Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Dear Jacob, I am very sorry to hear this. Along with John, I send my condolences. I spoke with your father in a couple of very long phone calls about 2 years ago, when I was beginning my research on Peirce. He was extremely helpful, generous, and kind. All my best to your family, Dan Everett > On Jan 15, 2021, at 5:06 PM, Charles Pyle wrote: > > > Hello Everyone, > > I’m writing on behalf of my father Charles Pyle. He passed away on 1/12 due > to COVID. We have seen that he was fairly active in this list and wanted to > let everyone know – my sincere apologies for the group email to the entire > list and letting you know in this manner. We are having a small ceremony on > Sunday at 2pm which we will livestream. We have received notes and memories > from all over the world which we will be reading and sharing along with our > memories at the “sharemony”, so if anyone has thoughts, memories or anything, > it has been a real blessing to receive and we would love to have more. If > anyone wants the private link to the livestream, please message off list and > I will provide the link. Link to his obituary: > https://www.walkerfuneralhomes.com/obituaries/Charles-Robert-Pyle?obId=19639780#/obituaryInfo > > Thank you all and again, my apologies for coopting this conversation. > > Sincerely, > Jacob Pyle > > From: Charles Pyle > Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 9:09 PM > To: tabor...@primus.ca; Jerry LR Chandler > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic > > Edwina, list: > > I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the > claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened > on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the > source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to > semiosis. > > ---begin quote > The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all > conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is > itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and > immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and > new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, > original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining > cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the > object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; > it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, > and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always > implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! > What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had > drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that > is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, > free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description > of it must be false to it. > ---end quote > > Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, > collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to > semiosis. > ---begin quote > 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before > the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a > thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person > who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of > the same object, collateral experience." > ---end quote > > Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of > knowing that is outside of the system of signs. > ---begin quote > I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of > signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the > prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, > 1909) > ---end quote > > And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the > sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are > inscribed. > > Regards, > Charles Pyle > > > From: Edwina Taborsky > Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM > To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle > > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic > > Charles, list: > > I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to > semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " >
RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Dear Jacob, Let me express my condolences on your loss. We'll miss your father's contributions to this list and to the study of Peirce's writings and their relationship to linguistics. When I read your note, I checked your father's list of publications at https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle His articles emphasize issues about "wild language" that many linguists "sweep under the rug" because they don't fits their elegant systems of logic. Although I have been working on logic for years, I appreciate the importance of those wild issues. They are the source of the thorny examples and counterexamples that any truly adequate theory of linguistics must address. I am sorry that we will no longer have a chance to discuss those issues with him. John Sowa _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Hello Everyone, I’m writing on behalf of my father Charles Pyle. He passed away on 1/12 due to COVID. We have seen that he was fairly active in this list and wanted to let everyone know – my sincere apologies for the group email to the entire list and letting you know in this manner. We are having a small ceremony on Sunday at 2pm which we will livestream. We have received notes and memories from all over the world which we will be reading and sharing along with our memories at the “sharemony”, so if anyone has thoughts, memories or anything, it has been a real blessing to receive and we would love to have more. If anyone wants the private link to the livestream, please message off list and I will provide the link. Link to his obituary: https://www.walkerfuneralhomes.com/obituaries/Charles-Robert-Pyle?obId=19639780#/obituaryInfo Thank you all and again, my apologies for coopting this conversation. Sincerely, Jacob Pyle From: Charles Pyle Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 9:09 PM To: tabor...@primus.ca; Jerry LR Chandler Cc: Peirce List Subject: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Edwina, list: I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky mailto:tabor...@primus.ca>> Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler mailto:jerry_lr_chand...@icloud.com>>; Charles Pyle mailto:char...@pyle.tv>> Cc: Peirce List mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>> Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that
Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
s. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf end quote There is also an informative Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to extensive empirical testing. As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous scholars
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
lown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv [1] sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf [2] end quote There is also an informative Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness [3] As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to extensive empirical testing. As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship. Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been active on this list for many years. See this article for example. https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf [4] Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. Cheers, Charles Pyle
Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Hi Charles: Well, this form of response is inadequate to address the substantial issue at question. >From a personal perspective, I have over five decades of experience as a >chemist. I am simply saying that the language of chemistry is not formed in >the way the semantics of other natural languages are formed. I come to this >conclusion from decades of efforts attempting to explain chemical reasoning to >non-chemists - particularly mathematicians and physicists. I have a few >scars from my failures to communicate! :-). As for markedness theory, I read widely in a range of reference materials during the fist decade of this century, historical as well as modern and developed a reasonable understanding of “markedness theory.” If markedness theory serves the social / academic purposes of linguists, fine. At the same time, several of your rhetoric claims are “over the top” and not very close to the theory itself. The metaphor for “gravity” could be omitted without changing markedness theory, could it not? As far as I am aware, Michael Shapiro’s work does not address the science of chemistry or any other of the natural sciences, all of which require idiosyntactic association of idiopathic assertions to relate semantics to mathematics. Have you studied the linguistic developments of mathematics? I have looked at a good bit. It is totally bizarre! It would be totally unfair to assert that mathematical language is based on scientific ignorance, it just appears that way. A classic example is B. Russell’s notion of the logical composition of ‘atomic sentences’ into 'molecular sentences'. At least, that is my understanding of the conundrums raised by CSP’s texts. That being said, I think one essential notion of understanding CSP rhetoric is his introduction of “abductive” logic as derivative from the latin case (and Finnish). This usage is widespread in the semantics of chemistry. Perhaps the socialistic linguistic theories are open to further developments? Cheers Jerry > On Nov 23, 2020, at 6:38 PM, Charles Pyle wrote: > > Hi Jerry, > > It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around > since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body > of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. > Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to > have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the > civilian world. > > If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of > information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about > the beginning of markedness theory. > > begin quote > Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain > linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than > others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first > proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and > Roman Jakobson. > https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf > > <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf> > end quote > > There is also an informative Wikipedia page: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness > <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness> > > As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to > extensive empirical testing. > > As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous > scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship. > > Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been > active on this list for many years. See this article for example. > https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf > <https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf> > > Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine > of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that > is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s > thinking. > > Cheers, > Charles Pyle > > > > From: Jerry LR Chandler > Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM > To: Charles Pyle > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic > > Hi Charles > > Your post below left me stone cold! > > One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of > chemistry. > It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The > propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several > facets of chemical logic that CSP explo
Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Edwinia: > On Nov 23, 2020, at 7:10 PM, Edwina Taborsky wrote: > > My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! This is not my understanding of CSP realism. I recall a text that, roughly speaking, asserts that signs are “emanations” of “sin-signs” as objects. Objects that are the same as legisigns and are the necessary sources the qualisigns (observations / measurements). This does not deny the possibilities that all interpretants are semiotic relatives. Some line of reasoning along these lines is necessary if any sense at all is to be made of the scientific foundations of pragmaticism. Cheers Jerry _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Hi Charles Your post below left me stone cold! One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of chemistry. It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience. Taste and smell are remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in human communication. Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory experiences on feelings / emotions. The connections between chemical receptor encoded directly from the chemical genetic structures and the chemical circumstances is firmly grounded in decades of experience and centuries of experience. The consistency of the chemical language has remained unchallenged for centuries. What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages? What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your assertions? Cheers Jerry > On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle wrote: > > Hi Helmut, > > Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of > Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. > > The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where > truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of > which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. > Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of > falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space > because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the > underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or > the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the > relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, > repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. > > In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. > Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. > Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound > that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on > which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, > the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first > mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. > > Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is > a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a > beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound > begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there > during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; > between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the > characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of > continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic > analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of > language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth > by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. > > Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be to mark the > vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the > continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic > infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of > timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here > phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three > elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space > resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further > divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. > Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of > development here: > Jakobson, Roman. 1968. Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, > Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague. > > And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in > “Wild Language” which can be found > here:https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle > <https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle> > > Charles Pyle > > From: Helmut Raulien > Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM > To: Charles Pyle > Cc: Peirce-L
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Charles, list 1] The categorical mode of Firstness is not an a priori Truth but an essential part of semiosis. 2] Direct experience functions within semiosis - with the Dynamic Object being mediated into an Interpretant 3] There is no such 'thing' or 'force' as an a priori Truth within Peircean semiosis. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 2:09 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Edwina, list: I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv [1] sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to t
RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Edwina, list: I don’t have access to my Peirce data right now, but I do disagree with the claim that Peirce does not allow for something prior to semiosis. I happened on the following quote from Peirce in some notes, but it doesn’t identify the source. It seems to me that Peirce is talking here about something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote The idea of the absolutely First must be entirely separated from all conception of or reference to anything else; for what involves a second is itself a second to that second. The First must therefore be present and immediate, so as not to be second to a representation. It must be fresh and new, for if old it is second to its former state. It must be initiative, original, spontaneous, and free; otherwise it is second to a determining cause. It is also something vivid and conscious; so only it avoids being the object of some sensation. It precedes all synthesis and all differentiation; it has no unity and no parts. It cannot be articulately thought: assert it, and it has already lost its characteristic innocence; for assertion always implies a denial of something else. Stop to think of it, and it has flown! What the world was to Adam on the day he opened his eyes to it, before he had drawn any distinctions, or had become conscious of his own existence – that is first, present, immediate, fresh, new, initiative, original, spontaneous, free, vivid, conscious, and evanescent. Only, remember that every description of it must be false to it. ---end quote Here too, I wonder what Peirce could mean here by direct experience, collateral experience, and self-experience, if not something prior to semiosis. ---begin quote 1908 [c.] | Letters to Lady Welby | MS [R] L463:14: "A Sign may bring before the Mind, a new hypothesis, or a sentiment, a quality, a respect, a degree, a thing, an event, a law, etc. But it never can convey anything to a person who has not had a direct experience or at least original self-experience of the same object, collateral experience." ---end quote Same here. As I read this and similar statements, he envisions a mode of knowing that is outside of the system of signs. ---begin quote I do not mean by "collateral observation" acquaintance with the system of signs. What is so gathered is not COLLATERAL. It is on the contrary the prerequisite for getting any idea signified by the Sign. (CP 8.179, EP 2:494, 1909) ---end quote And finally, as I recall in defining existential graphs Peirce held that the sheet of assertion represents truth, the context within which assertions are inscribed. Regards, Charles Pyle From: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 8:11 PM To: Jerry LR Chandler ; Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv<mailto:char...@pyle.tv> sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman J
Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Charles, list: I don't see how you can assert that, " there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. " My understanding of Peirce is that there is nothing outside of semiosis! 'the entire universe - not merely the universe of existents, the universe which we are all accustomed to refer to as 'the truth' - that all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs' 5.449f. [That is - there is no 'force' aka truth, that is prior to or outside of semiosis]. "Truth is the conformity of a representamen to its object, ITS object, mind you" 5.554. [Truth is obviously operative within the semiosic process - not prior to it]. And the methods of attaining this truth [the conformity of a representamen to its object] - is via..induction, deduction, abduction. I understand that you are a Buddhist - which does indeed, posit an a priori Truth - but I don't find any such concepts within the work of Peirce. Such a view would greatly change the power of semiosis, reducing it to almost a mechanical function. Edwina On Tue 24/11/20 12:38 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf [1] end quote There is also an informative Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness [2] As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to extensive empirical testing. As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship. Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been active on this list for many years. See this article for example. https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf [3] Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. Cheers, Charles Pyle From: Jerry LR Chandler Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Hi Charles Your post below left me stone cold! One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of chemistry. It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience. Taste and smell are remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in human communication. Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory experiences on feelings / emotions. The connections between chemical receptor encoded directly from the chemical genetic structures and the chemical circumstances is firmly grounded in decades of experience and centuries of experience. The consistency of the chemical language has remained unchallenged for centuries. What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages? What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your assertions? Cheers Jerry On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle wrote: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from w
RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Hi Jerry, It is not my hypothesis. The linguistic theory of markedness has been around since at least the 1930’s. Since then it has been tested against a vast body of data from a huge number of languages by generations of linguists. Nevertheless, as with so much of linguistics, markedness theory seems not to have come to the attention of the rest of the academic world, let alone the civilian world. If you do a google search on “markedness theory” you will find a lot of information. The top item returned to me just now had a nice statement about the beginning of markedness theory. begin quote Markedness Theory proposes that in the languages of the world certain linguistic elements are more basic, natural, and frequent (unmarked) than others which are referred to as marked. The concept of Markedness is first proposed by the Prague School scholars Nikolai Sergeyevich Trubetzkoy and Roman Jakobson. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/c855/a0ad0e00662ee7b813c6d332f7374ef221e4.pdf end quote There is also an informative Wikipedia page: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markedness As to falsification of the hypothesis, as I said it has been subject to extensive empirical testing. As to the relation between markedness theory and Peirce, again numerous scholars in many different fields have explored the relationship. Michael Shapiro is a well-known scholar of markedness theory and he has been active on this list for many years. See this article for example. https://cspeirce.iupui.edu/menu/library/aboutcsp/shapiro/shapiro-mclc.pdf Finally, I note that markedness theory in no way vitiates Peirce’s doctrine of the tripartite nature of the sign. And the idea that there is a truth that is prior to semiosis, in my opinion, also is consistent with Peirce’s thinking. Cheers, Charles Pyle From: Jerry LR Chandler Sent: Monday, November 23, 2020 6:57 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce List Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Hi Charles Your post below left me stone cold! One counter example to your hypothesis (conjecture?) is the language of chemistry. It is built on positive evidence and reproducible empirical observations. The propositional webs of inferences of chemical structures is one of the several facets of chemical logic that CSP exploited in constructing his philosophies. The sensory properties of matter are fixed by experience. Taste and smell are remembered and associated with activities and events. The timelessness of chemical names, such as water, or sugar or gold or…. are deeply embedded in human communication. Chemical language grows from these positive impressions of sensory experiences on feelings / emotions. The connections between chemical receptor encoded directly from the chemical genetic structures and the chemical circumstances is firmly grounded in decades of experience and centuries of experience. The consistency of the chemical language has remained unchallenged for centuries. What separates the acquisition of chemical language from other languages? What, if any, role does Popperian falsification theory play in your assertions? Cheers Jerry On Nov 22, 2020, at 6:14 PM, Charles Pyle mailto:char...@pyle.tv>> wrote: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of
Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
lsity. Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here: Jakobson, Roman. 1968. Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague. And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle Charles Pyle From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space? I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional". Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr "Charles Pyle" <char...@pyle.tv> wrote: Helmut, Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken. --begin quote from Helmut-- The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. --end quote from Helmut--- To begin with, the examples you cite exemplify the particular kind of asymmetric binary opposition, in technical linguistic terms is called the logic of ‘markedness’, of which the entire structure of language is comprised from bottom to top: phonology morphology, syntax, semantics. For example in phonology we find the same type of asymmetric opposition in the pairs p-b, p-f, p-t, t-d, etc. Taking p-f as a specific example, it is a well-tested language universal that (put in non-technical terms) if a language as f then it has p, but a language can have p without f. The effects of such a claim can be manifest in the order in which children learn language (they learn p before f), the order in which language loss takes place in aphasia, etc., the order in which language is recovered in the recovery from aphasia, and the phonology systems of language. An example illustrating the latter type of evidence can be seen Philippine languages, which do have p but not f. When Filipinos who are not also not native speakers of English try to pronounce English word with f like ‘fish’ they would say ‘pis’. And they would pronounce Filipino as Pilipino. So it is incorrect to characterize the desire to preserve the logic of the word pairs you cite as particularly conservative in a political sense, or in terms of an underlying moral anxiety in relation to sexual deviance. If you use language, you use this logic. And it is not just an arbitrary characteristic of these few pairs of words. You can’t just fudge around with the logic of a few pairs of words without attacking the fabric of language itself. Thus the resistance to loss of control you talk about should be seen as conservative in relation to language itself, not conservative in relation to politics or morality. Furthermore, one must be aware the logic of opposition in language is asymmetric. All oppositions in language are asymmetric. What is in play here is not just asymmetry in relation to concepts that have come to be politically or socially sensitive such as male-female, black-white, right-wrong, open-closed, etc., but in relation to all concepts and structures of language. To illustrate, I assume I can take it as self-evident that the opposition between one and many, manifest in grammar as singular-plural is asymmetric: singular is first and plural is second. When you start counting, you must begin with 1 and then you can get to 2. If you have two eggs in a basket, then you have one egg in the basket, but the reverse is not true. And in keeping with this s
Aw: Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Charles, Edwina, List, I understand the falsity-truth distinction abstractly, because Spencer-Brown´s calculus is isomorphic with Peirce´s Entitive Graphs, and the cut in them is, translated to Boolean, a "NOT". The truth of the unmarked space then would not be ultimate, but original truth. I think, S.-Brown´s calculus suits well to linguistics, because speech is a constructive action of a subject, and the said calculus is also subjective and constructivistic, it starts with the imperative "Draw a distinction". I guess that here mostly the commander and the obeyer is the same subject, as both decider and acter. So I think, that this model is constructivistic and subjective. I wonder how to compare this model and make it come close with other models, e.g existentialistic ones, or ones that claim objectivity. I am suspecting, that this compartison might show, that a distinction, especially a re-entry can be blurred and dissolved, or elsehow conditioned. Best, Helmut 23. November 2020 um 15:59 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations.. I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea. Edwina On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here: Jakobson, Roman. 1968. Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague. And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle Charles Pyle From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguisti
Re: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Sounds rather Buddhist - ie, 'ultimate truth which is empty of concrete characteristics - vs -provisional or concrete instantiations.. I don't see this as Peircean - for all three categories [1ns, 2ns and 3ns] are necessarily functional in his Realism. And his Objective Idealism includes matter with the idea. Edwina On Mon 23/11/20 12:14 AM , Charles Pyle char...@pyle.tv sent: Hi Helmut, Yes, as you surmise. I think it is reasonable to take this as a refinement of Spencer-Brown. Let me explain it a little further. The space in which language grows is a kind of gravitational field where truth is the center from which language arises in the form of marks each of which is an elaboration of some prior, and each mark is a sign of falsity. Thus the structure of language arises layer by layer as a structure of falsity. The more marked, the more false. And it is a gravitational space because the false tends by its nature to fall apart and reveal the underlying, whether it is only a relatively less false underlying layer, or the ultimate underlying layer of truth itself. Because of the nature of the relation between truth and falsity, falsity must be continually reinforced, repaired, defended, etc. or it will fall apart. In terms of markedness, truth is unmarked and unmarkable. Truth is silent. Every element of language arises from some prior by elaborating on the prior. Thus the first event in the arising of language is the production of a sound that interrupts silence and in doing so creates the derivative ground on which language is elaborated. The most unmarked vowel, the most open vowel, the most sonorant vowel is a. So in theory we can hypothecate a as the first mark which establishes the space of language as deviant from truth. Both truth and its manifestation as silence are actual continuities. Sound is a kind of false continuity. It sounds like a continuity. But it has a beginning and an end, whereas silence was already there before the sound begins, and it will be there after the sound ends. Silence is even there during the sound: sound consists of a rapid sequence of pulses of energy; between each of the pulses of energy is a brief gap that has the characteristics of silence, i.e. the absence of sound. Sound is a kind of continuity of discontinuity. You can clearly see this in a sonographic analysis of sound. And here we can also see how it is that the very ground of language is deviant from sound, seeking to interrupt the continuity of truth by means of a faux continuity, and thus is essentially a sign of falsity. Given this fundamental ground, the next logical step would be to mark the vocalic ground continuity by its opposite, that is, to interrupt the continuity, which is done in language by a consonant resulting in such basic infantile linguistic forms as ama, aba, aka, ata, etc. Driven by factors of timing these are often morphed into mama, baba, kaka, tata, etc. From here phonologically the vowel space is further divided into at least three elements naturally occupying the extreme margins of the vocalic space resulting in a vowel inventory of a, i, u. And of course these can be further divided. Consonants are similarly elaborated by the logic of opposition. Roman Jakobson provided the classical explanation of this process of development here: Jakobson, Roman. 1968. Child Language Aphasia and Phonological Universals, Janua Linguarum, Series Minor, 72, Moutoun, The Hague. And I reframed his explanation in the context of Peirce’s theory of signs in “Wild Language” which can be found here: https://umich.academia.edu/CharlesPyle [1] Charles Pyle From: Helmut Raulien Sent: Sunday, November 22, 2020 4:25 PM To: Charles Pyle Cc: Peirce-L Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic Charles, wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space? I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional". Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr "Charles Pyle" wrote: Helmut, Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken. --begin quote from Helmut-- The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more co
Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Charles, wow, interesting! I think about it. By first glance it seems to me like a linguistic elaboration of Spencer-Brown. Do all polarities come from a marked starting point, looking out for an opposite in unmarked space? I apologize to everybody "conservative". Please see my use of the term confined within the example I gave, and not generalized to its political meaning. Or replaced with "conventional" or "formerly conventional". Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 22:06 Uhr "Charles Pyle" wrote: Helmut, Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken. --begin quote from Helmut-- The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. --end quote from Helmut--- To begin with, the examples you cite exemplify the particular kind of asymmetric binary opposition, in technical linguistic terms is called the logic of ‘markedness’, of which the entire structure of language is comprised from bottom to top: phonology morphology, syntax, semantics. For example in phonology we find the same type of asymmetric opposition in the pairs p-b, p-f, p-t, t-d, etc. Taking p-f as a specific example, it is a well-tested language universal that (put in non-technical terms) if a language as f then it has p, but a language can have p without f. The effects of such a claim can be manifest in the order in which children learn language (they learn p before f), the order in which language loss takes place in aphasia, etc., the order in which language is recovered in the recovery from aphasia, and the phonology systems of language. An example illustrating the latter type of evidence can be seen Philippine languages, which do have p but not f. When Filipinos who are not also not native speakers of English try to pronounce English word with f like ‘fish’ they would say ‘pis’. And they would pronounce Filipino as Pilipino. So it is incorrect to characterize the desire to preserve the logic of the word pairs you cite as particularly conservative in a political sense, or in terms of an underlying moral anxiety in relation to sexual deviance. If you use language, you use this logic. And it is not just an arbitrary characteristic of these few pairs of words. You can’t just fudge around with the logic of a few pairs of words without attacking the fabric of language itself. Thus the resistance to loss of control you talk about should be seen as conservative in relation to language itself, not conservative in relation to politics or morality. Furthermore, one must be aware the logic of opposition in language is asymmetric. All oppositions in language are asymmetric. What is in play here is not just asymmetry in relation to concepts that have come to be politically or socially sensitive such as male-female, black-white, right-wrong, open-closed, etc., but in relation to all concepts and structures of language. To illustrate, I assume I can take it as self-evident that the opposition between one and many, manifest in grammar as singular-plural is asymmetric: singular is first and plural is second. When you start counting, you must begin with 1 and then you can get to 2. If you have two eggs in a basket, then you have one egg in the basket, but the reverse is not true. And in keeping with this self-evident character of numerology there has been found to be a universal of language, an empirical claim supported by lots of evidence, that if a language has grammatical singular and plural, then the singular is unmarked and the plural is marked. (And, by the way, if that language has also dual, it is twice marked in relation to singuilar.) That is, some piece of form is added to a word to mark it as plural e.g. dog vs dog+s, tree vs tree+s. Similarly, while many people would not regard it as self-evident that truth is prior to falsity, I hold that it is, and have argued as such in various publications. In keeping with the order of this asymmetry truth is unmarked and falsity is marked. Similarly, down is first and up is second. Similarly, happy is first and sad is second. Thus we can say ‘unhappy’ but not ‘unsad.’ Similarly well and unwell. People often cite right vs left as an example of symmetric opposition, but language, generically, has presupposed that right is first and left is second. Numerically, most people are right handed. And in many cultures left-handed people are punished for learning to write with their left hand, sometimes forced to learn to write with their right hand. And in many cultures left is explicitly associated with evil or dirtiness and right with
RE: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Helmut, Speaking as a linguist, I must point out that the view of language you take in the paragraph I quote below is profoundly mistaken. --begin quote from Helmut-- The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. --end quote from Helmut--- To begin with, the examples you cite exemplify the particular kind of asymmetric binary opposition, in technical linguistic terms is called the logic of ‘markedness’, of which the entire structure of language is comprised from bottom to top: phonology morphology, syntax, semantics. For example in phonology we find the same type of asymmetric opposition in the pairs p-b, p-f, p-t, t-d, etc. Taking p-f as a specific example, it is a well-tested language universal that (put in non-technical terms) if a language as f then it has p, but a language can have p without f. The effects of such a claim can be manifest in the order in which children learn language (they learn p before f), the order in which language loss takes place in aphasia, etc., the order in which language is recovered in the recovery from aphasia, and the phonology systems of language. An example illustrating the latter type of evidence can be seen Philippine languages, which do have p but not f. When Filipinos who are not also not native speakers of English try to pronounce English word with f like ‘fish’ they would say ‘pis’. And they would pronounce Filipino as Pilipino. So it is incorrect to characterize the desire to preserve the logic of the word pairs you cite as particularly conservative in a political sense, or in terms of an underlying moral anxiety in relation to sexual deviance. If you use language, you use this logic. And it is not just an arbitrary characteristic of these few pairs of words. You can’t just fudge around with the logic of a few pairs of words without attacking the fabric of language itself. Thus the resistance to loss of control you talk about should be seen as conservative in relation to language itself, not conservative in relation to politics or morality. Furthermore, one must be aware the logic of opposition in language is asymmetric. All oppositions in language are asymmetric. What is in play here is not just asymmetry in relation to concepts that have come to be politically or socially sensitive such as male-female, black-white, right-wrong, open-closed, etc., but in relation to all concepts and structures of language. To illustrate, I assume I can take it as self-evident that the opposition between one and many, manifest in grammar as singular-plural is asymmetric: singular is first and plural is second. When you start counting, you must begin with 1 and then you can get to 2. If you have two eggs in a basket, then you have one egg in the basket, but the reverse is not true. And in keeping with this self-evident character of numerology there has been found to be a universal of language, an empirical claim supported by lots of evidence, that if a language has grammatical singular and plural, then the singular is unmarked and the plural is marked. (And, by the way, if that language has also dual, it is twice marked in relation to singuilar.) That is, some piece of form is added to a word to mark it as plural e.g. dog vs dog+s, tree vs tree+s. Similarly, while many people would not regard it as self-evident that truth is prior to falsity, I hold that it is, and have argued as such in various publications. In keeping with the order of this asymmetry truth is unmarked and falsity is marked. Similarly, down is first and up is second. Similarly, happy is first and sad is second. Thus we can say ‘unhappy’ but not ‘unsad.’ Similarly well and unwell. People often cite right vs left as an example of symmetric opposition, but language, generically, has presupposed that right is first and left is second. Numerically, most people are right handed. And in many cultures left-handed people are punished for learning to write with their left hand, sometimes forced to learn to write with their right hand. And in many cultures left is explicitly associated with evil or dirtiness and right with cleanness and good. There are also cases where the asymmetry goes contrary to what is conventionally believed. For example, the conventional view holds that the past is first, the present it next, and then comes the future. But to the contrary language presupposes that the present is first and the past is second. This contrary view does make sense, however, in that we experience things first in the present, and then they become past. We take a picture in the present, but it
Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Edwina, I see. I think, I mistakenly have compared the thing I was talking about with semiotics. Maybe it might better refer to LOR. I guess, the triadic sign is something too special to be suggested for model in this respect. The triadicity in the Logic Of Relatives probably suits better to the emergence hypothesis, that binarities may create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to binarities. The sexuality-example can only be understood with the hypothesis, that culture, habits, feelings are not something self-created, but are due to logic, which is universal. Meaning, yes, a human may, with some empathy, roughly know what it is like to be a bat, and in an alien culture 2000 light years away they have similar social problems like we have. Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 18:18 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut My apologies - I see your point against the yes-no-maybe. But I don't think that the middle action of mediation emerges from the interaction of polarities. This is almost a type of 'averaging' where all individual units partake of 'some' of each other. The middle term is a set of 'normative habits of organization' - That's not the same as that 'dilution of types'. The mediative process is extremely powerful in moving data from original sensate input [Dynamic Object] to resultant specific Interpretant [Dynamic Interpretant]. ..whether that Interpretant is the meaning of a word or a nutrient transformed into a healthy cell. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 12:05 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, Yes, I agree, that the so-called progressives are not per se better argumenting or more ethical people than conservatives. An overreacting progressive can be a real monster. But you told me, that "The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. " But isnt that, what I wrote myself? I wrote: "I think, this is wrong.", and meant by it your black-white-gray distinction, I have called it the yes-no-maybe-distinction by Lukasiewicz. So, dont you think, that the middle term action-of-mediation might come from, or supplemetarily be analysed as, an emergence caused by the interaction of different polarity dimensions as I was writing? Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 17:30 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut - I think you've fallen into your own definitional trap. The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. And I don't see what this triadic process has to do with 'homophobia and transphobia'. Nor would I define a conservative perspective as 'binary'. I would define a closed perspective as...closed - and its opinions could be binary or completely relativistic and anarchistic. After all, the so-called 'progressives' can be as rigid and unyielding in their relativism as any so-called conservative. I would define an open perspective as - open to change. That's all. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 10:59 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: List, As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities. I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence. A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia: The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. The reason for sexuality
Re: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Helmut My apologies - I see your point against the yes-no-maybe. But I don't think that the middle action of mediation emerges from the interaction of polarities. This is almost a type of 'averaging' where all individual units partake of 'some' of each other. The middle term is a set of 'normative habits of organization' - That's not the same as that 'dilution of types'. The mediative process is extremely powerful in moving data from original sensate input [Dynamic Object] to resultant specific Interpretant [Dynamic Interpretant]. ..whether that Interpretant is the meaning of a word or a nutrient transformed into a healthy cell. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 12:05 PM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, Yes, I agree, that the so-called progressives are not per se better argumenting or more ethical people than conservatives. An overreacting progressive can be a real monster. But you told me, that "The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. " But isnt that, what I wrote myself? I wrote: "I think, this is wrong.", and meant by it your black-white-gray distinction, I have called it the yes-no-maybe-distinction by Lukasiewicz. So, dont you think, that the middle term action-of-mediation might come from, or supplemetarily be analysed as, an emergence caused by the interaction of different polarity dimensions as I was writing? Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 17:30 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut - I think you've fallen into your own definitional trap. The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. And I don't see what this triadic process has to do with 'homophobia and transphobia'. Nor would I define a conservative perspective as 'binary'. I would define a closed perspective as...closed - and its opinions could be binary or completely relativistic and anarchistic. After all, the so-called 'progressives' can be as rigid and unyielding in their relativism as any so-called conservative. I would define an open perspective as - open to change. That's all. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 10:59 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: List, As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities. I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence. A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia: The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. The reason for sexuality being not binary anymore is, that in an open society there are more than one polarity-dimensions now. One dimension is the biological male-female distinction (the sex), another dimension is the social dimension (the gender): What sex do I want to be, and the third dimension is the attraction: Which sex am I attracted to for having as a partner. A fourth dimension is, do I care about sex at all, or am rather tired of the whole topic. I just have mentioned this example due to its obvious relevance in contemporary discussions, but there are many more examples in nowadays culture, e.g. the rightism-leftism-discussion. Today it is not so easy anymore to distinguish between what is rightist and what leftist, like it was in former decades. Well, I just wanted to propose looking at all these things
Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Edwina, Yes, I agree, that the so-called progressives are not per se better argumenting or more ethical people than conservatives. An overreacting progressive can be a real monster. But you told me, that "The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option.The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option." But isnt that, what I wrote myself? I wrote: "I think, this is wrong.", and meant by it your black-white-gray distinction, I have called it the yes-no-maybe-distinction by Lukasiewicz. So, dont you think, that the middle term action-of-mediation might come from, or supplementarily be analysed as, an emergence caused by the interaction of different polarity dimensions as I was writing? Best, Helmut 22. November 2020 um 17:30 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" wrote: Helmut - I think you've fallen into your own definitional trap. The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. And I don't see what this triadic process has to do with 'homophobia and transphobia'. Nor would I define a conservative perspective as 'binary'. I would define a closed perspective as...closed - and its opinions could be binary or completely relativistic and anarchistic. After all, the so-called 'progressives' can be as rigid and unyielding in their relativism as any so-called conservative. I would define an open perspective as - open to change. That's all. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 10:59 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: List, As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities. I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence. A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia: The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. The reason for sexuality being not binary anymore is, that in an open society there are more than one polarity-dimensions now. One dimension is the biological male-female distinction (the sex), another dimension is the social dimension (the gender): What sex do I want to be, and the third dimension is the attraction: Which sex am I attracted to for having as a partner. A fourth dimension is, do I care about sex at all, or am rather tired of the whole topic. I just have mentioned this example due to its obvious relevance in contemporary discussions, but there are many more examples in nowadays culture, e.g. the rightism-leftism-discussion. Today it is not so easy anymore to distinguish between what is rightist and what leftist, like it was in former decades. Well, I just wanted to propose looking at all these things sensibly, with using adicy-models and the concept of emergence and irreducibility of triads. I have the feeling, that a triadic view is opposed to digitalism, which, with its binary 1-0-distinction in the small transistor-scale just creates polarities, fiter bubbles, hatred, in the large scales of communication too. Best, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE
Re: [PEIRCE-L] multiple-valued logic
Helmut - I think you've fallen into your own definitional trap. The Peircean triad doesn't mean that there are three options [ie black, white and gray]. The Peircean triad is an irreducible process, where the middle term is an action-of-mediation. Not a third option. And I don't see what this triadic process has to do with 'homophobia and transphobia'. Nor would I define a conservative perspective as 'binary'. I would define a closed perspective as...closed - and its opinions could be binary or completely relativistic and anarchistic. After all, the so-called 'progressives' can be as rigid and unyielding in their relativism as any so-called conservative. I would define an open perspective as - open to change. That's all. Edwina On Sun 22/11/20 10:59 AM , Helmut Raulien h.raul...@gmx.de sent: List, As Peircean semiotics is a three-valued logic, I think it bears relevance for the discussion about multiple-valued logic. But I have the impression, that multipleness is sometimes explained away by just adding a "maybe" to the values "yes" and "no" (e.g. Lukasiewicz). I think, this is wrong. I think, multipleness comes from more than one dimension of (binary) polarities being relevant for one problem. If a problem is analysed by more than one dimension of polarities, it can be shown, that the logic, the problem depends on, is tri- or more- adic. According to Peirce and others, a more-than-three-adicity can be reduced to three-adicities, but a three-adicity cannot always, or can hardly ever, be reduced to binarities. I would say, when different polarities create a triadicity, which from then on cannot be reduced back to them, this is an emergence. A polarity is logically an easy thing to grasp, and a traidicity is not. So this emergence often brings with it a feeling of loss of control, and anger. This is an explanation for homophobia and transphobia: The conservative concept of sexuality is male-female, so binary, like black-white, hot-cold, right-wrong, up-down, open-closed, well-unwell. When somebody claims for him*herself to belong to a third gender, conservative people see, that this way their world is made more complicated and harder to grasp, they feel a loss of control, and blame this person for deliberately being the reason for that. The reason for sexuality being not binary anymore is, that in an open society there are more than one polarity-dimensions now. One dimension is the biological male-female distinction (the sex), another dimension is the social dimension (the gender): What sex do I want to be, and the third dimension is the attraction: Which sex am I attracted to for having as a partner. A fourth dimension is, do I care about sex at all, or am rather tired of the whole topic. I just have mentioned this example due to its obvious relevance in contemporary discussions, but there are many more examples in nowadays culture, e.g. the rightism-leftism-discussion. Today it is not so easy anymore to distinguish between what is rightist and what leftist, like it was in former decades. Well, I just wanted to propose looking at all these things sensibly, with using adicy-models and the concept of emergence and irreducibility of triads. I have the feeling, that a triadic view is opposed to digitalism, which, with its binary 1-0-distinction in the small transistor-scale just creates polarities, fiter bubbles, hatred, in the large scales of communication too. Best, Helmut _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with no subject, and with the sole line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
