Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, List,

You wrote:


"To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that."

 

I have a guess about that: I remember from a thread with Jon Awbrey about relation reduction something like the following:

A triadic relation is called irreducible, because it cannot compositionally be reduced to three dyadic relations. Compositional reduction is the real kind of reduction. But there is another kind of reduction, called projective (or projectional?) reduction, which is a kind of consolation prize for people, who want to reduce. It is possible for some triadic relations.

Now a triadic relation, say, (S,O,I) might be reduced projectionally to (S,O), (O,I), (I,S).

My guess is now, that Peirce uses another kind of projectional reduction: (S,S), (S,O), (S,I).

It is only a guess, because I am not a mathematician. But at least I would say, that mathematically a relation wit itself is possible, so the representamen relation can be called relation too, instead of correlate.

Best,

Helmut


 

 13. April 2017 um 15:40 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Edwina, List:
 

Again, my understanding is that the three-spoke diagram represents one triadic relation.  As such, it corresponds to only one of the ten trichotomies of 1908--the very last one, "the Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamical Object and to its Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), which divides the Sign "As to the Nature of the Assurance of the Utterance" (EP 2:490) into Instinct/Experience/Form.  Hence the spokes themselves are all in the same mode, even though the correlates at their ends and the dyadic relations between those correlates can be in different modes.

 

By contrast, the three trichotomies of 1903 are for "the sign in itself" as Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign, "the relation of the sign to its Object" as Icon/Index/Symbol, and how "its Interpretant represents it" as Rheme/Dicent/Argument (EP 2:291-292).  Peirce subsequently characterized the latter as "the Relation of the Sign to the Normal Interpretant" (EP 2:483), but I have been suggesting recently that it should be associated instead with the relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant.

 

To be honest, given that the Sign relation is genuinely triadic, I have never fully understood why Peirce initially classified Signs on the basis of one correlate and two dyadic relations.  Perhaps others on the List can shed some light on that.

 

Regards,

 

Jon S.






 




 

On Wed, Apr 12, 2017 at 6:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Jon, list - thanks for your comments. A rapid response:

1) The reason I stick to the three relations - see Peirce's 8.335,8.337 comments on the relations to the Dynamic Object, Relations to the Interpretant..but the reason is that each of the three 'spikes' so to speak, can be in a different modal category. So, in a rhematic indexical legisign, the Representamen spoke can be in Thirdness; the relation to the Dynamic Object in a mode of Secondness; the relation to the Dy. Interpretant in a mode of Firstness. That's why I refer to relations in the plural. These interactions most certainly are NOT independent - and my use of the plural of RelationS doesn't imply their independence. Instead, it implies their modal differentiation within this singular semiosic interaction.

2) The problem I have with the linear image of the movement from DO to DI...and Peirce often uses it, which is one relation with three correlates, is that I also am interested in the morphological result of the semiosis. Not simply in the passing of X via Y to Z. But the physiological FORM.  That is - referring to my oft-quoted 4.551 'Mind ..in crystal, in the work of bees'...etc... I am considering that the Sign, that triad, takes on a FORM. This FORM is the full Sign. So, a cell - let's say a single cell - is the semiosic Form, a Sign. This is the result of the interaction of the Representamen HABITS interacting with many Dynamic Objects [water, nutrients, chemicals, etc etc]...which are then transformed via the HABITS held within the Representamen into the Dynamic Interpretant - that CELL. BUT - all three parts of this whole FORM/SIGN must be operative in this semiosic process:   The input from the various multiple Dynamic Interpretants.transformed via the general rules held by the Representamenresulting in the Dynamic Interpretant FORM of the whole system...that particular cell.

Edwina

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On Wed 12/04/17 6:33 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:


Edwina, List:
 


ET:  A large issue is the definition of 'sign'. Is it the representamen alone? Or is it the triad of the Immediate Object-Represntamen-Immediate Interpretant? 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs and the principle of individuation

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, List,

did I get it right, that "individuation" is just a thought-experiment about what and how a thing (or law...) would be, if it was totally rid of any representation? just, what a "thing in itself" would be: Something incomprehensible for the scholastic doctors, as Gary wrote? Not only for them. But, as Gary wrote, it is possible to assume, that there is always a representation, if not by humans, then by "some vast consciousness", which is "a Deity relatively to us". Peirce called it "Quasi-mind of the universe". So- problem about the incomprehensibility of "thing in itself" solved.

So why did you write, that the ""laws of nature"...are a product of the human mind"? They can also be a product of the universe´s mind, I guess, otherwise there would not have been planets before there have been humans. Other than the human representations of the laws of nature, they are a product of the human mind. Oh, I see: You wrote ""laws of nature"", in quotation marks, and these quotation marks indicate, that a representation of the human mind is meant, so your statement is correct.

Did I get it right?

Best,

Helmut

 

 10. April 2017 um 17:46 Uhr
Von: "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 


List:
 

The following quote deserves rigorous study.  It is deeply relevant to three critical aspects of CSP’s philosophy of science:

1. issues that relate realism to idealism 

2. issues that relate the physical sciences to the chemical sciences and

3. issues that relate the sciences to the relationships between reality and mathematics. 

 

 (Thanks to Gary for posting this quotes from the Harvard lecture  (EP2:184, CP 5.106-7):

 




On Apr 8, 2017, at 4:17 PM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
 


All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol. An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign. The general formula may logically determine another, less broadly general. But it will be of its essential nature general, and its being narrower does not in the least constitute any participation in the reacting character of the thing. Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them. Analogy suggests that the laws of nature are ideas or resolutions in the mind of some vast consciousness, who, whether supreme or subordinate, is a Deity relatively to us. I do not approve of mixing up Religion and Philosophy; but as a purely philosophical hypothesis, that has the advantage of being supported by analogy. Yet I cannot clearly see that beyond that support to the imagination it is of any particular scientific service.”

 





A literal interpretation of EP2:184, CP 5.106-7 is as follow:

 



All this is equally true of the manner in which the laws of nature influence matter. A law is in itself nothing but a general formula or symbol.



The “laws of nature” as well as the symbols of mathematics are a product of the human mind.  The existence of the formula is expressed in symbol systems generated as descriptions of thoughts and observations.  The formula is only one possible representation among all possible representations of a thing.  Thus, the second sentence can be thought of as the inverse order of CSP’s earlier assertion regarding “thing, representation, form.”  This is the basis of scientific realism and the development of the logic of the natural sciences.  Note that the distinction between the laws of physics and the habits of chemistry is missing!   

 



An existing thing is simply a blind reacting thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.



The second part of this sentence: 

 



 thing, to which not merely all generality, but even all representation, is utterly foreign.



focuses on the absence of “representation” in the concept of a thing.  

Things, in and of themselves, lack the capacity to create symbols and to create a symbolic logic. 

In particular, mathematical symbols are “utterly  foreign” to things. 

 



Here we have that great problem of the principle of individuation which the scholastic doctors after a century of the closest possible analysis were obliged to confess was quite incomprehensible to them.



The contrast is between the general formulas of mathematics and the "the principle of individuation”.  This “utter foreign”ness persists today. 

 

Two deep consequences follow from these assertions.  

 

The critical importance of this clear and crisp distinction between the “general” and the "the principle of individuation” lies in the nature of empirical observations. 

1.  Empirical observations can only be made on specific objects.  Consequently, any generalization to mathematical symbols requires judgments and substitution of

Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

John S., Helmut, Edwina, List:

JFS:  Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.


Technically anything that can affect our sense organs is a *replica *of a
Qualisign/Mark, the peculiar kind of Sinsign/Token that embodies it--right?

JFS:  The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.


I agree, except that I would substitute "reality" for "existence," since
the law itself is 3ns while its instantiations are 2ns.

HR:  ... I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work ...So law is all type, there are no tokens of it
in inanimate world of efficient causation.


Given my agreement with John S. above, it seems to me that a type
(3ns) can *only
*be experienced through its tokens (2ns).  We then use
reason--retroduction, deduction, induction--to formulate, explicate, and
evaluate the hypothesis that what we are observing is the manifestation of
a real law.

ET:  A type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.


Yes, the law as a *type *governs an inexhaustible continuum of
*potential *cases;
its instantiation as a *token *is any *actual *case that it governs.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Apr 8, 2017 at 3:20 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of that
> law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A type is a
> general that governs existents; the token is the existent. So- I'm unsure
> of your point.
>
> I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law in the
> inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming you mean the
> physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the laws of forming a
> hydrogen molecule...of which that individual molecule is a token of the
> type/law.
>
> Edwina
> --
> This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's
> largest alternative telecommunications provider.
>
> http://www.primus.ca
>
> On Sat 08/04/17 2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
>
> John, List,
> Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws
> existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed
> by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
> but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there
> are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not
> interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are
> no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
> type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation.
> Is my guess.
> Best,
> Helmut
>  08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
> "John F Sowa" wrote:
> Jon and Edwina,
>
> Jon
> > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
>
> Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
> could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
>
> Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
> or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
> tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
> "A cat on a red mat".
>
> All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
> monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
> to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
>
> The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
> which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
> observations.
>
> Edwina
> > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> > own [or both sets of] laws.
>
> I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
> Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
> An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
> babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
>
> John
>
>

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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Edwina Taborsky]

 
 Helmut, list - isn't the instantiation of a natural law - a token of
that law, showing the law itself at work. I don't get your point. A
type is a general that governs existents; the token is the existent.
So- I'm unsure of your point.

I don't see that there are 'no tokens' [existents] of a natural law
in the inanimate world. The inanimate world - by which I am assuming
you mean the physic-chemical world - does have laws! For example, the
laws of forming a hydrogen molecule...of which that individual
molecule is a token of the type/law.

Edwina
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 This message is virus free, protected by Primus - Canada's 
 largest alternative telecommunications provider. 
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 On Sat 08/04/17  2:59 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  John, List, Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that
there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they
have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the
instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at
work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed
systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with
all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs
either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all
type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient
causation. Is my guess. Best, Helmut 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
 "John F Sowa"  wrote:
   Jon and Edwina,
 Jon
 > I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
 > regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
 > reality as consisting entirely of Signs.
 Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
 could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.
 Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
 or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
 tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
 "A cat on a red mat".
 All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with
just
 monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
 to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.
 The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
 which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
 observations.
 Edwina
 > the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
 > Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
 > with another external organism, to informationally connect with
 > the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
 > own [or both sets of] laws.
 I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
 Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
 An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
 babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.
 John
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Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[John F Sowa]

On 4/8/2017 2:59 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token,
but the law itself at work.


I agree.


So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world
of efficient causation. Is my guess.


For a law of science, the proposition that states the law would
be a token.

For a law of nature, I agree that we could never observe a token.

But does that mean no token can exist?  What would existence mean
for such a thing?  Perhaps you could call it logos.  As John the
Evangelist said, "The logos is God."  Does God exist?

John

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Laws of Nature as Signs

[Helmut Raulien]

John, List,

Speaking of inanimate reactions, and assumed, that there are natural laws existing governing them, whether or not they have been thoroughly analyzed by humans, I would say, that the instantiation of a law is not it´s token, but the law itself at work. That is so, because in inanimate affairs there are no closed systems, no piece of matter or energy, which is not interacting with all other matter and energy in the universe. So there are no signs either which are spatially separate by their nature. So law is all type, there are no tokens of it in inanimate world of efficient causation. Is my guess.

Best,

Helmut

 

 08. April 2017 um 20:34 Uhr
"John F Sowa"  wrote:
 

Jon and Edwina,

Jon
> I am still trying to figure out how to classify that real aspect/
> regularity as a Sign itself, if in fact it is legitimate to treat
> reality as consisting entirely of Signs.

Anything that can affect our sense organs is a mark. Those marks
could be interpreted and classified as tokens of types.

Some of those tokens could be instances of individual qualities
or things that we could classify as redness or as a cat. Other
tokens could be instances of relational patterns, such as
"A cat on a red mat".

All those tokens could be represented by existential graphs with just
monads or dyads. As Hume and others have said, it's not possible
to observe an implication. Post hoc does not imply propter hoc.

The existence of a law (a triad) is always a hypothesis (abduction),
which must be tested by predictions that are confirmed by further
observations.

Edwina
> the Dynamic Object of a law of nature [which is Thirdness] is also
> Thirdness. This enables individual organisms, when they interact
> with another external organism, to informationally connect with
> the external organism's LAWS - and thus, possibly, change their
> own [or both sets of] laws.

I agree. But every kind of Thirdness must be learned by abduction.
Observation can only detect post hoc. Propter hoc is an abduction.
An infant observes patterns in the parents' babbling, imitates the
babbling, and discovers that certain patterns bring rewards.

John

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