as we move from a logica > utens to a logica docens. > > In addition, your remark that you don't consider yourself to be a 'real' > philosopher reminded me that the very democratic structure of this forum > was conceived by Joe Ransdell with a sense that, from the standpoint of > cenoscopic philosophy, we are all at least potential philosophers, and that > academic philosophy is not the be-all and end-all of philosophical > pragmatism, while academic philosophy has its own dangers and pitfalls, > something Joe spoke of informally, for example, in email messages to Ben > and me, and wrote of more formally. As Joe conceived it, the Peirce forum > was to be a place where anyone interested in the work of Peirce could > discuss his philosophy. > > Furthermore, my own experience in college teaching was, for example, to > teach a course titled "Critical Thinking" (which is *not *a course in > formal logic) from this cenoscopic standpoint, and informally, that is, as > critical commonsensism, logic not yet brought to the formal development > whereas pragmatism is placed within methodeutic in semeiotic. > > In a word, I think it is valuable that thinkers like yourself seem to find > pragmatic principles alive and valuable, and even long before they've > formally studied Peirce and pragmaticism. So, I'm very much looking forward > to discussing these and other related matters with you and others, > including how we pragmatically educate our young people, like you grandson, > to become excellent critical thinkers. > > As for the proofs of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology and continuing > into the normative sciences, that some of the later articles in EP2 are > structured and titled along these lines by Nathan Houser, has for some time > now aided me in considering Peirce's requirement that he* prove* his own > brand of pragmatism unlike the other pragmatists who felt no such > compulsion. In EP2 Nathan was, unfortunately, but understandably, not able > to address Peirce's proof emp
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Mara & List, I do not see a proof of pragmatism in this section either. Nor have I seen such a proof anywhere else, though I know many people are working on it, most via a proof of abduction/retroduction. If Abduction/Retroduction is the whole of pragmatism, as Peirce claims, then we need a proof of abductive inference to prove pragmatism. I was thinking in this vein when I wrote Abduction as an aspect of Retroduction for Semiotica in 2005. I do, however, think that Kees has the first parts of the sequence right: phenomenology for discerning, then semiotic (informed by aesthetics& ethics) for grounding [my next post addresses this], then logical critic. I'm going to be proposing though, that none of these is capable, alone or taken together, of proving pragmatism. The issue of system (as opposed to patterns of language, inference etc), which Gödel assures us cannot be proven from within, requires more--and Peirce provides for that in Methodeutic. In addition, the pragmatic maxim is a criterion, not a process, so it can be used as a pre/post tool or measure, but not as proof. I'll clean up my second post (7.2.2) and get it out soon. As for transubstantiation: When I complained to Gary R. about this example, he pointed out that it was from Peirce himself. (Peirce didn't care much for the belief systems of Catholics, the cognitive capabilities of blacks, or the mathematical abilities of women--a Larry Summers of his time?) I think this example is a poor one for demonstration purposes and will get to that in post 7.3. Im with the late Stephen J. Gould on religion & science belonging to different domains (in one sense, even different umwelts); one should not expect valid results by applying the methods of one domain to the other. I include Peirces Neglected Argument in this, because Reason, his summum bonum and the ultimate aim of what he calls religionism (see ethical classes of motives--motive #5) is just science redefined in religious words, but still meaning scientific concepts--e.g. no inexplicable ultimates. Meanwhile, as for proving pragmatism I keep recommending E. David Ford's book, SCIENTIFIC METHOD FOR ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH. It is an excellent demonstration of how methodeutic might operate in practice. Since the field of ecology examines consequences within open, as well as closed, systems, Ford's book seems to me to address the reciprocal nature of the process of retroduction. Though he doesn't use that word in the book, he did use it for his classes at the University of Washington back when I met with him in the late 1980's. Regards, Phyllis Chiasson _ From: Mara Woods [mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2014 8:20 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Phyllis, List, To be honest, I am not sure I see a proof of pragmatism in this section (7.2). Rather, I see a justification for pragmatism being that it was constructed using the pragmatic maxim. As far as I understand it, this essentially means that signs are only meaningful if they can be translated into thought-signs that have an effect on belief (and, thereby, also possibly on actions). If I may jump ahead a touch to section 7.3, the example of transubstantiation is used to demonstrate how a concept can be devoid of meaning because it has no practical consequences. As far as I understand this section, the reason why it is said to have no practical consequences is because no change in the phaneron occurs to signal a shift. This perhaps goes back to an implied proof of pragmatism that Phyllis alluded to with her vivid and useful description of her pre-Peircean cultivation of phaneroscopic abilities, "It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration." Now, the fact that I do not see the issue of transubstantiation as an example of the pragmatic maxim applied suggests strongly to me that I am missing something important here. My objection here is that it is more than the mere qualities get involved in the development of higher grades of clarity of a concept. What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person? Tokens of these types are also part of the phaneron when receiving communion, but somehow only the qualities of the wine and bread are considered relevant. It would seem that this example is suggesting that knowledge of substance cannot be gained through dynamic objects mediated by symbols but only through immediate objects. Perhaps the issue is that only beliefs that are fixed by the method of science are considered to be pragmatic, and since the belief in t
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Gary R. wrote: In EP2 Nathan was, unfortunately, but understandably, not able to address Peirce's proof employing Existential Graphs. However, Peirce's discussion of "the valency of concepts" and his informal proof of the Reduction Thesis in MS 908, which Nathan gives the title, "The Basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy," seems to me already to anticipate the case that is to be made by Peirce that the strongest proof comes from EGs. Gary & List, Existential Graphs are difficult for me, whereas diagrams of all sorts are not. I think I have a problem similar to my oldest granddaughter (not genetically related to me). The summer after her 2nd grade year, my husband discovered she could not count-at all. "How much is 2 + 3?" he asked her. "I dunno." "What about 2+1?" "I dunno." "What if," he suggested, "you had 3 chickens and 2 ducks. How many would you have altogether?" She immediately answered, "Five." I can do anything connected with words and practically nothing connected with symbols other than words. That is my problem with the graphs. I got a score of 98th %ile for logic on the GRE because the problems were all word-based (Mr. Blue, Ms Green/ small house, big house/ zebra, turtle/ etc. Who lived where? Had which Pet? Which job? Etc. I welcome more discussion of those graphs, perhaps with colors, ducks and chickens attached, because I'd really like to know more about how they work. Regards, Phyllis _ From: Gary Richmond [mailto:gary.richm...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2014 12:46 PM To: Phyllis Chiasson Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Phyllis, List, Thank you, first, for sharing your personal pragmatic story. It brought up many thoughts for me beginning with how Peirce commented that pragmatism is merely the formalizing of critical commonsensism as we move from a logica utens to a logica docens. In addition, your remark that you don't consider yourself to be a 'real' philosopher reminded me that the very democratic structure of this forum was conceived by Joe Ransdell with a sense that, from the standpoint of cenoscopic philosophy, we are all at least potential philosophers, and that academic philosophy is not the be-all and end-all of philosophical pragmatism, while academic philosophy has its own dangers and pitfalls, something Joe spoke of informally, for example, in email messages to Ben and me, and wrote of more formally. As Joe conceived it, the Peirce forum was to be a place where anyone interested in the work of Peirce could discuss his philosophy. Furthermore, my own experience in college teaching was, for example, to teach a course titled "Critical Thinking" (which is not a course in formal logic) from this cenoscopic standpoint, and informally, that is, as critical commonsensism, logic not yet brought to the formal development whereas pragmatism is placed within methodeutic in semeiotic. In a word, I think it is valuable that thinkers like yourself seem to find pragmatic principles alive and valuable, and even long before they've formally studied Peirce and pragmaticism. So, I'm very much looking forward to discussing these and other related matters with you and others, including how we pragmatically educate our young people, like you grandson, to become excellent critical thinkers. As for the proofs of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology and continuing into the normative sciences, that some of the later articles in EP2 are structured and titled along these lines by Nathan Houser, has for some time now aided me in considering Peirce's requirement that he prove his own brand of pragmatism unlike the other pragmatists who felt no such compulsion. In EP2 Nathan was, unfortunately, but understandably, not able to address Peirce's proof employing Existential Graphs. However, Peirce's discussion of "the valency of concepts" and his informal proof of the Reduction Thesis in MS 908, which Nathan gives the title, "The Basis of Pragmatism in Phaneroscopy," seems to me already to anticipate the case that is to be made by Peirce that the strongest proof comes from EGs. There's much more to be said in this matter, but for now I'll conclude with an except from MS 908 which I hope we'll have occasion to discuss as it connects deeply to this matter of the proof of pragmatism beginning in phenomenology. [U]nless the Phaneron were to consist entirely of elements altogether uncombined mentally, in which case we should have no idea of a Phaneron (since this, if we have the idea, is an idea combining all the rest), which is as much as to say that there would be no Phaneron, its esse being percipi if any is so; or unless the Phaneron were itself our sole idea, and were utterly
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
eirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Mara & List, I do not see a proof of pragmatism in this section either. Nor have I seen such a proof anywhere else, though I know many people are working on it, most via a proof of abduction/retroduction. If Abduction/Retroduction is the whole of pragmatism, as Peirce claims, then we need a proof of abductive inference to prove pragmatism. I was thinking in this vein when I wrote Abduction as an aspect of Retroduction for Semiotica in 2005. I do, however, think that Kees has the first parts of the sequence right: phenomenology for discerning, then semiotic (informed by aesthetics& ethics) for grounding [my next post addresses this], then logical critic. I'm going to be proposing though, that none of these is capable, alone or taken together, of proving pragmatism. The issue of system (as opposed to patterns of language, inference etc), which Gödel assures us cannot be proven from within, requires more--and Peirce provides for that in Methodeutic. In addition, the pragmatic maxim is a criterion, not a process, so it can be used as a pre/post tool or measure, but not as proof. I'll clean up my second post (7.2.2) and get it out soon. As for transubstantiation: When I complained to Gary R. about this example, he pointed out that it was from Peirce himself. (Peirce didn't care much for the belief systems of Catholics, the cognitive capabilities of blacks, or the mathematical abilities of women--a Larry Summers of his time?) I think this example is a poor one for demonstration purposes and will get to that in post 7.3. I’m with the late Stephen J. Gould on religion & science belonging to different domains (in one sense, even different umwelts); one should not expect valid results by applying the methods of one domain to the other. I include Peirce’s Neglected Argument in this, because Reason, his summum bonum and the ultimate aim of what he calls “religionism” (see ethical classes of motives--motive #5) is just science redefined in religious words, but still meaning scientific concepts--e.g. no inexplicable ultimates. Meanwhile, as for proving pragmatism I keep recommending E. David Ford's book, SCIENTIFIC METHOD FOR ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH. It is an excellent demonstration of how methodeutic might operate in practice. Since the field of ecology examines consequences within open, as well as closed, systems, Ford's book seems to me to address the reciprocal nature of the process of retroduction. Though he doesn't use that word in the book, he did use it for his classes at the University of Washington back when I met with him in the late 1980's. Regards, Phyllis Chiasson ____________ From: Mara Woods [mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com] Sent: Tuesday, April 29, 2014 8:20 PM To: Peirce-L Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Phyllis, List, To be honest, I am not sure I see a proof of pragmatism in this section (7.2). Rather, I see a justification for pragmatism being that it was constructed using the pragmatic maxim. As far as I understand it, this essentially means that signs are only meaningful if they can be translated into thought-signs that have an effect on belief (and, thereby, also possibly on actions). If I may jump ahead a touch to section 7.3, the example of transubstantiation is used to demonstrate how a concept can be devoid of meaning because it has no practical consequences. As far as I understand this section, the reason why it is said to have no practical consequences is because no change in the phaneron occurs to signal a shift. This perhaps goes back to an implied proof of pragmatism that Phyllis alluded to with her vivid and useful description of her pre-Peircean cultivation of phaneroscopic abilities, "It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration." Now, the fact that I do not see the issue of transubstantiation as an example of the pragmatic maxim applied suggests strongly to me that I am missing something important here. My objection here is that it is more than the mere qualities get involved in the development of higher grades of clarity of a concept. What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person? Tokens of these types are also part of the phaneron when receiving communion, but somehow only the qualities of the wine and bread are considered relevant. It would seem that this example is suggesting that knowledge of substance cannot be gained through dynamic objects mediated by symbols but only through immediate objects. Perhaps the issue
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Peirce Listers: For what my opinion is worth, Jeff has given a clear, detailed, and careful example that gets at the crux of the issue J. McCarthy It is not the sleep of reason that produces monsters, but the fury thereof. > From: jeffrey.down...@nau.edu > To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > Date: Wed, 30 Apr 2014 21:52:51 + > Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology > > Mara, Phyllis, List, > > In order to understand the point of the example concerning > transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good > candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The > Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I > suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. > Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify > scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is making > as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims as a > development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of the > assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood illustrate > more general principles of how the substantial identity of existing things > can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. > > Here is a short summary of a few key points: > > 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It is > not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, the > bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a new kind > of thing. > 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ > himself is the agent of the change. > 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere else, > and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine are > changed into the form of body and blood. > 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do not > change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of the > observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. > > Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the > blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type > of words spoken by a special type of person?" Notice that the habit of how > the sacrament is interpreted is not part of Aquinas's explanation of what > really taking place when the sacrament is being delivered. Insofar as we are > interested in questions about the real nature of the bread and wine > themselves when the sacrament is performed, we are working on the logical > presumption that the real nature of the things is independent of what you, or > I or any other individual happens to think. This assumption may turn out to > be a poor account of the nature of what is real, but we are starting with a > nominal definition that is based on common sense. > > In order to apply the pragmatic maxim, it will help to have some competing > hypotheses. There are quite a number to pick from. Aquinas was responding > to an ongoing controversy within the Catholic church, and we understand his > arguments in terms of objections made by the likes of Luther. Let's keep > things simple. Let me forward a metaphysical explanation. One possibility > is that, when the words are uttered, no real changes take place in the bread > and the wine themselves. The utterance of the words can definitely have an > effect on the people who interpret those words. Everyone to the debate > accepts that much. The question is, what is the meaning of saying 1-4 above? > In particular, what is the import of the fourth provision? Can you conceive > of any test that would separate the explanation Aquinas is offering from the > hypothesis I've ventured to put forth? Aquinas insists that, as a matter of > principle, there are no observable differences. If that is part of his > explanation, I can't conceive of any test that would separate the competing > explanations. Can you? If we can't, then there is no real difference in the > respective meaning of the competing hypotheses. That is, Aquinas is using > more words in (4), but he isn't really saying anything different than what is > contained in my hypothesis. It might appear that, when we think about the > familiar meanings of the words, that there is a difference, and there is. > What is more, a careful analysis of the meanings of the conceptions used will > show that the conceptions are distinct. Having said that, there are no real > differences between the hypotheses insofar as
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Jeffrey, Ah! Aquinas. Maybe that's why Peirce's scholasticism has always seemed so clear to me. I spent 11 of my first twelve years of schooling in Tucson Catholic schools. (4th grade, in a Palo Alto "public" school). I understand Aquinas' rationale but still hold with Gould's domain concept. I think there must be many better examples out there than transubstantiation for explaining the pragmatic maxim. Regards, Phyllis -Original Message- From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu] Sent: Wednesday, April 30, 2014 2:53 PM To: 'Peirce-L' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Mara, Phyllis, List, In order to understand the point of the example concerning transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is making as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims as a development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of the assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood illustrate more general principles of how the substantial identity of existing things can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. Here is a short summary of a few key points: 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It is not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, the bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a new kind of thing. 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ himself is the agent of the change. 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere else, and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine are changed into the form of body and blood. 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do not change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of the observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person?" Notice that the habit of how the sacrament is interpreted is not part of Aquinas's explanation of what really taking place when the sacrament is being delivered. Insofar as we are interested in questions about the real nature of the bread and wine themselves when the sacrament is performed, we are working on the logical presumption that the real nature of the things is independent of what you, or I or any other individual happens to think. This assumption may turn out to be a poor account of the nature of what is real, but we are starting with a nominal definition that is based on common sense. In order to apply the pragmatic maxim, it will help to have some competing hypotheses. There are quite a number to pick from. Aquinas was responding to an ongoing controversy within the Catholic church, and we understand his arguments in terms of objections made by the likes of Luther. Let's keep things simple. Let me forward a metaphysical explanation. One possibility is that, when the words are uttered, no real changes take place in the bread and the wine themselves. The utterance of the words can definitely have an effect on the people who interpret those words. Everyone to the debate accepts that much. The question is, what is the meaning of saying 1-4 above? In particular, what is the import of the fourth provision? Can you conceive of any test that would separate the explanation Aquinas is offering from the hypothesis I've ventured to put forth? Aquinas insists that, as a matter of principle, there are no observable differences. If that is part of his explanation, I can't conceive of any test that would separate the competing explanations. Can you? If we can't, then there is no real difference in the respective meaning of the competing hypotheses. That is, Aquinas is using more words in (4), but he isn't really saying anything different than what is contained in my hypothesis. It might appear that, when we think about the familiar meanings of the words, that there is a difference, and there is. What is more, a careful analysis of the meanings of the conceptions used will show that the conceptions are distinct. Having said that, there are no real differences between the hypotheses insofar as they are considered to be scientific explanations. Real difference requires two things: a conceivable test th
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Ben & Listers, You wrote: Well, my experience with basic categorical thinking, even before I first read Peirce, has been that basic philosophical categories don't shed much light except in exchange for at least a little light shed upon them. To the extent that that's true, even for Peirceans the proof will take one back to the categories for some exploration. My comment: Speaking Of Categories I had a categorical discussion of sorts with my 3 year old grandson this morning. Whether interesting or frustrating, I will leave to you to decide. [I should mention that I have a rule that I have always enforced across the board with 3 year old & teenager children & grandchildren: NEVER ARGUE WITH THEIR TRUTHS. They already know everything and become very frustrated when someone suggests otherwise. ] Jordie pointed to a stuffed dog and asked: "Gramma, what this?" I mistakenly thought it was an actual question. "It's a dog." "No!" he said forcefully, "It's a pet!" "Yes," I agreed. "It's a pet that is a dog." "No! Not a dog! A pet!" "Then what about Roo (their dog)? Isn't Roo a pet!" "NO! Roo a dog!" he said even more emphatically, "Not a pet!" "Oh. I didn't know that before," I said quickly. I followed my rule and extricated myself from further discussion on the topic. So, we obviously have a little work ahead with Jordie on categories and levels of abstraction. But that conversation set me to wondering about the whole issue of how one's grasp of categories affects (or maybe effects) one's place in society. I've been trying to figure out why my oldest grandchildren (now 16 & 13) are so smart. Their mother, one of our adopted fetal alcohol affected children, has an excellent vocabulary & perfect grammar, despite an IQ hovering in the borderline retarded range (she cannot read or do math). Their father is not by any stretch the sharpest knife in any drawer and his grammar is rather poor. He reads only well enough to follow a recipe, which is much more than mom can do. Yet Aaron & Sara have their mother's vocabulary and grammar skills. Aaron was identified mathematically gifted in 2nd grade. He's in honors for most HS classes (though not in one of the best schools in town). Sara is doing terribly in school but reads and writes (fiction only) very well. (The schools in her area only value expository reading and writing right now, because they have to get their state test scores up. She says they give dumb topics for the writing portion of those tests. I'm sure they don't offer topics about vampires or werewolves, which would be her preference.) All of our 8 grandchildren are either the children of our various adopted children or, in the case of my biological child, adopted. They're all real smart. Which does not make sense, unless it has to do with categories. Even our two fetal alcohol damaged children have had the experiences & learned the categories and language that children from educated upper middle class backgrounds have (they were raised in Bill Gates' neighborhood). The two alcohol damaged girls (now 40 & 42) are on Social Security Disability, Medicare, Medicaid and participate in Arizona's remarkable program for the seriously mentally ill (SMI). Each lives on her own, has a payee who manages bills. They are teetotalers, keep close contact with the children, us, each other, their extended family and many friends. They help us out now that we're getting old and help my 89 year old mother too. And yet those two grandchildren are really, really smart as smart as all of the others who have smart parents. It must be categories, don't you think? Regards, Phyllis Phyllis, list, Thanks for your thoughtful and clear post. I'm a fellow "unreal" philosopher, but differ from you in that I've no professional occasion of connection with Peirce's thought at all. I remember years ago finding a discussion of the ways in which people mean things that they say, and it occurred to me that the ways seemed to correspond, ingeniously, to at least of some of Peirce's 10 trichotomies of signs in a letter to Lady Welby, and then I noticed that you were the author or one of the authors (this was long ago and I don't now know what article I was reading). Anyway, I'll attempt to form a few thoughts. I just skimmed some of Jeremiah McCarthy's Version 2.0 of "An Account of Peirce's Proof of Pragmatism" http://www.cspeirce.com/menu/library/aboutcsp/mccarthy/proof2.htm, so I may have been influenced by it. I'd say that (as McCarthy points out), for Peirce's proof of pragmatism (on which I'm no expert), one needs to know his ways of thinking. Insofar as one does not know his phaneroscopic categories, one will need to study them, and so, to the outsider pursuing the proof, they'll seem like part of the proof - a preparation at least. For Peirce, all (cenoscopic) philosophy, pure or applied, is phaneroscopic analysis. So one needs to think in a framework where phaneroscopy and, in particular,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
On 4/30/14, 5:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Real difference requires two things: a conceivable test that could be run, and an observable difference we would expect to see. Real difference means there is a potential test which would show this difference. If inquiry lasts long enough the test will become conceivable then executable, but in the mean time any real difference is having its so far unconfirmable effect. With no positive test results there is no reason to believe there is a difference except for the reason of pure hope, i.e., James's Will to Believe. But what drives this will? Is it the same thing that makes abductions correct more often than chance allows? Saying "With no positive test results there is no reason to believe," appears, on its surface, very rough and shoddy to me. Well before a concrete peer-reviewable test is run the inquirer runs many deductions and inductions in his head. These proto-tests, filling up a whole spectrum ranging from the obvious, those at the fore-front of the mind, to the occult, those way at the back of the mind, are all assessed by the person and guide his actions. So, does this potential test need to be so obvious that it can potentially be peer reviewable? Or, are its results sufficient even if its greatest possibility is that it can only reside in the occult end of our reasoning? (I had the Peirce-Jastrow experiment in the back of my mind while writing this. Maybe there's potential to use their conclusions to support or detract from my point.) -- Matt - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Listers, As i reread this posting late last night, I realized that I had jumped across a deep chasm from categories to a specific, and not particularly philosophical example. The posting did have a larger point though. I just failed to make it. I'm not sure I've nailed it here, but ere it is: What if, in terms of sentient beings, the very mobility of living things that are not plants suggests the need for and application of a sort of instinctive bio -phenomenologist template, so that survival &/or flourishing of a given organism depends to a great degree upon the mental template it applies to make sense of phenomena. And what if that template differs not only among species as a tool for manuvering within an umwelt, but also among groups of individuals within species? (Think bees and wolf packs) And what if the only strategy available from the template applied by most members of a given species (say 60-70%--maybe much more in certain species/contexts) relies upon replication, similar in form and application to crude induction. And what if only a much smaller %age have mental templates that allow them to deal effectively with novelty. And what if these templates, should they exist, were observable and turned out to be stable over time? And what if, in people, these templates had absolutely nothing to do with academic intelligence (e.g. IQ)? Because we have been observing the operation of these phenomenological templates for many years in people from various contexts, ages, intelligence levels, etc we've discovered some startling and confusing things. For one, most of the very high earners we've assessed belong to the replicator group; so do most of the criminals/delinquents. (This is is an operstional process instrument, not a moral assessment) We've found those who are complex thinkers; those who deal most effectively with novelty and potential opportunity (the Wozniac/Buffet types--and maybe Jobs) also find it difficult to deal with the replicators, who need them to stay ahead of the game, but micromanage them away. Criminals who deal with effectively with novelty tend to have the same excellent management skills as their business counterparts. However, IQ does matter. Our most cognitively impaired child is an habitual abductive/deductive-like thinker. She adapts easily to novelty and plans ahead for contingencies. Her non-genetically related brother, who manages a division in a large corporation and was identified as gifted in second grade, also deals with novelty in this way. Our second son, a straight A student through college, also non-genetically related to any of the others, makes more money each year than we'd need for a lifetime. And he is a replicator par-excellence. Our other two daughters, also adopted and unrelated, are replicators--one extraordinarily bright the other fetal alcohol affected and living on disability. When I taught the verbal version of Peirce's categories in the 1970s, I saw that those students of all template types did better as a group on standard tests inc SATs than students from other teachers in the school. Their templates didn't change but their ability to analyze and interpret increased significantly, as did writing ability. Which I am now wondering whether exposure to a broad range of enriched experiences and good grammar might do as well. Which brings me back to the two smart grandchildren with the low IQ mom & dad. And why I wonder whether it may have to do with having broadened their mother's exposure to phenomena in positive ways when she was growing up, though it did absolutely nothing to help her learn to read, etc. (And, yes there were tutors...many) on Phyllis Chiasson wrote: >Ben & Listers, > >You wrote: Well, my experience with basic categorical thinking, even before >I first read Peirce, has been that basic philosophical categories don't shed >much light except in exchange for at least a little light shed upon them. To >the extent that that's true, even for Peirceans the proof will take one back >to the categories for some exploration. > >My comment: Speaking Of Categories > >I had a categorical discussion of sorts with my 3 year old grandson this >morning. Whether interesting or frustrating, I will leave to you to decide. >[I should mention that I have a rule that I have always enforced across the >board with 3 year old & teenager children & grandchildren: NEVER ARGUE WITH >THEIR TRUTHS. They already know everything and become very frustrated when >someone suggests otherwise. ] > >Jordie pointed to a stuffed dog and asked: "Gramma, what this?" > >I mistakenly thought it was an actual question. "It's a dog." > >"No!" he said forcefully, "It's a pet!" > >"Yes," I agreed. "It's a pet that is a dog." > >"No! Not a dog! A pet!" > >"Then what about Roo (their dog)? Isn't Roo a pet!" > >"NO! Roo a dog!" he said even more emphatically, "Not a pet!" > >"Oh. I didn't know that before," I said quickly. I followed
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Jeffrey, List, Let me put it this way: Here are your two hypotheses: 1. The bread changes form without changing sensible effects. 2. The bread doesn’t change in form. What could possibly be the difference in one’s understanding of these? An answer “I don’t know” does not necessarily mean “nothing” because a person’s understanding of anything can range from the obvious to the occult. The difference in understandings might be too subtle to be readily explained, but according to Peircian optimism with enough time and persistent inquiry a real difference would be fleshed out. Matt On 5/1/14, 2:58 PM, Matt Faunce wrote: On 4/30/14, 5:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: Real difference requires two things: a conceivable test that could be run, and an observable difference we would expect to see. Real difference means there is a potential test which would show this difference. If inquiry lasts long enough the test will become conceivable then executable, but in the mean time any real difference is having its so far unconfirmable effect. With no positive test results there is no reason to believe there is a difference except for the reason of pure hope, i.e., James's Will to Believe. But what drives this will? Is it the same thing that makes abductions correct more often than chance allows? Saying "With no positive test results there is no reason to believe," appears, on its surface, very rough and shoddy to me. Well before a concrete peer-reviewable test is run the inquirer runs many deductions and inductions in his head. These proto-tests, filling up a whole spectrum ranging from the obvious, those at the fore-front of the mind, to the occult, those way at the back of the mind, are all assessed by the person and guide his actions. So, does this potential test need to be so obvious that it can potentially be peer reviewable? Or, are its results sufficient even if its greatest possibility is that it can only reside in the occult end of our reasoning? (I had the Peirce-Jastrow experiment in the back of my mind while writing this. Maybe there's potential to use their conclusions to support or detract from my point.) - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Jeffrey, Thank you for the explanatory context; it helps to see the entire issue explained. The echo of the different methods of the fixation of belief here would suggests that the pragmatic maxim is applicable only to science because that's the only method that would require making such practical distinctions using the phaneron. If the issue of transubstantiation cannot, by definition, be decided through any test, which indeed makes any assertions meaningless from the point of view of the method of science. Does this mean that any doubt that arises about the validity of the issue of transubstantiation can only be resolved through one of the other three methods? Or is Peirce saying that the lack of meaning of the proposition suggests that there is, in fact, nothing meaningful to doubt in the first place? Another way to ask this question is: What role did Peirce think that science (as he defined science) should play in the development of religious thought? Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: > Mara, Phyllis, List, > > In order to understand the point of the example concerning > transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good > candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The > Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I > suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. > Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify > scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is > making as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims > as a development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of > the assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood > illustrate more general principles of how the substantial identity of > existing things can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. > > Here is a short summary of a few key points: > > 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It > is not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, > the bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a > new kind of thing. > 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ > himself is the agent of the change. > 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere > else, and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine > are changed into the form of body and blood. > 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do > not change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of > the observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. > > Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the > blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special > type of words spoken by a special type of person?" Notice that the habit > of how the sacrament is interpreted is not part of Aquinas's explanation of > what really taking place when the sacrament is being delivered. Insofar as > we are interested in questions about the real nature of the bread and wine > themselves when the sacrament is performed, we are working on the logical > presumption that the real nature of the things is independent of what you, > or I or any other individual happens to think. This assumption may turn > out to be a poor account of the nature of what is real, but we are starting > with a nominal definition that is based on common sense. > > In order to apply the pragmatic maxim, it will help to have some competing > hypotheses. There are quite a number to pick from. Aquinas was responding > to an ongoing controversy within the Catholic church, and we understand his > arguments in terms of objections made by the likes of Luther. Let's keep > things simple. Let me forward a metaphysical explanation. One possibility > is that, when the words are uttered, no real changes take place in the > bread and the wine themselves. The utterance of the words can definitely > have an effect on the people who interpret those words. Everyone to the > debate accepts that much. The question is, what is the meaning of saying > 1-4 above? In particular, what is the import of the fourth provision? Can > you conceive of any test that would separate the explanation Aquinas is > offering from the hypothesis I've ventured to put forth? Aquinas insists > that, as a matter of principle, there are no observable differences. If > that is part of his explanation, I can't conceive of any test that would > separate the competing explanations. Can you? If we can't, then there is > no real difference in the respective meaning of the competing hypotheses. > That is, Aquinas is using more words in (4), but he isn't really saying > anythin
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Hello all, I’ve been following with interest this thread on the proof (or otherwise) of pragmatism. I really liked Jeff D’s careful analysis of Peirce’s use of the transubstantiation issue to illustrate the pragmatic maxim. Mara made good points about how religious beliefs may nonetheless affect our practices in a ‘sideways’ manner, but I thought Jeff managed to show that transubstantiation with its in-principle unverifiability of the bloodiness of the wine provides an uniquely clean target for Peirce’s early pragmatism. Perhaps one might put the issue by saying that Aquinas’s claim of transubstantiation is ‘pseudo-scientific’, and thus in some sense not even truly religious. Jeremiah – thank you for the link to your paper on this. I just read through Kees’ explanation of the proof of pragmatism and I don’t quite follow it. On p. 119 the argument seems to be presented as: Peirce presents pragmatism as “the logic of abduction”, pragmatism is the *entire* logic of abduction, pragmatism cannot affect deduction or induction. Is this enough to **prove** pragmatism in any sense? Can anyone help me out here? A long time ago I read a paper by Richard Robin which I really liked in which he argued that the true proof of pragmatism will be the actual community of inquiry as it (if it!) goes about its business of increasing the world’s concrete reasonableness. Possibly the scholar who has had the most goes at explicating the proof of pragmatism is Chris Hookway. See for instance, in his latest book, chapter 9, “The Principle of Pragmatism: Peirce’s Formulations and Examples”, and chapter 11, “How Peirce Argued for his Pragmatist Maxim”. He is always careful and worth reading. Cheers, Cathy *From:* Mara Woods [mailto:mara.wo...@gmail.com] *Sent:* Saturday, 3 May 2014 3:27 p.m. *To:* Jeffrey Brian Downard *Cc:* Peirce-L *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Jeffrey, Thank you for the explanatory context; it helps to see the entire issue explained. The echo of the different methods of the fixation of belief here would suggests that the pragmatic maxim is applicable only to science because that's the only method that would require making such practical distinctions using the phaneron. If the issue of transubstantiation cannot, by definition, be decided through any test, which indeed makes any assertions meaningless from the point of view of the method of science. Does this mean that any doubt that arises about the validity of the issue of transubstantiation can only be resolved through one of the other three methods? Or is Peirce saying that the lack of meaning of the proposition suggests that there is, in fact, nothing meaningful to doubt in the first place? Another way to ask this question is: What role did Peirce think that science (as he defined science) should play in the development of religious thought? Mara Woods M.A., Semiotics -- University of Tartu On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 5:52 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: Mara, Phyllis, List, In order to understand the point of the example concerning transubstantiation, it would help to have a clear target in mind. One good candidate is the position Aquinas takes (e.g., in Summa Theologica and The Quodlibetal Questions). Once the theses and arguments are made clear, I suspect that it will be easier to understand the points Peirce is making. Given the fact that the pragmatic maxim is being used by Peirce to clarify scientific conceptions, it will help to think of the claims Aquinas is making as a series of metaphysical assertions. Aquinas presents the claims as a development of Aristotle's metaphysics, so that seems fair. Each of the assertions about the bread and the body and the wine and blood illustrate more general principles of how the substantial identity of existing things can change--and how God can be the cause of those changes. Here is a short summary of a few key points: 1. The bread and wine are substantially changed into body and blood. It is not a mere symbolic change in terms of what they mean to us. Rather, the bread and the wine are themselves quite literally transformed into a new kind of thing. 2. This happens through the sacrament delivered by the priest, but Christ himself is the agent of the change. 3. When the changes occur, the bread and wine are not moved somewhere else, and they are not annihilated. Rather, the form of the bread and wine are changed into the form of body and blood. 4. The accidental properties of what they look, smell and taste like do not change. That would be repulsive for creatures like us. Rather, all of the observable properties stay the same--only the form has changed. Mara, you ask: "What about the habit of interpreting wine as becoming the blood of Christ when in the type of setting, and preceded by the special type of words spoken by a special type of person?"
RE: [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology
Phyllis, I just want to add to what Gary R has already said that you don’t need to offer any kind of apology for not being an academic philosopher and discussing Peirce on the peirce-l!. The true sense of the term ‘amateur’ in ‘amateur philosopher’ is something Joe R was always concerned to encourage. (I’ve written more about this in the Introduction to the Transactions special issue “Joseph Ransdell and his Legacy” which is just published ;-)) You have always been a worthy interlocutor on this list, Phyllis. Thank you for the richness of your discussion of this chapter. Cathy *From:* Phyllis Chiasson [mailto:ath...@olympus.net] *Sent:* Tuesday, 29 April 2014 9:17 a.m. *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu *Subject:* [PEIRCE-L] Chapter 7.2.1 The Proof of Pragmatism & Phenomenology Listers I would like to approach this section about Kee’s discussion of the ‘proof of pragmatism’ backwards--from experience to theory. I came into my understanding of pragmatism in this way and still find it difficult to analyze from the other direction. I’ve many years of practical experience with these concepts (15 of the nearly 40 years pre any knowledge that they WERE concepts, let alone Peircean). This experience still shapes the way I am most able to think clearly about these issues. In 1975, circumstances that left me without any other materials with which to teach junior and senior language arts students forced me to make use of a set of unused workbooks called, “Creative Analysis,” by Albert Upton. Once my students and I made it through the first three sections of that workbook, we all (me included) had learned to qualify (affective, sensory, rational), to analyze based upon diagrams developed by deliberate qualitative choices and to understand and apply the immensely complex construct that Upton simply called “Signs.” So, I feel that everyone should know that I am not a ‘real’ philosopher—my only credentials are that I was able to write my first book (and everything else) in isolation (I have still never met a formally trained Peircean in the flesh). I started my first book pre-searchable discs, using only my limited collection (3 anthologies) of Peirce’s writings, a few well-answered questions from Dr. Ransdell, Cathy Legg (and some amiable Deweyans) and what I knew (know) from Creative Analysis, as well as a non-verbal assessment of Peirce-based non-verbal inference patterns, which I also did not know was based on Peirce. If Howard Callaway had not read an early snippet from the manuscript and suggested I send it to Rodopi via him when it was complete & if John Shook had not refereed that manuscript and accepted it for publication, that first book would probably still be just a manuscript. If I had not made an online (and now actual and close) friend of Jayne Tristan (a Deweyan) who vetted my manuscript for philosophical trigger words—like “necessary,” I would probably have made a complete fool of myself. (I still worry a lot about that, but should probably just say *dayenu* here). Thus, it is from this perspective of an aging and experience-based amateur that I invite Peirce-l to join me in this excellent adventure. Kee’s points out that any “…proof should begin with phaneroscopy and then run through the normative sciences.” I understand this as meaning that the proof of pragmatism begins with a close examination of the qualities (potential as well as actual) of phanera (as facts and occurrences). Peirce says that an occurrence is “a slice of the Universe [that] can never be known or even imagined in all its infinite detail” and that every fact within every occurrence is “inseparably combined with an infinite swarm of circumstances, which make no part of the fact itself” (Rosenthal, 1994, pp. 5-6). Peirce points out that a fact, which can be extracted from this swarm of circumstances by means of thought, is only so much of reality as can be represented by a proposition (Rosenthal, 1994, p. 5). One aspect of preparing a proposition for testing is determining which factors within the swarm of circumstances matter and which do not. It seems that the call for the proof of pragmatism to begin with phaneroscopy speaks to the examination of relevant properties (qualities of affect, sense, reason) of whatever fact is under consideration. Since Peirce allows for comparison & contrast, as well as sorting (and by implication) diagrammatic thinking (as a perceptual, rather than a logical judgment) in this non-normative branch of philosophy, it seems there is much “work” that a phenomenologist can do here before engaging the normative sciences, in particular, logic as semiotic (the semiotic paradigm) to craft the theoretical construct. It seems to me that the individual “strands” of the rope are discovered and explored within phaneroscopy, based upon their qualities and their possible relevance to something &/or one another. Only then would they be tested against norms before being added to the
