Re: Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
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comments below
On Tue 21/05/19 3:27 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
Edwina, Helmut, List:
1] ET: Science requires empirical evidence ...
JAS: The truth of this statement depends on how we define
"empirical." In the popular sense, only the Special Sciences require
empirical evidence. According to Peirce, philosophy--including both
Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics--requires empirical evidence,
defined as experiential evidence of the kind that is common to
anyone and everyone; and even Mathematics requires empirical
evidence, in the sense that it depends upon observation. That is why
he classified all of these fields as sciences.
EDWINA I refer only to the sciences that require objective empirical
evidence. I don't think that a pragmatic life can be lived without
such objectivity.
2]ET: Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't
provide any proof of their pragmatic reality.
Deductive logic shows us what Propositions follow necessarily from
other Propositions. In that sense, it reveals what else we must
believe in accordance with what we already believe; i.e., it only
provides "proof" of other pragmatic realities that are entailed by
what we already have ascertained to be pragmatic realities.
EDWINA So? Again - without objective evidence, then our logical
analyses are irrelevant.
3] ET: My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A
PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself.
JAS: There is no need to shout. Indeed, "a sign is not a real
thing" (EP 2:303; 1904); however, Peirce generally used "thought" or
"semeiosis" for the process, and "Sign" or "Representamen" for each
constituent of the process. On the other hand, an Argument is a Sign
that is also a continuous "inferential process," which we describe
using definite Propositions as if they were the constituent Signs of
that process. That is why I reject the charge of
"reductionism"--saying that the Universe (or any other Argument) is a
Sign says nothing whatsoever about its complexity, except that is more
complex than a Proposition, which in turn is more complex than a Seme.
EDWINA I'm not shouting but emphasizing. My computer doesn't do
italics or underlining very well - it somehow forgets how to shut
itself off from such methods. My focus is on the action [ACTION] of
the Repesentamen - and I think that we forget it is is an action.
4] ET: As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only
functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O;
the R-R; and the R-I.
JAS: Absolutely not; this treats the one triadic relation between
the Sign, Object, and Interpretant as if it were composed of three
dyadic relations. If anything merits the label of "reductionism,"
this is it. A Sign can be classified in accordance with its own
nature (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type), that of its
relation to its Dynamic Object (Icon/Index/Symbol), and that of its
relation to its Final Interpretant (Rheme/Dicisign/Argument or
Seme/Pheme/Delome); these result in the ten classes of Peirce's 1903
taxonomy. However, a Sign does not consist of these three relations;
I consider such a notion to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of
Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar.
EDWINA And I disagree. The triad is not reducible to dyads. I don't
say that the Representamen CONSISTS of these three relations. I say
that the Representamen, as a mediative process, engages in these
three relations. See 8.335, where Peirce discusses 'In respect to
their relations to their Dynamic Objects, ….
5] ET: Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to
the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the
concept that 'all signs are one' ...
JAS: So you acknowledge my objection to the term, but persist in
continuing to use it anyway. That seems rather hypocritical for
someone who routinely accuses me of calling her "unPeircean," even
though I have conscientiously avoided using that word myself. If I
claimed to be unable to come up with any other term to describe your
views, would that be justification for me to start using it now? Of
course not.
EDWINA There is no comparison between accusing someone of outlining
a semiosis that has nothing to do with Peirce [aka unPeircean whether
or not you use the term] - and my opinion that your outline of Peirce
is a reductionist one. I can't describe your reduction of 'plethora
of signs' to 'one sign' in any other way than 'reductionist'.
6] ET: In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see
it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude
that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from
themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say
that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually
has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't
Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
Edwina, Helmut, List: ET: Science requires empirical evidence ... The truth of this statement depends on how we define "empirical." In the popular sense, only the Special Sciences require empirical evidence. According to Peirce, philosophy--including both Logic as Semeiotic and Metaphysics--requires empirical evidence, defined as *experiential *evidence of the kind that is common to anyone and everyone; and even Mathematics requires empirical evidence, in the sense that it depends upon *observation*. That is why he classified *all *of these fields as *sciences*. ET: Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. Deductive logic shows us what Propositions follow necessarily from other Propositions. In that sense, it reveals what *else *we must believe in accordance with what we *already *believe; i.e., it only provides "proof" of *other *pragmatic realities that are entailed by what we *already *have ascertained to be pragmatic realities. ET: My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. There is no need to shout. Indeed, "a sign is not a real thing" (EP 2:303; 1904); however, Peirce generally used "thought" or "semeiosis" for the *process*, and "Sign" or "Representamen" for each *constituent *of the process. On the other hand, an Argument is a Sign that is *also *a continuous "inferential process," which we *describe *using definite Propositions *as if* they were the constituent Signs of that process. That is why I reject the charge of "reductionism"--saying that the Universe (or any other Argument) is a Sign says *nothing whatsoever* about its complexity, except that is *more *complex than a Proposition, which in turn is *more *complex than a Seme. ET: As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I. Absolutely not; this treats the *one triadic* relation between the Sign, Object, and Interpretant as if it were composed of *three dyadic* relations. If anything merits the label of "reductionism," this is it. A Sign can be *classified *in accordance with its own nature (Qualisign/Sinsign/Legisign or Tone/Token/Type), that of its relation to its Dynamic Object (Icon/Index/Symbol), and that of its relation to its Final Interpretant (Rheme/Dicisign/Argument or Seme/Pheme/Delome); these result in the ten classes of Peirce's 1903 taxonomy. However, a Sign does not *consist *of these three relations; I consider such a notion to reflect a fundamental misunderstanding of Peirce's entire Speculative Grammar. ET: Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one' ... So you acknowledge my objection to the term, but persist in continuing to use it anyway. That seems rather hypocritical for someone who routinely accuses me of calling her "unPeircean," even though I have conscientiously *avoided *using that word myself. If I claimed to be unable to come up with any other term to describe your views, would that be justification for me to start using it now? Of course not. ET: In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily. There is nothing "backwards" about reasoning from true premisses to a necessary conclusion; that is the nature of deductive argumentations in general, and syllogisms in particular. In this summary, you conveniently left out the minor premiss, that the entire Universe is a Sign. *Denying *that premiss warrants denying the conclusion; but *given *that additional premiss, if every Sign is determined by an Object other than itself, then it *necessarily *follows that the Universe is determined by an Object other than itself. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Tue, May 21, 2019 at 1:16 PM Edwina Taborsky wrote: > Helmut > > Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' > rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical > but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. > > I consider that a major problem in discussion of 'the sign' is the view, > almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the > sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is > not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the > sign/representamen only
Re: Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Trinity, Continuity, and the Cosmotheandric
Helmut Science requires empirical evidence - and discussions about 'God' rarely provide that. Logic can only show us that our beliefs are logical but can't provide any proof of their pragmatic reality. I consider that a major problem in discussion of 'the sign' is the view, almost, that it is a 'thing', a discrete entity. My understanding of the sign/representamen is that it is A PROCESS OF MEDIATION, an ACTION and is not a 'thing' in itself. As such a process of mediation, the sign/representamen only functions within a semiosic triad of relations, made up of the R-O; the R-R; and the R-I. Therefore, one has to examine the functioning nature of this mediative action- which never 'exists' or functions on its own. My understanding of it is that the sign/representamen operates by developing habits of organization or laws which enable matter to develop as morphological forms. Therefore - reductionism, which, despite JAS's objection to the term, is the only one I can come up with that describes the concept that 'all signs are one'seems to me to ignore these laws or habits. These laws and habits are real and not only real but existent [we can scientifically examine the laws of chemistry, physics, biology] - can or should they be ignored? And are all these laws reducible? Can a biological entity, eg, a swan, be reduced to a pile of chemicals? My view is that these normative rules of formation are relatively stable and scientifically, I don't see how we can ignore them such that we can conclude that ALL mediation is actually using the same law. In addition, I object to the 'backwards reasoning' as I see it, where you proceed from a conclusion to a premise. If we conclude that all signs/representamens must refer to objects external from themselves [and this is a debatable conclusion] - can we actually say that this 'proves' that the Universe, as a sign/representamen actually has an Object-external-to-itself? I don't think we can do this that easily. Edwina On Tue 21/05/19 11:18 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent: Edwina, All, I think there is (and will be) a premiss missing: Scale-invariance / connectedness / noncontingency. A forest consisting of different (nonconnected) trees is not a tree, it is not scale-invariant. But there may be a forest in which the trees are connected by their roots, which make them one plant, so you can say that this forest is one tree. Now to the question whether the universe is one sign: Do all signs have a connectibility towards each other, or are they separated, made contingent, by event-horizons due to the limitations by light-velocity and other speed/space limits? Or are there nonlocal and nontemporal ways of connections between signs, such as divine interactions? Is the universe scale-invariant or not? Does religion as reconnection in reality (whatever that is) provide such a scale-invariance, or is religion a collusion (shared illusion)? Nobody knows, but everybody is free to guess, or "believe" (whatever that is). I think it is ok. to assume that these things (justified religion, connectedness...) may exist. I mean, though it is unscientific to take unproven things for premiss, it is unscientific too to claim for premiss that something cannot exist because it is not proved. Helmut 21. Mai 2019 um 14:48 Uhr Von: "Edwina Taborsky" Gary R, list I think we have to be very cautious here. I don't think that these discussions on religion and logic have anything to do with bridging the chasm between religion and science. They have no scientific content whatsoever. Furthermore, because an argument's single premises are true, in the sense that they can be abstracted from a text's content and set up as, in themselves, true -- and the format of their syllogistic placement is valid, this does not make the content of this argument true. It merely sets up a valid argument. I, for example, question the soundness and truth of JAS's insistence that takes Peirce's statement that 'the Universe is perfused with signs' and then, matches it up with Peirce's concept that multiple signs can be 'merged' to be considered ONE sign - to conclude that the Universe is A single Sign. I question such reductionism, for that denies the actual complexity of the Universe and indeed, the functionality of semiosis - which includes, among its other functions - the ability and necessity to 'make matter complex' rather than simple. We can intellectually reduce a complexity to singularity but can we make this an existential simplicity? I also question the soundness of JAS's insistence that a sign requires an external object - for my reading of Peirce is that, indeed, the semiosic function requires 'dialogue' which does set up a 'this' and a 'not this' which interact. BUT, this external object is only that when it becomes an integral part of the semiosic interactionand
