Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung - you are missing my point. I'm not trying to convince YOU to accept my 
view that the Relations are not dyads. I frankly don't care about whether or 
not you agree with me. 

I'm asking you to stop informing this list (as well as your endless postings to 
the biosemiotics list) that I consider the Relations to be dyads! I'm asking 
you to speak for yourself - and not misinform the lists about what I think!  
READ what you wrote:

 "You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs are not 
signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic"

The way this reads - is that Edwina considers '9 dyadic relations'. But I 
don't. So, don't misinform people.  And you wrote:

I say: " The 9 Relations are dyadic relations, not triadic ones." (1229151-2)


I think you also meant (122915-2).


No, Sung, I did NOT say that the 9 Relations are dyadic relations. So - don't 
go and write something, informing the list of 'what Edwina also meant'.

Stick to your own comments about yourself and don't dictate what others 'ought 
to think'.

Edwina 
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 8:50 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina,


  You wrote:


  "Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the Relations 
are not dyads,  (122915-1)
  are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?"

  You may repeat (122915-1) as many times as you wish, but, to me, the fact 
remains that




  "The 9 types of signs are dyadic relations, regardless of whether or not they 
become incorporated   (122915-2)
  into a triadic sign, just as quarks are quarks regardless of whether or not 
they are incorporated into 
  a baryon." 


  Perhaps you will find the quark-sign analogy useful someday, even though it 
may not seem so now, despite the fact that I have been discussing this model on 
these lists since [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012.  


  All the best.


  Sung










  On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the 
Relations are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?

Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that it 
refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition of 
nominalism.

Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't 
simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and Gary 
R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These differences 
aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually substantive. I strongly 
reject your mechanical reductionism.

Edwina
      - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,



  You wrote:


  "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely 
an index,  (122015-1)
  but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one 
  day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."


  (1)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".  


  It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square 
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be 
explained below:


   f
  g
  Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant 
(I)
   |
 ^
   |
  |
   |___|
h


  Figure 1.  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
  f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign 
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).  
  Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. 




  The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e., 
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in Figure 1) 
in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is determined by 
TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the bullet.




   (2)  You are 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung, List:

The nine TERMS are signs (rhematic symbols).  For example, the word
"icon" is obviously a sign.  However, the OBJECTS that the nine terms
represent are NOT signs.  For example, the relation of resemblance between
representamen and object is not itself a sign.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 7:55 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "The nine terms are certainly signs--rhematic symbols, I suppose--but no
> one is disputing this."   (122915-1)
>
> With all due respect, Jon A, where have you been all these weeks and
> months ?
>
> Our great & honored debatress, Edwina, would not agree with you on
> (122915-1).
>
> Good luck.
>
> Sung
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina,

You wrote:

"Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the
Relations are not dyads,  (122915-1)
are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?"

You may repeat (122915-1) as many times as you wish, but, to me, the fact
remains that


"The 9 types of signs are *dyadic relations*, regardless of whether or not
they become incorporated   (122915-2)
into a triadic sign, just as quarks are quarks regardless of whether or not
they are incorporated into
a baryon."

Perhaps you will find the *quark-sign analogy *useful someday, even though
it may not seem so now, despite the fact that I have been discussing this
model on these lists since [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012.

All the best.

Sung






On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 8:16 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the
> Relations are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?
>
> Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that
> it refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition
> of nominalism.
>
> Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't
> simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and
> Gary R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These
> differences aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually
> substantive. I strongly reject your mechanical reductionism.
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Sungchul Ji 
> *To:* PEIRCE-L 
> *Sent:* Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
> *Subject:* Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely
> an index,  (122015-1)
> but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
> day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."
>
> (*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".
>
> It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
> triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
> explained below:
>
>  f
>  g
> Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant
> (I)
>  |
> ^
>  |
>  |
>  |___|
>   h
>
> *Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
> f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
> interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
> Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness.
>
>
> The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
> "interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
> 1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
> determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
> bullet.
>
>
>  (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of
> signs are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not
> triadic ?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to
> produce the 10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way
> you are expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my
> humble opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
> are all signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now
> and we can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the
> former are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an
> analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of
> baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This
> is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and
> the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, my
> suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the
> latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your
> naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the
> difference being only NOMINAL.
>
> (*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
> discussions on the relation between the 9

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung:

Again, the bullet-hole is ONLY a (necessarily triadic) sign because it has
immediate (possible) and final (would-be) interpretants.  The absence of a
dynamical (actual) interpretant does not somehow render it dyadic.

The nine terms are certainly signs--rhematic symbols, I suppose--but no one
is disputing this.  The issue is whether calling them "TYPES of signs" is
helpful or misleading, given the wide agreement that there are ten CLASSES
of signs based on their valid combinations.  Why do we even need a name for
all nine, taken together?  They are three relations that manifest in three
modes; why not just leave it at that?

Regards,

Jon S. (again, NOT Jon A.)

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 5:47 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely
> an index,  (122015-1)
> but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
> day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."
>
> (*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".
>
> It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
> triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
> explained below:
>
>  f
>  g
> Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant
> (I)
>  |
> ^
>  |
>  |
>  |___|
>   h
>
> *Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
> f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
> interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
> Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
> Secondness or Thirdness.
>
> The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
> "interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
> 1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
> determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
> bullet.
>
>  (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of
> signs are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not
> triadic ?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to
> produce the 10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way
> you are expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my
> humble opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs
> are all signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now
> and we can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the
> former are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an
> analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of
> baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This
> is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and
> the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, my
> suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the
> latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your
> naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the
> difference being only NOMINAL.
>
> (*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
> discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of
> signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with
> [biosemiotics:46] dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus
> on the definition of the seemingly simple concept of *the sign*.  It is
> like physicists quibbling over the definition of energy, or chemists not
> agreeing on the definition of molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.
> In fact semioticians, beginning with Peirce himself, seem to have been
> writing and discussing about the concept of *signs* in unbelievably
> complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably not because
> semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, but
> because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably
> more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why
> semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to
> advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would
> like to be informed of any specific contributions that smiotics have made
> to science, linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, or to theology throughout
> human history).  And yet semiotics is such an intellectually attractive
> discipline that it may act as a powerful intellectual blackhole for many
> aspiring thinkers. As a possible warning against such a semiotic danger,  I
> am taking the risk of committing the crime of another neologism, the 
> "*s

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Sung - how many times do I have to repeat that my view is that the Relations 
are not dyads, are not dyadic relations, but are part of a triad?

Also - your definition of 'nominal' seems to suggest that you think that it 
refers to a view focused around 'names'. No- that's not the definition of 
nominalism.

Furthermore, the difference in analysis of the 9 types of Relations, isn't 
simply due to their 'name' - where you call them 'elementary signs', and Gary 
R. calls them 'parameters' and I call them 'Relations'. These differences 
aren't simply terminological; they are conceptually substantive. I strongly 
reject your mechanical reductionism.

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Tuesday, December 29, 2015 6:47 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,



  You wrote:


  "So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely an 
index,  (122015-1)
  but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one 
  day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."


  (1)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".  


  It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square 
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be 
explained below:


   f  g
  Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant (I)
   |
 ^
   |
  |
   |___|
h


  Figure 1.  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
  f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign 
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).  
  Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness, 
Secondness or Thirdness. 




  The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e., 
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in Figure 1) 
in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is determined by 
TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the bullet.




   (2)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs are 
not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic ?  
Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to produce the 10 
classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way you are expressing 
your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my humble opinion, both the 9 
the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs are all signs (simply because we 
are thinking about them right here and now and we can only think in signs) but 
are not all of the same kind, since the former are parts of the latter and not 
the other way around, in an analogous way that quarks (there are 6 different 
kinds) are parts of baryons (i.e., protons, and neutrons) and not the other way 
around.  This is why I think it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of 
signs and the 10 classes of signs by giving them different names, for example, 
my suggestion that the former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the 
latter "composite signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your 
naming the former as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the 
difference being only NOMINAL.


  (3) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of 
discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of 
signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with [biosemiotics:46] 
dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus on the definition of 
the seemingly simple concept of the sign.  It is like physicists quibbling over 
the definition of energy, or chemists not agreeing on the definition of 
molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.  In fact semioticians, beginning 
with Peirce himself, seem to have been writing and discussing about the concept 
of signs in unbelievably complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably 
not because semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, 
but because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably 
more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why 
semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to 
advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would like to 
be informed of any specif

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Gary R, Matt, Edwina, Jon A, John C, List,

You wrote:

"So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely an
index,  (122015-1)
but may only possibly come to have an interpretant when, say, someone one
day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such."

(*1*)  I think you may be conflating "sign" and "semiosis".

It is clear that semiois is always triadic, as represented by my "square
triangle" as you call it, but signs are not always triadic, as will be
explained below:

 f
 g
Object (O) -->  Representamen (R)  -->  Interpretant (I)
 |
^
 |
 |
 |___|
  h

*Figure 1.*  The irreducible triadic nature of semiosis.
f = R-O relation, or sign production; g = R-I relation, or sign
interpretation; h = O-I relation (or correspondence).
Each of the three nodes, O, R and I, can be in the mode of Firstness,
Secondness or Thirdness.


The the "bullet hole in the tree", before being "semiosed", i.e.,
"interpreted as a sign, by a passer-by", is still a sign (i.e., R in *Figure
1) *in the mode of being of Secondness, since its very existence is
determined by TWO objects -- the bullet and the tree penetrated by the
bullet.


 (*2*)  You are agreeing with Edwina in believing that the 9 types of signs
are not signs because they refer to 9 dyadic relations that are not triadic
?  Rather you think the 9 types are the "parameters" needed to produce the
10 classes of triadic signs ?  You may be right, but the way you are
expressing your idea is not too convincing to me.  To repeat my humble
opinion, both the 9 the types of signs and the 10 classes of signs are all
signs (simply because we are thinking about them right here and now and we
can only think in signs) but are not all of the same kind, since the former
are parts of the latter and not the other way around, in an analogous way
that quarks (there are 6 different kinds) are parts of baryons (i.e.,
protons, and neutrons) and not the other way around.  This is why I think
it is justified to differentiate the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of
signs by giving them different names, for example, my suggestion that the
former be referred to as the "elementary signs" and the latter "composite
signs", which is in principle in the same spirit as your naming the former
as "parameters" and the latter as "triadic signs", the difference being
only NOMINAL.

(*3*) Frankly  I am really surprised that, after at least for 3 years of
discussions on the relation between the 9 types of signs and 10 classes of
signs on this list and the biosemiotics list, beginning with
[biosemiotics:46] dated 122/26/2012,  we have not yet reached a consensus
on the definition of the seemingly simple concept of *the sign*.  It is
like physicists quibbling over the definition of energy, or chemists not
agreeing on the definition of molecules endlessly, which is unthinkable.
In fact semioticians, beginning with Peirce himself, seem to have been
writing and discussing about the concept of *signs* in unbelievably
complicated ways for over 100 years ! This is probably not because
semioticians are, relatively speaking, not too bright on average, but
because semiotics may be a much more complex discipline -- incomparably
more complex than physics, chemistry, or even biology. This may explain why
semiotics has not yet been able to make any significant contributions to
advancing human knowledge (as I can see; If I am wrong on this, I would
like to be informed of any specific contributions that smiotics have made
to science, linguistics, mathematics, philosophy, or to theology throughout
human history).  And yet semiotics is such an intellectually attractive
discipline that it may act as a powerful intellectual blackhole for many
aspiring thinkers. As a possible warning against such a semiotic danger,  I
am taking the risk of committing the crime of another neologism, the "*semiotic
blackhole*" or the "*Peircean blackhole*".  If this wild speculation turns
out to have some validity upon further scrutiny, we may end up having two
kinds of *blackholes* in the Universe --

(i) the astronomical blackholes to be found in *space and time* through
spectroscopy, and

(ii) the "semiotics" or "Peircean blackholes"  that we can *experience*,
*conceptualize*, and *theorize about* in our *mind* through phaneroscopy,
communication, and logical analysis.

With all the best.

Sung





On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 3:46 PM, Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Sung, list,
>
> Sung, it seems to me likely that there are *very* few members of this
> list who do not see the Peircean sign as essentially triadic. Your attempts
> to find passages in Peirce to support your idiosyncratic position must
> fail. The vast majority of Peirce quotations which could be provided--and
> 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Sung, list,

Sung, it seems to me likely that there are *very* few members of this list
who do not see the Peircean sign as essentially triadic. Your attempts to
find passages in Peirce to support your idiosyncratic position must fail.
The vast majority of Peirce quotations which could be provided--and we're
probably talking about dozens if not hundreds--*immedately* make it clear
that all signs are triadic. The quotation you just offered, commenting that
in the case of an index that the Interpretant may be merely *possible*,
does not deny the triadic nature of the sign. See, for example, this
quotation which makes this explicit in the very MS which initiated this
thread. NDTR.

A Representamen is the First Correlate of a triadic relation, the Second
Correlate being termed its Object, and the possible Third Correlate being
termed its Interpretant, by which triadic relation the possible
Interpretant is determined to be the First Correlate of the same triadic
relation to the same Object, and for some possible Interpretant. A Sign is
a representamen of which some interpetant is a cognition of a mind. Signs
are the only representamens that have been much studied. CP 2.242


Even a symbol has only a 'possible' interpretant so that if, for example, a
novel written in Bulgarian were given to me, I couldn't make any sense of
it since I do not know that language. The interpretant would remain
'possible' for me (I might some day learn Bulgarian and read the novel),
but would be 'real' for an actual Bulgarian reader of it.

So, for example, and a fortiori, that bullet hole in the tree is surely an
index, but may only possibly come to have an interpretent when, say,
someone one day passes by, sees it, and interprets it as such.

Thus, I too would like to recomment that instead of trying to 'square the
triangle', so to speak, that you really do consider reading much more
Peircean semiotic, for example, the late Welby letters which Edwina
recently recommended, so that you will at last come to the conclusion which
virtually every Peircan semiotician recognized as such has come to, namely,
that signs are not dyadic (that's Saussurrean), all are *essentially*
triadic. Any basic handbook on semiotics (of which Kalevi Kull has posted a
list at Academia) will make this distinction between Peirce's and
Saussure's semiotic clear as day.

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 2:56 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Jon A, List,
>
> Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
> Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):
>
> "A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
> once,  (122915-1)
> lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
> would
> not lose that character if there were no interpretant."
>
> So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic
> sign*.
>
> Therefore,
>
> "Not all signs are triadic."
>   (122915-2)
>
> as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> "
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Sung, List:
>>
>> Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.
>>
>> You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something
>> non-triadic CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must
>> identify something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide
>> such a citation.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon S.
>>
>> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>>
>>> Hi Jon,
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
>>>   (122915-1)
>>>
>>> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
>>> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>>>
>>> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>>> something  (122915-2)
>>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>>
>>> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>>>
>>> All the best.
>>>
>>> Sung
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
 Sung, List:

 The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather,
 each one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is
 either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon,
 an index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
 argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
 with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
 (which entails legisign an

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Jon A, List,

Here is one quotation of Pierce cited in Charles Peirce's Guess at the
Riddle (K. Sheriff, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1994):

"A sinsign may be index or icon.  As index it is 'a sign which would, at
once,  (122915-1)
lose the chracter wich makes it a sign if its object were removed, but
would
not lose that character if there were no interpretant."

So it seems to me that (122915-1) establishes the concept of a *dyadic sign*
.

Therefore,

"Not all signs are triadic."
  (122915-2)

as some Peirceans on this list seem to believe.

All the best.

Sung









"

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 9:00 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.
>
> You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something non-triadic
> CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must identify
> something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide such a
> citation.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon S.
>
> On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Hi Jon,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
>> (122915-1)
>>
>> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
>> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>>
>> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>> something  (122915-2)
>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>
>> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
>> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Sung, List:
>>>
>>> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
>>> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
>>> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
>>> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
>>> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
>>> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
>>> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
>>> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>>>
>>> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
>>> something that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>>
>>> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
>>> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
>>> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
>>> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
>>> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
>>> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>>>
>>> Regards,
>>>
>>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>>
>>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 Edwina,

 You wrote:

 "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
   (122815-1)

 (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
 the 9 relations:

 1) quali*sign,*
 2) sin*sign*,
 3) legi*sign*.
 4) icon,
 5) index,
 6) symbol,
 7) rheme,
 8) dici*sign*, and
 9) argument.

 If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made
 mistakes when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9
 relations as "signs " ?

 (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to
 be that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
 triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
 above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.

 (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
 fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
 lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:

 "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
 (122815-2)
 reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."

 If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
 be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
 One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
 Principle in physics, is something like the following:

 "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
   (122815-3)
 and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung, List:

Yes, I meant legisign not dicisign.  Thanks for the correction.

You asserted that it is "non-Peircean" to think that something non-triadic
CANNOT be a sign.  If this is true, then Peirce's writings must identify
something non-triadic that CAN be a sign.  I asked you to provide such a
citation.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 6:47 AM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Hi Jon,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
> (122915-1)
>
> Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
> understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.
>
> "Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines
> something  (122915-2)
> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>
> Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Sung, List:
>>
>> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
>> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
>> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
>> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
>> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
>> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
>> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
>> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>>
>> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
>> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>>
>> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
>> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
>> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
>> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
>> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
>> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>>
>>> Edwina,
>>>
>>> You wrote:
>>>
>>> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>>> (122815-1)
>>>
>>> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
>>> the 9 relations:
>>>
>>> 1) quali*sign,*
>>> 2) sin*sign*,
>>> 3) legi*sign*.
>>> 4) icon,
>>> 5) index,
>>> 6) symbol,
>>> 7) rheme,
>>> 8) dici*sign*, and
>>> 9) argument.
>>>
>>> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
>>> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
>>> "signs " ?
>>>
>>> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
>>> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
>>> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
>>> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>>>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>>>
>>> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
>>> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
>>> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>>>
>>> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>>> (122815-2)
>>> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>>>
>>> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
>>> be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
>>> One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
>>> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>>>
>>> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>>> (122815-3)
>>> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>>>
>>> Or,
>>>
>>> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>>> (122815-4)
>>> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>>>
>>> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may
>>> refer to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the
>>> "semiotic uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>>>
>>> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
>>> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
>>> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>>>
>>> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates
>>> we have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of
>>> the Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community,

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Hi Jon,

You wrote:

"Every sign is either a qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; . . . "
  (122915-1)

Did you mean to say "legisign: instead of "dicisign" ?  It is my
understanding that "dicisign" is the interpretan of a sinsign.


"Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
 (122915-2)
that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."

Can you re-phrase (122915-2) ?

All the best.

Sung


On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 11:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:

> Sung, List:
>
> The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
> one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
> qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
> index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
> argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
> with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
> (which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
> start taking additional trichotomies into account.
>
> Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
> that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."
>
> It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not
> GUARANTEE that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of
> Peirce," and I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However,
> I suspect that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to
> come away with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only
> to a limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:
>
>> Edwina,
>>
>> You wrote:
>>
>> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>> (122815-1)
>>
>> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to
>> the 9 relations:
>>
>> 1) quali*sign,*
>> 2) sin*sign*,
>> 3) legi*sign*.
>> 4) icon,
>> 5) index,
>> 6) symbol,
>> 7) rheme,
>> 8) dici*sign*, and
>> 9) argument.
>>
>> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
>> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
>> "signs " ?
>>
>> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
>> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
>> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
>> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>>
>> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
>> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
>> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>>
>> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>>   (122815-2)
>> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>>
>> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may
>> be able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.
>> One possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
>> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>>
>> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>> (122815-3)
>> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>>
>> Or,
>>
>> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>>   (122815-4)
>> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>>
>> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may
>> refer to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the
>> "semiotic uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>>
>> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
>> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
>> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>>
>> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates
>> we have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of
>> the Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community,
>> including Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, Jon, and others.
>>
>> All the best.
>>
>> Sung
>>
>


-- 
Sungchul Ji, Ph.D.

Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology
Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy
Rutgers University
Piscataway, N.J. 08855
732-445-4701

www.conformon.net

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Sung, List:

The nine terms that you list are not really TYPES of signs; rather, each
one is a label for a single ASPECT of a given sign.  Every sign is either a
qualisign, a sinsign, or a dicisign; every sign is either an icon, an
index, or a symbol; and every sign is either a rheme, a dicent, or an
argument.  However, any one of these labels is an INCOMPLETE description,
with the exception of qualisign (which entails icon and rheme) and argument
(which entails legisign and symbol); and even those are incomplete once we
start taking additional trichotomies into account.

Please indicate where in Peirce's writings that he EVER defines something
that is dyadic or otherwise non-triadic as a "sign."

It seems rather obvious that "reading Peirce extensively does not GUARANTEE
that the reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce," and
I doubt that anyone on the List would dispute this.  However, I suspect
that reading Peirce extensively does render one MORE LIKELY to come away
with a correct understanding of his thought that reading him only to a
limited extent.  Just my opinion, of course.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Dec 28, 2015 at 6:22 PM, Sungchul Ji  wrote:

> Edwina,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "Furthermore, the 9 Relations are NOT signs."
>   (122815-1)
>
> (*1*)  Edwina, as you well know, Peirce gave the following "names" to the
> 9 relations:
>
> 1) quali*sign,*
> 2) sin*sign*,
> 3) legi*sign*.
> 4) icon,
> 5) index,
> 6) symbol,
> 7) rheme,
> 8) dici*sign*, and
> 9) argument.
>
> If these are not "signs" as you claim, do you think Peirce made mistakes
> when he referred to 4  (i.e., 1, 2, 3, and 8) out of the 9 relations as
> "signs " ?
>
> (*2*)  The problem with your reasoning here, as I can tell, seems to be
> that you think "sign" has always one meaning, i.e., something genuinely
> triadic.  So if something is not triadic  (e.g., the 9 dyadic relations
> above), that something cannot be a sign.  I think such a mode of thinking
>  is not only fallacious but also non-Peircean.
>
> (*3*) If my claim that your understanding of the 9 types of signs is
> fallacious turns out to be correct, this may provide , IMHO, an interesting
> lesson  and warning for all Peircean scholars:
>
> "Reading Peirce extensively does not guarantee that the
>   (122815-2)
> reader will come away with a correct understanding of Peirce."
>
> If (122815-2) proves to be true, upon further critical scrutiny, we may be
> able to identify possible reasons for why this statement may be true.  One
> possibility that occurs to me, in analogy to the Heisenberg Uncertainty
> Principle in physics, is something like the following:
>
> "It is impossible to simultaneously determine the object
>   (122815-3)
> and the interpretant of a sign with arbitrary precision."
>
> Or,
>
> "The more accurately one can define the object of a sign, the
>   (122815-4)
> less accurately can one define its interpretant, and *vice versa*."
>
> If (122815-3) and (122815-4) prove to be valid in the future, we may refer
> to them as the "Peircean uncertainty Principle" (PUP) or the "semiotic
> uncertainty principle" (SUP).
>
> Are there any Peircean experts on this list who knows whether or not
> Peirce discussed any topic in his extensive writings that may be related to
> what is here referred to as PUP or SUP?
>
> One indirect support for the PUP may be provided the by intense debates we
> have witnessed in recent months on this list about the true nature of the
> Peircean sign among the acknowledge leaders of the semiotic community,
> including Gary R, Gary F, Edwina, Jeff, Jon, and others.
>
> All the best.
>
> Sung
>

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Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

No, Sung. Again, it would help if you would actually read Peirce before you 
jump in with your views. 
We are talking about the meaning of these terms. The term of 'icon' refers to 
the relation between the Representamen and the Object. So, no-one, including 
me, is 'conflating 'representamen' and 'object'. ALL nine terms refer to the 
Relations of the Representamen; in itself as R-R, between R-O, and R-I. 

These 9 terms are not, as you insist, 'elementary terms', nor are they 
ambiguous. They are very specifically outlined, repeatedly, as to their 
meaning, in numerous Peircean texts.

And as John Collier's post just explained, these relations are not stand-alone. 
COLLIER:" I take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise relations are 
abstractions, and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So talking about, say, 
the relation between the representamen and its object always has the 
interpretant in the background."

That is - the relations operate within the semiosic triad. THREE relations - 
but you can't 'decompose' them.

Your lion-cat picture is totally irrelevant to the discussion.
Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 7:41 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List,


  You wrote:


  "Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of representamen 
relations'. (122015-1)
  Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . "

  These '9 types of representmane relations' are the objects of the 9 types of 
signs that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign',  'dicisign', etc.  
For example, icon, index , and symbol are the signs referring to the relation 
between  representamen and its object in the mode of being of Firstness, 
Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively.  It seems to me that you are 
conflating representmen and object.   


  The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs  is an ambiguous diagram, since it an 
be intepreted  in more than one ways with equal validity, like the figure shown 
below.  Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting  a lion, a cat, or 
both, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of signs.  I see both a lion  
(relations, i.e., objects) and a cat (name of the relations, i.e., signs) in 
the picture, but, metaphorically speaking, Edwina seems to see only a lion, and 
Helmut only a cat. 









  Retrieved from 
http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/
 on 12/20/2015.





  All the best.


  Sung










  On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of 
representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite Sung's 
description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition, a triad - 
and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself, can't be a sign, 
because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign.

That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the 
Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of course, 
Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The 
Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its history. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: colli...@ukzn.ac.za 
  Cc: Sungchul Ji ; PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  John, Sung, list,
  for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The 
difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, 
as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a 
type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 
types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 
object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear 
about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation 
with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the 
representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations 
between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some 
circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or 
composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal 
understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen 
relations". Is that correct?
  Best,
  Helmut

  20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
   &qu

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Sungchul Ji]

Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List,

You wrote:

"Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of
representamen relations'. (122015-1)
Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . "

These '9 types of representmane relations' are the *objects* of the 9 types
of *signs* that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign',
 'dicisign', etc.  For example, icon, index , and symbol are the *signs*
referring to the* relation* between  representamen and its object in the
mode of being of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively.  It
seems to me that you are conflating *representmen *and *object.   *

The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs  is an *ambiguous* diagram, since it
an be intepreted  in more than one ways with equal validity, like the
figure shown below.  Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting  a
*lion*, a *cat*, or *both*, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of
signs.  I see both a lion  (*relations, i.e., objects*) and a cat (name of
the relations, i.e., *signs*) in the picture, but, metaphorically speaking,
Edwina seems to see only a lion, and Helmut only a cat.



[image: Inline image 1]

Retrieved from
http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/
on 12/20/2015.


All the best.

Sung





On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of
> representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite
> Sung's description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition,
> a triad - and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself,
> can't be a sign, because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign.
>
> That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the
> Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of
> course, Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The
> Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its
> history.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Helmut Raulien 
> *To:* colli...@ukzn.ac.za
> *Cc:* Sungchul Ji  ; PEIRCE-L
> 
> *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM
> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> John, Sung, list,
> for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The
> difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is
> not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it
> is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs,
> and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen
> relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not
> completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or
> interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole
> sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because,
> if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of
> its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already
> is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A
> logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of
> signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct?
> Best,
> Helmut
>
> 20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
>  "John Collier"  wrote:
>
> Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only
> picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine,
> but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no
> difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not
> shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are
> grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't
> done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing
> different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I
> don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the
> classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could
> be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how
> we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about
> with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars
> who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a
> good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to.
> This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where the difference
> has experimental consequences.
>
> John
>
> Sent from my Samsung device
>
>
>  Original message 
> From: Sungchul Ji 
> Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00)
> To: PEIRCE-L 
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations
>
> John, List,
>
> You wrote:
>
> "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Edwina Taborsky]

Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of representamen 
relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite Sung's description of 
them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition, a triad - and therefore, 
in my view, even the representamen-in-itself, can't be a sign, because it is 
not in a triad. The triad is the sign.

That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the 
Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of course, 
Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The 
Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its history. 

Edwina
  - Original Message - 
  From: Helmut Raulien 
  To: colli...@ukzn.ac.za 
  Cc: Sungchul Ji ; PEIRCE-L 
  Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM
  Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations


  John, Sung, list,
  for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The 
difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is not, 
as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it is a 
type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, and the 9 
types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen relations, 3 
object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not completely clear 
about, is, what the representamen, object, or interpretant, has a relation 
with: Is it the representamen, or the whole sign? I think it is the 
representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, if they were relations 
between the whole triadic sign and either element of its, this would be some 
circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already is a relation between (or 
composition of?) these three relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal 
understanding is to replace "9 types of signs" with "9 types of representamen 
relations". Is that correct?
  Best,
  Helmut

  20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr
   "John Collier"  wrote:
   
  Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only 
picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, but 
they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no difference 
in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not shown this. You 
need tof show how the different classifications are grounded in different 
expectations about possible experiences. You haven't done that yet. From your 
response here it seems that you are confusing different ways of talking about 
the same things with different objects. I don't know of anyone who makes the 
mistake of confusing the objects of the classifications. Perhaps you could give 
an example. Of course someone could be misled by the difference in the 
immediate objects, which depends on how we are thinking, if they are confused 
about what Peirce is talking about with these classifications, I don't think 
that there are Peirce scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could 
provide examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. 
There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where 
the difference has experimental consequences. 

  John

  Sent from my Samsung device


   Original message 
  From: Sungchul Ji 
  Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00)
  To: PEIRCE-L 
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

  John, List, 

  You wrote:

  "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for 
“measurable”
  (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more 
clarity
  than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, the 
distinction
  between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; 
you would
  be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no 
information."

  The distinction between elementary signs and composite signs is the same as 
the distinction between the  9 types of signs and the 10 classes of sign that 
Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these terms, any one is entitled to 
come up with better replacements.) So the distinction must have been in 
Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the 9 types and 10 classes.  The only 
thing that I am trying to do here, since 2012, is to give "names" or 
"representamens" to these distinct objects, so that we can avoid conflating 
them, or so that we can have two different interpretants.  Right now, we have 
only one representamen, "sign", to refer to two different objects (9 types and 
10 classes) making them appear the same and yet they are not as you can plainly 
see in the fact that Peirce distinguished between 9 types and 10 classes.  This 
is why many, if not all, students of Peirce, seem confused.

  All the best.

  Sung





  On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier  wrote: 
Sung, Lists,



I am unclear what you

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Supplement: I just have looked into Stans papers, and I think, I wrote something wrong in the mice-example. The highest level in subsumptive (eg. classification) hierarchy is the observer level, that should be the individual level. Or is it the biologist, who is exploring mice? I dont know. But, if the highest and last level was the individual level, then there could not be more than ten sign-classes.




Gary f, list,

Thank you, Gary F., and I should not so quickly have asked this silly question. I understand it like this: Quali-, sin,- legisign is the first level of classification, then in the second level there are six, and ten in the third level. The third level (the ten classes) is the level about the class of individual signs, or just signs. Saying "Qualisign", is adressing one of these ten classes, saying "Sinsign" is adressing three, and "Legisign" adresses six. "Indexical sinsign" adresses two, and  "symbolic legisign" three. But, whatever one says or adresses, it is all about triadic signs, so where is degeneracy? So, what I do not see at the moment, in which way can the term "degenerate" apply in a classification- i.e. subsumption- hierarchy? In a composition hierarchy I see it: immediate object, immediate and dynamical interpretant may be seen as degenerate. Representamen and object may be seen as degenerate forms of the sign, and the interpretant as genuine- but really genuine only the final one. In classification I can see degeneracy only in involvement, eg. a legisign involves a qualisign, a symbol involves an index and an icon, an argument involves a (or more) dicent/s and rheme/s, and so on. But this consideration is leaving the subsumption/classification hierarchy and is regarding a composition hierarchy:  A sign can be composed of subsigns. What I find a bit confusing: In other subsumtion hierarchies, the levels are written in the plural: Vertebrae, mammals, mice, desert jumping mice, individuals of desert jumping mice. But  eg. "Qualisign" is written in the singular. BTW.: I think, the next mice levels would be: subjective societies of idjm, subjective worlds of idjm. Analogously I would guess, that the next levels of sign classification (the fourth level has 15 classes, and so on, up to 66 classes) is about the individual sign´s subjective environment (the Uexküll-"Umwelt"- but can a sign be regarded like an organism?).


Best,

Helmut


 07. Dezember 2015 um 01:43 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut, you ask,

 




Have I understood correctly:



--Embodiment means, that it is a complete triadic sign, eg.:



(1), qualisign, is not embodied, (1.1), iconic qualisign, is not completely embodied either, but (1.1.1), rhematic iconic qualisign, is embodied?

 

No, that can’t be it, because any qualisign has to be rhematic and iconic.

Since its mode of being is that of a logical possibility, a qualisign has to be embodied in something actual or existing (perhaps a sinsign) in order to act as a sign. Just as the quality of redness has to be embodied in something red in order to be perceived as red. That’s my guess.

 



--Degenerate is everything that is not all thirdness, so the only sign that is not degenerate at all, is the argument?




 

I think it’s possible that the argument, being also symbol and legisign, could be regarded as fully genuine so that all other sign types would be considered more or less degenerate. But I don’t know of anyplace where Peirce says exactly that, and I don’t see him comparing sign types across trichotomies. — However we apply it, we have to base Peirce’s concept of degeneracy on the conic section (see EP2:545 if you have it). A straight line is a degenerate form of the parabola, and so degenerate as a conic section; but a straight line considered as a moving point (for instance) is not degenerate. Likewise, Firstness is not degenerate in itself, nor is Secondness. But considered as a triadic relation, which can be quite complex, something as simple as a mere likeness of two correlates is degenerate, compared to, say, the relation between a symbol, its object, and its interpretant. 

 

Gary f.

 

Best!



Helmut





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Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary f, list,

Thank you, Gary F., and I should not so quickly have asked this silly question. I understand it like this: Quali-, sin,- legisign is the first level of classification, then in the second level there are six, and ten in the third level. The third level (the ten classes) is the level about the class of individual signs, or just signs. Saying "Qualisign", is adressing one of these ten classes, saying "Sinsign" is adressing three, and "Legisign" adresses six. "Indexical sinsign" adresses two, and  "symbolic legisign" three. But, whatever one says or adresses, it is all about triadic signs, so where is degeneracy? So, what I do not see at the moment, in which way can the term "degenerate" apply in a classification- i.e. subsumption- hierarchy? In a composition hierarchy I see it: immediate object, immediate and dynamical interpretant may be seen as degenerate. Representamen and object may be seen as degenerate forms of the sign, and the interpretant as genuine- but really genuine only the final one. In classification I can see degeneracy only in involvement, eg. a legisign involves a qualisign, a symbol involves an index and an icon, an argument involves a (or more) dicent/s and rheme/s, and so on. But this consideration is leaving the subsumption/classification hierarchy and is regarding a composition hierarchy:  A sign can be composed of subsigns. What I find a bit confusing: In other subsumtion hierarchies, the levels are written in the plural: Vertebrae, mammals, mice, desert jumping mice, individuals of desert jumping mice. But  eg. "Qualisign" is written in the singular. BTW.: I think, the next mice levels would be: subjective societies of idjm, subjective worlds of idjm. Analogously I would guess, that the next levels of sign classification (the fourth level has 15 classes, and so on, up to 66 classes) is about the individual sign´s subjective environment (the Uexküll-"Umwelt"- but can a sign be regarded like an organism?).


Best,

Helmut


 07. Dezember 2015 um 01:43 Uhr
g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut, you ask,

 




Have I understood correctly:



--Embodiment means, that it is a complete triadic sign, eg.:



(1), qualisign, is not embodied, (1.1), iconic qualisign, is not completely embodied either, but (1.1.1), rhematic iconic qualisign, is embodied?

 

No, that can’t be it, because any qualisign has to be rhematic and iconic.

Since its mode of being is that of a logical possibility, a qualisign has to be embodied in something actual or existing (perhaps a sinsign) in order to act as a sign. Just as the quality of redness has to be embodied in something red in order to be perceived as red. That’s my guess.

 



--Degenerate is everything that is not all thirdness, so the only sign that is not degenerate at all, is the argument?




 

I think it’s possible that the argument, being also symbol and legisign, could be regarded as fully genuine so that all other sign types would be considered more or less degenerate. But I don’t know of anyplace where Peirce says exactly that, and I don’t see him comparing sign types across trichotomies. — However we apply it, we have to base Peirce’s concept of degeneracy on the conic section (see EP2:545 if you have it). A straight line is a degenerate form of the parabola, and so degenerate as a conic section; but a straight line considered as a moving point (for instance) is not degenerate. Likewise, Firstness is not degenerate in itself, nor is Secondness. But considered as a triadic relation, which can be quite complex, something as simple as a mere likeness of two correlates is degenerate, compared to, say, the relation between a symbol, its object, and its interpretant. 

 

Gary f.

 

Best!



Helmut





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RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[gnox]

Helmut, you ask,

 

Have I understood correctly:

--Embodiment means, that it is a complete triadic sign, eg.:

(1), qualisign, is not embodied, (1.1), iconic qualisign, is not completely 
embodied either, but (1.1.1), rhematic iconic qualisign, is embodied?

 

No, that can’t be it, because any qualisign has to be rhematic and iconic.

Since its mode of being is that of a logical possibility, a qualisign has to be 
embodied in something actual or existing (perhaps a sinsign) in order to act as 
a sign. Just as the quality of redness has to be embodied in something red in 
order to be perceived as red. That’s my guess.

 

--Degenerate is everything that is not all thirdness, so the only sign that is 
not degenerate at all, is the argument?

 

I think it’s possible that the argument, being also symbol and legisign, could 
be regarded as fully genuine so that all other sign types would be considered 
more or less degenerate. But I don’t know of anyplace where Peirce says exactly 
that, and I don’t see him comparing sign types across trichotomies. — However 
we apply it, we have to base Peirce’s concept of degeneracy on the conic 
section (see EP2:545 if you have it). A straight line is a degenerate form of 
the parabola, and so degenerate as a conic section; but a straight line 
considered as a moving point (for instance) is not degenerate. Likewise, 
Firstness is not degenerate in itself, nor is Secondness. But considered as a 
triadic relation, which can be quite complex, something as simple as a mere 
likeness of two correlates is degenerate, compared to, say, the relation 
between a symbol, its object, and its interpretant. 

 

Gary f.

 

Best!

Helmut


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Re: [biosemiotics:8987] Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Gary Richmond]

Jerry, List,

I'm not exactly sure how to answer your question (I'm assuming that it's
about the parenthetical comment).

Sheaf theory, which appears to be changing to some consideral extent the
direction of topological mathematics, uses such concepts as presheaves
being *glued* together. Honestly, although I attended 3 of Fernando's 6
lectures (which included discussions of sheaf theory) at Pratt in NYC this
Fall, *that *mathematics was very far 'above my pay grade'. Although I
followed a lot of it and learned a lot, I was principally interested in
Fernando's insights into Peircean pragmatism and the continuum as Peirce
understood it.

For those who aren't familiar with sheaf theory, a sheaf is defined as "a
tool for systematically tracking locally defined data attached to the open
sets  of a topological space
."   Two wikipedia
articles are helpful for the novice, one on Grothendieck's work (which was
the topic of Fernando's seminar series):
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Grothendieck_topology

and a more general one. Perhaps this snippet from the latter site will show
why I commented that 'glue' was a technical term in this mathematics.

. . . A presheaf is *separated* if its sections are "locally determined":
whenever two sections over *U* coincide when restricted to each of *V**i*,
the two sections are identical. . .  Finally, a separated presheaf is a
*sheaf* if *compatible sections can be glued together*, i.e., whenever
there is a section of the presheaf over each of the covering sets *V**i*,
chosen so that they match on the overlaps of the covering sets, these
sections correspond to a (unique) section on *U*, of which they are
restrictions.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheaf_(mathematics)

But, again, my ignorance of this mathematics is profound.aeven though I've
been self-studying topology for some time now.

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Dec 1, 2015 at 12:51 AM, Jerry LR Chandler  wrote:

> Gary:
> On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:02 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> And he quotes Peirce, from several sources, in support of this notion (I
> should note, btw, that "glues" in the passage above is a technical term in
> the mathematics which Zalamea espouses).
>
>
> I am curious as to why you consider this assertion valid.
>
> Cheers
>
> jerry
>
>
>

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Aw: Re: [biosemiotics:8987] Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, Clark, Sung, list,

to make the subject more complicated: We are dealing with the two kinds of Salthean Hierarchy (Paper "Salthe´12Axiomathes"). The division of object into immediate and dynamical object, and of the interpretant into its three modes is a compositional hierarchy: The object is composed of its two modes, I think, just like consciousness is composed of primi- alter- and medisense, altersense of its two, and medisene of its three submodes. On the other hand, the ten sign classes is a subsumption hierarchy: Here the subclasses are not parts of, but kinds of those in the previous level. I wonder, whether in either case of hierarchy, it stops at the third level (eg. (3.2.2)), or the tree  goes on having branches (eg. (3.2.2) splits up to (3.2.2.1) and (3.2.2.2)).

Best,

Helmut

 

 01. Dezember 2015 um 06:02 Uhr
"Gary Richmond"  wrote:
 



Helmut, Clark, List,

 

Helmut wrote: Peirce in fact does not start from firstness in the temporal sense, like in the beginning there was firstness: Firstness is a part of the irreducible triad of the three categories. It is merely called "firstness", because one needs some starting point to start thinking about anything, but any anything is triadic from its start. Irreducible though, so a sort of monism (but not a noism).

 

I agree that Peirce does not start with firstness in that sense that "in the beginning there was 1ns." And I agree that 1ns cannot be separated from the other Pythagorean categories (although, admittedly, in some of his cosmological writings, often quoted, it does sound as if he 'begins' there; perhaps he saw things better later as a consequence of his deep studies in continuity).

 

I am, however, hardly alone in making much of the "blackboard" example in Reasoning and the Logic of Things (RLT, 1898) as an _expression_ of Peirce's mature cosmology. In my opinion, this is one of the two essential lecture series for understanding Peirce's thinking (the other being the 1903 Harvard Lectures on Pragmatism, both available in inexpensive softbound editions), 

 

In this example (RLT: 261 -283)), in my opinion, hardly yet fully appreciated, occurring in the final lecture of the series, Peirce argues that his blackboard represents "a continuum of some indefinite multitude of dimensions" (261) out of which not only the categories, but virtually every cosmological and, finally, every evolutionary thing will be 'written upon' (the chalk marks representing breaks in the continuum). 

 

Now, for Peirce, 'continuity' is nearly, if not exactly, a synonym for 'thirdness'. See discussions of this in, for example, the work of Fernando Zalamea, perhaps, and as far as I'm concerned, certainly, the 21st century's profoudest thinkers on Peircean continuity (btw, illness prevented me from attending the Bogota symposium, but I hope and expect that we'll be hearing much about it from Cathy Legg and Jeff Downard, perhaps in addition from other scholars who presented at the conference and who are members of this forum).

 

So, for example, in 'Peirce's Continuum: A Methodological and Mathematical Approach', http://acervopeirceano.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/09/Zalamea-Peirces-Continuum.pdf

Zalamea writes: 

 


"Generality –as a law or regularity beyond the merely individual, as a deep layer of reality beyond the merely named, as a basic weapon in the dispute between realism and nominalism– falls into peircean thirdness and glues naturally together with the continuum" (10).


 

And he quotes Peirce, from several sources, in support of this notion (I should note, btw, that "glues" in the passage above is a technical term in the mathematics which Zalamea espouses).

 


"The continuum is a General. It is a General of a relation. Every General is a continuum vaguely defined." 

 

"Continuity, as generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general. (...) The original potentiality is essentially continuous, or general."

 

"The possible is general, and continuity and generality are two names for the same absence of distinction of individuals."


 

I'm afraid I haven't time or energy to take this any further just now, so I'll end with a quotation. While I do not always agree with Joseph Esposito in his analysis of "the theory of Peirce's categories," I do most certain agree with him when he writes:

 


"Real potentiality. . . is only possible if Thirdness is First." 


 

(Evolutionary Metaphysics: the development of Peirce's theory of categories, 191).

 

Best,

 

Gary R

 







 

Gary Richmond

Philosophy and Critical Thinking

Communication Studies

LaGuardia College of the City University of New York

C 745

718 482-5690





 

On Mon, Nov 30, 2015 at 10:24 PM, Helmut Raulien  wrote:




 
 

Supplement: Now one of my weird ideas: Peirce starts with firstness, and relation of firstness with itself leads from (1) to (1.1), and then to (1.1.1), and so on, so in this case, the relation is not really somethin

Re: [biosemiotics:8987] Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Gary:
On Nov 30, 2015, at 11:02 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

> And he quotes Peirce, from several sources, in support of this notion (I 
> should note, btw, that "glues" in the passage above is a technical term in 
> the mathematics which Zalamea espouses).

I am curious as to why you consider this assertion valid.

Cheers

jerry



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RE: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier]

This can’t be correct, Sung, since you don’t distinguish between ‘exists’ (you 
use it improperly) and ‘is real’. Firsts are real, but they don’t exist. 
Seconds exist (and are real). Thirds are real, and may have a mode of existence 
through seconds.

John Collier
Professor Emeritus, UKZN
http://web.ncf.ca/collier

From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf Of 
Sungchul Ji
Sent: Sunday, 29 November 2015 11:56 PM
To: PEIRCE-L
Cc: biosemiotics; Sergey Petoukhov; Auletta Gennaro; Ed Dellian; Robert E. 
Ulanowicz; Mark Burgin
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations

[John Collier] snip …

"First determines Second and Second determines Third, or Third                  
              (112915-3)
 cannot exist without Second and Second cannot exist without First."

We may refer to (112915-3) as the ontological constraint.  By the same token, 
we may refer to the second column as the epistemological constraint, and  the 
Peircean selection selection rule,(112915-2), that governs the interior 
elements of Table 1 and Figure 1 as the 'onto-epistemological' constraint. 

[John Collier]  Once again you have Peirce wrong, and miss much of the subtlety 
of his views. First you mess up the ontology, and then you make epistemological 
claims about things that are not necessarily dependent on mind, let alone 
knowledge. Whatever the system behind you numerology it has little to do with 
Peirce, and if it happens to, it is by accident. Normally I just delete your 
posts without reading them because they are so careless and I don't need the 
noise, but this one was such a mess, and so misleading, that I had to show how 
it was basically and irretrievably wrong. You are very clever, but your wit is 
mostly wasted. That is a shame.

John

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