Edwina,
I agree, by adopting Peirce´s definition of "Nothing", which is only a no-thing, meaning no things, no secondnesses, but possibilities there are, even limitless. So Peirces "Nothing" is not the absence of possibilities. Maybe this Peircean "Nothing" is the same like the Thoran/Biblical "Tohuvabohu"? In contrast to a nihilistic "Nothing", in which there is nothing, not even possibilities, unless whoever plants some ideas into it. What I wanted to say, is, I think I agree with you, there just has been or is an unclarity about the term "nothing".
Best,
Helmut
 
24. Januar 2017 um 19:30 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca>
 
Helmut - I'll try to reply in points below:
 
1) HR: I understood that Nominalism means to reduce (or upduce?) everything to a symbol of a secondness, a language that adresses brute facts. So bio- and physicochemical semiotics are ignored, as there is no symbolic language. Only humans have languages, so now Nominalism for me appears to be human hybris. Is the linguistic turn also nominalistic? I guess so.
 
Edwina: Agreed
 
2) HR:  Maybe my tentative attempt to rescue Nominalism by extending the "mind"-concept towards the universe´s mind is anthropocentric:
 
EDWINA: But according to Peirce, the universe IS an evolving Mind. Don't worry about the 'anthropocentrism'.
 
 
3) HR: It would mean, that possibility, firstness, is not real by itself, but consists of symbols of secondnesses:
 
EDWINA: The categories are modes of being; that is, they are modes of how a 'being' or individual unit is organized. The question then is: Is 'possibility' a real force in nature, and I think we have to acknowledge that the force in matter organized in a mode of Firstness, is objectively real.  A symbol is in a mode of Thirdness not Secondness.
 
 
4) HR: That would be Platonism, I guess: To say, that something, an organism, a repeated situation, whatever, does not occur because it was possible (firstness), and then became a habit (thirdness), but is only a copy or token of a divine or super-divine (in polytheism) idea.
 
 
EDWINA: I'm not sure what you mean by the above. Are you saying that the FORM of Platonism is in a mode of Firstness? I don't accept the notion of a divine idea....I think you are moving into Platonism!
 
5) HR: To me it boils down to the question we have had, what was in the beginning: Tohuvabohu, everything was possible, then possibility was not ideas, but everything (in a pre-world in which "everything is possible" possibility is everything). Or was there "nothing" in the beginning: In this case possibilities are ideas, planted into the nothing (by whom or what, Mr. Plato?), like in Platonism. I tend towards the Tohuvabohu-Hypothesis, and against Nominalism. My tentative attempt (to rescue Nominalism on the basis of universal mind) has failed, and I am happy about that.
 
EDWINA: I tend to agree with Peirce - that in the beginning, there was nothing. .."a state of mere indeterminancy in which nothing existed or really happened" 1.411. Then, "Out of the womb of indeeterminacy we must say that there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the tendency to take them every strengthening themselves". 1.412.  He continues on outlining the development of habits within space and time...
 
You can read from this that there was no a priori Agent [God]; no necessary determinism. "We start then, with nothing, pure zero....But this pure zero is the nothing of not having been born.  There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing in which the whole universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely undefined and unlimited possibility - boundless possibility. There is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom". 6.217.
 
You can read from this that Thirdness or Laws did not exist prior to Secondness or the appearance of particular matter. In this phase, there were only - the tendency to the three modal categories of the organization of matter. Thirdness, as a modal category, can be understood as akin to Mind, and emerges with matter. Peirce was quite open about his view that Mind exists and is operative in all forms of matter:
 
"Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, or crystals, and throught the purely physical world" 4.551.
 
This does then raise the question of 'what is Mind'? My answer, which i derive from Peirce, is that it is a process of all three modal categories  where "Mind is a propositional function of the widest possible universe, such that its values are the meanings of all signs whose actual effects are in effective intercommunication'. [Note. 4.550]. That is, Mind is not just Thirdness nor is it a metaphysical agent but is a semiosic action of all three categorical modes.
 
Edwina
 
 
Best,
Helmut
 
 24. Januar 2017 um 16:07 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
 
Helmut - further to your post, where you write
"if you believe that the universe itself is an organism (pantheism) or part of an organism (panentheism), then nominalism would make sense?"
 
I'd say 'no' to that. I, myself, consider that the universe is an organism, a massive operation of 'Mind', but that's not nominalism.
 
Again, as Peirce pointed out in 1.16 - the question is, 'whether laws and general types are figments of the mind or real". As I mentioned in an earlier post, the Saussurian semiology is an example of a perspective that considers that general types are mental concepts. That is, since nominalism is expressed in symbols/words, then, information becomes almost entirely operative in the human realm. Plants, animals, cells, molecules..become inanimate or dumb matter.
 
And further, as Peirce noted, the great era of nominalism emerged in the 14th century,  with the rise of the battle against the control of thought by the Church. That is, with the emergence of a market economy and middle class, the civic individual, i.e., the non-clerical working man, began to require the political and economic right to individually and personally 'handle' the environment. This 'handling' was all about 'the being of individual thing or fact' [1.21]. This new age man was not interested in the amorphousness of general laws outside of his direct actual grasp and personal perception.
 
Thus, the world of nominalism reduces everything to only one mode of being; that of Secondness, or existent particular objects. It ignores Firstness, that mode of being of isolate free possibility - or, if it acknowledges it, it is to transform this mode into an 'unconscious' psychological feeling within that new age man..which can then be brought into the consciousness by ..guess what...by words.
 
And most certainly, nominalism rejects Thirdness, the mode of being made up of general laws - since, for the nominalist, laws are not real in themselves but are intellectual constructs of the human mind...."this general rule is nothing but a mere word or couple of words" [1.26].
 
When we reject nominalism for its obvious limitations, I think that we have to be careful with analyzing the two modal categories absent in nominalism; Firstness and Thirdness. These are modes of being, actual means of organizing matter, and can't be reduced to terms or words.
 
Edwina
 
 
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