Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 (was Philosophy of EGs
Jon Alen, list, I don't see how the quote you provide could lead to the insetion of 'of the scroll' after interpretation. I don't see any reason for it in that text. It is very well posssible and more probable given the remark on common sense and logicians that Peirce was pointing to a curiosity that follows from FOL from an interpretative or pragmatic perspective and looked at the matter in those quotes from the outside. best, Auke > Op 23 augustus 2020 om 0:19 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt > : > > Auke, All: > > > > > AvB: The interesting word being the emphasized > interpretation. Jon Alen inserts in his comment 'of the scroll' just after > interpretation. I do not know on what grounds. > > > > > > Here is what comes right before the quoted passage. > > > > > CSP: A conditional proposition is false only if the > condition of it is satisfied, while the consequent is falsified. For the > proposition asserts nothing at all in case the condition is not satisfied. So > then it is only if the condition is satisfied, while the consequent is > falsified, that the conditional proposition is false. But a proposition that > is not false is true. ... This reasoning is irrefragable as long as a mere > possibility is treated as an absolute nullity. Some years ago, however, when > in consequence of an invitation to deliver a course of lectures in Harvard > University upon Pragmatism, I was led to revise that doctrine, in which I had > already found difficulties, I soon discovered, upon a critical analysis, that > it was absolutely necessary to insist upon and bring to the front, the truth > that a mere possibility may be quite real. That admitted, it can no longer be > granted that every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen > to be realized is true, and the whole reasoning just given breaks down. (R > 490:23-26, 1906) > > > > > > As I explained before, the interpretation that Peirce deems to be "too > narrow" in light of "the truth that a mere possibility may be quite real" is > that "every conditional proposition whose antecedent does not happen to be > realized is true." Since "the verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs > represents a universe of possibilities," not just the denial of actuality, a > consequence (scroll) is not strictly equivalent to a composite of two > negations (nested cuts); he later explicitly reaffirms this in "The Bed-Rock > Beneath Pragmaticism" (R 300:48-50[47-51], 1908). Technically it only > affects the revised Gamma EGs that use tinctures for different modalities > rather than broken cuts, not Beta EGs that use shading but still conform to > classical first-order logic as explained in R 670 and RL 231, unless the > latter are adapted for intuitionistic logic. > > > > > AvB: At the very least it is not necessary to evaluate > the issue in terms of L231. The dicision of what is obsolete or not must be > based on a reality check and the context of his thought and experiences. Not > on what is written last. > > > > > > I strongly agree. While I generally give more weight to Peirce's later > writings as presumably reflecting his more considered views, this does not > warrant summarily dismissing his earlier writings as "irrelevant and > obsolete." Such an approach would be no more legitimate than relying > entirely on earlier passages and ignoring the later ones. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran > Christianhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt > -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Sat, Aug 22, 2020 at 11:44 AM Auke van Breemen < > peirce-l@list.iupui.edu mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu > wrote: > > > > > > John, Jon Alen, list, > > > > I am not interested in what might be the final version Peirce wrote > > on the negation vs scroll isue. Even if John is right, the interesting > > point that remains is not the actual history of Peirce's thought, but the > > systematic problem it poses. It remainds me of Hempels confirmation > > paradox. Jon Alen arguing the Peirce did not fall pry to it and John that > > he did. > > > > Jon Alen provided an interesting quote: > > > > CSP: I often think that we logicians are the most obtuse of men, > > and the most devoid of common sense. As soon as I saw that this strange > > rule, so foreign to the general idea of the System of Existential Graphs, > > could by no means be deduced from the other rules, nor from the general > > idea of the system, but has to be accepted, if at all, as an arbitrary > > first principle,--I ought to have poked myself, and should have asked > > myself if I had not been afflicted with the logician’s bêtise, What compels > > the adoption of this rule? The answer to that must have been that the > >
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 (was Philosophy of EGs
John, All: JFS: My guess: He reviewed his earlier writings on EGs, especially the ones from 1903 and 1906. The content of R670 and L231 shows what he rejected. No, it shows what he chose to *emphasize *in June 1911. He did not explicitly *reject *anything that he had written previously about EGs until December 1911, and even then he *endorsed *"the better exposition of 1903" for distinguishing the *Alpha*, *Beta*, and *Gamma* parts. JFS: The writings prior to June 1911 have some useful insights mixed with some obsolete material. It's necessary to evaluate them in terms of L231. This straightforwardly begs the question, since at issue is whether RL 231 is Peirce's *definitive *treatment of EGs. It is also necessary to evaluate RL 231 in terms of his earlier writings about EGs. JFS: All those quotations are prior to June 1911. They're irrelevant and obsolete. The first sentence states a fact. The second sentence states an opinion, and I obviously disagree. JAS: In R 669 (May 1911), he notes--just three weeks before composing RL 231--that necessary reasoning is possible without the concept of falsity, while negation is shorthand for implying the absurdity that "every proposition is true." JFS: No, for several reasons: (1) That is not an exact quotation, since Peirce knew that affirmation and negation are fundamental to every version of logic from Aristotle onward. Okay, here is the exact quotation. CSP: It was forced upon the logician’s attention that a certain development of reasoning was possible before, or as if before, the concept of *falsity *had ever been framed, or any recognition of such a thing as a false assertion had ever taken place. Probably every human being passes through such a grade of intellectual life, which may be called the state of paradisaical logic, when reasoning takes place but when the idea of falsity, whether in assertion or in inference, has never been recognized. But it will soon be recognized that not every assertion is true; and that once recognized, as soon as one notices that if a certain thing were true, every assertion would be true, one at once rejects the antecedent that lead to that absurd consequence. (R 669:18-19[16-17], May 31, 1911) I stand by my summary accordingly. JFS: (2) Peirce had forgotten his 1884 point that all reasoning can be done with just insertions and deletions (W 5:107). I find this highly implausible, unless we are likewise going to entertain the possibility that he also somehow had forgotten his c. 1906 "confession" that omitting the blackened inner close from a cut (or shading) for negation was an "error" (CP 4.564n). It seems much more likely that he deliberately *decided *to simplify his explanation of *Beta *EGs in R 670 and then RL 231, accepting the trade-off of making it less analytical by omitting the step of deriving negation from consequence. JFS: Although Peirce said that the version of 1903 was better than the version of 1906, it still has obsolete passages, such as the comments about the scroll. Again, whether those passages are "obsolete" is a matter of opinion, unless the missing pages from Peirce's December 1911 letter to Risteen turn up someday and shed further light on his views about EGs at that later date. JFS: With that explanation and further confirmation in L231, every previous comment about scrolls is obsolete and irrelevant. Repeating the same assertion over and over is not a persuasive argument. Besides, here is a relevant remark by Peirce from his entry for "negation" in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. CSP: Out of the conceptions of non-relative deductive logic, such as consequence, coexistence or composition, aggregation, incompossibility, negation, etc., it is only necessary to select two, and almost any two at that, to have the material needed for defining the others. What ones are to be selected is a question the decision of which transcends the function of this branch of logic. (CP 2.379, 1902) For "non-relative deductive logic," which corresponds to *Alpha *EGs, we can choose just about any two of consequence (scroll), coexistence (blank), aggregation (multiple nested cuts), incompossibility (multiple graphs inside a cut), and negation (cut) as the primitives, then derive the other two. The same is true of first-order predicate logic, which corresponds to *Beta *EGs, with identity (line) as the third primitive. It makes little (if any) difference *within *those classical systems which two we choose, so we are free to prioritize either making EGs *simpler *as Peirce did in 1911 or making them *more analytical* as he did in most of his earlier treatments. I prefer the latter because it facilitates taking a further step toward *Gamma *EGs with tinctures as in R 490 (1906), or toward *Intuitionistic *EGs with no excluded middle as Arnold Oostra has outlined. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher,
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 (was Philosophy of EGs
John, Jon Alen, list, I am not interested in what might be the final version Peirce wrote on the negation vs scroll isue. Even if John is right, the interesting point that remains is not the actual history of Peirce's thought, but the systematic problem it poses. It remainds me of Hempels confirmation paradox. Jon Alen arguing the Peirce did not fall pry to it and John that he did. Jon Alen provided an interesting quote: CSP: I often think that we logicians are the most obtuse of men, and the most devoid of common sense. As soon as I saw that this strange rule, so foreign to the general idea of the System of Existential Graphs, could by no means be deduced from the other rules, nor from the general idea of the system, but has to be accepted, if at all, as an arbitrary first principle,--I ought to have poked myself, and should have asked myself if I had not been afflicted with the logician’s bêtise, What compels the adoption of this rule? The answer to that must have been that the interpretation requires it; and the inference of common sense from that answer would have been that the interpretation was too narrow. Yet I did not think of that until my operose method like that of a hydrographic surveyor sounding out a harbour, suddenly brought me up to the important truth that the verso of the sheet of Existential Graphs represents a universe of possibilities. This, taken in connection with other premisses led me back to the same conclusion to which my studies of Pragmatism had already brought me, the reality of some possibilities. (R 490:26-28, CP 4.581,1906) -- The interesting word being the emphasized interpretation. Jon Alen inserts in his comment 'of the scroll' just after interpretation. I do not know on what grounds. It can be read as 'the movement of thought' being different when thinking something in a scroll or a double negation form. The context, logicians devoid of common sense, seems to point to a perspective wider than the strict formal logical. John wrote: Familiarity does not imply agreement. The writings prior to June 1911 have some useful insights mixed with some obsolete material. It's necessary to evaluate them in terms of L231. -- At the very least it is not necessary to evaluate the issue in terms of L231. The dicision of what is obsolete or not must be based on a reality check and the context of his thought and experiences. Not on what is written last. Best, Auke > Op 22 augustus 2020 om 6:47 schreef "John F. Sowa" : > > > Jon AS, List > > This thread began with my note of August 2nd, which I include below in > the file 2aug20.txt. All the points in that note are based on the citations > included in it. But I changed the subject line of this note to emphasize > Peirce's fundamental insight of 2 June 1911 shortly after 7:40 pm. > > That was when Peirce finished writing two of his three "Illative > Permissions" in R669. He then wrote a short paragraph with a few lines at > the top of a new page. And he stopped. > > He did not write the third permission (about double negations), he left > most of the sheet blank, and he never resumed R669. Three questions: Why > did he stop when he had enough paper to write the third permission? Why did > he begin a completely new version of EGs in R670 with different notation and > terminology? And what did he do in the time between June 2 and June 7? > > My guess: He reviewed his earlier writings on EGs, especially the ones > from 1903 and 1906. The content of R670 and L231 shows what he rejected. > His comments in L378 and L376 show that he considered the presentation in > 1906 "as bad as it could be". But his comments in R670 show that he > considered some combination of shading with tinctured areas as possible. > That would be an option for Delta graphs, as I mentioned in an earlier note. > > JAS> understanding the entire system of EGs requires familiarity with all > his different writings about them. > > Familiarity does not imply agreement. The writings prior to June 1911 > have some useful insights mixed with some obsolete material. It's necessary > to evaluate them in terms of L231. > > JFS> There is no need to derive negation from anything else. > > JAS> Peirce repeatedly says otherwise, as I have repeatedly > demonstrated.. > > All those quotations are prior to June 1911. They're irrelevant and > obsolete. > > JAS> In R 669 (May 1911), he notes--just three weeks before composing RL > 231--that necessary reasoning is possible without the concept of falsity > > No, for several reasons: (1) That is not an exact quotation, since > Peirce knew that affirmation and negation are fundamental to every version of > logic from Aristotle onward. (2) Peirce had forgotten his 1884 point that all > reasoning can be done with just insertions and deletions (W 5:107). And > Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911
[PEIRCE-L] Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 (was Philosophy of EGs
Jon AS, List This thread began with my note of August 2nd, which I include below in the file 2aug20.txt. All the points in that note are based on the citations included in it. But I changed the subject line of this note to emphasize Peirce's fundamental insight of 2 June 1911 shortly after 7:40 pm. That was when Peirce finished writing two of his three "Illative Permissions" in R669. He then wrote a short paragraph with a few lines at the top of a new page. And he stopped. He did not write the third permission (about double negations), he left most of the sheet blank, and he never resumed R669. Three questions: Why did he stop when he had enough paper to write the third permission? Why did he begin a completely new version of EGs in R670 with different notation and terminology? And what did he do in the time between June 2 and June 7? My guess: He reviewed his earlier writings on EGs, especially the ones from 1903 and 1906. The content of R670 and L231 shows what he rejected. His comments in L378 and L376 show that he considered the presentation in 1906 "as bad as it could be". But his comments in R670 show that he considered some combination of shading with tinctured areas as possible. That would be an option for Delta graphs, as I mentioned in an earlier note. JAS> understanding the entire system of EGs requires familiarity with all his different writings about them. Familiarity does not imply agreement. The writings prior to June 1911 have some useful insights mixed with some obsolete material. It's necessary to evaluate them in terms of L231. JFS> There is no need to derive negation from anything else. JAS> Peirce repeatedly says otherwise, as I have repeatedly demonstrated.. All those quotations are prior to June 1911. They're irrelevant and obsolete. JAS> In R 669 (May 1911), he notes--just three weeks before composing RL 231--that necessary reasoning is possible without the concept of falsity No, for several reasons: (1) That is not an exact quotation, since Peirce knew that affirmation and negation are fundamental to every version of logic from Aristotle onward. (2) Peirce had forgotten his 1884 point that all reasoning can be done with just insertions and deletions (W 5:107). And Peirce's discovery of 2 June 1911 makes the earlier quotations irrelevant. JAS> This (R 466:18-19, 1903) comes from one of Peirce's notebooks for the Lowell Lectures, which in RL 376 (December 1911) he calls "the better exposition" of EGs than "Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism" (1906). The three primitives are thus consequence (scroll), coexistence (blank), and identity (line) Although Peirce said that the version of 1903 was better than the version of 1906, it still has obsolete passages, such as the comments about the scroll. In R670, he writes "There are but three peculiar signs that the Syntax of Existential Graphs absolutely requires." The first is the line of identity. The, the second is the spot, which may be a medad or it may have one or more pegs. "The third is one that shall deny a Graph instance, or scribed assertion." With that explanation and further confirmation in L231, every previous comment about scrolls is obsolete and irrelevant. At this point, I rest my case. I stand by the attached 2aug20.txt and the additional comments above. Any relevant evidence to the contrary would have to come from documents later than June 1911. John To: ahti-veikko.pietari...@ttu.ee, francesco.belluc...@unibo.it, jonalanschm...@gmail.com> `` cc: "De Waal, Cornelis" , Martin Irvine Dear Ahti, Francesco, and Jon, I have long maintained that Peirce's best and final version of the syntax, semantics (endoporeutic), rules of inference, and terminology for EGs is in L231 and NEM 3.162-169. But Jon quoted some comments by Ahti that seem to contradict that claim. Instead of debating them on Peirce-L, I'd like to discuss the issues with this smaller group. First, I'll summarize my reasons for claiming that the copy in http://jfsowa.com/peirce/eg1911.pdf should be considered the most definitive: 1. By 1911, Peirce had abandoned hope of publishing a final version, but he knew that Lady Welby and her correspondents circulated letters among a group of well-respected philosophers and logicians. He considered the letter L231 to be as significant as a formal publication. 2. EG1911 is the clearest, shortest, and most elegant summary of Alpha + Beta. The shaded areas can be generalized to 3-D regions or to 4-D for stereoscopic moving images. Aspects of Gamma or Delta graphs could be added without changing the Alpha + Beta foundation. And eg1911 has a short, but complete selection of technical terms that could be adapted to a wide range of notations in any number of dimensions. 3. In L231, Peirce replaced the term 'illative transformation' with the term 'permission'. Perhaps he realized that the words 'illative' and 'illation' had become archaic.
