[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Ben, Patrck, List BU = Ben Udell AS = Arnold Shepperson BU: Peirce said that mathematics is the science which _draws_ necessary conclusions, as opposed to its being a science _of_ necessary conclusions. The science _of_ reasoning, necessary and otherwise, he called logic and placed it in philosophy. Peirce says that the science which _draws_ necessary conclusions is mathematics and includes (indeed begins with) mathematics _of_ logic. AS: Thanks for the correction, Ben. AS: Looks like I got to blathering a bit sooner than I had thought! Ben's quite right, of course, but I think that the corection does a lot to clarify what I was trying to get at, anyway. Cheers Arnold Shepperson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Arnold, list, My apologies: here the Peirce quote from his "coda" to The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" that I forgot to paste in at the end of my last message, after I wrote This he ends as follows: -- quote Peirce MS 283 - EP2: 396-397 -- Nobody, however, has ever found any law, reason, or rhyme according to which such and such points of the heavens are occupied with stars, or for any other fact of existence. Existence can be traced back to a metamorphosis, but the existence did not begin with the metamorphosis; and there is no single instance in which any law has ever been found to regulate with precision the when and where of existence. That the chemical elements of the atmosphere should have low atomic weights and that the elements of high atomic weights should be rare in the earth's crust is roughly true, as a mere consequence of the association of specific weight with atomic weight; but to suppose that there is any exact law as to arrangements of existents is a well-recognised mark of a mind not sanely loyal to truth of fact. Men's minds are confused by a looseness of language and of thought which leads them to talk of the causes of single events. They ought to consider that it is not the single actuality, in its identity, which is the subject of a law, but an ingredient of it, an indeterminate predicate. Consequently, the question is, not whether each and every event is precisely caused, in one respect or other, but whether every predicate of that event is caused. For instance, a man bets upon the toss of a coin. He wins his bet. Now the question is whether there was any circumstance about the toss of that coin which necessitated this character of it; namely, its accordance with his bet. There are those who believe that such predicates are precisely determinate; but rational proof fails them. The majority of men call such things uncaused; and this opinion is powerfully supported by the utter failure of every attempt to base predictions of such occurrences upon any specified law. The class of predicates is one of which every man on earth for several thousand years has had multiplied hourly experience; and since in no case there has been any promising appearance of approach to a law, we are more than justified in saying that precise dependence upon general conditions apppears to be limited to a category of predicates, without undertaking to say what category is that. -- end quote Peirce MS 283 - EP2: 396-397 -- To those on holiday, wherever, enjoy your break! Patrick PS Jim, thanks for your -- Patrick J. Coppock Researcher: Philosophy and Theory of Language Department of Social, Cognitive and Quantitative Sciences University of Modena and Reggio Emilia Reggio Emilia Italy phone: + 39 0522.522404 : fax. + 39 0522.522512 email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] www:http://coppock-violi.com/work/ faculty:http://www.cei.unimore.it the voice: http://morattiddl.blogspot.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Arnold, Patrick, list,
Although I myself write none too accurately when I use the word "interior"
regarding a Klein bottle, here is a case where accuracy really is needed.
Peirce said that mathematics is the science which _draws_ necessary
conclusions, as opposed to its being a science _of_ necessary conclusions. The
science _of_ reasoning, necessary and otherwise, he called logic and placed it
in philosophy. Peirce says that the science which _draws_ necessary conclusions
is mathematics and includes (indeed begins with) mathematics _of_ logic.
I agree that it's quite impoverishing to regard mathematics as primarily a
study of calculation, which would basically be to say that mathematics is all
algebra ("algebra" in the sense of "theory of calculation"). Insofar as the
ordering in a structure has special pertinence to logic and, in particular, is
what is relevant in determining the applicability of mathematical induction to
the set with said structure, and insofar as ordered structure is the basic kind
of structure involved in structures of ranking, preference, etc., it appears
that ordered structures are the mathematical structures with the most special
relevance to elucidation of the phenomenon of rational animals.
I recall in high school that treatment of ordered structures, measure &
enumeration, and topology & graph theory, ranged from minimal to zero. Even
recently I was initially uncertain whether Marty's lattice amounted,
technically, to a partially ordered set or whether it was some "other" sort of
not-entirely-ordered set.
Dieudonne in his Encyclopedia Britannica 15th Edition article on maths
discussed math in terms of "structures of order," "structures of group"
(including abstract algebra and much geometry), and "structures of space"
(including topology). He somewhere says, however, that Bourbaki (the group
which he often represented) probably hadn't paid enough attention to the
"combinatorial" aspects of mathematics. Of course, I don't know whether he was
referring to enumerative combinatorics, measure theory, etc., or (though I
somewhat doubt it) in the sense of "formal, finitely presented properties of
the inscriptions of the ambient formal language" (I'm uncertain of how to
translate that into English)
http://publish.uwo.ca/~jbell/foundations%20of%20mathematics.pdf .
Best, Ben
Arnold wrote,
AS: Now, I guess what I am getting at here is that the more one begins to grasp
the history of both math and logic through the lens of Peirce's undoubted
mastery of both (however idiosyncratic some of his inferences from history may
appear to some), the more one should be led to take a wider view of both. As
the `science of necessary reasoning', the discipline (as in self-control)
required for mathematical inquiry seems to me to indicate that there should be
no reason why one can't undertake the study of the diagrammatic forms of
necessary reasoning about human experience in a non-computational way. Peirce
treats the foundations of mathematics as a form of relational reasoning (which,
I am led to understand, runs counter to the modern mathematical tradition; I
won't debate that because I am no mathematician, but am never the less
fascinated by the potential arcaneness of the topic). At 3.562 he essays an
accessible account of this relational foundation (the CP source consists of
material left out of an article in an educational journal of 1898), and anybody
with some familiarity of anthropological field methods will immediately
recognize a relation that lies at the core of ALL possible experience: the
relation of sequence. Surely there can be no continuity in human affairs, the
basis upon which one could say we make all those judgements and inferences we
call `experience', without a sequence of generations, which Peirce very
accessibly shows has proprties that are quite mathematical.
AS: I won't take this further for now, because I suspect I'm going to start
blathering on without getting all my ducks in a row first. But I guess that
what I wanted to suggest to Patrick and the List is that the "trend in our
time" need not be accepted as fatalistically as all that. It does, after all,
represent perhaps 100-150 years' of debate in a tradition going back maybe 2500
years or more (I mean: how long ago did the distinction between
naturwissenschaften and geisteswissenchaften enter the conversational lexicon
of academia?). Maybe I'm overly optimistic, but surely it won't take that long
for the fashion to fade away?
Cheers
Arnold Shepperson
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[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Dear Patrick and Arnold Enjoyed your exchange! Not the least your spirited defense and encouragement of the desire and right to inquire no matter how humble or meager one's resources. In my experience when someone shares a tale or experience they hold dear it's almost always interesting. We humans are tellers of tales -- it may be our crowning glory. OK, its a holiday here in the states (and from what some of my British friends tell me for them as well ;) so I'll sign off for the day and give all my list friends a break. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Arnold, thanks for a long and rich respnse. For now I'll just confine myself to resonding to your brief "coda" -- which as any conversational discourse analyst - canonically in this case William Labov - will tell you, is when the speaker - in this case writer AS - tries to connect the possible world of the "tale" just told to the actual world, or common ground of everyday experience. Labov's idea is that this particular communicative act has the function of legitimising (or attempting to) for the audience the possible pragmatic relevance of the tale he or she has just told (but it could also be an argument, an explanation, a joke, whatever, and essentially too, as a way of thanking the others for the gift of being "conceded the floor" for the period of time necessary to recount the tale. In your "coda" you wrote: AS: I won't take this further for now, because I suspect I'm going to start blathering on without getting all my ducks in a row first. But I guess that what I wanted to suggest to Patrick and the List is that the "trend in our time" need not be accepted as fatalistically as all that. It does, after all, represent perhaps 100-150 years' of debate in a tradition going back maybe 2500 years or more (I mean: how long ago did the distinction between naturwissenschaften and geisteswissenchaften enter the conversational lexicon of academia?). Maybe I'm overly optimistic, but surely it won't take that long for the fashion to fade away? Couldn't agree more, and I passionately share your hopes in this respect. I also believe that in any case some degree of "oscillation" between different degrees of "intimacy" and "distance" is a quite healthy and natural part of the growth and development of any ongoing "relationship". Isn't this kind of oscillation between being and becoming what the notion of indeterminacy in quantum physics is all about really? Even more, I think it would also be a wonderful idea of we could manage to get it into our individual and collective heads that ALL sciences are first and foremost HUMAN enterprises, and that we will in any case always be talking about "Human Sciences", whether we are talking about maths, philosophy, physics, chemistry psychology or the applied sciences and arts... Where we differ most, of course, are in the different symbol systems and languages we use, and in the different practices, methodologies ands technologies we develop and use in order to to try to winkle our way in towards the "truth" of the matter (sic.) as well as we possibly can. This, I think, is essentially what Peirce essentially was onto when he wrote his "The Basis of Pragmaticism in the Normative Sciences" (EP: 371-397) This he ends as follows: Best regards Patrick PS If we try "getting all our ducks in a row" before we start trying to share our nascent ideas with others, we might never actually get started on that delightful journey of (self)discovery... P Pat, List Pat Coppock (PC) wrote: PC: I do sometimes feel that science, the humanities and the arts have become rather "estranged" from one another these days, and I personally think that is unfortunate, but it seems to be a trend in our time for now. PC: The kinds of constructive falsifiable predictions that are possible to make and test systematically in in the physical/ applied/technological sciences are of course far more difficult to make and test in the human sciences and the arts. AS: In developing my PhD dissertation proposal, I make the point that the Humanities, primarily, and a significant (although not a major) constituency in the social sciences, seem to take it as a given that `science' (they always use scare quotes!) is somehow fundamentally `reductionist' because of its basis in measurable phenomena and the logic of computation that follows from inquiry into these. AS: However, I sometimes wonder whether developments in mathematics over the last century or so have not encouraged the rather restricted public understanding of math as a sort of `theory of computation'? Peirce and his father both treated mathematics as the `science of necessary reasoning', of which computational matters constituted a rather restricted sub-field within the broader endeavour. Humanities academics (as quite distinct from Humanities scholars), especially, seem to have taken for granted the following line of reasoning: THAT: 1) mathematics is an essentially computational enterprise, and 2) the `sciences' (I'm sort of caricaturing their way of arguing, here) either operate directly by measurement and calculation or by using technical devices that derive from such activity, AND FURTHER, THAT 3) human experience involves measurable phenomena only to a small degree, the most fundamental sources of experience being essentially emotional and individual, hence escaping generalization through measurability; IT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT 4) the Human Scienc
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Pat, List Pat Coppock (PC) wrote: PC: I do sometimes feel that science, the humanities and the arts have become rather "estranged" from one another these days, and I personally think that is unfortunate, but it seems to be a trend in our time for now. PC: The kinds of constructive falsifiable predictions that are possible to make and test systematically in in the physical/ applied/technological sciences are of course far more difficult to make and test in the human sciences and the arts. AS: In developing my PhD dissertation proposal, I make the point that the Humanities, primarily, and a significant (although not a major) constituency in the social sciences, seem to take it as a given that `science' (they always use scare quotes!) is somehow fundamentally `reductionist' because of its basis in measurable phenomena and the logic of computation that follows from inquiry into these. AS: However, I sometimes wonder whether developments in mathematics over the last century or so have not encouraged the rather restricted public understanding of math as a sort of `theory of computation'? Peirce and his father both treated mathematics as the `science of necessary reasoning', of which computational matters constituted a rather restricted sub-field within the broader endeavour. Humanities academics (as quite distinct from Humanities scholars), especially, seem to have taken for granted the following line of reasoning: THAT: 1) mathematics is an essentially computational enterprise, and 2) the `sciences' (I'm sort of caricaturing their way of arguing, here) either operate directly by measurement and calculation or by using technical devices that derive from such activity, AND FURTHER, THAT 3) human experience involves measurable phenomena only to a small degree, the most fundamental sources of experience being essentially emotional and individual, hence escaping generalization through measurability; IT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THAT 4) the Human Sciences MUST employ methods that engage with the personal and the emotional by developing interpretive techniques based on aesthetic, linguistic, and other Qualitative techniques. AS: Although my summary of this reasoning may be rather cursory, even to the point of appearing to ridicule a tradition with a long provenance, I have heard this type of reasoning in arguments at academic meetings for decades. Hell, before I began studying Peirce, I used to use it myself (blush)! The fallacy, of course, is the even more radically reductionist view that math is principally (if not only) a science of computation. Listers may recall the release, some 3-4 years ago, of a book by Helen Verran, with the title *Mathematics and an African Culture*, which received a fair bit of exposure on commentary sites on the web; the value of the book, in my opinion, lies not in any of its reflections on how Africans approach the math curriculum in schools, but in how the whole enterprise could be taken on by an anthropologist who lacked both mathematical and logical training. Verran's experience of teaching math schoolteachers in West Africa was undertaken purely on the basis that because she came from a `western' society in which measurement and computation were part of the wallpaper (so to speak), she would `culturally' have been equipped to train math teachers from another kind of society. AS: Needless to say, Verran failed to make any real dent in the situation, and what struck me in the book as being valuable to philosophers of science was the extremely narrow range of sources she consulted in making sense of the episode. She cites not a single mathematician or logician, relying, instead, on the History and Philosophy of Science programme at one or other university (I'm writing at a student LAN, and don't have the book handy to provide more detail; I guess I can't lug my entire library with me like one of the sages of Swift's Laputa!). What struck me was the reliance she placed on teaching teachers that the essence of mathematics is the interpretation of measures into calculations. Formal Logic she treats as `totalizing logic', and this term receives its due place in the book's Index. AS: Now, I guess what I am getting at here is that the more one begins to grasp the history of both math and logic through the lens of Peirce's undoubted mastery of both (however idiosyncratic some of his inferences from history may appear to some), the more one should be led to take a wider view of both. As the `science of necessary reasoning', the discipline (as in self-control) required for mathematical inquiry seems to me to indicate that there should be no reason why one can't undertake the study of the diagrammatic forms of necessary reasoning about human experience in a non-computational way. Peirce treats the foundations of mathematics as a form of relational reasoning (which, I am led to understand, runs counter to the modern mathematical tradition; I won't debate that because I am no mathematician,
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Steven, thanks for a thoughtful reply. I'll have a look at Christophe Koch's article and perhaps get back to you on the basis of my reading of that. I notice however that any public discussion of it may be a bit complicated since he explicitly asks readers not to cite from it without his written permission, which ought of course to be respected. A quick comment on science and the merits of hypotheses. You wrote in that connection: Hypotheses are one of two classes of merit. The first are the useful hypotheses. They are constructive and they make falsifiable predictions - they are those that Popper and Peirce would seek. The second class, all other hypotheses, are those that are not constructive and do not make falsifiable predictions. I do sometimes feel that science, the humanities and the arts have become rather "estranged" from one another these days, and I personally think that is unfortunate, but it seems to be a trend in our time for now. The kinds of constructive falsifiable predictions that are possible to make and test systematically in in the physical/ applied/ technological sciences are of course far more difficult to make and test in the human sciences and the arts. For example, I could put forward the working hypothesis that promoting discussion of the philosophical explications/ reflections on the notion of God / prime mover /ens necessarium -- as conceived of by Whitehead, Peirce or other philosophers -- might serve a useful intercultural function by acting as stimulus for critical discussion of other types of cosmological or religious narratives that offer different ways of speculating about evolutionary processes The only empirical evidence I could offer to support that particular hypothesis would be the number of discussions, seminars, books, articles, TV programs, websites etc. that are spontaneously or otherwise generated by the testing of this hypothesis. But that of course will not really have anything to do with doing "science per se", only with the kind of general cultural value (or usefulness if you like) that may or may not be attributed to the human sciences within the broader cultural arena, or "market of ideas", as I put it before. The same applies to the performing and other arts. However, in the "globalising" mass media picture of today, themes, currents and trends that traditionally have been more specifically characteristic for the arts, human sciences and "hard" sciences often seem to be becoming more and more mixed up with one another. News and rumors travel very fast indeed all over the globe, and this can sometimes make systematic "peer evaluation" of research and other claims more difficult to do in a methodical way. However, there is also the positive aspect of the contestation of wayward claims reaching a critical mass more quickly this way. I often ask myself if the evolutionism vs creationism/ intelligent design debate that is still going on at the present time, especially in the USA, has more to do with international politics and mass-marketing strategies in that connection than it has to do with real consensus negotiation, or people's actual religious convictions. Otherwise, I think it is very important to try and make a quite clear distinction between personal sentiment, beliefs and opinions regarding possible answers to the why's and wherefore's of human existence in general, and personal forms of adherence to institutionalised religions and the relationships that single individuals and groups of individuals develop and cultivate within the framework of these institutions. Might the latter be what you mean by "a belief in God by any inherited convention"? Whitehead, as I understand it, was raised as an anglican (his father was in fact an anglican vicar), but at a certain point in his life he considered strongly converting to catholicism after studying both it and buddhism for a period together with his wife, but he never actually did, and he later declared himself to be an agnostic or "freethinker"... Best regards Patrick Dear Patrick, My thanks for your interesting response. At the start of the 20th Century it was, perhaps, still acceptable for Peirce and Whitehead to contend that "that holding religious beliefs and maintaining a responsible and coherent scientific attitude were fully compatible with one another." Although, Whitehead was more committed to this view and I suspect that Peirce would have been easily persuaded from it. At the start of the 21st Century I see no good cause for accepting it, if by it we mean adhering to the religious conventions of the past in any form. Hypotheses are one of two classes of merit. The first are the useful hypotheses. They are constructive and they make falsifiable predictions - they are those that Popper and Peirce would seek. The second class, all other hypotheses, are those that are not constructive and do no
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Dear Patrick, My thanks for your interesting response. At the start of the 20th Century it was, perhaps, still acceptable for Peirce and Whitehead to contend that "that holding religious beliefs and maintaining a responsible and coherent scientific attitude were fully compatible with one another." Although, Whitehead was more committed to this view and I suspect that Peirce would have been easily persuaded from it. At the start of the 21st Century I see no good cause for accepting it, if by it we mean adhering to the religious conventions of the past in any form. Hypotheses are one of two classes of merit. The first are the useful hypotheses. They are constructive and they make falsifiable predictions - they are those that Popper and Peirce would seek. The second class, all other hypotheses, are those that are not constructive and do not make falsifiable predictions. Science pursues the former and rapidly dismisses the latter. It is certainly foolish today to base research programs and public science expenditure on premises that clearly fall into the latter class - as is happening today in the USA and EU. The provisional nature of scientific hypothesis does not excuse or condone the acceptance of hypotheses clearly of the second kind - and the "market of ideas" is not served by including them. A belief in God by any inherited convention falls manifestly into the second class. Even if the proposed God turned up and said "I did it" this would still not be science since a priori predictions based on the premise are not falsifiable. Science simply cannot take God's word for it. If there is such a God then science is simply a pragmatic understanding God's will. This view would still not excuse the intellectual laziness that is the invention of emergence and identity theories - or change the irrational nature of an intuition that a God exists in the first place. It does not block inquiry to insist on sound premises and good reason. This is not to say that there is not something unknown and equally remarkable about the universe. But if there is, and I certainly believe that there is in the unexplained presence of experience in the world, then it is for science to discover. My reference to Christophe Koch is meant with the greatest respect - I admire what he has written and that he has written openly about his beliefs. And my observation remains a valid one. Scientists that adhere to any conventional notion of God, of there being something "extra" to the universe beyond science, are necessarily predisposed to accept the magic of today's emergence and identity theories. Mid 20th century logicians threw the baby out with the bath water by ignoring experience and not taking it seriously as a phenomenon (as Peirce did). Their dismissal of it has left a hole that has been filled by the very same irrational propositions they sought to counter. With respect, Steven Patrick Coppock wrote: Hi Steven, --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Re Crick and Koch and their theories of consciousness: What Koch
actually says in his recent book is "that consciousness emerges from
neuronal features of the brain" (p. 10). For a detailed review, see
http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/Koch.htm .
Koch and Crick are near the reductionist end of the consciousness-theory
spectrum, whereas the kind of "magic" usually associated with Catholic
belief would be found at the opposite end, along with outright mind/body
dualism. So when i first saw Steven's remarks on Koch, i assumed it was
some kind of joke -- and didn't reply because i didn't really get the
joke. ("Emergence and identity theory" is a rather odd colligation,
certainly not due to Koch, and i didn't have enough context to guess
what Steven meant by it, or whether his reference to "magic" was
tongue-in-cheek.)
Anyway, i think Peirce's views on consciousness are often closer to
traditional religious views than they are to Koch's. However, i find
Peirce's views on consciousness difficult to characterize, especially
since i read this passage in "Man's Glassy Essence":
[[[ I long ago showed that real existence, or thing-ness, consists in
regularities. So, that primeval chaos in which there was no regularity
was mere nothing, from a physical aspect. Yet it was not a blank zero;
for there was an intensity of consciousness there, in comparison with
which all that we ever feel is but as the struggling of a molecule or
two to throw off a little of the force of law to an endless and
innumerable diversity of chance utterly unlimited. ]]]
Among religious views, the closest thing i know to this is the Tibetan
Buddhist idea that consciousness is a kind of background awareness, so
to speak, which we all sink back into when we no longer have the
incessant chatter of the waking brain to distract us from it.
gary
- Original Message -
From: "Patrick Coppock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Sent: Sunday, July 02, 2006 5:44 PM
...
Both Peirce and Whitehead certainly believed that holding religious
beliefs and maintaining a responsible and coherent scientific
attitude were fully compatible with one another.
...
At 12:03 -0700 28-06-2006, Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote:
>Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the
>subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus
>of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe
>Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I
>recall).
>All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially
>appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument
>(including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.).
>
>Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about
>his religion on his web site - and without making aspersions upon
>his integrity I do find that a number of scientists in the field
>that are prepared to accept such magic are also religious. As a
>result they may, in fact, be predisposed to the argument that "God
>did it."
>
>My own view is that these appeals to magic as the product of
>intellectual laziness. :-)
>
>With respect,
>Steven
---
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[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Hi Steven,
You wrote:
Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about
his religion on his web site - and without making aspersions upon
his integrity I do find that a number of scientists in the field
that are prepared to accept such magic are also religious. As a
result they may, in fact, be predisposed to the argument that "God
did it."
My own view is that these appeals to magic as the product of
intellectual laziness. :-)
You are of course entitled to your own views, but I feel you are
being a bit harsh on scientists/ philosophers who might happen to
hold personal religious beliefs in your comments, especially when you
mention people by name, as you do above.
Seems lkike a bit of a "blow beneath the belt" to me.
Both Peirce and Whitehead certainly believed that holding religious
beliefs and maintaining a responsible and coherent scientific
attitude were fully compatible with one another.
Now, it may not be absolutely necessary to believe in God in order to
do good science or philosophy, but on the other hand, it is not
absolutely necessary either to believe passionately in science in
order to live our lives and do our daily work well, and treat other
people with tolerance and respect.
Belief in science and religious beliefs have each their different
potentials and each fulfill their own specific human/social functions
- for good and for bad (remember Giordano Bruno and eugenics)
I think where serious problems often arise is when the sentiments or
passions that might move people to believe in God (or not) become
confused with the sentiments that might move people to believe (or
not) that a consciencious pursuit of scientific practice in the
course of time will provide us with the objective or "true" knowledge
about the world that we desire/ need in order, not only just to
survive, but also to live our lives together well...
As Peirce put it (all good) "logic is based on a social principle",
since for him, any workable logic presupposes ethics, which in its
own turn presupposes aesthetics.
I would consider either agnosticism or athieism to be valid
metaphysical positions based on specific sentiments that may be as
strongly held as those metaphysical positions based on specific
sentiments that may valorise religious beliefs.
You wrote too:
Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the
subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus
of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe
Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I
recall).
All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially
appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument
(including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.).
However, in the generally accepted scientific paradigm (when it
works), any hypothesis ("astonishing" or not) will always come to be
"read" as a very provisional assertion regarding some (presumably
reasoned and argued) opinion, or set of opinions, about "the way
things may well be...".
The current norms of the community of science hold that the practical
consequences of any such assertions must be shown to hold
consistently over time on the basis of some future systematic
empirical inquiry in order to be taken seriously.
If not, the hypothesis in question is not likely to become widely
accepted as potentially valid/useful by the wider community of
inquiry.
Whether any given theory is "an appeal to magic" -- a term which I
would provisionally take to mean "potentially appealing to the
eye/sentiments/mind but also potentially deluding -- or not, it is
often only time -- coupled with the degree of individual and
collective interest and energy the scientific community actually
turns out to devote to systematic inquiry into the problem in hand --
will show.
I always tend to hold with Peirce that we should never try to "block
the way of inquiry", however wild other people's speculations may
seem to be. But of course we need some kind of filters that help us
sort out the chaff from the wheat.
So, in a sense, we will always have to put our trust in the wider
"market of ideas" (assuming that all ideas can flow and be discussed
as freely as possible), and in the informed common sense of our
"peers"
Best regards
Patrick
At 12:03 -0700 28-06-2006, Steven Ericsson Zenith wrote:
Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the
subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus
of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe
Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I
recall).
All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially
appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument
(including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.).
Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Crick's "Astonishing Hypothesis" (the name of Crick's book on the subject) is emergence and identity theory - and the continuing focus of Crick's younger partner (Crick himself died recently) Christophe Koch at CalTech is neuronal according to Koch's recent book (as I recall). All theories dependent on emergence and identity are essentially appeals to magic - despite the wide popularity of the argument (including the popular appeals by Wolfram, Kurzweil et al.). Koch is fairly religious (Catholic) - and has recently written about his religion on his web site - and without making aspersions upon his integrity I do find that a number of scientists in the field that are prepared to accept such magic are also religious. As a result they may, in fact, be predisposed to the argument that "God did it." My own view is that these appeals to magic as the product of intellectual laziness. :-) With respect, Steven Jim Piat wrote: Make of that what you will :-) With respect, Steven Dear Steven, I think Crick of DNA fame was also seeking consciousness in the microtubials. What troubles me most about the search for the neural basis of consciousness is our lack of a coherent and satisfying working definition of consciousness. I doubt we will find the neurological basis of something we can't identify in the first place. The effort begs the question. Moreover neurons may be a necessary without being a sufficient condition for consciousness. Just one layman's opinion. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Make of that what you will :-) With respect, Steven Dear Steven, I think Crick of DNA fame was also seeking consciousness in the microtubials. What troubles me most about the search for the neural basis of consciousness is our lack of a coherent and satisfying working definition of consciousness. I doubt we will find the neurological basis of something we can't identify in the first place. The effort begs the question. Moreover neurons may be a necessary without being a sufficient condition for consciousness. Just one layman's opinion. Cheers, Jim Piat --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
The Neuroquantology Journal invited me sometime ago to submit my paper on the limits of discovery in quantum physics, so I know something of their history. It was started as an online journal only by Sultan Tarlaci of Turkey, whom I believe is an academic, at the time of the 2003 Quantum Mind conference. Stuart Hammeroff of the University of Arizona was involved in the founding. Hammeroff and Roger Penrose are responsible for the quantum model of Orchestrated Objective Reduction (OOR) which sees the mind as the product of a quantum computation influenced by Penrose's model of quantum gravity. To quote Hammeroff, "It's in the microtubials." Hammeroff is shown on the list of advisers and I would guess that it was he that specified the "focus and scope" of the journal since he is an anesthesiologist. I also recognize Brian Josephson. Josephson is a Nobel Laurette, well known to anyone who has been in the semiconductor industry (as I have) for his invention of the "Josephson junction." Josephson currently runs a parapsychology lab at Cambridge University where he looks for quantum proof of telepathy and other psychic phenomena. Make of that what you will :-) With respect, Steven Irving Anellis wrote: Joseph Ransdell asked about the "Neuroquantology" journal. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
As a non-professional neuroscience-watcher (now working on my 10th book
review to be published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies), i would
agree with Irving, ("I do not recognize any of the names from either the
AI, cognitive science, or neuroscience fields"), with the exception of
Hameroff. Broadly speaking, the "quantum consciousness" folks are part
of the current discussion in the field but very much on the fringe of
it; few researchers in cognitive or neuro-psychology or in philosophy
of mind take them seriously, but nobody wants to dismiss them altogether
until they come up with a testable theory (which they regularly claim to
be on the verge of doing). But i don't bother to read past the abstracts
of their stuff, and none of the leaders in the field seem to do so
either.
gary
}And whoso is saved from his own greed, such are the successful. [Qur'an
64:16 (Pickthall)]{
gnusystems }{ Pam Jackson & Gary Fuhrman }{ Manitoulin University
}{ [EMAIL PROTECTED] }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/ }{
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[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
I know nothing about this journal but Stuart Hameroff, one of the editorial members, has very important works relating Neuroscience and Quantum Physics, most of them written with Roger Penrose. His page is at http://www.quantumconsciousness.org/ Vinicius Joseph Ransdell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Does anybody on the list know anything about the following journal or feel in position to assess -- or make a reasonable guess about -- its likely character as a journal by browsing its contents, contributors, editorial policy, etc.?http://www.neuroquantology.com/Joe Ransdell -- No virus found in this outgoing message.Checked by AVG Free Edition.Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.9.3/374 - Release Date: 6/23/2006---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Want to be your own boss? Learn how on Yahoo! Small Business. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Neuroquantology Journal
Joseph Ransdell asked about the "Neuroquantology" journal. I took a look at the list of members of their editorial board. I cannot give an up-to-date or informed opinion on the journal, its quality, or board members. I can say only that I do not recognize any of the names from either the AI, cognitive science, or neuroscience fields that I remember from my days, in the late 1970s and early 1980s when I was actively involved in the Society for Interdisciplinary Study of the Mind (SISTM) and the SISTM & Brain Theory Quarterly. Over the past year, I've taken up a new, more active interest in issues of psychology and mental health issues, as a member of the Education & Awareness Committee of the Webster County (Iowa) Disabilities Alliance. Some of my contributions to the Committee and its newsletter have been posted to the Peirce Publishing website (go to: http://www.peircepublishing.com/page8.html) and on the blog e-journal "Phaneroscopy" (go to http://360.yahoo.com/phaneroscopy). Here is some brief general information about "Phaneroscopy". Phaneroscopy is an e-Journal devoted to pragmatic phenomenology, and includes informal and comparatively brief articles devoted to topics in philosophy of mind, philosophical psychology, and issues in mental health, as well as to brief discussions of interest to historians of pragmatism, existentialism, and phenomenology. It is hosted by Irving Anellis, and invites informal contributions by those in the philosophical, psychological, and mental health communities working either as academics in philosophy, psychology, cognitive science, and psychiatry and their history, and praticioners in the practice of mental health and mental health therapy, in particular those working from the perspective of pragmatism, cognitive behavior, conceptual behavior therapy, phenomenology, or existentialism. All articles appearing in Phaneroscopy are available for reproduction by users of related ezines, blogs, or websites, provided a proper credit line is added indicating the origin of the source and a copyright notice. [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://360.yahoo.com/phaneroscopy Irving H. Anellis [EMAIL PROTECTED] ; [EMAIL PROTECTED] ; [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.peircepublishing.com -- ___ Search for businesses by name, location, or phone number. -Lycos Yellow Pages http://yp.lycos.com --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
