Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism - ???

2017-02-24 Thread Helmut Raulien 

Jerry, John, List,

It would be interesting to ask somebody who has been born blind. A word is a string of letters, and a melody a string of sounds. But the perceived thing of a word is a term, and that is not a string. A melody perceived neither is.

Maybe to call that, what it is, a picture or a diagram is too narrowly told, and it would be better to call it an icon? Maybe "icon" is not necessarily bound to a two-dimensional screen- or canvas-like visual substrate.

Like, when a composer has a piece for a whole orchestra in his or her head, before writing it down, or a mathematician or a philosopher is pondering about very complex interdependencies, trying to have the whole anticipated situation in the consciousness in order to regard it, all aspects and all relations between them are in the consciousness at one time, and form an icon. This icon, I guess, may have more than two or three dimensions, or it may even be the elements and interactions that make their own dimensions, perhaps of a non-integer number, like a fractal.

So I think, that this icon is different from a picture or a diagram, at least in the common (two-dimensional) understanding of picture or diagram. What is characteristical for it being an icon, I think, is, that it is a composition of aspects and their relations, present in the consciousness all at the same time.

Best,

Helmut

 

 

 22. Februar 2017 um 21:40 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 



 

John, List:
 



On Feb 16, 2017, at 7:17 AM, John Collier  wrote:
 



From talking with colleagues, some say they think only in words and others, like me, say they think mostly in diagrams or in physical feelings that I attach no words to (and probably couldn’t in many cases). Although I am surprised when I find someone who believes they think in words only, I have little reason to doubt them, as it seems these people also think quite differently from me. One of the hardest things for me in learning analytic philosophy (after original training and work in physics) was to think in words. Dick Cartwright helped me immensely with this.

 

Surely it is a psychological issue, if people differ so much in this respect




 

In my opinion, this topic of how different individuals “think”, that is, relate their experiences to their symbolic representations is a critical issue, a highly critical issue. 

 

Do readers of this list serve have favorite modes of thinking? 

 And how closely connected are modes of thinking with modes of explanation? 

 

If one reads much in the philosophy of science, one finds a wide range of claims about how we experience the molecular dynamics of brain function. Usually biased toward one method or another.  

 

It is a topic that cuts across disciplines. 

It cuts across logical forms.

It cuts across visualizations of abstractions.

 

I have run an inquiry into this topic with numerous friends and colleagues, simply asking if they think in words, or pictures or equations, or “emotions”. 

 

One of my hypotheses is that philosophers tend to think in words and struggle with pictures or geometry. Particular in drawing diagrams among arguments.  This severely constrains communications between scientists and philosophers of science. 

 

Another hypothesis is that chemists almost always think in terms of pictures (images) or diagrams.  It appears that this skill is essential to represent relations.

 

Mathematicians vary widely in answering my query - it appears to be correlated to the domain of study.  Often, first class mathematicians are extremely skilled with diagrams but stumble on the simplicity of chemical diagrams because the logical pre-suppositions do not correspond with the mathematical notions of relations.

 

In any case, I find it useful to try to understand the mode of thinking of colleagues because it is often useful in facilitating communication and selecting the mode of explanation. 

 

Cheers

 

Jerry

 

 


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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism -

2017-02-16 Thread Helmut Raulien 

List,

I think that I mostly think in diagrams and pictures, even when I think about words. I think that at this point, there is helpful Peirces three modes of consciousness: Primisense, Altersense and Medisense. They are connected with the three categories, and with the three object relations as well: Iconic, Indexical, Symbolic. The Primisense, I think, does not only picture things that come from the outside via the senses (seeing, hearing, touching, smelling, tasting), but also from the denoting and pondering process itself, that (I suppose) would be from Altersense and Medisense, so I guess, indexical and symbolical interactions are iconized again all the time in the Primisense (into something like diagrams). I think, this might be called "Re-entry", a term used by Spencer-Brown, Luhmann, and Edelman/Tononi, and I think it fits into the Peircean concept of Primi-, Alter-, and Medisense.


Best,

Helmut


 16. Februar 2017 um 16:53 Uhr
 "Clark Goble"  wrote:
 



 


On Feb 16, 2017, at 6:17 AM, John Collier  wrote:
 

One of the hardest things for me in learning analytic philosophy (after original training and work in physics) was to think in words.


 

Yes, the undue focus on the language turn in analytic philosophy has not necessarily been positive. I think the neglect of other ways of reasoning have let to lots of improper conclusions.

 

Your point about physics is apt too. That’s definitely a discipline that incentivizes thinking diagrammatically. At least I found back in my college days that many problems could more easily be solved by moving out of the calculus/tensor/algebra arena of manipulating symbols (really tokens) and into broader diagrams. At a minimum it’d give the proper way to think about manipulating ones symbols. (Say doing change of coordinates for instance)

 

My guess is that Peirce’s background in the hard sciences of physics and chemistry helped him in terms of thinking through practical logic of this sort. Although it is odd that more of the physicists who have entered philosophy haven’t taken these up quite as much. Perhaps due to the expectations especially in analytic philosophy towards linguistic methods.

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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

2017-01-28 Thread Helmut Raulien 
 
 

Supp-supplement:

In my view of sytems theory, a system is more than it´s parts, of course, and what is more, is real and natural. But in my opinion "natural" does not mean "good for us". A sytem that contains other systems, like a society that contains individuals, or their communications, correctly said with Luhmann, naturally tries to imitate an organism, tries to become the sytem in charge, and therefore tries to supress the individuality and the autonomy of the subsystems (us) (or our communications-Luhmann). This is the case with the contemporary digital dictationship, and with the fashist dream of a "volkskoerper".

Nominalism says, that this danger is not real. But it is. So my position is to say: Denet! Get offline! Systemic power is real and natural. But not everything natural is good for us humans: Fleas are not, viruses neither, pest, cholera, opium, bilharziosis, face recognition software, DNA scanners used by companies that counsel personnel departments of companies, and health insurance companies...

Luhmann called himself an "Anti-Humanist". I dont know why. I guess, that he could not imagine, that it might be the right thing to fight against something natural/real such as the nature of systems.

But it is. If we want to survive and reamain autonomous and individual.

Best,

Helmut

 

 



 
 

Supplement:

A third point is being introduced by Eugene Halton in his post just sent:

Nominalism claims, that social affairs are not real/natural. Eugene presents for example Hume´s view that only human egocentrism is natural, as only the individual is real, and therefore a strong state government is required, a "Leviathan" (Hume), to prevent the war of everybody against everybody. Have I got it right?

So maybe Nominalism denies, that a system is more than it´s parts, or, that that, which is more, is real or natural, so denies, that a social sytem can automatically keep itself, be homeostatic, therefore a strict artificial government is required to grant social functions.

So, can we say, with regard to this third point, that Nominalism is an atomistic doctrine?

About Platon, I think it does not suit this point about two realms (Luther, Calvin), as in the Platonian Two-Worlds-Theory, humans are able to look into the divine world, by inference from the non-perfect to the perfect, by abstraction. I guess.




Jon, List,

The second point to me seems like Radical Constructivism, and the first point like Two-Realms-theory by Luther and Calvin (maybe by Platon too?).

The first point is new to me, and perhaps an answer to the question I always have had: In the old times people were all quite faithful, so how could some have been nominalists, a view which seemed quite atheist and even nihilistic to me.

So now my guess is: Nominalism means two-realms (or two-kingdoms, two governments) theory, in which the divine realm contains all the universals, but cannot be known by humans, and the worldly realm is rid of universals, so quite nihilistic, inquiry is obsolete, only grace may help?

If I have got it rightly, that would be really a double inquiry blockade.

Best,

Helmut

 

 Samstag, 28. Januar 2017 um 02:19 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Eric, List:
 

Welcome!  A couple of issues come to mind.



	Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by humans?  The nominalist says yes, the realist says no.
	Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and events?  The nominalist says no, the realist says yes.



In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles  wrote:



Oh hey, my first post to the list
 
I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or disarm) longstanding philosophical problems.

With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a collection, or just a collection of "reals"?

I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

2017-01-28 Thread Helmut Raulien 
 
 

Supplement:

A third point is being introduced by Eugene Halton in his post just sent:

Nominalism claims, that social affairs are not real/natural. Eugene presents for example Hume´s view that only human egocentrism is natural, as only the individual is real, and therefore a strong state government is required, a "Leviathan" (Hume), to prevent the war of everybody against everybody. Have I got it right?

So maybe Nominalism denies, that a system is more than it´s parts, or, that that, which is more, is real or natural, so denies, that a social sytem can automatically keep itself, be homeostatic, therefore a strict artificial government is required to grant social functions.

So, can we say, with regard to this third point, that Nominalism is an atomistic doctrine?

About Platon, I think it does not suit this point about two realms (Luther, Calvin), as in the Platonian Two-Worlds-Theory, humans are able to look into the divine world, by inference from the non-perfect to the perfect, by abstraction. I guess.




Jon, List,

The second point to me seems like Radical Constructivism, and the first point like Two-Realms-theory by Luther and Calvin (maybe by Platon too?).

The first point is new to me, and perhaps an answer to the question I always have had: In the old times people were all quite faithful, so how could some have been nominalists, a view which seemed quite atheist and even nihilistic to me.

So now my guess is: Nominalism means two-realms (or two-kingdoms, two governments) theory, in which the divine realm contains all the universals, but cannot be known by humans, and the worldly realm is rid of universals, so quite nihilistic, inquiry is obsolete, only grace may help?

If I have got it rightly, that would be really a double inquiry blockade.

Best,

Helmut

 

 Samstag, 28. Januar 2017 um 02:19 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Eric, List:
 

Welcome!  A couple of issues come to mind.



	Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by humans?  The nominalist says yes, the realist says no.
	Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and events?  The nominalist says no, the realist says yes.



In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles  wrote:



Oh hey, my first post to the list
 
I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or disarm) longstanding philosophical problems.

With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a collection, or just a collection of "reals"?

I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue is at argument here or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly believe one way or the other?). 



 

Best,

Eric







---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician

U.S. Marine Corps












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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Nominalism vs. Realism

2017-01-28 Thread Helmut Raulien 

Jon, List,

The second point to me seems like Radical Constructivism, and the first point like Two-Realms-theory by Luther and Calvin (maybe by Platon too?).

The first point is new to me, and perhaps an answer to the question I always have had: In the old times people were all quite faithful, so how could some have been nominalists, a view which seemed quite atheist and even nihilistic to me.

So now my guess is: Nominalism means two-realms (or two-kingdoms, two governments) theory, in which the divine realm contains all the universals, but cannot be known by humans, and the worldly realm is rid of universals, so quite nihilistic, inquiry is obsolete, only grace may help?

If I have got it rightly, that would be really a double inquiry blockade.

Best,

Helmut

 

 Samstag, 28. Januar 2017 um 02:19 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Eric, List:
 

Welcome!  A couple of issues come to mind.



	Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by humans?  The nominalist says yes, the realist says no.
	Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and events?  The nominalist says no, the realist says yes.



In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable.

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles  wrote:



Oh hey, my first post to the list
 
I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or disarm) longstanding philosophical problems.

With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a collection, or just a collection of "reals"?

I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue is at argument here or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly believe one way or the other?). 



 

Best,

Eric







---
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey Statistician

U.S. Marine Corps












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Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] nominalism

2017-01-24 Thread Helmut Raulien 

Edwina,

I agree, by adopting Peirce´s definition of "Nothing", which is only a no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are, even limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities. Maybe this Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical "Tohuvabohu"? In contrast to a nihilistic "Nothing", in which there is nothing, not even possibilities, unless whoever plants some ideas into it. What I wanted to say, is, I think I agree with you, there just has been or is an unclarity about the term "nothing".

Best,

Helmut

 

24. Januar 2017 um 19:30 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 



Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:


 



1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so.

 

Edwina: Agreed

 

2) HR:  Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the "mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric:

 

EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.

 

 

3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, but consists of symbols of secondnesses:

 

EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how a 'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is 'possibility' a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge that the force in matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively real.  A symbol is in a mode of Thirdness not Secondness.

 

 

4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an organism, a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was possible (firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a copy or token of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea.

 

 

EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by the above. Are you saying that the FORM of Platonism is in a mode of Firstness? I don't accept the notion of a divine ideaI think you are moving into Platonism!

 

5) HR: To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not ideas, but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible" possibility is everything). Or was there "nothing" in the beginning: In this case possibilities are ideas, planted into the nothing (by whom or what, Mr. Plato?), like in Platonism. I tend towards the Tohuvabohu-Hypothesis, and against Nominalism. My tentative attempt (to rescue Nominalism on the basis of universal mind) has failed, and I am happy about that.

 

EDWINA: I tend to agree with Peirce - that in the beginning, there was nothing. .."a state of mere indeterminancy in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411. Then, "Out of the womb of indeeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them every strengthening themselves". 1.412.  He continues on outlining the development of habits within space and time...

 

You can read from this that there was no a priori Agent [God]; no necessary determinism. "We start then, with nothing, pure zeroBut this pure zero is the nothing of not having been born.  There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom". 6.217.

 

You can read from this that Thirdness or Laws did not exist prior to Secondness or the appearance of particular matter. In this phase, there were only - the tendency to the three modal categories of the organization of matter. Thirdness, as a modal category, can be understood as akin to Mind, and emerges with matter. Peirce was quite open about his view that Mind exists and is operative in all forms of matter: 

 

"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, or crystals, and throught the purely physical world" 4.551.

 

This does then raise the question of 'what is Mind'? My answer, which i derive from Peirce, is that it is a process of all three modal categories  where "Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual