[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor

[Bernard Morand]

Ben,

Just one word about a small part of your response (I am now lacking time 
for a much detailed response). You wrote:


I had said that "your scenario implies that a mind gets 
object-acquaintance from a sign (the previous interpretant) to that 
same mind about the object." So you contradicted Peirce in order to 
get those two triangles.
"A mind gets acquaintance with the object from a sign" : Yes and No. The 
apparent contradiction seems to me to be solved precisely by the duality 
between the continuous  agreggate of experience of some object and the 
instantaneous effect of the same object through its actual sign.
1)On the side of continuity the interpreter's mind holds an history, a 
digest of an object through the aggregation of a multiplicity of 
instantaneous signs of it. Such an aggregation we call experience. In 
this sense we can say that object acquaintance comes -indirectly- with a 
series of signs. This lets open several questions: a) the identity of 
the object to which such an experience refers and b) the kind of the 
processes that proceed to the aggregation (the question of memory, be it 
individual or collective, c)how short could be the series in order to be 
effective for acquaintance, etc. I remember an old discussion on the 
list with Cathy Legg in order to know what happens with the first sign 
of some object (for example the first occurrence of a new word).
2)On the other side there is the  instantaneous effect of a sign of the 
same object for the interpreter's mind. This effect does not bear 
anymore the identity of the object. In this sense the sign does not 
offers acquaintance with its object. It can only tell something about it.
3) Putting into relation 1) and 2) does the whole job. But analytically 
speaking, collateral experience is not genuinely distinct from the basic 
S-O-I relation. It is only a particular manifestation of such a relation 
qua entering into a continuous series of actualized signs.


To my understanding of this, if somebody wanted to do a basic revision 
of Peirce's semiotic it should consist not to add a fourth element but 
to argue that without psychology (the aggregation process in some human 
head) there could hardly be any semiosis at all. The other "angle 
d'attaque" would be to argue that the recourse to time (the series of 
signs) requires to change the theory of signs. None of them was accepted 
by Peirce of course.


Regards

Bernard

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[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor

[Bernard Morand]

. I think that it is 
an unnecessary luxury


Bernard


For my part, the cenopythagorean categories are quite relevant and belong in 
one-to-one correspondence with the basic semiotic elements just as they are 
with various kinds of signs (icon, index, symbol). But it's that much harder, 
for instance, to argue about the final interpretant, the final recognizant, and 
their particular importance (and I do hold with those ideas), if people remain 
undeclared on their views about the relevance of the cenopythagorean categories 
to the basic semiotic elements.

Best, Ben
http://tetrast.blogspot.com/ 



 


[Joe] I should say, though, that I think that verification in science is motivated in the same say 
as in ordinary life, namely, by the occurrence of a real question being at least pertinent or 
justifiable if not actually raised about a given claim made.  In practice, scientists tend to 
accept research claims made by those they regard as peers as unquestioningly as one does in 
ordinary life in regards to claims made by ordinary life peers. Huaan relationships depend 
importantly on this:  someone who thinks that everything anyone else says is questionable prima 
facie is living in hell (which, unfortunately, does indeed occur all too frequently in human life, 
as the daily news testifies).  Peirce's brief discussion of "credenciveness" in the New 
Elements paper (in Essential Writings 2) is very suggestive in this respect, and I note that Peirce 
is responsible for the definition of "credencive" in the Century Dictionary, though I 
can't check up on that right at the moment while in process of composing this message.  But, to put 
the point in brief, I think Peirce reognizes the fundamental importance of there being a normal 
presumption of credibility in human communication: the recognition of the speech acts of assertion, 
statement making, etc., is a theoretical understanding of that pre-theoretical practice in daily 
life and in science as well.  It is a recognition of the fundamental role of trust.
 



 


- Original Message 
From: Bernard Morand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
Sent: Friday, September 1, 2006 5:48:29 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor

Ben, Gary, Joe, Charles and list

I followed the discussion about verification with interest and while I don't 
think that the question of verification calls for a fourth category, some 
arguments from Ben deserve to be  studied carefully.  As an example I will take 
 a passage out of the last reply from Joe, a short extract in order to limit 
the subject to one point that I think to be important.

Joe writes :

"Scientific verification is really just a sophistication about ways of checking up on something about 
which one has some doubts, driven by an unusually strong concern for establishing something as 
"definitively" as possible, which is of course nothing more than an ideal of checking up on 
something so thoroughly that no real question about it will ever be raised again.But it is no different 
in principle from what we do in ordinary life when we try to "make sure" of something that we think 
might be so but about which we are not certain enough to satisfy us."

It seems to me that the Peirce's quote given by Ben makes clear that scientific 
"verification" is NOT the same as checking something in ordinary life as Joe 
puts it. I reproduce a fragment of the quote :

Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1) seems to me to have come 
pretty near to stating the true cause of the success of modern science when he 
has said that it was *_verification_*. I should express it in this way: modern 
students of science have been successful because they have spent their lives 
not in their libraries and museums but in their laboratories and in the field; 
and while in their laboratories and in the field they have been not gazing on 
nature with a vacant eye, that is, in passive perception unassisted by thought, 
but have been *_observing_* -- that is, perceiving by the aid of analysis -- 
and testing suggestions of theories. The cause of their success has been that 
the motive which has carried them to the laboratory and the field has been a 
craving to know how things really were, and an interest in finding out whether 
or not general propositions actually held good -- which has overbalanced all 
prejudice, all vanity, and all passion. (CP 1.34)

The main differences are:
- the originator of the verification: according to Joe, an individual being 
doubting of something ; according to Peirce a group of students motivated by a 
desire to know. Doubt isn't an essential part of the verification motive in 
science.
- the goal of the verification: the fact that no real question will be raised again on the subject according to Joe ; wether or not a GENERAL proposition ACTUALLY holds good

[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor

[Bernard Morand]

 life peers. Huaan relationships depend 
importantly on this:  someone who thinks that everything anyone else 
says is questionable prima facie is living in hell (which, 
unfortunately, does indeed occur all too frequently in human life, as 
the daily news testifies).  Peirce's brief discussion of 
"credenciveness" in the New Elements paper (in Essential Writings 2) 
is very suggestive in this respect, and I note that Peirce is 
responsible for the definition of "credencive" in the Century 
Dictionary, though I can't check up on that right at the moment while 
in process of composing this message.  But, to put the point in brief, 
I think Peirce reognizes the fundamental importance of there being a 
normal presumption of credibility in human communication: the 
recognition of the speech acts of assertion, statement making, etc., 
is a theoretical understanding of that pre-theoretical practice in 
daily life and in science as well.  It is a recognition of the 
fundamental role of trust.


Joe Ransdell
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
   
- Original Message 

From: Bernard Morand <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Peirce Discussion Forum 
Sent: Friday, September 1, 2006 5:48:29 AM
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor

Ben, Gary, Joe, Charles and list

I followed the discussion about verification with interest and while
I don't think that the question of verification calls for a fourth 
category,

some arguments from Ben deserve to be  studied carefully.  As an
example I will take  a passage out of the last reply from Joe, a short
extract in order to limit the subject to one point that I think to be 
important.


Joe writes :

"Scientific verification is really just a
sophistication about ways of checking up on something
about which one has some doubts, driven by an
unusually strong concern for establishing something as
"definitively" as possible, which is of course nothing
more than an ideal of checking up on something so
thoroughly that no real question about it will ever be
raised again.But it is no different in principle
from what we do in ordinary life when we try to "make
sure" of something that we think might be so but about
which we are not certain enough to satisfy us."

It seems to me that the Peirce's quote given by Ben 
makes clear that scientific "verification" is NOT the 
same as checking something in ordinary life as Joe puts 
it. I reproduce a fragment of the quote :


Mr. George Henry Lewes in his work on Aristotle(1)
seems to me to have come pretty near to stating the
true cause of the success of modern science
when he
has said that it was *_verification_*. I should
express it in this way: modern students of science
have been successful because they have spent their
lives not in their libraries and museums but in their
laboratories and in the field; and while in their
laboratories and in the field they have been not
gazing on nature with a vacant eye, that is, in
passive perception unassisted by thought, but have
been *_observing_* -- that is, perceiving by the aid
of analysis -- and testing suggestions of theories.
The cause of their success has been that the motive
which has carried them to the laboratory and the field
has been a craving to know how things really were, and
an interest in finding out whether or not general
propositions actually held good -- which has
overbalanced all prejudice, all vanity, and all
passion. (CP 1.34)

The main differences are:
- the originator of the verification: according to Joe,

an individual being doubting of something ; according 
to Peirce a group of students motivated by a desire to 
know. Doubt isn't an essential part of the verification 
motive in science.
- the goal of the verification: the fact that no real 
question will be raised again on the subject according 
to Joe ; wether or not a GENERAL proposition ACTUALLY 
holds good with regards to a PARTICULAR fact according 
to Peirce
- the means of the verification: our own satisfaction 
(I suppose) according to Joe ; observation ("perception 
by the aid of analysis") for Peirce. 

In scientific "verification" we take advantage of 
theories to be tested. Is there the same, or some 
equivalent in ordinary life conduct? I don't know but 
perhaps psychologists could answer. However I don't see 
why it would be required that the same goes for ordinary 
life conduct and scientific activity.

In fact "verification" is the word borrowed by
Peirce 
from G.H. Lewes here but I think that we would better say 
today "experimental method" of which the strict 
verification is but one little stage. As already said it 
requires what Peirce calls a general proposition and what 
we would call today a "model" or a theory and what is 
ascertained with the help of the method is an actuality. 
Hence the verification step needs reiterations on several 
c

[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.

[Bernard Morand]

Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:



Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by 
Andre de Tienne:


http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf

the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs 
and in triadic relations should read it.


to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine 
triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the 
elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being 
something else, being something that mediate between the other two 
elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or 
the interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like 
ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes 
depending on how the relation is being analysed.


Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the 
functional role of each element is determined by some categorial 
intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing 
but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic  
was struggling against, I think.


This is also the aim of my little game. If you take "Protected 
Designation of Origin" (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is 
capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get:

Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness
Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern,  
between something that is pointed at and its name

Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the origin.

But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of 
each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a 
sign), shows:

- Designation for PDO remains a Second
while:
- Protected for PDO is a First
- Origin for PDO is a Third
Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for 
its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is 
the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux.
The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of 
rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it:

-
235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate 
of any triadic relation.
The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as 
of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three 
is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature.
236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as 
of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a 
law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature.
237. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as 
of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to 
being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the 
Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of 
different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence.

--

The linguistic aspect of the game, and the syntactic habit in different 
languages is worth noticing too. The necessary linear structure of the 
linguistic chain can't mark easily such a triadic construction.  So we 
have virtually the ambiguity in every language: Protected (Designation 
of Origin) / (Protected Designation) of Origin. However the syntactic 
habit (inverse in French and in English) spares the complex calculus of 
knowing which is S, O or I by constraining their position in the chain. 
For example English puts the sign "Protected" at the head of the chain 
while French puts it at the tail.


Bernard

as a consequence the object and the interpretant too can mediate 
between the other two elements of the relation.



here are some excepts:

"... The function of a given element can vary, depending on the 
perspective taken in the analysis of the triad. It can thus happen 
that an element that was considered as a third from a certain 
perspective A, will be considered as a second or a first from a 
different perspective B or C. This is possible because the elements 
are not considered in their categorial hierarchy, but in their 
functional identity. I will soon draw extensively on this important 
feature.In the third place, Peirce makes in his theory of the 
categories the crucial"


"Peirce's favorite word to characterize thirdness is mediation. A 
third is a medium between a first and a second. If each of the 
correlates of a genuine triad is a third, that means that each of them 
is something that mediates between the other two correlates. This much 
granted, let us examine in this light the triadic sign. Peirce's 
general definition of the sign is that which stands for an object to 
an interpretant. What we have here are the three terms of a 
purportedly ge

[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...

[Bernard Morand]

Claudio, Jim and others

I have a little game to suggest to everybody on the list who has some 
time to devote to it. Fortunately, it is related to a question of wines.
In French language we have a phrase "Appellation d'Origine Controlee" 
(A.O.C.) to characterize at the same time the name, the origin and the 
level of certification of a bottle of wine. It seems that in English the 
phrasing would have to be "Protected Designation of Origin" (P.D.O.). I 
am sure that Claudio knows how to say that in his mother tongue.
I will suppose that anyone of the acronyms is a sign. The question is : 
among the three elements of this sign (either A,O,C or P,D,O) which of 
them is the First, the Second and which is the Third?


Hoping that you will find that the question is worth answering.

Bernard 



Claudio Guerri a ¨crit :


Jim, List,
 
I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two quotes:
1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such 
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be 
capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP 2.274)

and
2. "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the 
object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281
Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third ] as an apparent 
contradiction.
 
I have to give up trying to understand the subtle differences in 
English between capital "First" and little "third"... but even so, 
something sounds also meaningfull there (even for an Italian leaving 
head upside-down in Argentina)...
 
Since EVERYTHING is a sign, or everything can only be considered as a 
sing by humans, and since all discussions can proceed only through 
signs, etc. etc... (see CP 1.540, 5.283, 5.308, 5.309 and others...), 
signs can not be a 'definitive-something', or all Peirce's effort 
could get lost in his most ineresting aspect: the emphasys on 
relations instead of on taxonomies.
 
On the other side, every sign can be considered in it's 3 aspects (or 
better 9, or 27, or 81, since, only 3 is mostly a very rough cut into 
'reality'... that resists symbolization -Lacan-).
 
In quote 2 we have the sign in context. The sign is considered a 
little third, 'only' it's thirdness, which is it's most outstanding 
aspect to fulfill the task of mediation. Only the symbolic aspect is 
considered here, by using the verbal language (which is lineal and 
sequential -de Sassure-). Auke's diagrams (or other diagramms too...) 
could show the same statement without 'erasing' the other two aspects 
of the different signs involved, just by enphasysing with color the 
outstanding parts involved in this statement. Here we have a graphic 
example (forgive me Ben, the outcome could not be uglyer):
 
 
In quote 1 the sign is considered in it's most complex-difficult 
aspect, the capital First, which envolves the pure POSSIBILITY, the 
quali-quantitative-elemental-abstract-knowledge that "opens" the 
logical 'power' of that sign. The most valuable value of any sign is 
to know and to be aware (by the 'interpretant') of it's 'firstness'. 
In that 'possible FIRST' we have the clue of what comes logically 'after'.
Signs "grow" (historically) from thirdness to firstness, in opposition 
of the logical order.
 
Jim Piat says: "...all signs (which are thirds) are also firsts 
because they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because 
they exist and have effects. But *signs are neither mere Firsts nor 
mere Seconds*". (bold is mine)
 
Each coherent statement, in verbal language, should be constructed 
logically like quote 2 by relating 1ness, 2ness and 3ness (not 
necessarily in this order) of three different signs. This parts 
have not to be explicit in the verbal text. The signs are not mere 
Firsts nor mere Seconds nor mere Thirds, but the verbal language can 
give or construct this (terrible) impression. (like in the traditional 
bad example: the weathervane IS an index...)
 
Jim Piat says: "...I do think  Peirce meant for his three trichotomies 
of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me are 
clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be 
the foundation of his theory of signs.  In particular I think his 
first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as 
either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy 
addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means 
of qualitative similarity,  existential correlation, or convention; 
and the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can 
represent either a  mere quality, an object or another sign.  For me 
this suggest a* three by three matrix of sign aspects* based on 
Peirce's categories." (bold is mine)
 
There is already some research done in this direction, for applied 
semiotics. The outcome is what I called the "Semiotic Nonagon". It is 
a diagrammatic-icon, an operative model that can be used with great 
advantage in qualitative research, but it is NOT an e

[peirce-l] Re: Under the Peirce's text...

[Bernard Morand]

robert marty a ¨crit :


...the lattice of the ten classes of signs :

http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/marty/lattices/Lattice-CP.rtf

Please consider that this argumentation is a partial response to several
questions recently discussed. I cannot react with the necessary quickness at
the time all the more reason that I don't have a great liking for debate on
the Peircean orthodoxy. I my opinion the more interesting task is
collectively try to extract a coherent theory of signs of the mass of the
Peirce's texts.

Robert Marty
http://robert.marty.perso.cegetel.net/


 

Very clear Robert, thanks for that. Especially thanks for the 
accompanying comments that show the relationship between the lattice 
diagram and Peirce's own explanations. I don't see which elements of 
this result could be disputed, once the phenomenological ordering of 
categories admitted.
For my part, I will insist once more time on the two classification 
operators that are at work in the lattice. We find the usual "division" 
or "separation" or "discrimination" operator when there are two classes 
on the same horizontal line of the picture. It is the case with the 
Dicent Indexical Legisign (322) as opposed to the Rhematic Symbol (331) 
for example. This is the ancient figure of classification by means of 
trees, each of both species (322 / 331) having in common the same 
seemingly genus, in this case the Dicent Symbol (332). But this is is a 
misleading appearance. As Peirce's commentary makes it clear, the 
relationship between 332 and its "childs" is NOT a relation of 
specialization, or subsumption, or sub-concept, etc. It is a relation of 
"involvement" that is to say that in order to play its role as a Dicent 
Symbol a sign has to embody either a Dicent Indexical Legisign or a 
Rhematic Symbol.
This is the reason why I was directing the attention to the error that 
consists in representing the sign classification by means of simple 
trees where we loose the licit additive character of signs. This latter 
can only be figured by means of cells in a table, enabling to make sense 
with groupings of cells (or by means of your own oriented arrows).


Bernard  



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[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)

[Bernard Morand]

Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:



the classification is obtained in a deductive the way, but the 
sequence order is arbitrary.


let us say I want to classify a group of people according to 2 divisions:

- men / women (1st division)
- under age / adult (2nd division)

that's 4 classes, OK?

if I consider the "men / women" division a first dichotomy and the 
"under age / adult" division the second dichotomy, are you saying that 
the classes of people are magically ordered just because of that choice?


what are the order relations among the classes of signs? that the 
first question to answer before laying down the numerals


/JM

I think that your example funishes a good basis for reflexion Jean-Marc. 
And I am not sure you are right in this special case. A division among 
men and women is made on the basis of a discriminant, the sex. The other 
division is made on the age as a discriminant. But sex and age are two 
mutually  independant attributes of people.What is aimed at is to  
distribute a stock of individuals among  four pre-given classes. Observe 
in passing that the purpose is not to define what are men or women. This 
activity is what is called nowadays data analysis for which the 
attributes that make the division are let to the choice of the 
classifier. These attributes can be calculated in order to confer some 
nice or formal properties to the resulting classification but in a sense 
they are arbitrary (dependant on he who makes the classification). Note 
too that the potential list of candidate discriminants is infinite.
I think that this is not what is at work with the classification of 
1903. If words could convey good meanings in themselves I would say that 
it is much more a categorization than a classification. There are not 
individual signs in our hands in order to put them in the one box or the 
other. We have a set of characters which are  structured according to 
the law of prescission (and not discrimination) and make a system. It is 
this law which gives a sense to the order of the trichotomies and which 
makes that the attributes used to make the classes are not mutually 
independant. For example if a sign has for its object an index, it 
cannot be an argument,but  it can be a rheme a dicisign. The fact that 
such a categorization does not require any individual makes it dependant 
only on what Peirce sometimes calls the  "formal structure" of the 
elements of thought and consciousness (CP 8.213). An important 
consequence is that such a classification enables to determine all what 
is possible (and thus impossible) contrary to the data analysis 
tradition which describes what exists. If I was to revive some old 
controversies, I would hold that Peirce was a precursor in structuralism 
:-). However a  natural classification is based on genealogy and final 
cause for Peirce, two criteria that structuralism did not bother with.
This is the reason why I was reproaching to Joe the use of plural in his 
figure for qualisigns, sinsigns, legisigns as if they were individual 
class members and not structural elements, as well as the separation of 
the classification into three sub-trees. In fact, it has no effect on 
the surrounding  text but nevertheless I think that the presentation of 
the figure in itself can be misleading. It  conveys an idea of the first 
trichotomy as being more material than formal (and also more decisive 
than the two others)
On the status of classifications for Peirce, there would be something 
worth adding. He often makes a distinction between what he calls 
"natural classes" which are built from the formal structure of elements 
with "artificial classes" which are built for a special purpose. I think 
that his conception of artificial classification is very near from the 
approach taken by data analysis. I wonder whether the Welby 
classification was not an "artificial" one. Peirce had not the habit of 
confusing himself with his scientific study but here he says "MY second 
way of dividing signs". This puzzled me for several years.


Bernard


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

[Bernard Morand]

Thanks very much for the quote Joe. The last sentence puzzles me. Will 
have to think about it: seems like Peirce considered lately that he had 
earlier put erroneously some considerations related to the (dynamic) 
interpretant  into his characterizations of the relation of the object 
to the sign. This is a common mistake that we all do everyday.


Bernard


Joseph Ransdell a ¨crit :


Bernard says::,

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in
progress for Peirce.

I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.

However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2)
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view.

REPLY:
I'll reply more extensively later in the day, Bernard, but the basis for
my saying this is as follows, from MS 339D.662 (1909 Nov 1)

=quote Peirce
During the past 3 years I have been resting from my work on the Division of 
Signs and have only lately -- in the last week or two -- been turning back 
to it; and I find my work of 1905 better than any since that time, though 
the latter doubtless has value and must not be passed by without 
consideration.
Looking over the book labelled in red "The Prescott Book," and also this one 
[the "Logic Notebook", MS 339], I find the entries in this book of 
"Provisional Classification of 1906 March 31st" and of 1905 Oct 13 
particularly in imporant from my present (accidentally limited, no doubt) 
point of view; particularly in regard to the point made in the Prescott 
Book, 1909 Oct 21, and what immediately precedes that in that book but is 
not dated.


Namely, a good deal of my early attempts to define this difference besween 
Icon, Index, & Symbol, were adulterated with confusion with the distinction 
as to the Reference of the Dynamic Interpretant to the Sign.


end quote==

Joe Ransdell




 




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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

[Bernard Morand]

Joe and list,
I agree with the idea of being very cautious with the 10 trichotomies 
classification. You are right I think in recalling that it was work in 
progress for Peirce.


I would be very interested too in reading the material you are refering 
to below if you can make it available to the list in one way or the other.


However, I think that your concluding sentence is excessively narrow 
when you write that 1) the theory did not reach any stable state and 2) 
it can't be reasonably represented as being Peirce's view. I would tend 
to comprehend such statements within a pessimistic view aiming at 
undervaluate what was at stake for an understanding of Peirce's 
semiotic. In fact your diagnosis could remain correct while what Peirce 
tried to clarify at the beginning of the century and during quite a 
decade could be of the utmost interest for semiotics. This is more or 
less my own view. In particular I think that if we manage to produce 
someday a sufficient account of signs theory in order that it be of 
practical usage in special sciences, such a sign theory will be informed 
by the 10 trichotomies system. I know that this statement will have to 
be justified but just an example: the study of concrete signs needs some 
concepts as the distinctions between immediate and dynamic objects, and 
betweeen the three interpretants too. From the theoretical point of view 
I am also convinced that the transition from the 3 trichotomies to 10 
and the relation between the two kinds of systems deserves to be studied 
on the methodological level (pragmatism).


Bernard




Joseph Ransdell wrote:

Ben asks:
 
"My basic question here is whether these structural relations are 
correct or whether the ordering of the trichotomies "I, II, III, IV, 
V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X" is correct."
 
REPLY:
The MS material in the logic notebook (MS 339) shows quite clearly 
that Peirce did not regard himself as having arrived at anything he 
could regard as satisfactory, as regards the ten trichotomies, as late 
as Nov. 1 of 1909, and the two versions which he thought were -- at 
best -- the least objectionable were ones he formulated on Oct 13th of 
1905 and March 31st of 1906.  The version you are working with is from 
an unsent draft of a letter to Welby of 1908, a year earlier than the 
assessment just mentioned, and it differs in significant ways from the 
versions he thought best though still unsatisfactory.  The fact that 
it appears in the Collected Papers gives it no special status since it 
is really just discarded draft material.   Take all talk about the ten 
trichotomies with a VERY LARGE grain of salt, Ben, until we get 
some effective and shared access to the relevant MS material.  Of 
course it is perfectly okay for people to do their own constructions 
of the expanded set of trichotomies as they should have been 
formulated, provided they are clear on the fact that this is their own 
theory; but if the question is as to what Peirce's theory was it can 
only be said that it was work in progress which never arrived at a 
reasonably stable developed state and which cannot reasonably be 
represented as being his view.   
 
Joe Ransdell
 
 



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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

[Bernard Morand]

Ben and list,

Professional duties don't let me time enough to enter now in this very
interesting discussion. Just some words: I think that the list of
divisions from I to X  has to be ordered differently and may be that
several orderings are conceivable. This is something about which Peirce
scholars could not arrive at an agreement in the past. R. Marty shows
in his Algebre des signes that 4 divisions among the 10 are redundant,
then the hexadic sign thesis,  while I prefer to stay with 10 for now.
In fact I think that the main problem  relies on the methodological and
philosophical background that comes with the passage from 3
trichotomies to 10 (to begin with: it relies on the status of the first
classification in 3 trichotomies and 10 classes :-).

Regards
Bernard

Benjamin Udell a écrit :

  
  
  
  
  Various corrections. Sorry about that.
   
  Also, anybody replying, please remember to delete all unneeded
graphics and text. - Ben
  ---
   
  Gary R., Robert, Bernard, Wilfred, Claudio, List,
   
I thought I'd try to the branching style chart of Peirce's ten-adic
division of sign parameters. (These parameters are not mutually
independent). I supposed that the same formal relations applied as with
the main three trichotomies of parameters (qualisign/sinsign/legisign,
icon/index/symbol, and rheme/dicisign/argument).
   
  
  As you can see, it gets complicated and long, and I ended up
omitting divisions V through IX.
   
  
   
  Then I did a complete table of the "branching" variety but I did
it without repeating such terms as "assurance of instinct" 55 times.
   
  My basic question here is whether these structural relations are
correct or whether the ordering of the trichotomies "I, II, III, IV, V,
VI, VII, VIII, IX, X" is correct. If the same rules hold for these 10
trichotomies as for the three, then it would appear, for instance, that
all symbols are copulants. Copulants "neither describe nor denote
their Objects, but merely express… logical relations"; for example
  "If--then--"; "--causes--." That seems like it just must be
wrong. Then a symbol like the word "red" couldn't be a symbol, instead,
since it's descriptive, it can be a legisign, a sinsign, or a
qualisign, but in any case it has to be a descriptive abstractive
iconic hypothetical sympathetic suggestive gratific rhematic assurance
of instinct. That just can't be right.
   
  After this big table, I append (for those who wish to review
these 10 trichotomies) a table of the 10 trichotomical divisions of
sign parameters, pretty much using a table which I found in "Problems
With Peirce" http://jameselkins.com/Texts/Peirce.pdf ,
which is an excerpt from _Visual Culture: A Skeptical Reader_
(work in progress) by James Elkins. (The nice thing about his table is
(a) it includes quotes from Peirce & (b) it's on the Internet.)
   
  The funny thing is, I once produced a 10-ad of the sign
parameter trichotomies for Gary Richmond, and he had most of that info
included in it, but I forgot about it because, at the time, I simply
thought of it vaguely as "advanced" classifications and I hadn't
mentally connected the "parameters" with it.
   
  Best, Ben Udell.
  


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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

[Bernard Morand]

Benjamin Udell wrote :

  
  
  
  
  I had already produced the second table (Fig. 3) when you sent
the graphic of Peirce's own table. It's really just Joe's table,
re-produced as an HTML table, and with the second column put into
"standard" order (a, ab, abc instead of a, ba, cba) consistently like
the other columns. 
  The basic idea was to use less memory and make it easier for
people to edit. Actually, Joe's graphic is small in KB but image files
in emails tend to use more than their own filesize in KB. Anyway, Joe's
descriptors in the first trichotomy happened to be plural nouns, and I
merely followed along in that regard. Part of the reason for the colors
is that they make the html table cohere better. In the html table, it's
more difficult to make everything line up nicely. The colors help.
   
  The emphasis on the viewpoint of the first trichotomy helps
emphasize that the three trichotomies are ordered (first
trichotomy, second trichotomy, third trichotomy), ordered in a way
which is embodied in the collective structure of ideas uniting the
three trichotomies. I had known about this but not really focused on it
before. Wilfred's question about qualisigns/sinsigns/legisigns became
my occasion to really think about it. Here I've added examples to it,
they're all from Peirce but I pasted them in whole-hog from James
Elkins' "Problems with Peirce" http://jameselkins.com/Texts/Peirce.pdf
which, despite the ominousness of its title, displays some real
engagement with Peirce and anyway has a number of handy tables. Turned
out he ordered them all-ascending too.

The view point from the first trichotomy emphasizes an order on the
trichotomies. That's true. Yet this order is not the whole of the
subject matter: it is only the order of the numerical sequence 1, 2, 3
but it does not account for the fact that into three, 2 and 1 can be
found and the fact that into two, 1 can be found. So, developping the
original Peirce's table could result into this alternative
presentation  to the one you gave below, this one being grounded on the
second trichotomy:  

icons  -(in)-  quality  -(for)-  rhema
icons  -(in)-  singularity  -(for)-  rhema
icons  -(in)-   law  -(for)-  rhema
indexes -(in)- singularity -(for)-  rhema
...etc.
symbols -(in)-  law  -(for)- rhema
...etc.

And there is of course a third development grounded on the third
trichotomy showing the structure of rhematic signs, dicent signs and
arguments.

This is the reason why I asked for an explanation of the plural. You
answered that Joe is the original author, I would be interested in his
own view on this. From the point of view of structural forms which was
my starting point, Joe's presentation is a composite of three joined
subgraphs, each of which is a tree (in the Aristotelian tradition)
while Peirce's presentation is a table equipped with an internal
ordering relation. The main practical difference is that the former
cannot display the forbidden combinations while the latter does. For
example, the construct (see below) can't show that qualisigns -
indexical - rhematic are prohibited while the Peirce's table shows it.
I suspect that the invention of matrix calculus at his time and his own
work with quaternions influenced his way of thinking the form of
classifications. I never found a justification of this idea in the
sources but I would be interested in the reflexions of listers if any.
There is evidence that Mendeleiev chemical classification was a
reference for Peirce and it was a table too. But as far as I can know
there remains an enigma on the fact that Peirce invented suddenly the
first trichotomy around 1903 though he had worked the two others in
every detail for many years. Was not such an invention the result of
the necessity of achieving a neat structure for sign classification?
Another way of putting things could be to say that Joe's presentation
is directed in a sense by a specific linguistic usage that requires in
our so called indo-european languages to put things in the form
Subject-Verb-Object(s). Thus the peculiar status attributed to
qualisign, sinsign, legisign that become with the help of the plural
gender the subjects of quasi sentences. I have shown above that there
are two possible alternate forms. In fact I think that in the Peirce's
presentation the terms like qualisign, index, ...and so on, are neither
linguistic nor syntactical elements. They are just markers for places
in a structure of relations, like letters in a geometrical figure. Now
this fact does not prevent to define that which is marked by such
markers.

Ben, as regards to the discussion on the borromean knot and the fourth
category, I did not intend to make your system enter into the figure of
the borromean knot. I was using the latter as some kind of metaphor in
order to inquire into the kind of relation that the 4th category (as
you conceive it) could entertain with the three others. I had always
supposed through your posts that you agree on the idea that S

[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

[Bernard Morand]

Gary Richmond a écrit :

  
  
Thanks you Ben and Bernard!
  
Gary
  
Benjamin Udell wrote:
  



Thank you,
Bernard! -Ben
  

Fig 1 and Fig. 2 seem to be identical except that the second one has
colors which indicate explicitly that there are rows and columns.
But the third figure seems to focus on the first trichotomy by 
developing the previous figure from the particular point of view of
this first trichotomy. Ben: is there some hidden meaning when you turn
the descriptors of the first trichotomy to plural? 
In fact, the developped graph formula  in Fig. 3 seems to me to have
the  disadvantage of loosing the idea of a tabular representation in
favour of a weaker list representation (three trichotomies related by
the simple idea of sequence).
I think that the great merit of the Peirce's proposal is that his
classification is definitely closed when considered in its tabular
form: the sum of the parts make the whole. This is a revolution because
since Porphyrus and Aristotle we where used to classify by means of
trees (built on the criteria of kinds and species). The main problems
of such graphs has been shown in Artificial Intelligence: 1) they can
be expanded infinitely in the bottom direction and there is no criteria
for stopping and 2) there is no means to distinguish concepts from
concepts' instances

May be Ben your successive figure transformations and particularly the
last one are designed in order to add further a fourth trichotomy
(quadritomy ?) to the initial list of three ?
As an aside I am now reading some writings from Lacan. Do you know Ben
that he ruminated over some problem which looks like yours (at least
from the point of view of Form). He had got a triadic system (Real,
Symbolic, Imaginary) which he thought as making together a borromean
knot. But he felt that it could have a fourth element that he figured
as being the node formed by the three initial elements. I sometimes
wonder whether your fourth category is not in part such a node formed
by the three genuine ones.

Bernard


  
Fig.1 
  



  


  

  Qualisign
  Sinsign
  Legisign


  


  Icon
  Index
  Symbol


  


  Rheme
  Dicisign
  Argument

  

Fig.2 
  


  
 
 


  

  qualisigns –
  iconic –
  rhematic


  
  


  / 
sinsigns    
  \
  iconic –
  rhematic


  
  


  indexical <
  rhematic


  dicentic


  
  


  /
legisigns     
  \
  
  
  iconic –
  rhematic


  
  


   indexical <
  rhematic


  dicentic


  
  


   /
   symbolic    
\
  rhematic


  dicentic


  argumental

  

Fig.3  
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

[Bernard Morand]

Sorry, hoping this one will work :
From
the own hand of the  inventor ( MS 339, August 7th 1904) :
  
  
  



B Morand
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign

[Bernard Morand]

From the own hand of the  inventor ( MS 339, August 7th 1904) :



B Morand






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[peirce-l] Re: Category Theory & CSP

[Bernard Morand]

Jim Piat a ¨crit :

 
 
Grary Richmond wrote:
 
I agree with your assessment of the relational nature of Peirce's 
categories at least in the sense that at least in 'genuine' 
trichotomies that each of the three has a relation to the other two. 
But in another sense your comments seem to me  to perhaps mix apples 
and oranges.
 
As Bernard Morand pointed out in his message of 4/29:
BM: As regards the relevance to Peirce one has to consider first that 
the word category in mathematics has nothing to do with the same word 
as it was used by Aristotle, Kant or Peirce.The mathematical category 
is an abstract construct which has no denotation nor connotation in 
itself.
 
Dear Gary, Bernard, Folks--
 
Thanks for the comments.   I don't know anything about mathematical 
category theory but I wonder what sort of construct (abract or 
otherwise) has no denotation nor connotation in itself.  Isn't a 
construct's location in time/space in effect a self denotation?  And 
isn't a constructs properties or form its self connotation?Aren't 
all constructs defined in terms of either their qualities or 
locations.  My guess is that these so called mappings, transformations 
and such of category theory are in some fashion an elaboration of the 
meaning of such terms as connotation and denotation  -- or 
alternatively form and location. The ways in which these categories 
are preserved under various logical, syntactical or 
mathematical operations.  I don't know the differences among these 
operations but they seem related to me.
 


Nice Jim! I had the feeling that I was blundering just at the time of 
writing that the categories in the sense of maths  have no denotation 
nor connotation .  However I could not see where the blunder was. So I 
decided to let the  idea as it was and see what will happen.
The underlying problem is I think the relationship between maths and 
other sciences, the most developed and interesting of them to observe 
being physical sciences. I suspect them to use mathematics as a 
convenient language in order to work physics but not for the very 
mathematical properties of this language. There is only a very basic 
arithmetics in the formula : e=mc2.  J. Chandler suggests a similar 
shortcut in a previous message for chemistry: "Suppose I construct an 
abstract algebra for chemistry / biology that  is not expressible in 
category theory". And this looks to be the problem of the admissibility 
of Gary's vectors too.
In this line of thought, I wanted to convey that mathematical theory of 
categories does not presuppose any arrangement of the real (no 
denotation) nor any purpose for its internal organisation. What would be 
added to this even if we were agreeing that  it is self denoting and 
connoting?
Now, the fact that such mathematical systems really tell something to 
us, and very accurately,  is always a divine surprise  to me.


Regards

Bernard

In my view, following Peirce, there are three basic categories under 
which all conceivable modes of being fall:qualities or form,  
otherness or location (others must occupy different locations) and the 
 contrual of the two producing a third which is representation.   I 
cant quite imagine operations on hypothetical categories that have 
neither properties nor locations.  Categories whose specific 
properties and locations are not at issue yes, but not categories 
absent these relations.
 
Ah,  it finally occurs to me that this may be just what you and 
Bernard mean by abstract categories.  Abstract categores are 
those whose *particular* connotations and denotations are not at issue 
-- not categories without qualities or locations per se.  Is this what 
you mean?  However,  if that is your meaning then I would still 
argue that the rules establishing how these categories relate to one 
another are in effect definitions of the general properties of the 
categories themselves.  And further, that Peirce's categories are 
abstract or general in just that sense.
 
Which is to say that form, substance and function are inseparable 
relations in the sense of being inextricable aspects of the same 
thing -- being itself.  They are defined in terms of one another and 
there is no way around it.  The most fundamental constituents of any 
system must be all defined in terms of one another (all in terms of 
all) or else they are not fundamental. 
 
I'm not sure how much sense any of this makes, Gary, but I've worked 
too hard on it to just give it the heave.  So I'm posting it in hopes 
someone might either agree or point out some problems with it  -- if 
they have the time and inclination.  Thanks again for interesting and 
helpful comments.  I too, btw, would like further discussion of Robert 
Marty's work if others are interested.  I tried to follow it on my own 
a few years ago but was unable to make much progress and need help.   
 
 
Cheers,

Jim Piat
 
 
 

[peirce-l] Re: Fw: What is Category Theory?

[Bernard Morand]

Joseph Ransdell a ��crit :

Does anybody know anything about category theory in math, which is what the 
book in the forwarded message below is about. What is it?   Does it actually 
have any philosophical interest?  Is it relevant to Peirce?


 


Joe and list,
Yes I think that the category theory has a  great interest to 
philosophers because it is actually the most general -and abstract- 
language that mathematicians can use in order to work with algebraic 
structures. I have heard people say that it makes it possible to 
represent the whole set theory for example within the formalism. But I 
will let this to more informed people than me.
As regards the relevance to Peirce one has to consider first that the 
word category in mathematics has nothing to do with the same word as it 
was used by Aristotle, Kant or Peirce.The mathematical category is an 
abstract construct which has no denotation nor connotation in itself. 
However this construct can be used in order to examine the 
correspondances between the structure of a theory and the structure of a 
set of mundane objects (if the correspondance is true the latter is 
called a "model" of the former, in a tarskian spirit).
So, you can use the category theory, not in order to put to the test the 
caenopythagorian ones (which would have no sense at all), but in order 
to express the formal internal relations between, say,  the 10 or 66 
classes of signs for example. This has already been done by Robert Marty 
all along the 400 pages of his Algebre des signes (John Benjamins 
Publishing Company, 1990). He shows there that the formal structure that 
lies behind the sign classes is a lattice and he argues for an algebraic 
approach in terms of a precisely defined communication language between  
the people involved into this inquiry. I think it is a very strong point 
but I will let Robert speak for himself if he is following the thread..


Regards

Bernard

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[peirce-l] Knowledge Management

[Bernard Morand]

List,
Some time ago there was a discussion on the list about what is meant by 
Knowledge Management. The following call for papers gives a fair account 
of what is meant by the term in an academic context. (ECAI is the 
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence)


Regards
Bernard

---
CALL FOR PAPERS
ECAI'2006 Workshop on Knowledge Management and Organizational Memories

Riva del Garda, Italy, August 28 or 29, 2006
http://www-sop.inria.fr/acacia/WORKSHOPS/ECAI2006-OM/call.html


Knowledge Management (KM) is one of the key progress factors in
organizations. It aims at capturing explicit and tacit knowledge of an 
organization in order to facilitate the access, sharing, and reuse of 
that knowledge as well as creation of new knowledge and organizational 
learning. KM must be guided by a strategic vision to fulfill its primary 
organizational objectives: improving knowledge sharing and cooperative 
work inside the organization; disseminating best practices; improving 
relationships with the external world; preserving past knowledge of the 
organization for reuse; improving the quality of projects and
innovations; anticipating the evolution of the external environment; and 
preparing for unexpected events and managing urgency and crisis

situations.

One approach for KM consists of building a corporate memory or
organizational memory (OM). Several techniques can be considered, 
according to the type of organization, its needs and its culture: 
knowledge-based approaches, document-based approaches, workflow-based 
approaches, CBR-based approaches, CSCW and cooperative approaches, 
ontology-based approaches, corporate Semantic Webs, Web-based

approaches, agent-based approaches, distributed OMs, etc.

Several scenarios of KM can be tackled through OMs: project memory, 
skills management, communities of practice, strategic or technological 
watch, e-learning, e-government, etc. The workshop aims at gathering 
researchers from multiple disciplines, industrial participants and 
students in order to discuss models, methodologies, techniques and 
application dealing with these scenarios and approaches.



Papers are welcome in any area concerning knowledge management.
Examples of interesting topics are:

SCENARIOS FOR OMs :
• Skill management
• Project memory
• Community memory
• Strategic or technological watch, Business Intelligence
• E-learning
• E-government
• Inter-organization cooperation
• …

MODELS FOR KM and OMs:
• Organizational dimensions of KM
• Enterprise modelling and business process modelling
• …

TECHNIQUES
• Knowledge-based approaches
• Document-based approaches
• Workflow-based approaches
• Process-oriented approaches
• CBR-based approaches
• CSCW and cooperative approaches
• Ontology-based approaches
• Corporate Semantic Webs
• Web-based approaches
• Agent-based approaches
• Peer-to-peer approaches
• Distributed approaches
• …

APPLICATIONS
• Design
• Medical domain
• Biology
• Telecommunications
• Aeronautics and space
• Automobile
• Building sector
• …


Important dates

Submission deadline:
April 15, 2006
Notification of acceptance: May 10, 2006
Early registration deadline
May 18, 2006
Camera (Web)-ready: May 24, 2006
Workshop: August 28-29, 2006


Submission format

Contributions are invited in the form of a full paper (max. 20 pages), 
following the formatting style for ECAI-2006 . The title page should 
include name, affiliation, and e-mail address of the contributor. Papers 
will be judged according to their contribution to the discussion. They 
should be submitted electronically (in PostScript or pdf) to

[EMAIL PROTECTED]
The title, authors and list of keywords should also be sent in ascii by 
E-mail. The best papers will be published later in a book, as for the 
previous ECAI/IJCAI workshops on KM & OM from 1999 to 2001.



Remark: All workshop participants must register for ECAI-2006




Workshop organizing committee

Jean Paul Barth¨s
Address: University of Technology of Compiegne, Departement of Genie 
Informatique, BP.60319

60203 Compi¨gne Cedex France
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]


Rose Dieng-Kuntz (co-chair)
Address: INRIA Acacia Project, 2004 route des Lucioles, BP 93
06902 Sophia-Antipolis Cedex FRANCE
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 

Knut Hinkelmann
Address: University of Applied Sciences Solothurn
Riggenbachstrasse 16
CH-4600 Olten
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Ann Macintosh
Address: International Teledemocracy Centre
Napier University
10 Colinton Road
Edinburgh, EH10 5DT
Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Nada Matta (co-chair)
Address: Universit¨ de Technologie de Troyes (GSID/Tech-CICO)
12, rue Marie Curie BP. 2060,
10010 Troyes Cedex France
E-mail:[EMAIL PROTECTED]

Ulrich Reimer
Adress: Business Operations Systems, Switzerland
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Carla Simone
Department of Informatics, Systems and Communication
University of Milano-Bicocca (Italy)
E-mail: [EMAIL PR

[peirce-l] Re: Nonagon Revisited [...from "naming definite individuals"]

[Bernard Morand]

Claudio, you wrote in part :


Claudio to Frances and List,
 []
BUT... I am not trying to improve Peirce's pragmatism, this was the 
best a learned in my life, but since I am not a philosopher but a 
designer, my interest is in a different direction.
I am trying to construct a "tool", and as I already wrote, tools are 
dirty.
From my point of view, Lacan's and Althusser's "sign typologies" are 
simply WONDERFUL, because they were derived from Peirce's proposal. 
Nor Althusser nor Lacan could imagine this before knowing Peirce in 
some seminar in Paris given by somebody I have already forgotten.
Both triadic sign typologies are not related to pure logic anymore but 
to Social Practice and to the Freudian-unconscious.
From my modest and ignorant point of view, there is no other 
alternative for "real" as in secondness, and Lacan is LACAN only after 
he got that wonderful idea from Peirce in relation to his poor 
structuralist proposal (please, no offense) of only imaginary and 
symbolic.


The question of stating whether tools are really "dirty" and why they 
should be so would deserve to be discussed (to be clear: I disagree). 
But I focus here on the historical aspects, namely the relationship from 
Peirce to Lacan on the one side and to Althusser on the other.
As regards Peirce and Lacan, Lacan himself vouches for having read a 
piece of Peirce. We are often told that Deledalle intoduced Foucault, 
Deleuze and Lacan to Peirce ; probably Jakobson was also an important 
conveyor. But something more precise is reported by Michel Balat in his 
"Des fondements semiotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et 
Lacan", L'Harmattan, 2000. Here (p. 7) he quotes Lacan from the Seminar 
L'identification (S IX, 1961-1962):
"J'ouvrais r¨cemment un excellent livre d'un auteur am¨ricain dont on 
peut dire que l'oeuvre accroit le patrimoine de la pens¨e et de 
l'¨lucidation logique. Je ne dirai pas son nom parce que vous allez 
chercher qui c'est. Et pourquoi est-ce que je ne le fais pas ? Parce 
que, moi, j'ai eu la surprise de trouver dans les pages o¨ il travaille 
si bien un tel sens si vif de l'actualit¨ du progr¨s de la logique, o¨ 
justement mon huit int¨rieur intervient. Il n'en fait pas du tout le 
m¨me usage que moi. N¨anmoins je suis amen¨ ¨ la pens¨e que quelques 
mandarins parmi mes auditeurs viendraient me dire un jour que c'est l¨ 
que j'ai p¨ch¨. (...). Pour le logicien en question, il y a longtemps 
qu'il est mort, et son petit huit int¨rieur pr¨c¨de incontestablement sa 
promotion ici. Mais quand il entre d'un bon pas dans son examen de 
l'universelle affirmative, il use d'un exemple qui a le m¨rite de ne pas 
tra¨ner partout. Il dit :"Tous les saints sont des hommes, tous les 
hommes sont passionn¨s, donc tous les saints sont passionn¨s."
While Lacan does not reveal the name of Peirce, M. Balat does not doubt 
that he is the so called american author because the syllogism can be 
found in CP 4.350 We don't know anymore which book from Peirce Lacan 
read at this time. I wonder if it is not  Justus Buchler, ed.  /The 
Philosophy of Peirce:  Selected Writings.  /New York:  Harcourt Brace, 
1940 because it was usually referenced at the time, more often than the 
CP, by the French structuralist school. The "petit huit int¨rieur" is 
probably the Mobius ribbon which will become further the borromean knot 
for Lacan.
However it seems clear to me that the lacanian conception of the R¨el 
owes nothing to the peircean  conception of the Real. You seem to 
believe the contrary Claudio: on what grounds do you make it ? On my 
side, I think on the contrary that it is wonderful that two great 
intellectual men end into two very close conceptions, starting from 
different points and  within different contexts. In such cases I take it 
as an index that there is something real besides both of them, that is 
to say that the Real is real :-)


Now concerning Althusser I am very surprised that there could be a 
connection with  Peirce as you are assuming it.  His own dialectical 
materialism seems to me very far from the pragmatist principles or at 
least I can't manage to figure the Althusser I have read (Pour Marx, ..) 
to be influenced by Peirce. Can you say more about the seminar in Paris 
you are refering or other traces of such a connection ?


Amicalement

Bernard


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[peirce-l] Re: R: Re: R: Re: naming definite individuals

[Bernard Morand]

Claudio and list,

Comments inserted here and there:

  
  
  
  
  Bernard and List,
  thanks for your answer
  ¨ 
  1. BM wrote: I am always suspicious with the idea of applied
sciences in general. 
  ¨ 
  CG: ...I am also convinced that I have to say: "Me too!!!"
  But then??? the world/humanity can not go on ONLY with
Metaphysics... even if Metaphysics is firstness (so to say)
  As a designer/architect (already out of practice and devoted to
research/teaching) I have to put the bricks somewhere...
  This is our "mud of philosophy"... We have to step in the mud
and our friends philosophers has to help as... not out... but not to
sink...
  ¨ 

BM. The picture of "airy" philosophy vs foundation bricks could be
misleading. Between the realm of ideas and the realm of concrete design
realizations, there is the realm of logics. In a sense, this is what
everybody can learn starting with Peirce's semiotics.¨  The reality of
design lies in its logical character, out of which philosophy as well
as engineering can be done. Observing the way a designer deals with his
diagram of the thing to be designed, makes it clear that he is
committed to logical activity. But no doubt we surely agree on this.


  2. BM wrote: most engineering jobs of today require a lot of
design tasks 
  ¨ 
  CG: Yes, I agree that the word [design] is becoming more general
and charged with new theoretical and practical consequences, not only
in the "arts". It is very important to develop what 'designing' really
means as a specific task, as mental operation, etc. etc. The 'project'
by¨ 'projecting' (sic) could be really metaphorically described as
throwing 'something' (like an abductive idea)¨ through the ideological
grid (the culturally 'disturbed' mind of the designer) with the dubious
help of an ideological system or language of representation... I don't
know if I forget something worse to say...
  ¨ 
  
  3. BM wrote: transverse science that we can call science of
design 
  ¨ 
  CG: This sounds very good...
  As always, historically, firstness is reached, or searched,¨ only
when thirdness and secondness are exhausted. 
  

BM. You seem to refer to Firstness within the idea of foundations,
roots or "genetic" things like that. I see it much more as the space of
all the possibilities, an infinite and continuous one. In practical
matters, such a space can be restricted (qua interval, or window, onto
the continuum) to what is practically possible, something that I used
to call the conditions of possibilities. Thus the interest into a
"science of design" is not to search for some common origin but is to
make room for the idea that design can be characterized¨  qua activity
independently of the people and objects involved in this activity. 

  
  CG. Anyway, we are still fare from finding a 'general
acceptance' for that. In 'our' faculties, you will find still a lot of
resistance to lose the power of the designer/magician that can do this
because and only because he is gifted, he"knows", he has the secret and
indefinite/inexplicable power¨ (which is true in some way) and so on.
The consequence is... darkness and mystification (?) and a lot of
frustration in lots of student.
  

BM. Yes, this is very accurate. Furthermore such an attitude is not the
special property of our faculties. We met it in industrial contexts
too. Design in software engineering had not been taught for a long time
because nobody thought of that in terms of knowledge spreading. In
companies, the usual pattern was to pay¨  at a very high cost for a
specialist who had made a name in several big projects. But nobody
thought that its skills could be taught so that anybody could do the
same. Things have fortunately changed during the last decade. ¨  

  
  CG. In this sense, [graphic languages] are the last and more
outstanding concrete tool that the designers use (of course as a
consequence of physics, math, geometry, logic, etc). But, if Peirce is
'true', we have a serious problem there, we have only 2 graphic
systems: orthogonal/parallel (Monge and axo) and conic ('perspective')
projections. The first systems is specialized in secondness
(quantification of¨ matter in some space)¨ and the second system is
specialized in thirdness (qualification of the 'space' created by that
matter)... off course, since 5000 years ago (so to say) all kinds of
inferences are possible... that's why we can have a 'style' by
designing, that's why design improve through time, that's why we can
say: this is a wonderful design... with a simple glance on a plan.¨  But
we NEED an other graphic language that should 'work' in firstness, in
the possibilities of "pure form" relations, etc: and this (for now) is
TSD... but explaining it would be to out of theme here. What matters is
to understand that a possible science of design can not appear before
this problem (in firstness)¨ is solved... or at least stated, visualized
in some way...
  

BM. Yes Claudio. I have often heard architects arguing this way a

[peirce-l] Re: R: Re: naming definite individuals

[Bernard Morand]

Jim Piat wrote:


Dear Bernard,

Just lost to cyberspace a response I had composed, but I'll try to 
reconstruct it quickly.Basically I think I agree with both your 
clinical and semiotic analysis above.   I did not mean to suggest that 
feelings were other than qualites best connoted by icons.I was 
just playing with the distinction sometimes made between the emotion 
of free floating anxiety and the more focused experience of the 
emotion we call fear.  But I've no quarrel with your analysis.   For 
me, all purposeful behaviors involve feelings, actions and thoughts.  
And I associate the icon with the felt component, the index with the 
reactive (inertial or temporal spatial component) and the symbol with 
the thought component.  (I know this is probably not the spot but as I 
understand the matter Einstein equated inertia --gravity or 
resistance-- with space time.  Such that what we call inertia or 
resistance is in fact very much a matter of location or pointing so to 
speak)


You were expressing misgivings about my seeming attempt to provide an 
indexical account of emotions,  correct?  If not, and I've missed your 
point, please let me know.  Like you, I'm interested in this issue and 
admire your attempt to illustrate a felt quality with an concrete 
example of what we call feelings.  No matter the difficulty of trying 
to reify what can not be reified. The attempt must be made so that we 
can abstract from it the felt residue.


Best wishes,
Jim Piat


Thanks Jim,

Yes I was sceptic with regards to the indexical character of emotions 
but I am not able to make a solid defense of this point for now. In a 
few words, it seems to me that a semiotical (or logical) study of 
phenomena is different from the psychic study of the very same phenoma, 
phenomena being in this case emotions. To give an idea of this, it seems 
to me that semiotic inquires into the HOW question, i.e. how does 
emotions signify? While psychology inquires into the WHAT question: what 
is an emotion? , with some purpose in clinics. It is well known that 
Peirce often repeats that logic as to be developped independently from 
psychology but I think that there is an overlooked counterpart of this 
statement : psychology has its proper place into the chorus of sciences. 
Furthermore, this place does not seem to be an application of logics, so 
we have to be careful when trying to transpose concepts from the one to 
the other.
I continue to follow with a very great interest your discussion with 
Giovanni on this subject.

Regards

Bernard


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[peirce-l] Re: R: Re: naming definite individuals

[Bernard Morand]

Jim,
I pick up a little passage of yours addressed to Giovanni that has  
interested me because I asked to myself exactly the same question many 
times in the past. You write:




But I dare not put too fine a point on my speculations.  I'm thinking 
now of anxiety which is sometimes defined as "fear without an 
object".  Not sure how that might fit with your view of emotions as 
indexes or with mine of emotions as indexical and iconic symbols.  
Perhaps anxiety does have an object but the problem is that the 
anxious person is unaware of this object and the therapist task is in 
part to make this indexical connection manifest so it can be addressed 
materially.  It's had to correct a hidden problem.


I wondered about something like this from another starting point. In 
order to present the Peirce's classification of signs in my book 
(Logique de la conception) to an intended audience supposed to be 
ignorant of such things, I searched for a concrete, non trivial, example 
of a qualisign.To give an example of a type of sign is always difficult 
because the relation between the case and the type depends on the 
situation and the context. But it is much more difficult for qualisigns 
because to give an example of a qualisign is to throw it out of 
firstness and to give it birth in secondness (qua example). Despite all 
these difficulties I thought that I could try as an explicative example 
the fear of an accident felt before driving up the car for a journey. I 
think it is a common everyday experience that becomes manifest in the 
fortunately rare cases where the accident really happens: people say 
afterwards that they had some "premonition". The fear can be regarded as 
a qualisign and thus an iconic sign. The resemblance is with what would 
be felt if the person was in the course of actually having a real 
accident. So, I think that the object of the fear-sign, while being 
purely virtual, remains nevertheless the object. Now may be that the 
therapist will be required when the person will confuse such an icon 
with an index. It will be the case if she believes that her actual fear, 
before driving up the car, will cause her to really have an accident 
later on, and so giving room for the premonition. In summary, contrary 
to what you are suggesting, 1) the fear would always have an object but 
it could be virtual 2) the awareness of the object that results from the 
erroneous indexical property of the fear would be a clinical fact.

I would be grateful for your comments on my weak suppositions.
Thanks

Bernard  


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[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals

[Bernard Morand]

Benjamin Udell a écrit :

  
  
  
  Bernard, Jim, list,
   
  I got too excited, I'm not at all sure that "subindex" can be
equated with "degenerate index."
   
  Best, Ben
  ==
   

Ben,
I was ready to  write you that if  a "degenerate index" makes sense
because it signifies degenerate secondness, the parallel with hypoicons
would not hold anymore because there is not "degenerate firstness".
The whole passage from Essential Peirce, Vol. 2, p. 273-274 (which
comes from the Syllabus of 1903) is certainly of service here. The two
paragraphs concerning respectively the Icon and the Index are written
under the same structure. First a definition is given and some doubtful
limiting cases are discussed. Then we find respectively the
consideration of hypoicons and hyposemes. Nevertheless I think that
these latter considerations are of a different tone than the
definitions or case studies (and then that they are not related to the
degenerescence subject). For hypoicons we find the following exposition
of motives: "But a sign may be iconic, that is, may represent its
object mainly by its similarity, no matter its mode of being". I
understand this as addressing any kind of sign, be it a qualisign
(which is evident), a sinsign or a legisign provided that they bear an
iconic ingredient. I think that hyposemes can be understood the same
way except for qualisigns which can never be indexical.
As a matter of fact the common presentation structure we see  for icons
and indices is not reproduced in the subsequent paragraph concerning
symbols. There seems to have nothing like "hyposymbols". And we can
guess why: an hyposymbol can't be anything else than a legisign. Thus
the concept would be empty or redundant.

Apologies for writing in a previous message the phrasing "subindices or
other hyposemes". I did not intend to mean that there could be a
distinction between both of them. I was just replicating a typical
French phrasing where "other" ("autres") is meant to emphasize that we,
speaker and recipient,  know very well and otherwise that they are the
same! Some case of imputed context  if I can say so. I infer from your
reply that such a  language artifice does not work the same way in
English. Or may be my English itself was not what it should have been.

Bernard

  Bernard, Jim, list,
   
  I should have noted that EP 2.273, combined with EP 2.274, in
fact contains "The Answer!" about subindices. A subindex is a
degenerate index. It can be singular or general. I would note to
Mats Bergman & the Commens Dictionary folks, that the passage from
2.273 might be best included along with 2.274 under the "subindex"
entry.
   
  
  
  1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:273)
  (which I found here though they numbered it "2.283" &
"2.284" http://72.14.203.104/search?q=cache:pcLX9-62OoUJ:www.univ-perp.fr/csp2001/jappy.htm+%22Thus+a+proper%22
  
  66~~~
  An _Index_ or _Seme_†1 ({séma}) is a
Representamen whose Representative character consists in its being an
individual second. If the Secondness is an existential relation, the
Index is _genuine_. If the Secondness is a reference, the
Index is _degenerate_. A genuine Index and its Object
must be existent individuals (whether things or facts), and its
immediate Interpretant must be of the same character. But since every
individual must have characters, it follows that a genuine Index may
contain a Firstness, and so an Icon as a constituent part of it. Any
individual is a degenerate Index of its own characters.
  ~~~99
  
  1903 ('A Syllabus of Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274)
  66~~~
  _Subindices_ or _hyposemes_
are signs which are rendered such principally by an actual connection
with their objects. Thus a proper name, personal demonstrative, or
relative pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it
does owing to a real connection with its object but none of these is an
Index, since it is not an individual. 
  ~~~99
   
  Best, Ben
  
  
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[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals

[Bernard Morand]

Drs.W.T.M. Berendsen a ¨crit :

  
  
  
  
  Dear list,
   
  Just now I
was thinking about some passages of
Peirce. About some small sentences which for me appeared to be quite
important
somehow. For me they are now, whatever  the answers to my questions I
have to
ask here now. The questions relate to the term “diagrammatic” of C.S.
Peirce. I
saw that term in some posts before, connected with at least thoughts.
   
  My questions
here are, whether in the original texts
of Peirce (whatever texts he wrote):
   
  1)  
  It
is only mentioned that thoughts
would be (or are) diagrammatic
  

A diagram is a special kind of iconic relation between a sign and its
object (more precisely the ressemblance lies between  the parts of the
object an the parts of the sign). So it is much more the train of
thought, its form,  which can accurately be said diagrammatic. This
amounts to say that it is reasoning that is diagrammatic, particularly
in the syllogistic form. For example (CP 3.363):

--Quote Peirce
The truth, however, appears to be that all deductive reasoning, even
simple syllogism, involves an element of observation; namely, deduction
consists in constructing an icon or diagram the relations of whose
parts shall present a complete analogy with those of the parts of the
object of reasoning, of experimenting upon this image in the
imagination, and of observing the result so as to discover unnoticed
and hidden relations among the parts. For instance, take the
syllogistic formula,

   All M is P
   S is M
   .¨. S is P.

This is really a diagram of the relations of S, M, and P. The fact that
the middle term occurs in the two premisses is actually exhibited, and
this must be done or the notation will be of no value. As for algebra,
the very idea of the art is that it presents formulæ which can be
manipulated, and that by observing the effects of such manipulation we
find properties not to be otherwise discerned. In such manipulation, we
are guided by previous discoveries which are embodied in general
formulæ. These are patterns which we have the right to imitate in our
procedure, and are the icons par excellence of algebra. The letters of
applied algebra are usually tokens, but the x, y, z, etc., of a general
formula, such as

   (x+y)z = x z + y z,

are blanks to be filled up with tokens, they are indices of tokens.
Such a formula might, it is true, be replaced by an abstractly stated
rule (say that multiplication is distributive); but no application
could be made of such an abstract statement without translating it into
a sensible image.
--


  
  
  2)  
  Whether
he also stated somewhere that (something in the) real world would be
diagrammatic.
  

Yes, I think, while it is only indirect. The deductive syllogism has a
diagrammatic form and Peirce often makes the case of the example of the
frog as a syllogism:
-Quote Peirce- CP
2.711
. The cognition of a rule is not necessarily conscious, but is of the
nature of a habit, acquired or congenital. The cognition of a case is
of the general nature of a sensation; that is to say, it is something
which comes up into present consciousness. The cognition of a result is
of the nature of a decision to act in a particular way on a given
occasion.†P1 In point of fact, a syllogism in Barbara virtually takes
place when we irritate the foot of a decapitated frog. The connection
between the afferent and efferent nerve, whatever it may be,
constitutes a nervous habit, a rule of action, which is the
physiological analogue of the major premiss. The disturbance of the
ganglionic equilibrium, owing to the irritation, is the physiological
form of that which, psychologically considered, is a sensation; and,
logically considered, is the occurrence of a case. The explosion
through the efferent nerve is the physiological form of that which
psychologically is a volition, and logically the inference of a result.
When we pass from the lowest to the highest forms of inervation, the
physiological equivalents escape our observation; but, psychologically,
we still have, first, habit--which in its highest form is
understanding, and which corresponds to the major premiss of Barbara;
we have, second, feeling, or present consciousness, corresponding to
the minor premiss of Barbara; and we have, third, volition,
corresponding to the conclusion of the same mode of syllogism. Although
these analogies, like all very broad generalizations, may seem very
fanciful at first sight, yet the more the reader reflects upon them the
more profoundly true I am confident they will appear. They give a
significance to the ancient system of formal logic which no other can
at all share.


--

[peirce-l] Re: naming definite individuals

[Bernard Morand]

Ben, Jim and list,
My understanding of the problem opened by Peirce's use of subindices or
hyposemes seems to be quite different from your's. So I try to give my
idea of it below, being accepted that I think this not to be secondary
problem in Peirce's sign theory because he also used the same
distinction for icons (hypoicons) as Frances  Kelly recalls it in
another post.

Ben summarizes the problem this way when he writes (in part) in reply
to Jim:

  
  
  
  Now here, then, is what
you cannot reconcile:
   
  From "A Letter to Lady
Welby," SS 33, 1904:
  66~~~
  "I define an Index
as a sign determined by its dynamic object by virtue of being in a real
relation to it. Such is a Proper Name (a legisign); such is the
occurrence of a symptom of a disease (the symptom itself is a legisign,
a general type of a definite character. The occurrence in a particular
case is a sinsign).
  ~~~99
   
  YET:
   
  1903 ('A Syllabus of
Certain Topics of Logic', EP 2:274) he says of subindices / hyposemes
(click on "subindex" in the sidebar at the Commens Dictionary): 
66~~~
  _Subindices_ or _hyposemes_ are signs which
are rendered such principally by an actual connection with their
objects. Thus a proper name, [a] personal demonstrative, or relative
pronoun or the letter attached to a diagram, denotes what it does owing
to a real connection with its object but none of these is an Index,
since it is not an individual. 
  ~~~99
   
  You will note that in the
1903 he says, specifically, that a proper name IS a subindex and ISN'T
an index "since it is not an invidual."  Peirce is very clear on that
point.
   
  
  
  

My reading of this is that despite Peirce is saying that a proper name,
a personal demonstrative, etc. are not indices because they lack of
individuality, he is NOT saying at the same time that they would be
subindices or hyposemes. May be Ben is mislead by equating "real" with
"actual". The first sentence only states to my sense a character of
subindices, namely Actuality of a Connection.The second sentence states
-INDEPENDENTLY-  that in order to be an Index, individuality is
required.
Now, the two sentences are related by "Thus", which means I think that
if we consider that subindices are some kinds of indices, yet they need
to be individuals as well as actually connected to their objects.
But nothing implies here that a proper name is a subindex. On the
contrary, not being an index  he cannot be a fortiori a subindex.

BEN: 

  
  
  
  Yet in the other, the
1904, he says that a proper name, in the sense of a legisign, _is_
an index.
   
  The point is that Peirce
is _varying_ over time. That's what I was tracing the series
of quotes. In the 1904, an Index can be a legisign or a sinsign. That
means it can be general or singular.
  
  
  

I doubt for the time being Peirce is varying here. There is a recurrent
shorthand that perverts our reasoning. It consists in assimilating the
relation sign-object into a kind of sign (this I had  already said at
the time of the "pure symbols" discussion). Strictly speaking saying
that a sign is an index is a metonymy (which Peirce uses often too).
The first trichotomy , the sign in itself, allow a sign to be either a
qualisign, or a sinsign, or a legisign. It is only after that that
either of them (except the qualisign) can be considered as an index for
example. If there is a change in Peirce's analysis of signs starting
from the Syllabus of 1903, it is in the "invention" of the first
trichotomy. Perhaps it would be safer not to say as Ben does that an
Index can be a legisign (general) or a sinsign (singular) but the
converse: a legisign and a sinsign can be both indices (among other
things).

Now, what about subindices and other hyposemes? I am not sure at all.
But as it is suggested by the etymology they  seem to me to be species
of index, this latter being their genus. At first sight this could
apply indifferently to sinsigns and legisigns, being admitted if we
follow Peirce that the supplementary indexical character lies in the
actuality of their connection to their objects. Now, this does not
prevent the question I hear Ben uttering behind his computer screen:
does legisigns (or generals) can have actual connections to their
objects or does this property can apply only to singulars?

Hoping to have not enfonce des portes ouvertes.

Bernard


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[peirce-l] Re: on continuity and amazing mazes

[Bernard Morand]

Thanks Ben, I think that you have got it better than me.
What is meant is certainly as you put it: "to say that all men are 
mortal is the same as to say that for every man, for every character, if 
said man possesses said character, then there is a mortal who possesses 
said character". This expresses that the comprehension of mortal is 
included into the comprehension of man while the converse holds only for 
the respective extensions (and it is precisely such an inclusive view of 
implication that B. Russell will reproach to Peirce). I was used to make 
the point that in order to read correctly Peirce we have to throw out of 
our heads what we learned before, but I was not obeying my own maxim 
here :-).


Thanks Ben and thanks to Thomas Riese too for opening this thread

Bernard

Benjamin Udell a ¨crit :


Bernard, list,
> I returned to the sources and fell short with the following:

--CP 3.175
175. The forms A -< B, or A implies B, and A ~-< B, or A does not 
imply B †3, embrace both hypothetical and categorical propositions. 
Thus, /*to say that all men are mortal is the same as to say that if 
any man possesses any character whatever then a mortal possesses that 
character*/. To say, 'if A, then B ' is obviously the same as to say 
that from A, B follows, logically or extralogically. By thus 
identifying the relation expressed by the copula with that of 
illation, we identify the proposition with the inference, and the term 
with the proposition. This identification, by means of which all that 
is found true of term, proposition, or inference is at once known to 
be true of all three, is a most important engine of reasoning, which 
we have gained by beginning with a consideration of the genesis of logic

-
>The assertion I have underlined in bold strikes me: I would say 
exactly the converse. Am I wrong? or did the editors make a mistake or 
did Peirce makes it? (there seems to be a conflict here between 
extension and comprehension) [The remainder works well for me]
"Is the same as" sounds like an equivalence relation. If Peirce meant 
an equivalence, then the converse is the same.
But the equivalence claim doesn't seem _/prima facie/_ true, so I 
think that we're talking about the same issue. One might have expected 
Peirce to say something like *"/to say that all men are mortal is the 
same as to say that for every man there's a mortal such that, for 
every character, if said man possesses it then said mortal possesses 
it."/* (I'm assuming that there won't be considered to exist two 
distinct things such that one's characters comprise a strict subset of 
the other.) The point there is that the choice of man & mortal is 
fixed before one starts speaking of all characters. But instead Peirce 
let the choice of mortal vary dependently on the choice of man & 
character. I.e., Peirce's assertion amounted to this: */to say that 
all men are mortal is the same as to say that for every man, for every 
character, if said man possesses said character, then there's a mortal 
who possesses said character./* That all men are mortal seems to imply 
its asserted equivalent, but doesn't automatically seem implied _/by/_ 
it. Instead one wonders, can there be a man whose every character is 
possessed by one or another mortal without there being some same 
single mortal who possesses all of the said man's characters? So now 
the truth of the equivalence depends on what a "character" is, among 
other things, and /whether any given thing must have at least one 
unique character/ (in which case I think that the equivalence claim 
would be true) and one starts to wonder whether the whole issue will 
get into infinities in some sensitive way. I remember Peirce's 
defining "character" somewhere but I can't find it.

Best, Ben
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[peirce-l] Re: on continuity and amazing mazes

[Bernard Morand]

Joseph Ransdell a écrit :

  
  
  
  Arnold says:
   
   I would venture to suggest (subject to the better sense of
those on the list who have greater experince with the MSS than I have)
that the notion of a Sign contains the concept of a transitive
function, making a very strong case for what Thomas has said on this
subject.  Other transitive functions in Peirce can be found in Vols III
and IV of the CP (see especially 3.562)RE
   
  RESPONSE:
   
  You won't get any
objections from me on that, Arnold.  Let me quote myself (from
my dissertation many year ago (1966) on CSP's conception of
representation):  "Peirce indicates in several places that he
regards the nota notae as the generic inference principle (see esp.
5.320 and 3.183).  [Nota notae est nota rei ipsius: the mark of the
mark is the mark of the thing itself.]  Further, he identifies this
with the dictum de omni (4.77) [which is in Aristotle], and with what
De Morgan called the principle of the transitiveness of the copula. 
(2.591-92).  The latter is in turn identified with the illative
relation (3.175), and this, again, is explicitly said to be the
"primary and paramount semiotic relation." (2.444n1). I suggest,
therefore, that all of Peirce's statements of the representation
relation may thus be taken as so many variant expressions of what he
understands to be expressed by the nota notae, the dictum de omni, the
notion of the transitivity of the copula, or the principle of
illation." (Charles Peirce: The Idea of Representation, 63)
   
  Joe Ransdell
  
  

Thanks Joe for these very promising associations of logical ideas about
representation.
I returned to the sources and fell short with the following:

--CP 3.175
175. The forms A -< B, or A implies B, and A ~-< B, or A does not
imply B †3, embrace both hypothetical and categorical propositions.
Thus, to say that all men are mortal is the same as to say that
if any man possesses any character whatever then a mortal possesses
that character. To say, 'if A, then B ' is obviously the same
as to say that from A, B follows, logically or extralogically. By thus
identifying the relation expressed by the copula with that of illation,
we identify the proposition with the inference, and the term with the
proposition. This identification, by means of which all that is found
true of term, proposition, or inference is at once known to be true of
all three, is a most important engine of reasoning, which we have
gained by beginning with a consideration of the genesis of logic
-
The assertion I have underlined in bold strikes me: I would say exactly
the converse. Am I wrong? or did the editors make a mistake or did
Peirce makes it? (there seems to be a conflict here between extension
and comprehension) [The remainder works well for me]

Bernard


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[peirce-l] Re: Introduction

[Bernard Morand]

Claudio Guerri a ¨crit :


Bernard and List,

in this sense there are an agreement in different languages, not only 
in French...

In Italian:
"non ti sei fatto propio niente" referring to the grazed knee
"anche un nientino lo fa ridere"
In Spanish:
"no te hicistes nada de nada" even if it is bleeding...
"se rie de nada"
In German:
"Du hast dich gar Nichts gemacht" (knee)
but in this moment with a feet on the bus... I can think at laughing 
for nothing... probably somebody of the List can help.


On the other side, there is also an other aspect of the dimention of 
noting when a little kid falls badly on his nose and look up to see 
what happens, and he kries only if the present parent also shauts 
up... this related to sensation, feeling, firstness that still is not 
arriving clearly to thirdness even if secondness hurts...


Best
Claudio

It seems that we are going to catch something that is really rooted into 
our indo-european languages.
The example from Claudio about the kid who cries only if he has a parent 
in the neighbouring is very interesting too. But I wonder whether it is 
only a matter of aborted thirdness or of genuine thirdness: if the child 
who is alone to endure his pain doesn't cry, it looks as if he knows 
what thirdness is, isn't it ?
Speaking of humorists and, may be, incomplete thirdness, someone just 
sent me the following that I don't resist spreading all over the list:


Celui qui, dans la vie, est parti de z¨ro pour n'arriver ¨ rien n'a de merci
¨ dire ¨ personne (Pierre Dac)
Something like: He who, in  his life, started from zero to get to nothing has 
no word of thanks to say to anyone.

Bernard

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[peirce-l] Re: Introduction

[Bernard Morand]

Darrel, Ben, Gary and List,

I was away from my home and my computer for a few days and I see when 
coming back that you are making interesting  comments out of "Zero" and 
"Nothing".
Some of  you know perhaps that in French the word "rien" (nothing) can 
be used to mean also "a little thing". For example to say "he laughs at 
the slightest little thing" we will say "un rien le fait rire". In the 
same sense we will say to Darrel's daughter if she grazed her knee "Its 
nothing". But if we recognize that it makes her crying we will say: 
"C'est trois fois rien" intending in this case that it is just a little 
thing and thus that she can stop crying.
So it seems that when Peirce makes the point that the pure zero is the 
germinal nothing in which the whole universe is involved or 
foreshadowed, he is right according to French language at least.
And then as one of our humorists puts it: "Trois fois rien c'est deja 
quelque chose" (Three times nothing, it is already something). May be 
that in order to pass from Nothing to Something repetition is needed?


Bernard

Gary Richmond a ¨crit :


But, Ben, nothing.com produces something, valuable I think, viz.

<> We start, then, with nothing, pure zero. But this is not the 
nothing of negation. For /not/ means /other than,/ and /other/ is 
merely a synonym of the ordinal numeral /second./ As such it implies 
a first; while the present pure zero is prior to every first. The 
nothing of negation is the nothing of death, which comes /second/ to, 
or after, everything. But this pure zero is the nothing of not having 
been born. There is no individual thing, no compulsion, outward nor 
inward, no law. It is the germinal nothing, in which the whole 
universe is involved or foreshadowed. As such, it is absolutely 
undefined and unlimited possibility -- boundless possibility. There 
is no compulsion and no law. It is boundless freedom.  Charles S. 
Peirce , "Logic of Events" (1898)


This, as I sure you noted, points exactly to what I was just arguing 
which seems to me of some value (not necessarily how I was arguing it, 
but what Peirce has to say).. While something.com produced just 
nothing, at least nothing that I could find. Of course, when one 
continues on nothing.com one gets 
http://www.showcasedvd.com/?from=nothing which seems to me next to 
nothing. So what's the point?


Gary


Benjamin Udell wrote:


Darrel, Tori, Gary,

I knew it! 


I shoulda, woulda, coulda posted my surmise that it was from nothing.com.

By the way, did you check out something.com? There's been something there, 
though the server seems to be down right now.

Best, Ben Udell

Tori, 


Being an optimist by nature, I typed www.nothing.com into my web browser. In a rare 
stroke of "Internet Luck" I was presented with a Pierce quote and a link to 
http://www.peirce.org/ and happened upon this forum. Another stroke of luck I must say.

Darrel


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[peirce-l] Re: How to catch a bird and peel an onion

[Bernard Morand]

Yes Thomas, the case of catching a bird was made by Peirce himself if I 
remember correctly to show the difference between a final cause and an 
efficient one. To let the rope go is efficient but aiming at ahead of 
the bird is a final cause. Probably, it is the habit that makes the 
skilful hunter win on some lucky occasions (This is a result of 
experience since, as a child, I was brought up in the country where I 
used to catch birds by means of a sling :-)  
In case of trains of thought, I think that we use also something like a 
"replay" and "backward" functions which do not require hypostatic 
abstractions every time. Your comment reminded me another passage from 
Peirce which I find very nice:

--Peirce CP 2.27 (extract)---
A man goes through a process of thought. Who shall say what the nature 
of that process was? He cannot; for during the process he was occupied 
with the object about which he was thinking, not with himself nor with 
his motions. Had he been thinking of those things his current of thought 
would have been broken up, and altogether modified; for he must then 
have alternated from one subject of thought to another. Shall he 
endeavor, after the course of thought is done, to recover it by 
repeating it, on this occasion interrupting it, and noting what he had 
last in mind? Then it will be extremely likely that he will be unable to 
interrupt it at times when the movement of thought is considerable; he 
will most likely be able to do so only at times when that movement was 
so slowed down that, in endeavoring to tell himself what he had in mind, 
he loses sight of that movement altogether; especially with language at 
hand to represent attitudes of thought, but not movements of thought.

--
(The reservation about language which would not be accurate to represent 
"movements of thought " is  very  clear-sighted too.


Bernard



Thomas Riese a ��crit :

Sun, 05 Feb 2006 19:11:17 +0100, Bernard Morand 
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]>  a ecrit:


(originally in response to Charles Rudder, here taken out of context):


Now, I have questions about your idea that "the interpretant represents
the sign as the same sign that it replicates". In fact, the replica is
the sign itself, and the interpretant will become a replica of another
signperhaps, sooner or later. My reading of Peirce led me to think
that the interpretant is such that it is in the same relation to the
object as the sign itself is. Nothing makes necessary that the
interpretant be some kind of clone of the sign it interprets, no?
Furthermore I don't understand what you are calling a "rule" in this
context nor the reasons you have to say that "for anything to be a sign
it must be a symbol".



Cher Bernard,

I can¨¨t tell you what your answer to your question is, but I think it 
is  important
to understand that  signs operate in a continuum. Whenever you have 
before  you as
a sign what you were looking for, you are too late. Semiosis has 
already  happened
(all you get is replicas). When you are still struggeling to find out 
what  it is,
you are too early. But you have to be just in time. Though, if you 
want to  catch
your own thought in full flight and get the ¨Ding an sich¨ (thing 
in  itself, mind Kant),
this is impossible. It's a continuous process. So the situation seems 
to  be hopless.

But it isn������t, provided we stop the game of peeling onions.

You can catch your thought in full flight. But only indirectly. What 
you  want to do is to form
a hypostatic abstraction: You project out as an object what your 
thought  is. Now this object
isn't the thing in itself, but it is an arbitrary determination of it  
insofar as your thought
is a lawfull process (lawful, not awfull). In a sense you are ahead 
of  your thought with this,
since your thought wasn't yet quite complete (otherwise you wouldn't 
have  had the wish to make it

clearer, to ���������get at it��������� by means of hypostatic abstration).

A little bit of illustration doesn't hurt, so if we shouldn't peel 
onions  what would be fair game then?
Let's say you want to shoot a bird in full flight with a rifle. No, we 
had  better take bow and arrow
for fairness' sake. Now you don't aim right at the bird, but you aim 
at  where the bird isn't: ahead of it
(you do something and the arrow does something quite different 
then!).  There happen an awful lot of things

in the process as a whole and I can't analyse it all.

But I would like to direct your attention to one other important 
thing  which often seems to me
to be overlooked or misunderstood when seen and which at first 
perhaps  sounds mystical,
but in truth isn't: in a curoious way you have to let the bird let hit 
yo

[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

Charles and List,

I extract a few lines from your very interesting post, because they
seem to me to deserve a special attention. You wrote :

C.F. Rudder
Although further on as a means of making explicit what he means by
saying that, "Logic is the study of the essential nature of
signs." Peirce reasserts his earlier contention that "A sign is
something that exists in replicas." in order to point out that the
distinction between signs and replicas is "of the very
minutest interest to logic, which is a study, not of replicas, but of
signs [what replicas replicate].", it is nonetheless the case that for
anything to be a sign it must be replicatable and, hence, it must
embody, however vaguely, a rule.  For anything to be a sign it must
be re-representable by a sign the interpretant of which represents it
as the same sign that it replicates; which is to say that a rule,
entailed in its determination of its interpretant, governing its
replication must be included in its capacity to represent.  In short,
for anything to be a sign it must be a symbol--a sign that represents
by means of a rule--that takes the form of a proposition.  As I see it,
this is a, if not the, major overall thrust of Peirce's scholium.
--

I agree with your conclusion and it is the reason why I focussed on the
subject of replicas previously. If a sign is "what replicas replicate"
as you write with talent, then could we not go as far as to say that
the "essential nature of signs" is also of being replicatable? So when
Peirce is restating that logic studies signs but not replicas, one
would have to read: logic is not concerned with replicas in themselves
but logic is concerned with signs which are things endowed with a
capacity of replication.
This could be seen as a mere play with words but I don't think so. I
think Peirce is trying all along the New Elements to see how his
critical logic can be linked (and could furnish a basis) to the
speculative rhetoric. As to the latter Peirce knows only its general
principles at this time and the problem at hand will be to confront
these principles with what can be elaborated about the (3)
interpretant(s), the continuity of semiosis and so on. All these
aspects involve what I call for the sake of  simplicity "the life of
signs" (as opposed to their essential nature), causalities, time and
space, etc. Then the idea that metaphysics are concerned here. It is
true that Peirce makes at several places in the text that he will not
go very far in this direction.  Nevertheless I believe that here they
are because beneath the surface the problem is  the relationship
between the Firstness of the nature of signs, the Secondness of their
replicas and the Thirdness of their final cause. But your remark
reminds us (to my sense) that the works to come will have to remain
firmly grounded on what is already establihed, the logic of signs. This
would be of such a nature as to dismiss the idea that Peirce changed
his mind when working on the interpretant.     . 

Now, I have questions about your idea that "the interpretant represents
the sign as the same sign that it replicates". In fact, the replica is
the sign itself, and the interpretant will become a replica of another
signperhaps, sooner or later. My reading of Peirce led me to think
that the interpretant is such that it is in the same relation to the
object as the sign itself is. Nothing makes necessary that the
interpretant be some kind of clone of the sign it interprets, no? 
Furthermore I don't understand what you are calling a "rule" in this
context nor the reasons you have to say that "for anything to be a sign
it must be a symbol".

Bernard 

Charles F Rudder a écrit :

  [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?
  
  
  
  Martin, Benard, List
   
  On Tue, 31 Jan 2006 14:27:59 -0500 martin lefebvre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
writes:
   
  
  Cher Bernard,
   
  "As you know, icons are rhematic (though, of course, indices and
symbols can also be rhematic). In answering your question one might
begin by considering a rheme such as " ___ is green". Obviously the
sign here is not subject to truth or falsity ‹ no more than are the
words "table" or "chair" taken in themselves. Their inability to denote
any particular object renders them sinnlos (as Wittgenstein
would say -- senseless). Of course, they can be used in a proposition
such as "This table is green" which is already a more complete, more
genuine [one has to be careful in distinguishing between genuine, pure,
and degenerate signs in reading "New Elements"**] sign (a
dicent) ‹ they can also be used in arguments. The dicent "contains"
[the French verb "impliquer" might be used here] a rheme (as well as an
icon and an index -- and it is also, when used in conversation, a
replica of a legisign). Now, Peirce clearly intimates that there are no
pure icons in the world of existents ‹ i.e. they don't EXIST (Even
thou

[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

Gary Richmond a écrit :

  
  
Kirsti, Bernard, list,
  
BM: Bernard Morand
KM Kirsti Määttänen 
GR: Gary Richmond
  

I skip the response from Gary to Kirsti: I have nothing to add there

[GR] But, moving forward, Bernard since then wrote:
  [BM] I think that I did not say that
metaphysics is a deductive science, or
if so it was a blunder.
[GR] I am glad to read that  your calling metaphysics a deductive
science
"was a blunder" for in your message to the list of 1/28 you do say that
it is:
  [BM] One common proeminent feature to
metaphysics and mathematics is that they can develop themselves without
the help of experience of facts. They proceed in an axiomatic way or
may be it would be better to say within a deductive method.

OK Gary, I was too much imprecise in my initial _expression_ but note
that I was using some cautious "may be" as well as "would be". And I
was too much in a hurry with the reply.  So I suggest to  refer to
Peirce himself for the time being, hoping that we will both agree
provisionnally with him as a starting point. The quote is taken from
the review of The World and the Individual by Royce (C.P. 8.110):

-Quote Peirce---
 Metaphysicians have always taken mathematics as their exemplar in
reasoning, without remarking the essential difference between that
science and their own. Mathematical reasoning has for its object to
ascertain what would be true in a hypothetical world which the
mathematician has created for himself, -- not altogether arbitrarily,
it is true, but nevertheless, so that it can contain no element which
he has not himself deliberately introduced into it. All that his sort
of reasoning, therefore, has to do is to develop a preconceived idea;
and it never reaches any conclusion at all as to what is or is not true
of the world of existences. The metaphysician, on the other hand, is
engaged in the investigation of matters of fact, and the only way to
matters of fact is the way of experience. The only essential difference
between metaphysics and meteorology, linguistics, or chemistry, is that
it does not avail itself of microscopes, telescopes, voyages, or other
means of acquiring recondite experiences, but contents itself with
ascertaining all that can be ascertained from such experience as every
man undergoes every day and hour of his life. All other differences
between philosophy and the special sciences are mere consequences of
this one. It follows, that deductive, or mathematical, reasoning,
although in metaphysics it may oftener "take the stage" than in the
drama of special research, yet after all, has precisely the same rôle
to enact, and nothing more. All genuine advance must come from real
observation and inductive reasoning.
---End
Quote
[GR] As I
recently noted, metaphysics proceeds not only by deduction but by
applying the methodological principles underlying all good inquiry as
developed in the last branch of semeiotic, theoretical rhetoric ==
methodeutic (btw,  Peirce comments in documents other than the New
Elements on various kinds of rhetoric, some pure, some applied, some
more appropriate to art, others to science, others to political
persuasion, etc. which may figure in what I find a bit confusing in
your discussion of the, shall we say, rhetorical turn you see
in it the New List discussion).
There was not any confusion there if Rhetorics is to be taken in
Peirce's sense: " The doctrine of the general conditions of the
reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they
aim to determine." (CP 2.93)
[GR] Whether
metaphysics can develop itself
"without the help of experience of facts" is an issue I won't get into
just now, but this too, I believe, needs further analysis which I must
pass over for now except to comment that since within philosophy
rhetoric is equated with methodeutic, and since all experiments will
have to deal with some facts, even if they are primarily mental ones,
in my understanding, one can't develop a three staged inquiry--even one
based on the mental diagrams of a metaphysical one-without employing
certain facts. Bishop Berkeley might be able to do that, but not
Peirce. 
In any event
I was glad to read the following:
  [BM} I agree with you that the kind of
reasoning
does not furnish a criterium in order to distinguish sciences, even for
Mathematics which appear to be mainly a deductive one.
[GR] There is much to be said here too including  how Peirce's
definition of
mathematics is finally partially distinguished from his father's so as
to include the pure possibilities which the son suggests is key to
understanding what mathematicians do (they imagine pure possibilities
of relationship then deduce what follows from these
possibilities).
  
You later commented:
  [BM]
---

[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

er, Peirce is at pains in the passage you
quoted to note that he is "forced" to merely "touch upon" metaphysics
(your comments took up the reason why) but that he would "refuse to
enter
here upon a metaphysical discussion." He refuses, I would say, because
it is not an essentially metaphysical discussion--although it must
"touch" on it as providing intelligent context.
  
I agree with you that the New Elements brings together all these
threads (theory, practice, metaphysical context), but would insist that
its thrust is decidedly NOT metaphysical. Well, as I earlier noted, I
believe that this is your understanding as well, but you are making a
different point, that one needs to contextualize these "new elements"
in the kind of metaphysics Peirce was developing as opposed to the
prevailing erroneous one. We all have metaphysical presuppositions
(whether we admit them at all). Peirce is saying that while "the
question is a purely logical one" yet "a false metaphysics is generally
current" amongst those who think they know physics but may not fully or
deeply (may be reducing it dyadically, mechanically, deterministically,
etc.)
  CSP: The question is a
purely logical one; but it happens that a false metaphysics is
generally
current, especially among men who are influenced by physics but yet are
not physicists enough fully to comprehend physics, which metaphysics
would disincline those who believe in it from readily accepting the
purely logical statement of the nature of affirmation.
I would say that this "false metaphysics" persists to this day
(modified of course by the passage of about a century's time since
Peirce identified it). So thanks, Bernard, for raising this very
significant issue to enrich the discussion of the New Elements.
  
Gary
  
Bernard Morand wrote:
  A 14:05 01/02/2006 -0500, Gary Richmond a écrit :
Kirsti, Bernard, list
  
Caught up in a million and one pressing personal and profession
matters,
I won't for now be able to engage much in your mode of  inquiry,
Kirsti (while I would like to experiment with it on-list soon when some
deadlines for conference papers being reviewed, etc. are behind me).
But
let me for now just agree with you regarding a  tentative conclusion
you've arrived at, or rather, a question you have about another's
interpretation following your own textual analysis. First, quoting
Bernard Morand, you wrote:
  

  BM: I think more and more that the only topic on which
this
text is
all about is nothing but METAPHYSICS. 

  

KM: This I find very intriguing. Metaphysics is what Peirce
explicitly says he wishes to avoid here. So, in terms of quotes, the
answer would be negative. Still, it may not be the case. In fact, I'd
tend to affirm the idea. Provisionally, of course. 
As you no
doubt know, I have tended to be of the same mind (commind?) as
Bernard  and Martin Lefebvre in the discussion of the New Elements
so far. However, I would tend to agree with your questioning Bernard's
remark for I too see the New Elements fragment as NOT concerning itself
with metaphysics. Perhaps Bernard will clarify his comment since he too
has otherwise suggested that the New Elements is "all about logical
structure."


I think that as a COMMENT about the logical structure of a DOCTRINE, it
is metaphysics, the doctrine being the doctrine of signs:

--Quote New Elements
"In order fully to understand the distinction between a proposition
and an argument, it will be found important to class these acts,
affirmation, etc. and ascertain their precise nature. The question is a
purely logical one; but it happens that a false metaphysics is
generally
current, especially among men who are influenced by physics but yet are
not physicists enough fully to comprehend physics, which metaphysics
would disincline those who believe in it from readily accepting the
purely logical statement of the nature of affirmation. I shall
therefore be forced to touch upon metaphysics. Yet I refuse to
enter
here upon a metaphysical discussion; I shall merely hint at what ground
it is necessary to take in opposition to a common doctrine of that
kind." (my emphasis)

The general idea that I am proposing is that at this time, the turn of
the Century, Peirce is leaving the critical logic of signs to enter
into
rhetorics. Entering into rhetorics means the study of the effect of
signs
on their interpretants. These interpretants cannot be any more in
futuro
but existent signs of their own. Finally the piece of metaphysics that
is
necessary is to state the difference between the logical conditions of
possibilities of signhood (as those one can find in propositions or
arguments theory) and the individuation of them into existent signs (
affi

[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

A 14:05 01/02/2006 -0500, Gary Richmond a écrit :
Kirsti, Bernard, list

Caught up in a million and one pressing personal and profession matters,
I won't for now be able to engage much in your mode of  inquiry,
Kirsti (while I would like to experiment with it on-list soon when some
deadlines for conference papers being reviewed, etc. are behind me). But
let me for now just agree with you regarding a  tentative conclusion
you've arrived at, or rather, a question you have about another's
interpretation following your own textual analysis. First, quoting
Bernard Morand, you wrote:

BM: I think more and more that the only topic on which this text is
all about is nothing but METAPHYSICS. 


KM: This I find very intriguing. Metaphysics is what Peirce
explicitly says he wishes to avoid here. So, in terms of quotes, the
answer would be negative. Still, it may not be the case. In fact, I'd
tend to affirm the idea. Provisionally, of course. As you no
doubt know, I have tended to be of the same mind (commind?) as
Bernard  and Martin Lefebvre in the discussion of the New Elements
so far. However, I would tend to agree with your questioning Bernard's
remark for I too see the New Elements fragment as NOT concerning itself
with metaphysics. Perhaps Bernard will clarify his comment since he too
has otherwise suggested that the New Elements is "all about logical
structure."

I think that as a COMMENT about the logical structure of a DOCTRINE, it
is metaphysics, the doctrine being the doctrine of signs:

--Quote New Elements
"In order fully to understand the distinction between a proposition
and an argument, it will be found important to class these acts,
affirmation, etc. and ascertain their precise nature. The question is a
purely logical one; but it happens that a false metaphysics is generally
current, especially among men who are influenced by physics but yet are
not physicists enough fully to comprehend physics, which metaphysics
would disincline those who believe in it from readily accepting the
purely logical statement of the nature of affirmation. I shall
therefore be forced to touch upon metaphysics. Yet I refuse to enter
here upon a metaphysical discussion; I shall merely hint at what ground
it is necessary to take in opposition to a common doctrine of that
kind." (my emphasis)

The general idea that I am proposing is that at this time, the turn of
the Century, Peirce is leaving the critical logic of signs to enter into
rhetorics. Entering into rhetorics means the study of the effect of signs
on their interpretants. These interpretants cannot be any more in futuro
but existent signs of their own. Finally the piece of metaphysics that is
necessary is to state the difference between the logical conditions of
possibilities of signhood (as those one can find in propositions or
arguments theory) and the individuation of them into existent signs (
affirmation for example). Of course Peirce maintains that even in the
case of existent signs, the logical doctrine continue to hold but to
explain this, some metaphysics is necessary. It is this change of topic,
within the continuity of a doctrine, that many scholars have not
understood I think. They have seen (felt?) some changes in Peirce's work
that they relate mainly to secondness emphasis, indexicality, and so on
but they interpret them as a change in doctrine while it was just a move
into the field of rhetorics. But to accept this view, a special
metaphysics is itself required, which is not the one we are used to
practise in most sciences of the day.  
 
If these ideas are not too foolish, this makes New Elements a very
interesting text. And after all why is it entitled "New
Elements", if not a wink at Euclid and his way of putting geometry
at work?

Bernard


__________
Bernard Morand
Département Informatique
Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
TEL (33) 02 31 52 55
34
FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

A 03:43 02/02/2006 +0200, Kirsti Määttänen a écrit :

Bernard, list

31.1.2006 kello 20:13, Bernard Morand kirjoitti


 BM: To continue the discussion, we find "pure icons" in the following
passage of New Elements and "pure indices" will appear later. I
mention this with regard to a precedent discussion between Joe and Jon
relative to "pure symbols". I think that "pure" as to be taken here in
the same sense as we could consider "pure symbols". But in fact my
question is elsewhere: at the end of the quote Peirce makes the point
that "An icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign". I am not
sure of what he is saying here. Answers are welcome!


Interesting question. What catches my attention is that Peirce does NOT
say "A PURE icon can only..." , but "AN icon", so it's a question of
ANY one icon. Nor does Peirce say: "THE icon".

I think the question is best approached through the categories. An
icon, as firstness, is
a mere possibility. But we cannot e.g. point out to someone else (or to
oneself, for that matter) a mere possibility without realizing (in both
senses) the possibility. (So, a mere possibility is akin to Kantian
Ding an sich in this respect.)

From this it seems to follow that when Peirce speaks of pure icons, he
is emphasizing that he is speaking of mere possibilities, something we
can understand, but only as something virtual. As soon as a mere
possibility is brought into relation with anything, secondness is
brought in, and it no longer is about mere firstness, but firstness IN
RELATION, any relation. Then firsness (a pure icon) is no longer pure,
but necessarily "mixed" with secondness (some object). And if the
relation is interpreted, e.g. by understanding the relation AS some
kind of a relations, then thirdness is brought in. The relation is then
mediated by a certain kind of understanding.


Kirsti and list
We need before going further on these topics to arrive at an agreement 
about the sense of the words pure and genuine (and their contraries). I 
think that if something can be mixed, it is not signs with categories but 
signs with signs. My comprehension of "pure" in Peirce is the sense of 
unmixed. I would be tempted to use a chemical analogy: pure gold is gold 
without any other metal, but bronze is not pure. The relation which can 
take place between signs under this criterium is a relation of composition, 
say the composition of an index and an icon. In principle in order to be 
member of some composite signs ought to be existents. It is not the case 
for icons, then they can only be fragments of completer signs. Note that it 
is neither the case for legisigns or symbols, thus they can only enter into 
composites qua replicas.
On the other hand the relation between categories is a relation of order 
which leads to a figure like a Porphyrus tree (Peirce called it a catena I 
think). Our culture was used since Aristotle to see everything through the 
genus/species structure. Peirce, aided by the sciences of his time adds 
matrices to the ancient trees. So goes his classification of signs to my 
sense.




If Peirce had written "THE icon", he would have been speaking of
something general (thirdness), the being of which can only be virtual.
But here he is not. I don't think THE icon, being general, can be a
fragment (of a completer sign).

 All this brings me to the conclusion that the precedent discussion on
pure symbols became so complicated partly because the question: Are
there pure icons? may not have been a good first question. It
presupposes that participants share an understanding of what "pure
icon" means. Which did not seem to be the case.

Anyway, now it seems to me that Peirce used "pure" in two senses given
in The Concise Oxford Dictionary (5th ed.): 1) Unmixed, and 3) Mere,
simple, nothing but, sheer.

So, a pure icon means something not mixed with anything, as a fragment
necessarily is. Consequently, "An icon can only be a fragment of a
completer sign" does not deal with a pure icon, but an icon mixed with
at least secondness, its object, possibly also with thirdness, an
interpretant. An icon as a fragment being necessarily mixed.

Sometimes Peirce used "mere icon", if I remember correctly (which I may
not?). Sometimes "pure icon". It seems to me that respective meanings
overlap, "pure" giving more emphasis to "unmixed" than "mere". - But
who am I to say? Not being a native speaker.

Does this have any relevance to what you had in mind, Bernard?

I apologize for lagging behind in the discussion. There are several
mails I have not read yet, But if I don't respond right away, leaving
subsequent ones to wait, I won't have time to respond at all.

Best regards

Kirsti Määttänen


---Quote New Elements
T

[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

A 13:51 31/01/2006 -0500, Skagestad, Peter a écrit :

Bernard, Gary, and list,

The English wording is "Every decoding is another encoding". It is uttered 
repeatedly in "Small World" by the fictional Professor Zapf, who 
references Peirce as the father of semiotics, so David Lodge had at least 
heard of Peirce. He later heard even more. After quoting this saying in 
one of my papers (I think it was in "Peirce and Contemporary Thought"), I 
sent Lodge a copy, for which he professed himself most grateful.


Peter



Thanks for the details Peter. I had forgotten them. It's nice to see that 
D. Lodge had heard of Peirce and may be read about him. I suppose that you 
have read the novel Thinks... the subject of which turns around Artificial 
Intelligence. I don't remember if he is referring to Intelligence 
Augmentation as such. I was a little bit disappointed when reading this one 
because I felt that the author had got second hand documentation without 
being directly involved with the milieu he was reporting (evidently Small 
World was exactly the other way). But this was just an impression.


Bernard


________

From: Bernard Morand [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tue 1/31/2006 1:13 PM
To: Peirce Discussion Forum
Subject: [peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?



A 20:19 30/01/2006 -0500, Gary Richmond a écrit :
>Bernard, list,
>
>You concluded your post by quoting (or paraphrasing?) David Lodge to the
>effect that "Every decoding is a new encoding."  Of course this can be
>interpreted as exactly the point of the New Elements approach. As Peirce
>puts it:
>>In so far as the interpretant is the symbol. . . the determination agrees
>>with that of the symbol. . . It's purpose. . .is to represent the symbol
>>in its representation of its object; and therefore, the determination is
>>followed by a further development in which it becomes corrected. EP2: 
323-324

>This, then, is exactly the entelechy of the symbol: "symbols grow" as
>Peirce elsewhere expresses it. He continues:
>>By virtue of of this [that "it is of the nature of a sign to be. .a
>>living general"] the interpretant is animaaed by the original replica. .
>>. with the power of representing the true character of the object. . . In
>>these two steps, of determination and of correction, the interpretant
>>aims at the object more than at the original replica and may be truer and
>>fuller than the later.
>Of course the implications of this are profound, for as Peirce comments:
>>The every entelechy of being lies in being representable. . .[so that]
>>there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol. EP2: 324
>Gary
>

Gary and list,

My reference to D. Lodge was somehow interrogative because I know it only
through the French edition : "Tout décodage est un nouvel encodage". I was
not sure that the phrasing in the original English edition was what I was
writing. (As a matter of fact I suppose that D. Lodge did not read Peirce
but some ideas in his novels sound peircian)

To continue the discussion, we find "pure icons" in the following passage
of New Elements and "pure indices" will appear later. I mention this with
regard to a precedent discussion between Joe and Jon relative to "pure
symbols". I think that "pure" as to be taken here in the same sense as we
could consider "pure symbols". But in fact my question is elsewhere: at the
end of the quote Peirce makes the point that "an icon can only be a
fragment of a completer sign". I am not sure of what he is saying here.
Answers are welcome !

Bernard

---Quote New Elements
The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is the icon. This
is defined as a sign of which the character that fits it to become a sign
of the sort that it is, is simply inherent in it as a quality of it. For
example, a geometrical figure drawn on paper may be an icon of a triangle
or other geometrical form. If one meets a man whose language one does not
know and resorts to imitative sounds and gestures, these approach the
character of an icon. The reason they are not pure icons is that the
purpose of them is emphasized. A pure icon is independent of any purpose.
It serves as a sign solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves
to signify. The relation to its object is a degenerate relation. It asserts
nothing. If it conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the
object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information. An
icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign.
---

__

Bernard Morand
Département Informatique
Institut Universitaire d

[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

A 20:19 30/01/2006 -0500, Gary Richmond a écrit :

Bernard, list,

You concluded your post by quoting (or paraphrasing?) David Lodge to the 
effect that "Every decoding is a new encoding."  Of course this can be 
interpreted as exactly the point of the New Elements approach. As Peirce 
puts it:
In so far as the interpretant is the symbol. . . the determination agrees 
with that of the symbol. . . It's purpose. . .is to represent the symbol 
in its representation of its object; and therefore, the determination is 
followed by a further development in which it becomes corrected. EP2: 323-324
This, then, is exactly the entelechy of the symbol: "symbols grow" as 
Peirce elsewhere expresses it. He continues:
By virtue of of this [that "it is of the nature of a sign to be. .a 
living general"] the interpretant is animaaed by the original replica. . 
. with the power of representing the true character of the object. . . In 
these two steps, of determination and of correction, the interpretant 
aims at the object more than at the original replica and may be truer and 
fuller than the later.

Of course the implications of this are profound, for as Peirce comments:
The every entelechy of being lies in being representable. . .[so that] 
there can be no reality which has not the life of a symbol. EP2: 324

Gary



Gary and list,

My reference to D. Lodge was somehow interrogative because I know it only 
through the French edition : "Tout décodage est un nouvel encodage". I was 
not sure that the phrasing in the original English edition was what I was 
writing. (As a matter of fact I suppose that D. Lodge did not read Peirce 
but some ideas in his novels sound peircian)


To continue the discussion, we find "pure icons" in the following passage 
of New Elements and "pure indices" will appear later. I mention this with 
regard to a precedent discussion between Joe and Jon relative to "pure 
symbols". I think that "pure" as to be taken here in the same sense as we 
could consider "pure symbols". But in fact my question is elsewhere: at the 
end of the quote Peirce makes the point that "an icon can only be a 
fragment of a completer sign". I am not sure of what he is saying here. 
Answers are welcome !


Bernard

---Quote New Elements
The more degenerate of the two forms (as I look upon it) is the icon. This 
is defined as a sign of which the character that fits it to become a sign 
of the sort that it is, is simply inherent in it as a quality of it. For 
example, a geometrical figure drawn on paper may be an icon of a triangle 
or other geometrical form. If one meets a man whose language one does not 
know and resorts to imitative sounds and gestures, these approach the 
character of an icon. The reason they are not pure icons is that the 
purpose of them is emphasized. A pure icon is independent of any purpose. 
It serves as a sign solely and simply by exhibiting the quality it serves 
to signify. The relation to its object is a degenerate relation. It asserts 
nothing. If it conveys information, it is only in the sense in which the 
object that it is used to represent may be said to convey information. An 
icon can only be a fragment of a completer sign.

-------

__

Bernard Morand
Département Informatique
Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
TEL (33) 02 31 52 55 34 FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.iutc3.unicaen.fr/~moranb/
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[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

Gary and list,

Thanks for the revival of the subject Gary. In particular I did not know
the work from Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen. I had a quick look at it which will
make me return there more slowly. I knew for a long time the argument
from Sowa which claims the filiation between EG and Model Theory in
mathematics. I had never grasp the grounds of the argument I think. But
the text from Pietarinen seems to make it more understandable to 
me.
Your appreciation of Martin Lefevre's contribution is wonderful too. I
was also surprised that nobody did react to it on the list. Commenting
Peirce, Martin is making a distinction between the activities of the
mathematician and those of the laboratory researcher under the topic of
getting at the entelechy. The former seeks to elucidate its object in
order to perceive all its features while the latter seeks by
"generalization" to produce its object. This crucial
distinction is a bone of contention in computer science since the
discipline is felt as a child of mathematics by the ones and as practical
by the others (engineering science). I think also that to forget this
distinction leads sometimes to misunderstandings in our own discussions
on the list (namely between philosophy and logic for example). In my book
on conception I tried to inquire into how these two inverse movements can
be related, a problem that might amount to find the right possible
combination(s) between abduction, deduction and induction. And to
conclude for the moment I will report a formula from an English novelist,
David Lodge: "Every decoding is a new encoding" (not sure that
this is the good _expression_ in English)

I will go back to Kaina Stoicheia  later

Bernard
 

A 17:26 29/01/2006 -0500, Gary Richmond a écrit :
Bernard, list,

JR = Joseph Ransdell
BM = Bernard Morand
ML = Martin Lefebvre
GR: Gary Richmond

I would tend to agree with your last few posts, Bernard, suggesting that
whatever the Peirce-Royce connection may be, that it should come out of
an inquiry into the "New Elements" rather than be the direction
of the inquiry itself. Joe has made an interesting conjecture regarding a
possible Royce connection and, while I am also tending to find Theresa
argumentation persuasive, he may indeed have more to say about that
eighth lecture. In any event, Joe never presented it as much more than a
plausible (to use a word which both Ben Udell and I employed in this
connection) abduction. Of course it may prove not to be much more than
the "guess" that Joe said he was merely "mentioning"
(see the snippet just below) Anyhow, and as regards the 8th  
lecture, let us see if there's more evidence to bear on that particular
theme than Turrisi's commentary as explicated so well by Theresa. 

In any event I have wanted to respond to the email your posted to the
list on 1/25/06 but for personal reasons have been unable to do so until
now. Allow me to make a somewhat belated response to at least some of the
points you made since I agree with you that we ought to plunge into the
content of the New Elements itself. You begin by responding to Joe's
question which announced this thread, namely, what's KAINA STOICHEIA all
about, after quoting from his post which concludes:
JR: I am sure there are others as
well who 
know something about Royce.  Kelly Parker does but I don't know if
he is 
currently on the list, and there was somebody else who mentioned Royce
not 
too long back as well.  (Gary Richmond, maybe?)  It's just a
guess, and I 
have nowhere in particular to go with it myself at this point, but it
seems 
worth mentioning in an attempt to reduce the bewilderment of
it.Since Joe mentioned me in this regard, I responded on
list to suggest that at first blush while Joe's conjecture seemed
plausible, that I didn't know enough about either Royce or the historical
connections to add much to that discussion. However, I did a string
search of "1904" of the eCP to see if it offered me any
"hints" in the matter--it didn't. Of course, I too would be
interested in what Kelly Parker might have to say in this connection
(when I spoke with him at the ICCS conference in 2004 where he was an
invited speaker, I was much more interested in discussing Peirce so that
the theme of Royce barely came up even though I was aware that he was
launching with some others a major Royce initiative. But all of that is
inessential history). But, again, one of the points I see you making in
your response to Joe's question is that we ought get to the New Elements
content, and I agree. You wrote:
BM: I would suggest to take another
direction to try answering the question of what the New Elements are
about. Not to try searching into the context of his work at this time,
which would certainly be useful but for which we will find nothing but
indices. It would be more fruitful to examine the text we have at hand,
some 

[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

Joseph Ransdell a ¨crit :


Why is this important? Because it is in knowing who Peirce was addressing
that we are given the clues we need as to why he is saying them. Of course,
this must be shown in detail in interpreting the text, and I intend to do
this. But Jean-Marc and Bernard are quite mistaken, in my opinion, in their
view that it is better just to start from the text without understanding
such matters of context as this. In this case, that means understanding to
whom Peirce is speaking in what he is saying. I cannot think of what reason
they could give for such an interpretational maxim as that.

Joe Ransdell


 


Joe, Theresa, and list,

I was suggesting to go directly to the text of New Elements because I 
think it to be the most immediate way of dealing with the question "So 
what is it all about?" (as well as answering it). This seems to be such 
an evidence that it does not need any more reasons, except that the 
fundamental character of the text requires that it be studied carefully 
(may be some procedure of slow reading as it was once tried with the New 
List?).
Now it is possible that in the course of the investigation some ideas of 
connection with the one or the other philosopher will appear. It will be 
just in time to go into such digressions then, I think. Have a look Joe 
to what is now happening with your approach in favour of who Peirce is 
addressing? What have we learned with it? We know that you think that it 
would be possible that Peirce was addressing Royce and his students but 
for the time being we have not any concrete support for that. Theresa is 
arguing for the converse, convincingly to my sense, on the basis of the 
general relationships between Peirce and Royce philosophical systems. 
But the New Elements is no more into the discussion. We know that you 
think that there would be a certain relation between the New Elements 
and the Harvard Conferences, especially the seventh. Sure, both texts 
are quite contemporary but what then? The 7th Lecture deals with the 
Logic of Abduction and with the pragmatic maxim. I don't see the 
relationship to the New Elements except in the very distant way of the 
subject matter of pragmaticism. It was quite foreseeable that the 
discussion would soon get lost into the whole pragmatic schools  from 
James to Royce... But may me that it was your very purpose in attracting 
our attention to the New Elements?
Finally,  I have a basic reservation in dealing with Peirce's work from 
the point of view of its expected audience. I think that Peirce never 
elaborated his contributions for any audience except for this audience 
that he used to call the Truth. When he tried to make something like 
that, for example an elementary book in mathematics, the manuscript was 
judged too much original to be published by the editors.  May be that in 
some circumstances the case could be made that he was making a specific 
discourse but it would have to be strongly justified by the defender of 
such a view, I think.


Bernard


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[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

recisely at the turn of the century? (Royce seems to me 
not very convincing)


Bernard



__________
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D¨partement Informatique
Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
TEL (33) 02 31 52 55 34 FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
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[peirce-l] Re: NEW ELEMENTS: So what is it all about?

[Bernard Morand]

 things, the problem of methods is crucial and this same
problem makes the distinction between Theory and Practice one of the
basic points he is revisiting. Martin has given us a superb comment on
this, very much clearer than I could do. So I just reproduce it below for
the sake of the discussion: 
 
---Martin Lefevre
quote-
In "New Elements", Peirce begins by telling us that
"Theory" seeks to discover deductivelly all that which applies
to a sign (which is what Peirce means by reaching a "direct
perception of the entelechy": the perception of truth through
necessary reasoning or, to put it differently, the recognition that
"a conception can only be admitted into a hypothesis in so far as
its possible consequences would be of a perceptual nature" --
Harvard Lecture #6). Semeiotically this implies elucidating an object
through (the discovery of) its qualities and proceeding in deductive
manner. Knowing that all men are mortal, I discover that Sorcates, in
being a man, is mortal. This will be the case for all men to which,
therefore, "__is mortal" applies. Symbols require
interpretation and arguments indicate their interpretants. But this they
can do only if they combine denotation and connotation (indices and
icons). Indices are such that they build on an genuine dyadic relation
with their object. Whence the importance of perception (which Peirce
construed in a broad, logical not psychological, way) which he also saw
as relevant in mathematics (the deductive science par excellence).
Practice, on the other hand, seeks to discover all that to which a sign
can be applied to by considering the predicates that can apply for each
instance of it. Practice seeks to generalize the object of a sign. This,
says, Peirce is done through exertion rather than
perception. As arguments inductions (this is also true for
abductions) also require the service of indices, but these are, in a
sense, continually discovered with every new experiment (every new
induction offering a new index) -- what is sought here is the
production (exertion) of entelechy. Now I'm no mathematician
(nor logician, for that matter) but it seems to me that these
distinctions would've been quite valuable for mathematicians (the
intented audience of "New Elements") whom Peirce saw as working
with deductions -- as opposed to lab scientists whose discovery of the
Truth lies chiefly in exertion (lab work). Moreover, Peirce
recognized that mathematical deductions, in requiring indices (and
icons), were also "perceptual" in a logical sense; such
deductions discovering "not so much how things are, but how they
might be supposed to be" in relation to objects that, unlike those
of the natural sciences, are "creations of our own minds"
(but no less Real for though they are not independent of our
collective minds they are still independent from the accidents of what
you or I think). One key for this line of argument is found in
lecture 6 of the Harvard Lectures when Peirce asserts:
"...perception being for the logician simply what experience, that
is, the succession of what happens to him, forces him to admit
immediately and without any reason." 
---End Quote
---

The unique little reservation I could suggest is that the distinction
between exertion and perception is not something primarily addressed to a
mathematical audience but probably to the semiotic theory itself when it
encounters the problem of interpretants qua interpreted signs, that is to
say the dynamic interpretant.

Let us see if the examination of the rest of the text will confirm or not
this first sight impression.

Bernard


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Département Informatique
Institut Universitaire de Technologie BP53 14123 Ifs Cedex France
TEL (33) 02 31 52 55
34
FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
e-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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[peirce-l] List membership

[Bernard Morand]

Joe,

It seems that Armando Sercovich as well as his friends from CISPEC are
"persona non grata" on the list. I remember that they have been
regular contributors in the past. 

Were they removed from the list and why? Is there some reason for not
being admitted to join now (see the automatic response of the list server
below)?

Regards

Bernard
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TEL (33) 02 31 52 55
34
FAX (33) 02 31 52 55 22
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