Supp-supplement:
In my view of sytems theory, a system is more than it´s parts, of course, and what is more, is real and natural. But in my opinion "natural" does not mean "good for us". A sytem that contains other systems, like a society that contains individuals, or their communications, correctly said with Luhmann, naturally tries to imitate an organism, tries to become the sytem in charge, and therefore tries to supress the individuality and the autonomy of the subsystems (us) (or our communications-Luhmann). This is the case with the contemporary digital dictationship, and with the fashist dream of a "volkskoerper".
Nominalism says, that this danger is not real. But it is. So my position is to say: Denet! Get offline! Systemic power is real and natural. But not everything natural is good for us humans: Fleas are not, viruses neither, pest, cholera, opium, bilharziosis, face recognition software, DNA scanners used by companies that counsel personnel departments of companies, and health insurance companies...
Luhmann called himself an "Anti-Humanist". I dont know why. I guess, that he could not imagine, that it might be the right thing to fight against something natural/real such as the nature of systems.
But it is. If we want to survive and reamain autonomous and individual.
Best,
Helmut
Supplement:
A third point is being introduced by Eugene Halton in his post just sent:
Nominalism claims, that social affairs are not real/natural. Eugene presents for example Hume´s view that only human egocentrism is natural, as only the individual is real, and therefore a strong state government is required, a "Leviathan" (Hume), to prevent the war of everybody against everybody. Have I got it right?
So maybe Nominalism denies, that a system is more than it´s parts, or, that that, which is more, is real or natural, so denies, that a social sytem can automatically keep itself, be homeostatic, therefore a strict artificial government is required to grant social functions.
So, can we say, with regard to this third point, that Nominalism is an atomistic doctrine?
About Platon, I think it does not suit this point about two realms (Luther, Calvin), as in the Platonian Two-Worlds-Theory, humans are able to look into the divine world, by inference from the non-perfect to the perfect, by abstraction. I guess.
Jon, List,
The second point to me seems like Radical Constructivism, and the first point like Two-Realms-theory by Luther and Calvin (maybe by Platon too?).
The first point is new to me, and perhaps an answer to the question I always have had: In the old times people were all quite faithful, so how could some have been nominalists, a view which seemed quite atheist and even nihilistic to me.
So now my guess is: Nominalism means two-realms (or two-kingdoms, two governments) theory, in which the divine realm contains all the universals, but cannot be known by humans, and the worldly realm is rid of universals, so quite nihilistic, inquiry is obsolete, only grace may help?
If I have got it rightly, that would be really a double inquiry blockade.
Best,
Helmut
Samstag, 28. Januar 2017 um 02:19 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
"Jon Alan Schmidt" <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Eric, List:
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .Welcome! A couple of issues come to mind.
- Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by humans? The nominalist says yes, the realist says no.
- Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and events? The nominalist says no, the realist says yes.
In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote:
Oh hey, my first post to the list....I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or disarm) longstanding philosophical problems.
With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that I think people respond to things (without any a priori dualistic privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a collection, or just a collection of "reals"?
I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue is at argument here.... or, if someone is feeling even more adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I firmly believe one way or the other?).Best,Eric
-----------
Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
Supervisory Survey StatisticianU.S. Marine Corps
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