Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List, You wrote:
"Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of representamen relations'. (122015-1) Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . " These '9 types of representmane relations' are the *objects* of the 9 types of *signs* that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign', 'dicisign', etc. For example, icon, index , and symbol are the *signs* referring to the* relation* between representamen and its object in the mode of being of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively. It seems to me that you are conflating *representmen *and *object. * The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs is an *ambiguous* diagram, since it an be intepreted in more than one ways with equal validity, like the figure shown below. Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting a *lion*, a *cat*, or *both*, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of signs. I see both a lion (*relations, i.e., objects*) and a cat (name of the relations, i.e., *signs*) in the picture, but, metaphorically speaking, Edwina seems to see only a lion, and Helmut only a cat. [image: Inline image 1] Retrieved from http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/ on 12/20/2015. All the best. Sung On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote: > Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of > representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite > Sung's description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition, > a triad - and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself, > can't be a sign, because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign. > > That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the > Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of > course, Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The > Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its > history. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Helmut Raulien <h.raul...@gmx.de> > *To:* colli...@ukzn.ac.za > *Cc:* Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> ; PEIRCE-L > <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > *Sent:* Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM > *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > John, Sung, list, > for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The > difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is > not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it > is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, > and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen > relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not > completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or > interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole > sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, > if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element of > its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign already > is a relation between (or composition of?) these three relations...A > logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 types of > signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct? > Best, > Helmut > > 20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr > "John Collier" <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> wrote: > > Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only > picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, > but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no > difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not > shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are > grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't > done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing > different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I > don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the > classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone could > be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends on how > we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking about > with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce scholars > who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide examples. There is a > good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. There is no need to. > This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, where the difference > has experimental consequences. > > John > > Sent from my Samsung device > > > -------- Original message -------- > From: Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> > Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00) > To: PEIRCE-L <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu> > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations > > John, List, > > You wrote: > > "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for > “measurable” > (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without > more clarity > than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, > the distinction > between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; > you would > be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no > information." > > The distinction between *elementary signs* and *composite signs* is the > same as the distinction between the *9 types of signs *and the *10 > classes of sign* that Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these > terms, any one is entitled to come up with better replacements.) So the > distinction must have been in Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the > 9 types and 10 classes. The only thing that I am trying to do here, since > 2012, is to give "names" or "*representamens*" to these distinct *objects*, > so that we can avoid conflating them, or so that we can have two different > *interpretants*. Right now, we have only one representamen, "sign", to > refer to two different objects (9 types and 10 classes) making them appear > the same and yet they are not as you can plainly see in the fact that > Peirce distinguished between 9 types and 10 classes. This is why many, if > not all, students of Peirce, seem confused. > > All the best. > > Sung > > > > > > On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier <colli...@ukzn.ac.za> > wrote: >> >> Sung, Lists, >> >> >> >> I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is >> important is that if there is no difference to possible experience, by the >> Pragmatic Maxim there is no difference in meaning. No elementary particle >> properties are directly measurable. The best we can do is to have evidence >> for them by way of properties that *are* directly measurable, together >> with the theory (the measurements of quark properties are what is called >> “theory-laden”). So the notion of measurement that you are using is void >> unless there is some measurable difference between “there are nine >> elementary signs” and “there are ten composite signs”). The same would, of >> course hold for quarks and baryons unless there is a detectable difference >> to experience. In this case the difference is, of course, by your notion of >> a baryon as isolatable, that we can isolate baryons but not quarks (for a >> combination of theoretical and experimental reasons). So it seems to me >> that, unless you have a rather special meaning for “measurable” (or even >> “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without more >> clarity than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to >> make, the distinction between elementary signs and composite signs have no >> basis in what exists; you would be making a distinction without a >> difference, and thus containing no information. >> >> >> >> John Collier >> >> Professor Emeritus, UKZN >> >> http://web.ncf.ca/collier >> >> >> >> *From:* sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] *On >> Behalf Of *Sungchul Ji >> *Sent:* Sunday, 20 December 2015 07:05 >> *To:* PEIRCE-L >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >> >> >> >> Hi Gary R, >> >> >> >> You wrote : >> >> >> >> "As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I >> do not consider the 9 parameters (121915-1) >> as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied >> signs, I am *always* referring to >> >> the 10 classes." >> >> >> >> >> >> I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion: >> >> >> >> (1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the word >> "sign" in "qualisign" ? >> >> >> >> (2) The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an >> unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is >> only one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or the >> 10 classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two kinds >> of signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, although >> he used the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as physicists >> use the same word "particles" for both *quarks* and *baryons.* They are >> both particles but physicists discovered that protons and neutrons are not >> fundamental particles but are composed of triplets of more fundamental >> particles called quarks. >> >> >> >> (3) I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to >> have contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10 >> classes of signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different names >> (belatedly) for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "*elementary signs*" >> for the 9 types and the "*composite signs*" for the 10 classes of signs >> as I recommended in [biosemiotics:46]. The former is monadic and incomplete >> as a sign, while the latter is triadic and hence complete as a sign. Again >> this situation seems similar to the relation between quarks and baryons: >> Quarks are incomplete particles in that they cannot be isolated outside >> baryons whereas baryons (which are composed of three quarks) are complete >> particles since they can be isolated and experimentally measured. >> >> >> >> All the best. >> >> >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Sung, list, >> >> >> >> When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not >> possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be a >> part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the rhematic >> iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To >> designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] >> because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic." >> >> http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html >> >> >> >> As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do >> not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am discussing >> signs as possibly embodied signs, I am *always* referring to the 10 >> classes. >> >> >> >> What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that >> is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign >> (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that it >> simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a >> 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic universe). >> >> >> >> Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point >> clear before there was any further confusion. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> >> *Communication Studies* >> >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> *C 745* >> >> *718 482-5690* >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji <s...@rci.rutgers.edu> wrote: >> >> Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, >> >> >> >> I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the >> 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in >> order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one of >> the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as >> "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. >> However, >> >> >> >> "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to >> feel it. (121915-1) >> For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and >> >> applied one of them to it." >> >> >> >> Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which >> renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be index >> or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose the >> character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would not >> lose that character if there were no interpretant". >> >> >> >> By extension, I wonder if we can say that >> >> >> >> "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a >> sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2) >> >> >> >> >> >> Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1). >> >> >> >> >> >> Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding >> confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, i.e., >> 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs: >> >> >> >> "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are >> experimentally measurable; (121915-3) >> >> Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but >> only the latter can be >> >> used as a means of communicating information." >> >> >> >> In [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of >> signs as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs >> >> as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being >> composed of elementary quarks. >> >> >> >> A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year to you all ! >> >> >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com> >> wrote: >> >> Jeff, Gary F. list, >> >> >> >> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example >> of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more >> complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign. >> >> >> >> Best, >> >> >> >> Gary R >> >> >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> >> *Communication Studies* >> >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> >> *C 745* >> >> *718 482-5690* >> >> >> >> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < >> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote: >> >> Hello Gary F., List, >> >> In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of >> a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters >> of a more complete sign." How should we understand this distinction >> between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a sign that are >> less complete? >> >> --Jeff >> >> >> >> Jeffrey Downard >> Associate Professor >> Department of Philosophy >> Northern Arizona University >> (o) 928 523-8354 >> ________________________________________ >> From: g...@gnusystems.ca [g...@gnusystems.ca] >> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM >> To: 'PEIRCE-L' >> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >> >> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” >> EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this >> thread has been referring to, so far. >> >> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at >> some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the >> manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius >> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or >> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” >> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is >> Peirce’s. — gary f. >> >> On the Foundations of Mathematics >> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining >> rendered as italics] >> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think >> is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The >> word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor >> to analyze it. >> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular >> replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is >> the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not >> clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though >> they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more >> complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of >> determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately >> producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could never >> contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless jargon. On >> the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, cause >> appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs although >> there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can only be >> because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the present >> condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality of >> feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. But a >> sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is therefore >> essential that it should be capable of determining an interpretant sign. >> Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some sense correspond to a >> real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, with some degree of >> definiteness, it specifies the real object of which it is false. That the >> sign itself is not a definite real object has been pointed out under >> “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must be that it is one >> thing to really be and another to be represented, or else it must be that >> there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves no denial that every >> real thing may be a representation, or sign, but merely that, if so, there >> must be something more in reality than mere representation. Since a >> sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also since it is not any >> replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. But it refers to a real >> object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign as its sole object; though >> it may refer to an object through a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever >> the Pope, as such, may declare will be true,” or as a map may be a map of >> itself. But supposing the Pope not to declare anything, does that >> proposition refer to any real object? Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even >> if there were no pope, still, like all other signs sufficiently complete, >> there is a single definite object to which it must refer; namely, to the >> ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a >> sign may refer, in addition, and specially, to any number of parts of that >> universe. Seventhly, every interpretant of a sign need not refer to all the >> real objects to which the sign itself refers, but must, at least, refer to >> the Truth. Eighthly, an interpretant may refer to an object of its sign in >> an indefinite manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was a man, and Enoch was >> translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was translated.’ >> Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, in case >> the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an interpretant of >> the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the first sign does not >> specially refer, but only generally refers. Thus, the sign ‘Any man there >> may be is mortal’ does not refer to any real man, unless it so happens that >> it is a part of a sign which otherwise refers to such a real thing. But if >> it be a part of a sign of which another part is ‘some man sings,’ the sign >> ‘some man is mortal’ becomes an interpretant of it. This may be more >> conveniently expressed by speaking of an ‘utterer’ and an ‘interpreter.’ >> Then the utterer says to the interpreter, “you are at liberty to understand >> me as referring to any man [of] whom you can get any indication, and of >> him, I say, ‘he is mortal.’” Tenthly, a sign sufficiently complete must >> signify some quality; and it is no more important to recognize that the >> real object to which a sign refers is not a mere sign than to recognize >> that the quality it signifies is not a mere sign. Take the quality of the >> odor of attar. There is no difficulty in imagining a being whose entire >> consciousness should consist in this alone. But, it may be objected, if it >> were contrasted with nothing could it be recognized? I reply, no; and >> besides, such recognition is excluded by the circumstance that a >> recognition of the smell would not be the pure smell itself. It may be >> doubted by some persons, however, whether the feeling could exist alone. >> They are the persons whom it ought to be easiest for me to convince of my >> point. For they, at least, must admit that if such pure homogeneous quality >> of feeling were to exist alone, it would not be a sign. Everybody ought to >> admit it because it would be alone, and therefore would have no object >> different from itself. Besides, there would be no possible replica of it, >> since each of two such things would be nonexistent for the other; nor could >> there be any third who should compare them. So, then, the whole question of >> whether such a quality is a sign or not resolves itself into the question >> of whether there could be such a tinge upon the consciousness of a being, >> supposing the being could be conscious (for I shall show presently that the >> fact that he would be asleep is only in my favor). In order to decide this >> question, it will be sufficient to look at any object parti-colored in >> bright red and bright blue and to ask oneself a question or two. Would >> there be any possibility of conveying the idea of that red to a person who >> had no feeling nearer to it than that blue? Plainly not, the quality of the >> red is in the red itself. The proximity of the blue heightens the shock >> up[on] the seer[']s organism, emphasizes it, renders it vivid, perhaps >> slightly confuses the feeling. But the red quality is altogether positive >> and would remain if the blue were not there. If every other idea were >> removed, there would be no shock, and there would be sleep. But the quality >> of that sleep would be red, in this sense, that if it were taken away >> frequently and brought back so as to wake the being up, the tinge of his >> consciousness would be of that quality. A quality, in itself, has no being >> at all, it is true. It must be embodied in something that exists. But the >> quality is as it is positively and in itself. That is not true of a sign, >> which exists only by bringing an interpretant to refer to an object. A >> quality, then, is not a sign. Eleventhly, we may assume that this is as >> true of what is, with excusable inaccuracy, called a composite quality as >> of a simple one. In itself, one quality is as simple as another. A person >> who should be acquainted with none but the spectral colors would get no >> idea of white by being told that it was the mixture of them all. One might >> as well tell him to make a mixture of water, patriotism, and the square >> root of minus one. Find a man who has had no idea of patriotism; and if you >> tell him that it is the love of one's country, if he knows what love is, >> and what a man's country, in its social sense, is, he can make the >> experiment of connecting ideas in his imagination, and noting the quality >> of feeling which arises upon this composition. Tell him this in the >> evening, and he will repeat the experiment several times during the night, >> and in the morning he will have a fair idea of what patriotism means. He >> will have performed an experiment analogous to that of mixing colored >> lights in order to get an idea of white. If a treasure is buried in the >> midst of a plain, and there are four signal poles, the place of the >> treasure can be defined by means of ranges, so that a person who can take >> ranges and set up new poles can find the treasure. In like manner the name >> of any color may be defined in terms of four color disks so that a person >> with a color-wheel can experimentally produce the color and thereafter be >> able to use the name. Every definition to be understood must be treated as >> a precept for experimentation. The imagination is an apparatus for such >> experimentation that often answers the purpose, although it often proves >> insufficient. No point on the plain where the treasure is hid is more >> simple than other. Colors may be defined by various systems of coördinates, >> and we do not know that one color is in itself simpler than another. It is >> only in a limited class of cases that we can define a quality as simply a >> mixture of two qualities. In most cases, it is necessary to introduce other >> relations. But even when that is the case, if a quality is defined as being >> at once a and b, there will always be another way of defining it as that >> which is at once c and d. Now all that is either a or c will have a certain >> quality p, common and peculiar to that class; the class of possible objects >> that are b or c will be similarly related to a quality, r; and the class of >> possible objects that are either b or d will be similarly related to a >> quality, s. Then that quality which was defined as, at once, a and b, can >> be more analytically defined as that which is at once p, q, r, and s; and >> so on ad infinitum. We may not be able to make out these qualities; but >> there is reason to believe that any describable class of possible objects >> has some quality common and peculiar to it. It is certain that a pure >> quality, in its mode of being as a pure quality, does not cease to be >> because it is not embodied in anything. Every situation in life appears to >> have its peculiar flavor. This flavor is what it is positively and in >> itself. For the experiment by which it may be reproduced an adequate >> prescription may be given; but the definition will not itself have that >> flavor. To say that a flavor, or pure quality, is composed of two others, >> is simply to say that on experimentally mixing these others in a particular >> way, that first flavor will be reproduced. Every sufficiently complete sign >> determines a sign to the effect that on a certain occasion, that is, in a >> certain object a certain flavor or quality may be observed. >> This attempt to begin an analysis of the nature of a sign may seem to be >> unnecessarily complicated, unnatural, and ill-fitting. To that I reply that >> every man has his own fashion of thinking; and if such is the reader's >> impression let him draw up a statement for himself. If it is sufficiently >> full and accurate, he will find that it differs from mine chiefly in its >> nomenclature and arrangement. [Not unlikely he might insist on distinctions >> which I avoid as irrelevant.] He will find that, in some shape, he is >> brought to recognize the same three radically different elements that I do. >> Namely, he must recognize, first, a mode of being in itself, corresponding >> to my quality; secondly, a mode of being constituted by opposition, >> corresponding to my object; and thirdly, a mode of being of which a >> branching line Y is an analogue, and which is of the general nature of a >> mean function corresponding to the sign. >> §2. Partly in hopes of reconciling the reader to my statement, and partly >> in order to bring out some other points that will be pertinent, I will >> review the matter in another order. >> The reference of a sign to the quality which is its ground, reason, or >> meaning appears most prominently in a kind of sign of which any replica is >> fitted to be a sign by virtue of possessing in itself certain qualities >> which it would equally possess if the interpretant and the object did not >> exist at all. Of course, in such case, the sign could not be a sign; but as >> far as the sign itself went, it would be all that [it] would be with the >> object and interpretant. Such a sign whose significance lies in the >> qualities of its replicas in themselves is an icon, image, analogue, or >> copy. Its object is whatever that resembles it its interpretant takes it to >> be the sign of, and [it is a] sign of that object in proportion as it >> resembles it. An icon cannot be a complete sign; but it is the only sign >> which directly brings the interpretant to close quarters with the meaning; >> and for that reason it is the kind of sign with which the mathematician >> works. For not only are geometrical figures icons, but even algebraical >> arrays of letters have relations analogous to those of the forms they >> represent, although these relations are not altogether iconically >> represented. >> The reference of a sign to its object is brought into special prominence >> in a kind of sign whose fitness to be a sign is due to its being in a real >> reactive relation,—generally, a physical and dynamical relation,—with the >> object. Such a sign I term an index. As an example, take a weather-cock. >> This is a sign of the wind because the wind actively moves it. It faces in >> the very direction from which the wind blows. In so far as it does that, it >> involves an icon. The wind forces it to be an icon. A photograph which is >> compelled by optical laws to be an icon of its object which is before the >> camera is another example. It is in this way that these indices convey >> information. They are propositions. That is they separately indicate their >> objects; the weather-cock because it turns with the wind and is known by >> its interpretant to do so; the photograph for a like reason. If the >> weathercock sticks and fails to turn, or if the camera lens is bad, the one >> or the other will be false. But if this is known to be the case, they sink >> at once to mere icons, at best. It is not essential to an index that it >> should thus involve an icon. Only, if it does not, it will convey no >> information. A cry of “Oh!” may be a direct reaction from a remarkable >> situation. But it will convey, perhaps, no further information. The letters >> in a geometrical figure are good illustrations of pure indices not >> involving any icon, that is they do not force anything to be an icon of >> their object. The cry “Oh!” does to a slight degree; since it has the same >> startling quality as the situation that compells it. The index acts >> compulsively on the interpretant and puts it into a direct and real >> relation with the object, which is necessarily an individual event (or, >> more loosely, a thing) that is hic et nunc, single and definite. >> A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant into >> prominence, is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of any >> particular analogy with the quality it signifies, nor because it stands in >> any reactive relation with its object, but simply and solely because it >> will be interpreted to be a sign. I call such a sign a symbol. As an >> example of a symbol, Goethe's book on the Theory of Colors will serve. This >> is made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs etc.; and the cause of >> its referring to colors and attributing to colors the quality it does is >> that so it is understood by anybody who reads it. It not only determines an >> interpretant, but it shows very explicitly the special determinant, (the >> acceptance of the theory) which it is intended to determine. By virtue of >> thus specially showing its intended interpretant (out of thousands of >> possible interpretants of it) it is an argument. An index may be, in one >> sense, an argument; but not in the sense here meant, that of an >> argumentation. It determines such interpretant as it may, without >> manifesting a special intention of determining a particular interpretant. >> It is a perfection of a symbol, if it does this; but it is not essential to >> a symbol that it should do so. Erase the conclusion of an argumentation and >> it becomes a proposition (usually, a copulative proposition). Erase such a >> part of a proposition that if a proper name were inserted in the blank, or >> if several proper names were inserted in the several blanks, and it becomes >> a rhema, or term. Thus, the following are rhematic: >> Guiteau assassinated ______ >> ______ assassinated ______ >> Logicians generally would consider it quite wrong for me to call these >> terms; but I shall venture to do so. >> >> From: sji.confor...@gmail.com [mailto:sji.confor...@gmail.com] On Behalf >> Of Sungchul Ji >> Sent: 18-Dec-15 16:22 >> >> Gary F, Jeff, List, >> >> Please excuse my ignorance. >> What is NDTR ? >> >> Thanks in advance. >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net >> > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net > ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" > or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should > go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" > in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > ------------------------------ > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > -- Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy Rutgers University Piscataway, N.J. 08855 732-445-4701 www.conformon.net
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
