[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and immediate object)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Jeff, List:

Again, I am shifting this exchange to the new thread.

First of all, CP 1.537 is from 1903, when Peirce still thought of semiosis
as an "infinite series" of Signs in both directions.  By 1906 (CP 4.536),
he recognized that some Signs *do not* have other Signs as their
Interpretants--they have feelings or exertions as their Interpretants
instead.  By 1907 ("Pragmatism"), he further recognized that even
intellectual Signs have "ultimate logical interpretants" that are *not *Signs;
rather, they are habits (or habit-changes).

Moving on, my initial answer to your question is as follows.

   - The II of the first Sign is internal to it.
   - The DI of the first Sign *is *the second Sign, which has its own II
   that is internal to it and not necessarily identical to the first Sign's II.
   - The FI of the first Sign is also the FI of the second Sign.
   - The second Sign may or may not have a DI; and if it does, that DI can
   be a feeling, an exertion, or a third Sign.

The II, DI, and FI are not three *parts *of one Interpretant, but three
*aspects* of it.  In my current model, the II is its Form, the DI is its
Matter, and the FI is its Entelechy.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 8:27 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Gary R, Jon S, Gary F, List,
>
> Here is a question. Consider the following definition of the sign, which
> is consistent with what Peirce says in a number of places:
>
> A sign stands *for *something *to *the idea which it produces, or modifies.
> Or, it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something from without. That for
> which it stands is called its *object; *that which it conveys, its
> *meaning; *and the idea to which it gives rise, its *interpretant. *The
> object of representation can be nothing but a representation of which the
> first representation is the interpretant. But an endless series of
> representations, each representing the one behind it, may be conceived to
> have an absolute object at its limit. The meaning of a representation can be
> nothing but a representation. In fact, it is nothing but the
> representation itself conceived as stripped of irrelevant clothing. But
> this clothing never can be completely stripped off; it is only changed
> for something more diaphanous. So there is an infinite regression here.
> Finally, the *interpretant is nothing but another representation to* *which
> the torch of truth is handed along; and as representation, it has its
> interpretant* *again. Lo, another infinite series*.
>
> For starters, let us focus on the last sentence, which I have highlighted
> in bold and underline. If an interpretant functions as a sign in relation
> to some further interpretant, what is the implication of saying that there
> are three interpretants, the immediate, dynamical and final? Peirce says
> that in the process of cognition by agents who are relatively
> self-controlled, that the sign is thought playing the part of firstness,
> while the object is thought playing the role of secondness, while
> the interpretant is thought playing the part of thirdness. (CP 1.537)
>
> If this sounds odd to you, especially when thinking about the object, then
> consider the case where the object is something like a number, which is an
> idealized object formed by a process of hypostatic abstraction. In this
> kind of case of hypostatic abstraction, which is not by any means limited
> to mathematical objects, what was once a predicate comes to serve as the
> object for some further interpretant. Having made this point about the
> object, let's set it to the side and focus on the relation between signs
> and interpretants.
>
> In order to keep things straight, let's label things by saying that the
> object, sign and interpretant in the first case are each labelled
> level (1), and in the next stage where the interpretant is now serving as a
> sign in relation to some further interpretant, the sign, object and
> interpretant are at level (2). What is the implication of describing the
> interpretant (at level 1) that also functions as a sign (at level 2) in
> this way? The interpretant in level (1) is thought playing the part of
> thirdness (i.e., a genuine triad) with respect to the sign that it is
> serving to interpret, but that same interpretant/sign at level (2) has the
> character of firstness (i.e., a monadic character) with respect to
> its level (2) interpretant.
>
> Here is the question:  what is the implication with respect to the
> character of the sign and interpretant at each level? That is, the
> interpretant at level (1) has three parts (immediate, dynamical and final)
> in its relation to the level (1) sign it interprets, but then it does not
> appear to have three parts when it is serving as a sign at 

[PEIRCE-L] Re: Triad vs. Triadic Relation (was Direct experience and immediate object)

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

 Gary R., List:

I am shifting this exchange to the new thread where I posted the diagram.

I would not (yet) say that the IO and II are *sufficient *to constitute the
Sign; there may still be some remainder when they are analytically
distinguished from it.  However, I have come to realize that we should *not
*use the term "Representamen" for that leftover part, because Peirce never
did--or even came close to doing so.

I do not understand why you find it peculiar that only one of the three
Interpretants is internal to the Sign.  After all, only one of the two
Objects is internal to the Sign.  Moreover, not *every *Interpretant of a
Sign is "a more developed version of that self-same Sign"; in *some *cases,
the DI is a feeling, and in others, it is an exertion (cf. CP 4.536;
1906).  Even when the DI *is *a Sign, it is a *different *Sign from the one
for which it serves as the Interpretant--i.e., it is external to that
*previous *Sign.  As for the FI, since it is a *would-be* that need
not *actually
*come to pass, it *cannot *be internal to the Sign.

I am speaking somewhat loosely here, because semiosis is a *continuous
*process;
we can break it down into these discrete stages only for the sake of
analysis.  As you may remember, the notion of overlapping was more apparent
in my earlier diagrams, in which I tried to represent the three Quasi-minds
involved in any instance of concrete semiosis--the Utterer, the
Interpreter, and the Commens as their intersection.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
 - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Jun 25, 2018 at 7:33 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> After studying again the attachment of your model of semiosic
> determination you resent, I'm beginning to better understand what confused
> me about it earlier. I would recommend that anyone interested in this topic
> take another look at it as it has (at least for me) been much clarified
> through this recent discussion, but only, as it were, 'retrospectively'. My
> quarter hour or so study of your diagram today, again in light of this
> threaded discussion, finally allowed me to grasp what I hadn't quite
> comprehended about your model earlier.
>
> So, if I understand you correctly: 1. the Object certainly yet determines
> 2. the Sign which 3. determines possible Interpretant Signs.
>
> However, in your model 1. the Object which determines the Sign is the
> Dynamic Object, and 2. both the Immediate Object and the Immediate
> Interpretant are internal to the Sign and in some way constitute--*are *the
> Sign--which Sign 3. determines the other Interpretants. Is this correct?
>
> If so then there is the peculiarity that one of the Interpretants, the Ii,
> is internal to the Sign while the other possible Interpretants (the Id and
> If) are external to it. That the two Interpretants other than the Ii are
> diagrammed outside the Sign now becomes for me somewhat problematic since
> an Interpretant is itself a more developed version of that self-same Sign
> albeit tending toward meaning.
>
> 1909 | Essays on Meaning. Preface | MS [R] 640:9
>
> By the *Interpretant* of a Sign is meant all that the Sign can signify,
> mean, or itself convey of new, in contradistinction to what it may
> stimulate the observer to find out otherwise, as for example, by new
> experience, or by recollecting former experiences.
>
>
> and
>
> 1908 | Letters to Lady Welby | SS 83
>
> It is usual and proper to distinguish two Objects of a Sign, the Mediate
> without, and the Immediate within the Sign. Its Interpretant is all that
> the Sign conveys: acquaintance with its Object must be gained by
> collateral experience.
>
>
> At the moment I think that there ought to be some kind of diagrammatic
> overlapping of the Sign and the more developed Sign which it determines,
> namely, its Interpretant Sign. Now the Id and If appear to be outside the
> Sign as much as is the DO, and I don't think that's quite right.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *718 482-5690*
>

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