Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (Entrepôts)
Bill R: Thanks for a very interesting post and the references, which I haven't had time to check yet. I haven't been able to pinpoint the exact quote, but somewhere in _Capital_ Marx (slightly tongue-in-cheek) quotes Adam Smith saying that all entrepôts are barbaric; Marx's point being that monopolies of foreign trade were the main way in which metropolitan bourgeoisies exploited colonial bourgeoisies. How times change. Regards, Grant. --- Outgoing mail is certified Virus Free. Checked by AVG anti-virus system (http://www.grisoft.com). Version: 6.0.351 / Virus Database: 197 - Release Date: 19/04/2002
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
At 11:17 AM 21/04/2002 +0800, Grant wrote: >That wasn't my contention, which is more accurately that except for actual >formal/military imperialism, (e.g. Britain in India) "imperialist" and >"imperialised" have always been poles on a notional axis, rather than being >distinct and permanent things. I mean are you saying that there is little >difference between the present positions (relative and absolute) of the >economies and overseas political influence of Malaysia and Indonesia, >compared now with what they were 50 years ago? Nothing is pure or permanent, but yes, Malaysia and Indonesia are still imperialist-dominated countries (and also still in a different way than lesser imperialists Australia and New Zealand). > > The best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, > but, hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes... > >Forces which, some would argue, have assisted the South Korean national >bourgeoisie in the same way that the capitalist economies of Japan, Taiwan >and the old West Germany grew significantly as "armed camps". >S Korea ... > >could do > > _nothing_ if Japan, Europe and the US stopped imports from s. Korea with a > > stroke of a pen. > >Why would they do that? And there's always China... For protectionist reasons, like the current US tariffs on s. Korean steel. Korean capitalists are impressive, but they are more vulnerable than capitalists in Japan or Germany. s. Korea and Taiwan were assisted to stop 'communism', but I don't see either of them being let into the imperialist club. It is possible, but a lot of this kind of talk has been cooled by the 'Asian' financial crisis. >One point of the stats was that the highly "imperialised" Kenya is >"imperialist" in regard to neighbouring countries, as shown (e.g.) by the >restrictions on Kenyan investment. Nigeria is an even stronger case. Yes, imperialized countries often dominate weaker neighbours, but I think the concept of imperialism should be reserved for geo-politics at a larger scale. And Kenya's outward FDI/GDP is only 1.5%; one-fifth of the inward rate. Nigeria's outward FDI/GDP is an impressive 31%, but still less than inward FDI/GDP at 51%. I mentioned South Africa before, but forgot to include the rates - inward FDI/GDP is 13.4% and outward FDI/GDP 24.8%. We need to look at other criteria, but the FDI numbers suggest that in Africa the only candidate for imperialist status is South Africa. > > As you can see, Belgium and Switzerland show high rates of outward FDI, > and most FDI is to and from Europe - and almost nothing is _from_ the > likes of Argentina, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia. > >I note that the HK and Singaporean outward FDI figures cited are higher >than any of the European states you have cited, except Switzerland. Fair enough, but, again, I think 'real' imperialist status requires a bigger real-estate base than these city-states. They are historical/geographical accidents/exceptions who lack the (more) independent economic base characteristic of 'real' imperialists. Bill R. also notes that it is important to consider the extent to which their FDI data reflects investors from other countries (this is probably also very relevant for the Swiss data). >Substitute longer term declines in prices >for wheat (which in the 1950s was worth more than three times what it is >now), beef and other commodities and you have substantial structural >problems for Argentina and Australia, both of which (unlike Indonesia or >Malaysia) have also both experienced a withering of their manufacturing >industries in the last 30 years. The source I cited also reports a decline in the index for Australian coal from 55.9 in 1980 to 32.6 in 1997. However, in general terms the point is that the prices of goods produced by the rich imperialist countries have risen relative to those produced by poor imperialized countries. The Argentina-Australia comparison is very much on point. Have their manufacturing sectors really followed similar paths in recent decades? I don't have the data for Argentina on hand, but the OECD STAN database shows that per capita manufacturing output in Australia in 1997 was over US$8000, and total manufacturing output was over 5 times greater than in 1970, and about 25% greater than in 1989. (current US$). I think this suggests a different kind of 'withering' than in Argentina. >There are obviously more "non-thieves" and fewer "thieves" in "imperialised" >countries than in imperial ones; we will never stop "thievery" by >encouraging the "smaller thieves". It is my fault for having started this inelegant metaphor, so... Bill
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Grant Lee wrote: > > HK and Singapore are entrepots, and > > they are city-economies, which indicates the need to qualify the > > significance of their numbers > > It seems to me that if no "western" state is very similar --- and I'm not > convinced this is the case --- to HK and Singapore it would have a lot to > do with the latter being extremely small, densely populated city states and > therefore more focused on foreign trade. The international stats (e.g. World Bank, WTO) seem to highlight only Singapore and Hong Kong as being major re-exporters. This is presumably due to historical, colonial and geographical factors as much as their size. If you want a fascinating glimpse into how it works in Hong Kong (the tolling operations, rundown of manufacturing, use by transnationals etc) have a look at "Intermediaries in Entrepôt Trade: Hong Kong Re-Exports of Chinese Goods", by Robert C. Feenstra Department of Economics, University of California, Davis and National Bureau of Economic Research, and Gordon H. Hanson, Department of Economics and School of Business Administration, University of Michigan and NBER, December 2000. Also published as NBER paper W8088. It's on both Hanson's (http://webuser.bus.umich.edu/gohanson/gohanson.html#WorkingPapers) and the NBER web sites. I wrote up some of this when looking at the consequences for New Zealand of a FTA with HK (currently under negotiation but faltering) - see http://canterbury.cyberplace.org.nz/community/CAFCA/publications/Trade/GlobalisationByStealth.pdf > > > The > > best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, but, > > hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes... > > Forces which, some would argue, have assisted the South Korean national > bourgeoisie in the same way that the capitalist economies of Japan, Taiwan > and the old West Germany grew significantly as "armed camps". > Though what is happening to the S Korean national bourgeoisie post-1997 financial crisis, with many of the most powerful corporations being wound up or sold to European and US TNCs? > > I think the difference between > > presenting a NZ passport and a Malaysian passport helps clarify the social > > relationships in world imperialism. > > That would depend on where they travelled to I think. What do "social relationships" mean when discussing imperialism? New Zealand (along with Australia) takes an imperialist position in the South Pacific, where it is a relatively big fish amongst tiny ones. But that is hardly a fertile source of resources: New Zealand's income and living standards would barely change if that role disappeared. New Zealand's main role is as a footman to the imperialists, and its role in the S Pacific reflects that - carrying the good words of neoliberalism to the governments there, acting as policeman when needs be. But as footman, it mainly gets crumbs from the imperial table in terms of trade access and dependence on their capital. Australia has a stronger imperial role (especially north of it in PNG, E Timor, etc) but in reality is not much different in the pecking order to New Zealand. > I note that the HK and Singaporean outward FDI figures cited are higher than > any of the European states you have cited, except Switzerland. Again, I suspect a large part of their outward FDI is in fact from branches of companies from other countries. In Hong Kong's case that is esp mainland China, but also all the usual suspects. I looked at that in New Zealand's case: In 12 of the 72 cases I listed from statutory approvals over the last decade, no genuine Hong Kong investment was involved, and an additional five included Hong Kong investors among third country investors. Countries represented whose investors were using Hong Kong as a base to invest in New Zealand (in addition to investors from Hong Kong itself) include Australia, Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Monaco, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.A. In addition, in two instances, New Zealand investors were using Hong Kong companies to invest here. In addition, a large part of HK businesses' time seems to be spent circulating their capital through tax havens (see the info I gave in my previous post). Even 15-16% corporate tax rates still provide incentives for tax avoidance apparently. But that certainly does not mean all, or even the majority of "their" outward FDI is sourced elsewhere - both HK and Singapore (in that case, often the Singapore government) now have very strong national capital. Bill
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Bill B.: > Hong Kong 65.772 > Saudi Arabia22.71.3 > s. Korea6.1 6.5 > Taiwan 7.8 14.7 > New Zealand 66.211 > Israel 11.16.8 > Spain 21.512.5 > Austria 11.38.2 > Sweden 22.541.3 > Belgium 61.750.2 > Switzerland 26.569.1 > > I cited the FDI/GDP ratios against the suggestion that FDI from the likes > of Malaysia and Indonesia is dissolving the cardinal difference between > imperialist and imperialized countries. That wasn't my contention, which is more accurately that except for actual formal/military imperialism, (e.g. Britain in India) "imperialist" and "imperialised" have always been poles on a notional axis, rather than being distinct and permanent things. I mean are you saying that there is little difference between the present positions (relative and absolute) of the economies and overseas political influence of Malaysia and Indonesia, compared now with what they were 50 years ago? > HK and Singapore are entrepots, and > they are city-economies, which indicates the need to qualify the > significance of their numbers It seems to me that if no "western" state is very similar --- and I'm not convinced this is the case --- to HK and Singapore it would have a lot to do with the latter being extremely small, densely populated city states and therefore more focused on foreign trade. > The > best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, but, > hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes... Forces which, some would argue, have assisted the South Korean national bourgeoisie in the same way that the capitalist economies of Japan, Taiwan and the old West Germany grew significantly as "armed camps". S Korea ... >could do > _nothing_ if Japan, Europe and the US stopped imports from s. Korea with a > stroke of a pen. Why would they do that? And there's always China... > I think the difference between > presenting a NZ passport and a Malaysian passport helps clarify the social > relationships in world imperialism. That would depend on where they travelled to I think. > Don't know what you mean with the Kenya stats, but there is _zero_ danger > of Kenya going imperialist in any serious use of the term. One point of the stats was that the highly "imperialised" Kenya is "imperialist" in regard to neighbouring countries, as shown (e.g.) by the restrictions on Kenyan investment. Nigeria is an even stronger case. > > As you can see, Belgium and Switzerland show high rates of outward FDI, and > most FDI is to and from Europe - and almost nothing is _from_ the likes of > Argentina, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia. I note that the HK and Singaporean outward FDI figures cited are higher than any of the European states you have cited, except Switzerland. > Trade/GDP in Austria is 44% and 38% in Switzerland, again, most trade is > with fellow imperialist countries, not semi-colonial countries. They enjoy > 'free' trade, not the imperialist protectionism and unequal exchange faced > by Malaysia or Indonesia. The price index for their manufactured goods > _rose_ from 72 in 1980 to 108 in 1997, while logs from Malaysia dropped > from 272 to 221, Indonesia's coffee producers faced a coffee index decline > from 450.4 to 161.2 !!! The index for cotton fell from 284.3 to 162.2 > and for rubber from 197.9 to 94.5 (indexes from World Bank, World > Development Indicators). Yes, these are striking downturns. Substitute longer term declines in prices for wheat (which in the 1950s was worth more than three times what it is now), beef and other commodities and you have substantial structural problems for Argentina and Australia, both of which (unlike Indonesia or Malaysia) have also both experienced a withering of their manufacturing industries in the last 30 years. > If we can't distinguish between a big thief taking from a smaller thief and > theft from non-thieves we will never stop thievery. There are obviously more "non-thieves" and fewer "thieves" in "imperialised" countries than in imperial ones; we will never stop "thievery" by encouraging the "smaller thieves". Regards, Grant.
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Louis: > For the > foreseeable future, places like Argentina and Venezuela are on the > front lines. In places such as these, anti-imperialist consciousness > will fuel the proletarian revolution just as it did in Vietnam, Cuba, > China and many other countries where victory was not achived. The main advantage held by revolutionaries in Russia in 1917, China in the 1940s, Cuba and Vietnam in the 50s was class consciousness and/or the opposition of weak/unpopular states. What they did not have were the fully developed capitalist economies which would have ensured the long term success of their revolutions. > I wouldn't compare what > happened in Australia to what happened to Nicaragua, however. Me either. > The USA > could have lived with a Labor government in Australia. It was on the > other hand ready to break laws and risk a constitutional crisis to > topple a government that it feared would become another Cuba. You have correctly identified the percieved threat to important US satellite/communications bases (e.g. Pine Gap, Nurrungar and North West Cape) as the main reason why the US state wanted rid of Whitlam. His government was also a direct threat to accumulation by US companies; there were strong left nationalists in his cabinet who were committed to nationalisation of mineral/petroleum ressources owned by US companies. There were other reasons as well, such as Whitlam's embarrassment of Nixon's foreign policy (e.g. unilateral withdrawal of Australian troops from Vietnam and his criticism of US foreign policy generally.) > In a letter to Marx, dated October 7, 1858, Engels wrote: "...The > English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so > that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming > ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a > bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. For a nation which > exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent > justifiable." > In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You > ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, > exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no > workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and > Liberal-Radicals. and the workers gaily share the feast of England's > monopoly of the world market and the colonies." What these quotes do not show is that Marx's view, especially at the end of his life, was very long term. English wage labourers in 1858 were --- apart from Australia and other settler societies --- the best paid working class in the world. English workers benefited directly from the economic growth driven by formal/military imperialism and directly from cheap consumer goods produced overseas. These things could hardly lend themselves to revolutionary class consciousness. But the end had to come and it did. No one could say in 2002 that class consciousness or pauperisation is absent in England. Regards, Grant.
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)
Charles Brown wrote: > Profits aside, two features of FDI which seem to clearly differentiate developed > and developing countries (in the context of the US foreign investment thread, > imperial vs neo-colonies) appear to be the balance between inward and outward > investment stock (biased towards outward for developed countries; overwhelmingly > inward for developing > > > > CB: Might this be termed "export of capital " ? It could be expressed as net export of capital, but that would cover up the fact that most capital exports are from one developed country to another. Bill
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Grant wrote: > > country inward FDI stock/GDPoutward FDI stock/GDP > > Canada 23.9% 26.9% > > Australia 28.117.1 > > UK 23.335.9 > > France 11.715.9 > > Singapore 85.856.1 > > Malaysia67.022.7 > > Indonesia 73.32.4 > > Argentina 13.95.4 > > Brazil 17.11.4 > >Interesting figures. I haven't had time to look at the comparable figures >for other countries. In any case they don't prove a permanent/structural >exclusion from "imperial" activity. For example, what about Hong Kong >(pre-1997, not that it is yet a homogenous part of China)? The last I heard >there was hardly any manufacturing left in Hong Kong because proprietors had >shifted operations to the mainland. South Africa? Saudi Arabia? Hong Kong 65.772 Saudi Arabia22.71.3 s. Korea6.1 6.5 Taiwan 7.8 14.7 New Zealand 66.211 Israel 11.16.8 Spain 21.512.5 Austria 11.38.2 Sweden 22.541.3 Belgium 61.750.2 Switzerland 26.569.1 I cited the FDI/GDP ratios against the suggestion that FDI from the likes of Malaysia and Indonesia is dissolving the cardinal difference between imperialist and imperialized countries. I don't see any real shift in the last 75 years or so in this division. Hong Kong has 'moved up' a couple of rungs on the product ladder, and a large part of the 'outward' FDI above is the labour-intensive factories that were opened nearby in the (rest of) PR China. But it lacks other characteristics, e.g. trade/GDP in Hong Kong is 135% - as Bill R. noted, emphasized, HK and Singapore are entrepots, and they are city-economies, which indicates the need to qualify the significance of their numbers (Malaysia has the third highest trade/GDP; these three are the only countries with annual trade greater than GDP). The best recent candidate for the 'imperial' club is probably s. Korea, but, hello, this country is divided in half, occupied by US nukes, and could do _nothing_ if Japan, Europe and the US stopped imports from s. Korea with a stroke of a pen. The balance of inward-outward FDI in Saudi Arabia tells the same story as we know about other realities of foreign-dominated oil producers. I'd be interested in more rounded characterizations of South Africa, but the FDI data is consistent with the 'white'-settler state-now-lesser imperialist status of New Zealand, Israel, etc. Bill R. and I have discussed the NZ FDI stats before; I still have a hard time accepting the 66.2% inward rate in NZ as one that provides a realistic comparison to that in other countries, but in any case, I think the difference between presenting a NZ passport and a Malaysian passport helps clarify the social relationships in world imperialism. >Every bourgeoisie has to start somewhere. For example --- and I'm not going >to revisit the complexities and vitriol of the "Kenya Debate" --- but I just >came across this on the web: Don't know what you mean with the Kenya stats, but there is _zero_ danger of Kenya going imperialist in any serious use of the term. >Singapore's inward and outward rates are both high, but note that inward FDI is still well above outward FDI in this city-state where annual trade is also 160% !!! of GDP. >That trend is not unusual for countries with small populations and highly >developed economies. What are the comparative figures for Belgium and >Switzerland? As you can see, Belgium and Switzerland show high rates of outward FDI, and most FDI is to and from Europe - and almost nothing is _from_ the likes of Argentina, Malaysia or Saudi Arabia. Trade/GDP in Austria is 44% and 38% in Switzerland, again, most trade is with fellow imperialist countries, not semi-colonial countries. They enjoy 'free' trade, not the imperialist protectionism and unequal exchange faced by Malaysia or Indonesia. The price index for their manufactured goods _rose_ from 72 in 1980 to 108 in 1997, while logs from Malaysia dropped from 272 to 221, Indonesia's coffee producers faced a coffee index decline from 450.4 to 161.2 !!! The index for cotton fell from 284.3 to 162.2 and for rubber from 197.9 to 94.5 (indexes from World Bank, World Development Indicators). C. Jannuzi wrote: >I guess my point was that exploiter can easily become the exploited when the US involved. As any US citizen should know. If we can't distinguish between a big thief taking from a smaller thief and theft from non-thieves we will never stop thievery. Bill Burgess
Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)
Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment) by Bill Rosenberg -clip- Nice synthesis of these threads, Bill. Profits aside, two features of FDI which seem to clearly differentiate developed and developing countries (in the context of the US foreign investment thread, imperial vs neo-colonies) appear to be the balance between inward and outward investment stock (biased towards outward for developed countries; overwhelmingly inward for developing CB: Might this be termed "export of capital " ?
BATA SHOES (stems from Argentina, Australia and Canada)
Louis P. pointed out that shoe production in SE Asia for western companies
is often done through subcontractors. Bata Shoes has production and retail
worldwide and it tries to sell shoes locally based on the income of the avg.
worker so as to keep the shoes affordable. Everytime I go to Malaysia I pick
up a pair of Bata sandals for use back in Japan (where no one sells Bata).
Interestingly Bata is consistently rated a better company than Nike or
Reebok or Adidas, but it becomes most exploitative when it is producing for
such companies as those.
---
http://www.nikeworkers.org/reebok/compare.html
How does Reebok add up?
1. How does Reebok compare with other MNCs or footwear companies?
Since Reebok "contracts out" all shoe-making operations, the treatment of
the workers by the contractors is pretty much the same, whether it is Nike,
Reebok, adidas or Fila. It is a model based on the "lowest wage/least
rights" formula that concentrated almost all shoe production in Indonesia,
China and (later) Vietnam.
Another model -- NOT contracting out -- offers a different result. Bata
(based in Toronto) runs its own factories which produce cheap sneakers for
local markets. Ten years ago, the Bata factory in Jakarta had already had a
union contract for eighteen years and was paying triple the minimum wage.
Ironically, when Bata started to produce expensive shoes for export (for
Reebok and others) around 1993, a two-tier system developed and workers
making expensive shoes for export were treated as "contract" (temporary)
workers with far inferior conditions and lower wages. Still, a 1999 survey
done with the Urban Community Mission showed that there was less abusive
treatment in the 2 Bata factories, compared to the factories producing
exclusively for export. See full report of interviews with 4,000 Indonesian
workers:
Click here to find out more
There is another "mixed" model, represented by companies such as U.S.-based
New Balance and Saucony (Hyde Athletic). While both companies produce mostly
in China, a significant amount of production takes place in the U.S. This
means that some sports shoe workers earn more in two hours than Indonesians
can earn in a forty-hour week! (Converse also continued to make some sport
shoes in the U.S., until mid-2001.)
2. How does the cost/profit of a pair of Reeboks break down? Relation labour
costs/publicity?
Though the sports shoe business is highly competitive, profits are quite
good. It must be remembered that profits are taken by the contractor that
makes the shoes, by Reebok and by the retailer. The contractors that produce
for Reebok (mostly Taiwanese and Korean companies) have been very successful
for the past twenty to twenty-five years -- especially since the production
moved to China and Indonesia around 1987. Several years ago, the investment
giant Goldman Sachs bought a huge stake in Yue Yuen (one of these
contractors), giving an indication of profitability. These profits are
derived from a selling cost of around eight dollars (the labor cost being
just about one dollar). Last year, a Wall Street Journal article quoted a
Yue Yuen manager asking NOT to be quoted saying that Yue Yuen's profits were
better than the buyers' (Reebok or Nike) profits.
Next, profits are taken by Reebok. Gross margin before taxes is pretty
standard at 9%. The spending aimed at increasing sales -- the marketing
costs of shoe companies -- has been estimated at about ten percent of final
sales price, by Professor Robert J. Ross at Clark University. This is more
than TEN times what companies such as Wal-Mart spend on marketing and
promotion, Prof. Ross says. In addition, Reebok was severely criticized by
the pension fund managers for California's public employees ("Calpers") for
the ridiculously high salary paid to CEO, Paul Fireman during most of the
90s.
The standard practice of retailers such as FootLocker is to mark up the
shoes 100% over what it pays to Reebok. That is, a $50 pair of shoes will
sell for $100. If it does not sell for "full retail", it is discounted, of
course. During the sneaker industry's "boom" years (1992- 97), FootLocker
expanded rapidly, going from 2,000 shops to something like 7,000.
3. Who buys Reeboks, where and why? What alternatives are there to buying
Reeboks?
Currently, Reebok sells about 15% of the sports shoes sold in the world ・
about the same as adidas. Nike has well over 40% of the world-wide market.
Reebok had its greatest success with an "aerobics shoe" for women in the
late 1980s ・for a short time, the company was ahead of Nike. Since that
time, performance has been pretty dismal. Last year, a Boston Globe
columnist called Fireman "the worst CEO in America", in a column which
reviewed the company's performance over the past decade.
Reebok sales are strong in the U.S. and W. Europe; the demographic skews
slightly older than Nike痴. Alternatives for running shoes: the U.S.
magazine, "Consumer Reports" rated some New Balance and Saucony shoe
Re: Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
April 5, 1998 THE SWISS, THE GOLD, AND THE DEAD By Jean Ziegler. Translated by John Brownjohn. 322 pp. New York: Harcourt Brace & Company. $27. (Review) Gnomes and Nazis An account of Switzerland's role in financing Germany's war machine. By PETER GROSE (Peter Grose, a research fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, is the biographer of Allen Dulles. He is completing a book on covert action in East Europe during the cold war.) The day of reckoning for mighty Switzerland has been long in coming. In the manner of a post-modern Zola, an angry man of letters, Jean Ziegler, has thrown down his "J'accuse" with "The Swiss, the Gold, and the Dead," and brigades of auditors, financiers, factors, historians, lawyers and publicists are trying to cope with it. During the cold war, successive Swiss generations wrote off the ambiguities of the World War II era as the time-honored way of neutrality. The enormous self- enrichment that grew from the financing of Hitler's war machine came, it was always said, through Switzerland's normal banking acumen. The disappearance into Swiss public and private coffers of assets seized by the Nazis from Jews and other victims was beneath polite discussion. For half a century, Switzerland lived as a nation in denial. But the country has been set aflame by this modest volume, published last year by a petulant professor of sociology at Geneva University, a longtime Member of Parliament and a socialist, too left wing for the bankers' tastes yet Swiss through and through. Readers of English can now savor his polemic for themselves (in a fine translation from the German by John Brownjohn). "The awesome, world-encompassing financial power wielded today by the major Swiss banks is founded on wartime profits," Ziegler writes. And, he says, the Swiss public, those who benefited directly or indirectly from these profits, accept this outcome with pride and an absolutely clear conscience. Ziegler's fundamental aim is one that no board of auditors would presume to undertake: "to analyze sociological factors and human behavior, complicities and constraints." His is a book about the Swiss people, his own countrymen, a "nation of guilty innocents and innocent guilty," consumed in a "mania for self-righteousness, guiltlessness and perpetual purity." "What never fails to fascinate me about Swiss business tycoons, industrial magnates and bankers is their combination of great professional ability and infinite political naivete," Ziegler declares. "We Swiss are 'available,' as Bernese political jargon still calls it. We have no political opinions, we merely offer our services." Ziegler is no stranger to the Swiss banking community. His scholarly works over three decades have dwelt on capitalist exploitation in the third world. More than 20 years ago, he turned his acerbic scrutiny inward, to lift the story of his own society "out from under the stifling and alienating blanket of fog which is produced by the ruling discourse and produces the silence and uniformity of consent." This first tentative foray was published in 1976, but attracted little notice in or out of Switzerland; an English edition entitled "Switzerland Exposed" found no American publisher. But in the changed mood of 1997 Ziegler's latest broadside has provoked anguish among the Swiss. At best they are astonished; more often they are outraged. Geneva television held a three-hour town meeting on the issues raised by Ziegler's book; the studio audience jeered its author and applauded his critics. "The Foreign Minister instructed all our embassies to persuade 'friendly' journalists to denigrate the book in the foreign press," Ziegler writes in an afterword for this American edition. He also reports on a long-scheduled parliamentary debate about "dormant Jewish bank accounts" that was canceled in September 1996, a few moments before it was to start. The presiding officer "seems puzzled by my indignation," says Ziegler, one of those listed to speak in the debate. "His rosy face registers profound surprise, his response strikes a reproachful note: 'You surely don't want us to make an exhibition of ourselves in front of all these foreigners?'" The press galleries were indeed crowded with American, French, British and German correspondents; the Ambassadors from Israel and the United States were settled in the diplomatic gallery. They were incredulous as word spread of the cancellation. The issues that have to be aired have mounted far beyond the capacity of any single debate or author. Even as Ziegler was writing his book, the British Foreign Office put out a hastily assembled review of evidence from its official archives. In May 1997 the United States weighed in with a more thorough investigation led by Stuart Eizenstat, then an Under Secretary of Commerce; disputing Eizenstat's conclusions (which largely coincided with Ziegler's), the Swiss Government nonetheless d
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
LP: > > Perhaps we have a different definition of imperialism. I don't regard > US bullying and imperialism as the same thing. Switzerland and Sweden > have never bullied anybody in recent years, but they are imperialist > powers. US imperialism rules the roost, but it has junior partners > including Australia and New Zealand. One of the unfortunate > consequences of the "humanitarian intervention" in East Timor is that > it has legitimized the imperial ambitions of the Oceania powers. > > -- > Louis Proyect, [EMAIL PROTECTED] on I guess my point was that exploiter can easily become the exploited when the US involved. As any US citizen should know. C. Jannuzi
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
The CIA in Australia, Part 1 ... and individuals in Australia. Today, in part 1 ... operations against the Whitlam government through the ... for covert actions. Covert Action often means the ... http://www.serendipity.magnet.ch/cia/cia_oz/cia_oz1.htm - 24k - Cached - Similar pages The CIA in Australia, Part 2 ... was involved in covert activities against the ... industrial upheaval in Australia leading virtually to ... centre of the action was Whitlam Cabinet Minister Clyde ... http://www.serendipity.magnet.ch/cia/cia_oz/cia_oz2.htm http://www.pir.org/main2/Gough_Whitlam.html WHITLAM GOUGH Australia 1972-1984 Agee,P. On the Run. 1987 (197) Blum,W. The CIA: A Forgotten History. 1986 (278-83) Canadian Covert Activity Analyst 1984-W (9) Christic Institute. Sheehan Affidavit. 1988-03-25 (36-8) Corn,D. Blond Ghost. 1994 (303-7) CounterSpy 1982-01 (54) CounterSpy 1982-08 (4) CounterSpy 1984-02 (46-8) Covert Action Information Bulletin 1982-#16 (53) Covert Action Information Bulletin 1987-#28 (7) Freney,D. Get Gough! 1985 (54-62) Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) 1984-06 (4-6) Jeffreys-Jones,R. The CIA and American Democracy. 1989 (206-7) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (16, 127-42) Leigh,D. The Wilson Plot. 1988 (xii, 230, 232-3) Lernoux,P. In Banks We Trust. 1984 (72) Mother Jones 1984-03 (14-20, 44-5, 52) Parapolitics/USA 1982-03-31 (14) Seagrave,S. The Marcos Dynasty. 1988 (370-1) Stich,R. Russell,T.C. Disavow: A CIA Saga of Betrayal. 1995 (93-4) Texas Observer 1991-09-20 (11-4) Thomas,K. Keith,J. The Octopus. 1996 (42, 90-1) Wall Street Journal 1982-08-24 (22) Washington Post 1985-01-01 (A20) pages cited this search: 83 Order hard copy of these pages Show a social network diagram for this name The names below are mentioned on the listed pages with the name WHITLAM GOUGH Click on a name for a new proximity search: ANGLETON JAMES JESUS Blum,W. The CIA: A Forgotten History. 1986 (279) Freney,D. Get Gough! 1985 (55-57) Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) 1984-06 (6) Jeffreys-Jones,R. The CIA and American Democracy. 1989 (207) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (132-133) Mother Jones 1984-03 (14 16 19) Parapolitics/USA 1982-03-31 (14) ANTHONY J DOUGLAS Blum,W. The CIA: A Forgotten History. 1986 (280) Christic Institute. Sheehan Affidavit. 1988-03-25 (37) Corn,D. Blond Ghost. 1994 (303) CounterSpy 1982-01 (54) Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) 1984-06 (4 6) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (135) Mother Jones 1984-03 (20) Texas Observer 1991-09-20 (13) API DISTRIBUTORS INC Stich,R. Russell,T.C. Disavow: A CIA Saga of Betrayal. 1995 (94) ASIA FOUNDATION Blum,W. The CIA: A Forgotten History. 1986 (283) Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) 1984-06 (4) ASKIN ROBERT Parapolitics/USA 1982-03-31 (14) ASTON JOHN Wall Street Journal 1982-08-24 (22) AUSTRALIAN SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE Corn,D. Blond Ghost. 1994 (303-304) Leigh,D. The Wilson Plot. 1988 (232-233) AUSTRALIA CIA IN Blum,W. The CIA: A Forgotten History. 1986 (278-283) Canadian Covert Activity Analyst 1984-W (9) CounterSpy 1982-01 (54) CounterSpy 1982-08 (4) CounterSpy 1984-02 (46-48) Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) 1984-06 (4-6) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (127-142) Mother Jones 1984-03 (20 44-45 52) Parapolitics/USA 1982-03-31 (14) BARBOUR PETER Freney,D. Get Gough! 1985 (55) Leigh,D. The Wilson Plot. 1988 (232) Mother Jones 1984-03 (15-16) BARNETT HARVEY CounterSpy 1984-02 (48) BEAZLEY DONALD E Stich,R. Russell,T.C. Disavow: A CIA Saga of Betrayal. 1995 (94) BLACK EDWIN F (GEN) Thomas,K. Keith,J. The Octopus. 1996 (91) Wall Street Journal 1982-08-24 (22) BOYCE CHRISTOPHER JOHN Blum,W. The CIA: A Forgotten History. 1986 (283) Corn,D. Blond Ghost. 1994 (305-307) Covert Action Information Bulletin 1982-#16 (53) Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) 1984-06 (4) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (130-131) BRANDT WILLY Leigh,D. The Wilson Plot. 1988 (230 232) BROWN COLIN (ASIO) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (129) BRUNN HERBERT THEODORE Texas Observer 1991-09-20 (14) BUSH GEORGE W Texas Observer 1991-09-20 (11) BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CounterSpy 1984-02 (46) CAIRNS JIM Intelligence/Parapolitics (Paris) 1984-06 (6) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (134) CAMERON CLYDE Leigh,D. The Wilson Plot. 1988 (232) CANADA CIA IN Canadian Covert Activity Analyst 1984-W (9) CARROLL ALAN CounterSpy 1984-02 (46) CARTER LEO Wall Street Journal 1982-08-24 (22) CHAVEZ RICARDO Christic Institute. Sheehan Affidavit. 1988-03-25 (38) CITY NATIONAL BANK (MIAMI) Stich,R. Russell,T.C. Disavow: A CIA Saga of Betrayal. 1995 (94) CLINE RAY STEINER Corn,D. Blond Ghost. 1994 (306-307) Covert Action Information Bulletin 1982-#16 (53) Kwitny,J. The Crimes of Patriots. 1987 (133-134) Thomas,K. Keith,J. The Octopus. 1996 (90) COCKE ERLE JR Wall Street Journal 1982-08-24 (22) COLBY WILLIAM EGAN Covert Action Information Bulletin 1982-#16 (53) Freney,D. Get Gough! 1985 (56-57) Texas Observ
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
On Fri, 19 Apr 2002 22:46:00 +0900, Charles Jannuzi wrote: >US policies toward New Zealand came damn close >when NZ objected to US ships not confirming >whether or not they carried nukes in NZ waters >and harbors. >In the case of Australia, the US has taken the >place of GB as key 'military ally' and you could >argue the post-war US- >Australia relationship has become neo-imperial. Perhaps we have a different definition of imperialism. I don't regard US bullying and imperialism as the same thing. Switzerland and Sweden have never bullied anybody in recent years, but they are imperialist powers. US imperialism rules the roost, but it has junior partners including Australia and New Zealand. One of the unfortunate consequences of the "humanitarian intervention" in East Timor is that it has legitimized the imperial ambitions of the Oceania powers. -- Louis Proyect, [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 04/19/2002 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
LP: >>But I wouldn't compare what happened in Australia to what happened to Nicaragua, however. The USA could have lived with a Labor government in Australia. It was on the other hand ready to break laws and risk a constitutional crisis to topple a government that it feared would become another Cuba.<< US policies toward New Zealand came damn close when NZ objected to US ships not confirming whether or not they carried nukes in NZ waters and harbors. In the case of Australia, the US has taken the place of GB as key 'military ally' and you could argue the post-war US-Australia relationship has become neo-imperial. I found it interesting that a US firm so closely linked to the US imperium should be operating the immigrant prisoner camps in Australia. But then again, it was also interesting that this security firm got sold to a Danish company (which I know nothing about, though). Charles Jannuzi
Re: Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)
On Sat, 20 Apr 2002 00:37:28 +1200, Bill Rosenberg wrote: > >It's difficult to say what profit figures would >show. The ability of TNCs to transfer their >profits from one country another for tax, >political or internal reasons must make the >profit attributed to their operations in any one >country arbitrary to a degree. It is absolutely necessary to dispense with the idea that imperialism is identical to multinationals seeking out countries where labor is cheap and profits are high. Imperialism is operative even when there is not a single US corporation or subsidiary on foreign soil. Take the petroleum industry, for example, an essential piece in the jigsaw puzzle of imperialism. Saudi Arabian and Venezuelan oil wells are owned by the government, but are forced to deal with Anglo-American corporations that market the finished product. With pliant governments, the US can continue to bleed these countries dry even if it is not operating on foreign soil. This is also true of agro-export. For example, Colombia capitalists own all of the plantations but are forced to deal with much bigger and more powerful US marketing operations that buy and process the raw beans. In general, third world cartels for products like coffee beans, etc. are at a much bigger disadvantage than oil exporters, who can at least cause shocks to the world system if they cut back on production. Higher coffee prices might cause grumbling at Starbucks, but they won't bring the advanced countries' economy crashing down. Finally, many maquilas are typically not owned directly by US corporations or subsidiaries. Nike would prefer to line up local subcontractors who it can then blame for abuses to the work-force. This, of course, is not to say that North American auto production in places like Mexico is driven by the need to compete with Korea and Japan. There is a drive to the bottom. However, to fully understand the operations of imperialism, you have to look at the full constellation of class relations not just multinational behavior. -- Louis Proyect, [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 04/19/2002 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
On Fri, 19 Apr 2002 11:45:40 +0800, Grant Lee wrote: >We have quite different understandings of what >constitutes a "powerful revolution". In short, I >think Marx was right in the first place: a >_proletarian_ revolution has a much greater >chance of success and longevity if it takes >place (or begins) in a society with an >"advanced" economy. Unfortunately, there hasn't been much support for the idea of revolution in advanced countries since the end of WWII. For the foreseeable future, places like Argentina and Venezuela are on the front lines. In places such as these, anti-imperialist consciousness will fuel the proletarian revolution just as it did in Vietnam, Cuba, China and many other countries where victory was not achived. >Well you might be interested to know that >Australia probably has among the highest numbers >of US diplomats per capita, at four US govt >missions (Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, Perth) in >a country of 19 million. There is some evidence >to support allegations of CIA involvement in the >dismissal of Gough Whitlam as PM in 1975. Yes, you can find out about this in the excellent "Iceman and the Falconer", a narrative about two US youths who spied for the Soviets. One of them worked at a top secret division of TRW where he learned about the anti-Whitlam conspiracy. But I wouldn't compare what happened in Australia to what happened to Nicaragua, however. The USA could have lived with a Labor government in Australia. It was on the other hand ready to break laws and risk a constitutional crisis to topple a government that it feared would become another Cuba. >There are large companies owned by "third world" >(however you want to define that) proprietors in >both Australia and Canada. It also rains in the desert occasionally. >If it hasn't been clear yet, I don't think that >the oppression of one _whole_ society by another >_whole_ society exists. There is no real >"universal" in this case. To me imperialism is >(1) a question of degree and (2) only meaningful >when it refers to a particular class or classes >from one national society exploiting labour in >another national society. (In fact Marx _never_ >used the word "imperialism" and did not >distinguish between the logic of capital in >metropolitan countries and in their empires, >which is not to say the activities of capital in >both were identical. cf Charles Barone, 1985, In a letter to Marx, dated October 7, 1858, Engels wrote: "...The English proletariat is actually becoming more and more bourgeois, so that this most bourgeois of all nations is apparently aiming ultimately at the possession of a bourgeois aristocracy and a bourgeois proletariat alongside the bourgeoisie. For a nation which exploits the whole world this is of course to a certain extent justifiable." In a letter to Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, Engels wrote: "You ask me what the English workers think about colonial policy. Well, exactly the same as they think about politics in general. There is no workers' party here, there are only Conservatives and Liberal-Radicals. and the workers gaily share the feast of England's monopoly of the world market and the colonies." From: http://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1916/oct/x01.htm -- Louis Proyect, [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 04/19/2002 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (and US foreign investment)
Ratios of inward and outward FDI stock to GDP, and FDI flows to gross fixed capital formation are tabulated for most countries in the various World Investment Reports of UNCTAD. They also calculate a "transnationality index" of FDI host countries, which averages the four shares: FDI flows (as a percentage of GFCF), FDI inward stocks as a percentage of GDP, value added of foreign affiliates as a percentage of GDP, and employment of foreign affiliates as a precentage of total employment. The developed countries which the 2000 report tabulates (with New Zealand at the top!) average around 13%, and the tabulated developing countries 14%. Unfortunately they don't seem interested in tabulating profits! It's difficult to say what profit figures would show. The ability of TNCs to transfer their profits from one country another for tax, political or internal reasons must make the profit attributed to their operations in any one country arbitrary to a degree. Even without deliberate transfer pricing, it is conceivable that (say) Nike would put up with lower rates of profit in Indonesia because the manufacture of its shoes is such a small part of the cost. Most of the profits may well be made elsewhere in the chain of distribution and sale. I'm not saying that it necessarily happens like that, but it is quite conceivable. To say TNCs chase cheap labour is to oversimplify. Certainly that is an important part of their motivation, but since around 76% of FDI was to developed countries (in 1999) - and 90% of mergers and acquisitions - it isn't the whole story. Other motivations include domination of their selected markets, increasing scale for competitive reasons, and security of investment. Profits aside, two features of FDI which seem to clearly differentiate developed and developing countries (in the context of the US foreign investment thread, imperial vs neo-colonies) appear to be the balance between inward and outward investment stock (biased towards outward for developed countries; overwhelmingly inward for developing); and greenfield vs mergers/acquisition investment (over 80% of FDI was M&As for all countries in 1999; but about one third of FDI to developing countries). Grant Lee remarks below that Singapore's "inward FDI is still well above outward FDI in this city-state where annual trade is also 160% !!! of GDP". Singapore has unusually high FDI, but its high level of trade is no mystery. Like Hong Kong, it has a huge entrepot function, with high levels of "re-exports" - importing for the purpose of re-exporting with little or no work done on the goods on the way through. In 1999 Hong Kong (popn about 6 million) had the world's 10th largest international trading volume (mainland China was 9th). In 2000 88.5% of its exports were re-exports, a third of these to mainland China. Its foreign investment is even more remarkable (and statistics-distorting!): with the exceptions of China and its former colonial master, the U.K., the top-ranked sources and destinations of Hong Kong investment are the tax havens of the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, and Bermuda (1998 figures). The ownership of this investment is certainly elsewhere, including the U.S., Europe, Hong Kong itself, and China. Bill Grant Lee wrote: > > Bill Burgess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > country inward FDI stock/GDPoutward FDI stock/GDP > > Canada 23.9% 26.9% > > Australia 28.117.1 > > UK 23.335.9 > > France 11.715.9 > > Singapore 85.856.1 > > Malaysia67.022.7 > > Indonesia 73.32.4 > > Argentina 13.95.4 > > Brazil 17.11.4 > > Interesting figures. I haven't had time to look at the comparable figures > for other countries. In any case they don't prove a permanent/structural > exclusion from "imperial" activity. For example, what about Hong Kong > (pre-1997, not that it is yet a homogenous part of China)? The last I heard > there was hardly any manufacturing left in Hong Kong because proprietors had > shifted operations to the mainland. South Africa? Saudi Arabia? > > > Note the > > obvious difference in rates of outward FDI, plus the fact that most FDI by > > Canada, France, etc. is in other imperialist countries while most FDI by > > Indonesia, Argentina, etc. is in fellow semi-colonies. > > Every bourgeoisie has to start somewhere. For example --- and I'm not going > to revisit the complexities and vitriol of the "Kenya Debate" --- but I just > came across this on the web: > > Andrea Goldstein and Njuguna S. Ndung'u, OECD Development Centre Technical > Paper No. 171: "New Forms Of Co-Operation And Integration In Emerging Africa > Regional Integration Experience, March 2001. > > quote: (p. 16) Table 5. Import Sources (1997)* > > (From)Kenya Tanzan
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada (Comparative FDI)
Bill Burgess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > country inward FDI stock/GDPoutward FDI stock/GDP > Canada 23.9% 26.9% > Australia 28.117.1 > UK 23.335.9 > France 11.715.9 > Singapore 85.856.1 > Malaysia67.022.7 > Indonesia 73.32.4 > Argentina 13.95.4 > Brazil 17.11.4 Interesting figures. I haven't had time to look at the comparable figures for other countries. In any case they don't prove a permanent/structural exclusion from "imperial" activity. For example, what about Hong Kong (pre-1997, not that it is yet a homogenous part of China)? The last I heard there was hardly any manufacturing left in Hong Kong because proprietors had shifted operations to the mainland. South Africa? Saudi Arabia? > Note the > obvious difference in rates of outward FDI, plus the fact that most FDI by > Canada, France, etc. is in other imperialist countries while most FDI by > Indonesia, Argentina, etc. is in fellow semi-colonies. Every bourgeoisie has to start somewhere. For example --- and I'm not going to revisit the complexities and vitriol of the "Kenya Debate" --- but I just came across this on the web: Andrea Goldstein and Njuguna S. Ndung'u, OECD Development Centre Technical Paper No. 171: "New Forms Of Co-Operation And Integration In Emerging Africa Regional Integration Experience, March 2001. quote: (p. 16) Table 5. Import Sources (1997)* (From)Kenya Tanzania Uganda (To)Kenya-0**0** Tanzania 10.4 -0 Uganda 25.90**- * These are percentages of total imports for the respective country. **The percentages are very small. Source:Report of the permanent Tripartite Commission for East African Co-operation: 1996-98. Obviously exports are not investment but the above suggests one reason why (p. 24) "... there are also restrictions on Kenyan investment in Uganda and Tanzania..." (24) > Singapore's inward > and outward rates are both high, but note that inward FDI is still well > above outward FDI in this city-state where annual trade is also 160% > !!! of GDP. That trend is not unusual for countries with small populations and highly developed economies. What are the comparative figures for Belgium and Switzerland? Regards, Grant.
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Louis: > Basically, I > advocate anti-imperialist slogans in places like Argentina and Venezuela, > in combination with demands against the local comprador bourgeoisie. The > most powerful revolutions in this hemisphere over the past 50 years have > identified with the historical colonial revolution, even though the > countries were nominally independent: Cuba, Nicaragua, Colombia and El > Salvador. This means identifying and fighting against all attempts to > control the country from outside, starting with the US Embassy to the oil > companies that are bleeding Colombia dry. We have quite different understandings of what constitutes a "powerful revolution". In short, I think Marx was right in the first place: a _proletarian_ revolution has a much greater chance of success and longevity if it takes place (or begins) in a society with an "advanced" economy. > BTW, do you know why there has > never been a coup in the USA? Because there is no US Embassy here. Well you might be interested to know that Australia probably has among the highest numbers of US diplomats per capita, at four US govt missions (Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne, Perth) in a country of 19 million. There is some evidence to support allegations of CIA involvement in the dismissal of Gough Whitlam as PM in 1975. > I am talking about maquiladoras, > mines and plantations owned by the bourgeoisie of the 3rd world employing > white Canadians and Australians at sub-minimum wage while goons beat up or > kill trade union organizers. There are large companies owned by "third world" (however you want to define that) proprietors in both Australia and Canada. I think history shows that capital (whether national, comprador or global) will do anything necessary and/or possible, including slavery and murder, wherever it operates. I don't know about Canada but in Australia capital has been constrained by unusual historical factors: e.g. long term shortages of skilled/experienced labour, immigration dominated by an "aristocracy of labour", workers familiar with organisation (i.e. in Britain and Ireland) and who --- thanks to all of these factors --- were relatively militant. (This also led to the world's first ever governments by an avowed party of the working class [but as Lenin himself noted, not really _for_ the working class]: in the Colony of Queensland in 1899 and at the federal level in 1904.] Nevertheless, for many years now union membership has been declining, the deregulation of labour has increased and so has the rolling back of the welfare system. > You are describing capitalism as it involves the two major classes in > society. I am describing imperialism, which involves one nation subjugating > another. It combines class and national oppression. If it hasn't been clear yet, I don't think that the oppression of one _whole_ society by another _whole_ society exists. There is no real "universal" in this case. To me imperialism is (1) a question of degree and (2) only meaningful when it refers to a particular class or classes from one national society exploiting labour in another national society. (In fact Marx _never_ used the word "imperialism" and did not distinguish between the logic of capital in metropolitan countries and in their empires, which is not to say the activities of capital in both were identical. cf Charles Barone, 1985, _Marxist_Thought_on_Imperialism:_Survey_and_Critique_) As I said above, what capital needs to do, it will do, to the greatest possible degree, to the nearest available workers in the weakest position. > When a single African country > begins to play this role, then maybe we can revisit the question. South Africa has attributes of both the third world and first world. Including multinational corporations. (If it matters --- and I'm not sure it does --- I would expect to see an increasing number of black shareholders and executives within these companies. Perhaps someone else has facts on this.) Regards, Grant.
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Louis Proyect writes: > >there are degrees. Japan isn't going to become a neo-colony in the near > >future, but it's clear that US-based companies use their clout to push for > >"opening" the Japanese economy to freer flow of capital, etc., so that US > >companies can buy Japanese assets, etc., at advantageous terms. The US's strategic advantage in this little war so far has been the value of the equity markets, which places Japan at a distinct disadvantage and makes US and UK firms, at least until they buy high in a bubble, masters of the acquisitions universe. In some ways it's possible to argue the US-Japan relationship is 'neoimperial'. Japan's strategic resource base is tied to US foreign policy, and Japan in most ways has no independent foreign policy--this is why there is so little progress with the Koreas, China or even Russia. Japan's 'defense' is tied into a US-Japan agreement that is more limiting and extraterritorial than NATO is in Europe (though the US military has always appreciated things like Mitsubishi avionics). The new phase (which I correlate with a stalled stock market in the US along with liberalization of capital movements, the phony war against terror notwithstanding) , though, is the US push to get inward direct investment into Japan--especially banks, insurance, finance and real estate (which reflects the 'strengths of the US economy in these areas--FIRE industries). This became so obvious when US representatives were proclaiming in public it was time for US interests to re-capitalize Japan's failed banking system (a claim which seemed ridiculous to everyone but the grasping Americans, since it is Japan with all the savings not going anywhere). However, little has been said about what is regulation for these new forces (US led and owned private equity, which finds its apotheosis perhaps in Carlyle Group using CALPERS money). And the need has become glaring with things like Enron and Andersen and the inherhent conflicts of interests at the investment banks (over analysis, consultation, the banks' own investments, and interests of its private equity clients). > > Indeed, inter-imperialist rivalry provoked WWI and WWII. For background on > the last attempt by US imperialism to push Japan against the wall, see > Jonathan Marshall's "To Have and Have Not: Southeast Asian Raw Materials > and the Origins of the Pacific War". Yes, this is an excellent analysis. Many Americans are still in denial over what led to that disastrous war. Dower's 'War Without Mercy' is an excellent analysis of the ideologies used to justify the conflict. Charles Jannuzi
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Grant Lee wrote: >Louis, > >I'm sorry you feel that way. I took your reference to Lenin meant that you >favoured the "national front" tactics of the early 1920s, which did involve >bourgeois nationalists (in dependent countries). This only confuses things further. Lenin advocated support for nationalist movements as a means to an end: communism. This becomes clearer when you read his article on ultraleftism, which urges support for social democrats in terms of the way a rope supports a hanging man. >I suggest nearly all of the world remains under the control of imperialism >in the sense in which you use the word. This dissolves the concrete into the universal. If imperialism is the latest stage of capitalism, then of course it exists everywhere. However, we need to be able to distinguish between exploiter and exploited. For example, as I understand it, Michael Perelman is working on a book that will look at ecological imperialism. When Bolivian peasants were being forced to pay for water, it was a multinational corporation that was doing the charging. Bolivian corporations do not generally come to places like the USA and Australia to seize control of natural resources, do they? >In 1900, Australia had a much higher standard of living relative to the rest >of the world --- in fact probably the highest --- when it was officially six >British colonies and dominated by British finance capital. The standard of >living has declined significantly since then. I am puzzled. I just posted the UN data that indicated that Australia ranks SECOND in the world in terms of standard of living indicators. What kind of drop is this supposed to be then? Argentina ranked among the top nations in the world in the early 1900s but ranked SEVENTY-FIFTH in 2001. It has probably dropped lower. That is what we are dealing with, isn't it? >What would the highest stage >of colonialism/imperialism mean if not direct rule for the purposes of >economic exploitation? (Exploitation being inherent in all capitalist >relations of production.) Lenin spoke in terms of super-profits. In third world countries, you have a reserve army of the unemployed and repression against trade unionists and the left. This leads to maquiladoras and all the rest. If Guatemalan multinationals were coming to Canada in order to pay the natives 3 dollars a day to sew dresses for K-Mart, we'd be entitled to speak about "all capitalist relations of production" being generalized or some such thing. This does not happen, however. Louis Proyect Marxism mailing list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Louis, I'm sorry you feel that way. I took your reference to Lenin meant that you favoured the "national front" tactics of the early 1920s, which did involve bourgeois nationalists (in dependent countries). > Imperialism deals with class relations, not which flag is flying over > a country. I agree. But why then would Lenin have bothered to seek ties with bourgeois independence movements in the European overseas empires? Because he believed there could be no workers' revolution until formal national questions had been solved. In nearly all cases they have been, showing both the emptiness of nationalism and the futility of alliances between marxists and nationalists. > This is the reason that Hugo Chavez calls his movement > Bolivarist. He understands that all of Latin America remains under > the control of imperialism, despite formal independence. I suggest nearly all of the world remains under the control of imperialism in the sense in which you use the word. > Why is Australia not a semicolony? Because it ranks number 2 in the > world in terms of Human Development, according to the UN > (http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/), with a GDP per capita of $24,574. If > it were a semicolony, these figures would not obtain. In 1900, Australia had a much higher standard of living relative to the rest of the world --- in fact probably the highest --- when it was officially six British colonies and dominated by British finance capital. The standard of living has declined significantly since then. What would the highest stage of colonialism/imperialism mean if not direct rule for the purposes of economic exploitation? (Exploitation being inherent in all capitalist relations of production.) Regards, Grant Lee.
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
On Mon, 15 Apr 2002 15:29:15 +0800, Grant Lee wrote: >I would ask: "why would >Marxists any longer seek solidarity with >bourgeois nationalists, except in the now rare >circumstances where the formal national question >has never been resolved?" In my last reply to you, I urged you not to put words in my mouth. Now, once again, you would accuse me of seeking solidarity with bourgeois nationalists. Therefore, after replying to you this final time, I will ignore your future remarks on this thread. I have not accused you of seeking solidarity with imperialist powers, have I? > The world has changed >a great deal since Lenin's lifetime: in >particular, there are now very few cases of >formal/legal/military/direct control. >Do you not see decolonisation since 1945 as a >major historical event? Isn't there a world of >difference between imperialism in India in 1920 >and Argentina in 2002? No, I do not see decolonization as a major historical event. Imperialism deals with class relations, not which flag is flying over a country. This is the reason that Hugo Chavez calls his movement Bolivarist. He understands that all of Latin America remains under the control of imperialism, despite formal independence. >Why not? Why is Australia not a semicolony? Because it ranks number 2 in the world in terms of Human Development, according to the UN (http://www.undp.org/hdr2001/), with a GDP per capita of $24,574. If it were a semicolony, these figures would not obtain. -- Louis Proyect, [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 04/15/2002 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Louis: You said: > But I am trying to address the question of whether Argentina is > qualitatively different from Great Britain. My purpose in these posts > is to answer a current within Marxism that asserts that there is no > difference. In that case you were complicating matters by referring to other cases (e.g. Canada and Australia). I simply responded to what I perceived as a critique of the (very widely held) view that there are significant historical similarities between the economies of Argentina and Australia. In regard to the following: > I am trying to help > Marxists make elementary distinctions that will help them carry out > solidarity work, not develop a class analysis of Great Britain or > Canada. and > I am dealing with the question of national oppression and > You don't seem to find the category imperialist meaningful in the > sense that Lenin did. Not necessarily. I would ask: "why would Marxists any longer seek solidarity with bourgeois nationalists, except in the now rare circumstances where the formal national question has never been resolved?" The world has changed a great deal since Lenin's lifetime: in particular, there are now very few cases of formal/legal/military/direct control. Do you not see decolonisation since 1945 as a major historical event? Isn't there a world of difference between imperialism in India in 1920 and Argentina in 2002? > But Australia is not a semicolony in the sense that Argentina is. Why not? > Pushing countries around is not the same as imperialism. Because the > USA is hegemonic, it can influence economic and political affairs > across the globe. But it has a different kind of relationship to > Latin American countries than it does to European countries. Does "European" include Australia? That will be good news to the miniscule conservative faction that has floated the idea of EU membership. If your "Europe" does include Australia, then there is evidence of more than "hegemonic" interference by the US in economic and political affairs here. > There is a wealth of literature that has explained this, from Baran-Sweezy to > Wallerstein. Those are my ideological influences. What are yours? I agree strongly with the classic formulation that "ideology is false consciousness". If you mean theoretical influences, then my view is that there is no substitute for Marx's own method (even if I disagree with the way he used it on some occasions). > There is also a powerful bourgeoisie that includes people like Rupert Murdoch. This is not a good example; News Corporation has been based in New York for years. Murdoch is also now a US citizen, if that means anything. I'm sure there are ex-Argentine billionaires as well. > Let Argentine capitalists off the hook? If you want to have a > discussion with me, don't put words in my mouth. I apologise and hope to read a full discussion of their activities. Regards, Grant Lee.
Re: Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Left nationalism is nothing new in Canada and it certainly not a novel theory of Ross Dowson. Left nationalism was a strong current in the NDP (New Democractic Party) a social democratic party that ruled in BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba and even Ontario for a while. It still governs Manitoba and Saskatchewan. This is a federal manifesto though of 1969 Cheers Ken Hanly The Waffle Manifesto Waffle Resolution 133 Our aim as democratic socialists is to build an independent socialist Canada. Our Aim as supporters of the New Democratic Party is to make it a truly socialist party. The achievement of socialism awaits the building of a mass base of socialists in factories and offices, on farms and campuses. The development of socialist consciousness, on which can be built a socialist base, must be the first priority of the New Democratic Party. The New Democratic Party must be seen as the parliamentary wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental social change. It must be radicalized from within and it must be radicalized from without. The most urgent issue for Canadians is the very survival of Canada. Anxiety is pervasive and the goal of greater economic independence receives widespread support. But economic independence without socialism is a sham, and neither are meaningful without true participatory democracy. The major threat to Canadian survival today is American control of the Canadian economy. The major issue of our times is not national unity but national survival, and the fundamental threat is external, not internal. American corporate capitalism is the dominant factor shaping Canadian society. In Canada American economic control operates through the formidable medium of the multinational corporation. The Canadian corporate elite has opted for a junior partnership with these American enterprises. Canada has been reduced to a resource base and consumer market within the American empire. The American empire is the central reality for Canadians. It is an empire characterized by militarism abroad and racism at home. Canadian resources and diplomacy have been enlisted in the support of that empire. In the barbarous war in Vietnam, Canada has supported the United States through its membership on the International Control Commission and through sales of arms and strategic resources to the American military-industrial complex. The American empire is held together through world-wide military alliances and by giant corporations. Canada's membership in the American alliance system and the ownership of the Canadian economy by American corporations precluded Canada's playing an independent role in the world. These bonds must be cut if corporate capitalism and the social priorities it creates is to be effectively challenged. Canadian development is distorted by a corporate capitalist economy. Corporate investment creates and fosters superfluous individual consumption at the expense of social needs. Corporate decision making concentrates investment in a few major urban areas which become increasingly uninhabitable while the rest of the country sinks into underdevelopment. The criterion that the most profitable pursuits are the most important ones causes the neglect of activities whose value cannot be measured by the standard of profitability. It is not accidental that housing, education, medical care and public transportation are inadequately provided for by the present social system. The problem of regional disparities is rooted in the profit orientation of capitalism. The social costs of stagnant areas are irrelevant to the corporations. For Canada the problem is compounded by the reduction of Canada to the position of an economic colony of the United States. The foreign capitalist has even less concern for balanced development of the country than the Canadian capitalist with roots in a particular region. An independence movement based on substituting Canadian capitalists for American capitalists, or on public policy to make foreign corporations behave as if they were Canadian corporations, cannot be our final objective. There is not now an independent Canadian capitalism and any lingering pretensions on the part of Canadian businessmen to independence lack credibility. Without a strong national capitalist class behind them, Canadian governments, Liberal and Conservative, have functioned in the interests of international and particularly American capitalism, and have lacked the will to pursue even a modest strategy of economic independence. Capitalism must be replaced by socialism, by national planning of investment and by the public ownership of the means of production in the interests of the Canadian people as a whole. Canadian nationalism is a relevant force on which to build to the extent that it is anti-imperialist. On the road to socialism, such aspirations for independence must be taken into account. For to pursue independence seriously is to make visible the necessity of socialism in Canada. T
Re: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
On Sun, 14 Apr 2002 10:23:17 +0800, Grant Lee wrote: >Louis: > >If it isn't already clear, I find references to >monolithic, single-minded exploitative entities >called "Great Britain" or the "United States" to >be untenable generalisations, which ignore the >complexity of real class structures and the >historical agency of indigenous layers of >capital (in particular). But I am trying to address the question of whether Argentina is qualitatively different from Great Britain. My purpose in these posts is to answer a current within Marxism that asserts that there is no difference. Not surprisingly, these currents flourish in Great Britain and were either neutral during the Malvinas war, or damned Argentina with faint praise. I am also trying to explain why the "national question" is on the agenda for Argentina, while it would not be for Canada, for example. Recently, a founder of Canadian Trotskyism named Ross Dowson passed away. He developed the rather novel theory late in life that Canada was semicolonial and promoted a kind of left-nationalism. He was quite wrong. I am trying to help Marxists make elementary distinctions that will help them carry out solidarity work, not develop a class analysis of Great Britain or Canada. If I were to do so, I would be posting for the next 10 years. My time is limited. >No, Whitehall didn't have to send gunboats to >Australia because British state force was there >in large numbers from day one. And they were >also quite willing to use force against their >own subjects. I am not sure what you are driving at. The USA used state force against miners in Colorado and Philippine freedom-fighters in the early 1900s. But the USA was qualitatively different from the Philippines. I am dealing with the question of national oppression, which became the focus of revolutionary socialism during the early years of the Comintern: At the fourth session of the Baku Conference on July 26, 1920, Lenin said, "First, what is the cardinal idea underlying our theses? It is the distinction between oppressed and oppressor NATIONS." He also referred to Comrade Quelch of the British Socialist Party who said that "the rank-and-file British worker would consider it treasonable to help the enslaved NATIONS in their uprisings against British rule." These are the sorts of distinctions I am trying to make. >To say that you have never heard anybody refer >to "Australia" as a victim of imperialism is to >also overgeneralising; >obviously millions of Australians were and are >victims of imperialism, if not necessarily in >the same ways that workers in Nepal or the >Netherlands are victims. But Australia is not a semicolony in the sense that Argentina is. >British finance capital used its market >dominance to "rip off" everyone in the 19th >Century, including other layers of British >capital. One kind of rip off was bullying weak >states to pay exorbitant amounts for >infrastructure. You don't seem to find the category imperialist meaningful in the sense that Lenin did. >Yes, they did this to the weak 19th Century >colonial states in Australia. Is that >surprising? US-based capital still does it to >Australian governments. Pushing countries around is not the same as imperialism. Because the USA is hegemonic, it can influence economic and political affairs across the globe. But it has a different kind of relationship to Latin American countries than it does to European countries. There is a wealth of literature that has explained this, from Baran-Sweezy to Wallerstein. Those are my ideological influences. What are yours? >"Was Australia based on something like the >latifundia?" Not in the sense of peasant >agriculture; however in some ways Australia was >arguably more "backward" prior to 1850 and until >well into the 20th Century in northern >Australia, since the main productive activities >in those times/regions, especially large scale >pastoralism, relied on unfree labour: at first >British convicts, later Aborigines, South East >Asians and Pacific Islanders. That is only aspect of Australian class society. There is also a powerful bourgeoisie that includes people like Rupert Murdoch. >A pertinent metaphor, since the >economies focused on exports of raw materials, >like Argentina, Australia and Canada were >actually the worst affected by the Great >Depression. "Eventually a mass radical movement >gave them the understanding that the fault is in >capitalism, not theirs. This is the lesson I am >trying to impart for Argentina." I fully >appreciate that; but why let Argentine >capitalists off the hook? Let Argentine capitalists off the hook? If you want to have a discussion with me, don't put words in my mouth. -- Louis Proyect, [EMAIL PROTECTED] on 04/14/2002 Marxism list: http://www.marxmail.org
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Louis: If it isn't already clear, I find references to monolithic, single-minded exploitative entities called "Great Britain" or the "United States" to be untenable generalisations, which ignore the complexity of real class structures and the historical agency of indigenous layers of capital (in particular). For example, you say "Great Britain" built railways in Argentina as though it was the British state/society and not a few British companies, backed by the occasional gunboat. (BTW Is the "Argentine parliamentarian" you cite a Marxian political economist?) No, Whitehall didn't have to send gunboats to Australia because British state force was there in large numbers from day one. And they were also quite willing to use force against their own subjects. To say that you have never heard anybody refer to "Australia" as a victim of imperialism is to also overgeneralising; obviously millions of Australians were and are victims of imperialism, if not necessarily in the same ways that workers in Nepal or the Netherlands are victims. British finance capital used its market dominance to "rip off" everyone in the 19th Century, including other layers of British capital. One kind of rip off was bullying weak states to pay exorbitant amounts for infrastructure. Yes, they did this to the weak 19th Century colonial states in Australia. Is that surprising? US-based capital still does it to Australian governments. "Was Australia based on something like the latifundia?" Not in the sense of peasant agriculture; however in some ways Australia was arguably more "backward" prior to 1850 and until well into the 20th Century in northern Australia, since the main productive activities in those times/regions, especially large scale pastoralism, relied on unfree labour: at first British convicts, later Aborigines, South East Asians and Pacific Islanders. What I wrote to my Argentine friend in consolation was pretty much what I said to you: it is a failure of the global bourgeoisie, the Argentine bourgeoisie in particular and the Argentine bourgeois state, not Argentine wage earners. "During the early years of the Great Depression, unemployed men would blame themselves for their failure." A pertinent metaphor, since the economies focused on exports of raw materials, like Argentina, Australia and Canada were actually the worst affected by the Great Depression. "Eventually a mass radical movement gave them the understanding that the fault is in capitalism, not theirs. This is the lesson I am trying to impart for Argentina." I fully appreciate that; but why let Argentine capitalists off the hook? Regards, Grant Lee.
Re: Re: RE: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Michael, I don't know enough about Argentina to do a proper comparison, but a few points on Canada -- since the break with British colonialism in Canada's case was initiated by Britain over the opposition of the ruling elite in Canada. 1. The British were losing money on the Canadian colonies since the cost of defense for such a few isolated colonies against American imperialism was heavy. (e.g. war of 1812-14). 2. There were 'liberal' revolts (incipient revolutions) against the colonial elite by the farmers and small business in 1837 which led Britain to appoint a commission to find an answer to the failing colonial administration. A particular problem was Quebec which held no allegience to Britain and was opposed by the increasing numbers of British (Irish) immigrants and Empire Loyalists from the US. There was also a self-rule movement in the Maritimes. Remember, at this time, Canada existed as essentially 8 different colonies each under different forms of rule (from the Chartered Company rule of the Hudson's Bay Company over the Northwest Territories and over Vancouver Island and British Columbia until the gold rush) to the various forms of semi-independent colonial regimes in the Maritimes and Upper and Lower Canada. 3. The rise of the free trade (anti-corn law) movement in Britain meant the end of colonial preference for Canada's major staple industries -- end of timber preferences, end of the corn laws, end of the navigation acts -- completely gutted the "commercial empire of the St. Lawrence," the merchant-capitalist system based on exports to Britain, the leading one being timber. US grain shipped through Canada was given preference as Canadian grain and with that, Canadian merchants had financed canal and railway systems (1840s-1850s) backed by British bondholders. This all came crashing down with the end of the Br. Imperial System. The Canadian colonies were told to go on their own and the British tried to negotiate the cheapest deal possible. 4. The Canadian alternative was to a. join the US; b, negotiate a 'free trade agreement'; c. amalgamate into an independent country. B. was tried but the US repudiated the treaty as a result of the civil war. A. was rejected by the Canadian population. C was the final result with the formation of Canada with the British North America Act of 1867. Confederation was the compromise solution of domestic commercial-financial capital. To the extent there was any industrial capital interest it was tied up with the railways which were financed in Britain but run for the benefit of Canadian commercial capital. The evolution of industrial capital is a much more complicated question but really post-dates Canadian 'independence'. However, this is the subject of a major debate of interpretation of Canadian development which I won't go into here. Paul Phillips Date sent: Sat, 13 Apr 2002 12:31:55 -0700 From: Michael Perelman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: [PEN-L:24882] Re: RE: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Louis tells us that that the British behaved differently toward Argentina > than Canada. Why? Was it because the settlers were ethnically different > in Argentina from those in Canada? Did Britain have to behave differently > toward Commonwealth countries? > > Paul, could you give us a brief outline of the answer? > > I also enclosed a quote from very interesting book that I know Lou has > read. > > Drayton, Richard. 2000. Nature's Government: Science, Imperial > Britain, and the "Improvement" of the World (New Haven: Yale > University Press). > 104: The American Revolution taught the British that they should > desire colonies with dissimilar climates to their own so that the > colonies with the complements rather than competitors. > > > -- > > Michael Perelman > Economics Department > California State University > Chico, CA 95929 > > Tel. 530-898-5321 > E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED] > >
Re: RE: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Louis tells us that that the British behaved differently toward Argentina than Canada. Why? Was it because the settlers were ethnically different in Argentina from those in Canada? Did Britain have to behave differently toward Commonwealth countries? Paul, could you give us a brief outline of the answer? I also enclosed a quote from very interesting book that I know Lou has read. Drayton, Richard. 2000. Nature's Government: Science, Imperial Britain, and the "Improvement" of the World (New Haven: Yale University Press). 104: The American Revolution taught the British that they should desire colonies with dissimilar climates to their own so that the colonies with the complements rather than competitors. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
RE: Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >Yea, there is a lot of superficial truth in this account, at least as >relative to Canada. But there is also a lot of overgeneralization and >obfuscation in this account also. Since I have already published several >hundreds of pages and articles on this subject Where? I'd like to read some of this. Doug Since Doug Asked, Here is the list of my publications in the area of Canadian economic development with particular reference to regional impacts on class formation and the distribution of the gains of development. Concentration is on the 1860--1920 period though there are a couple from an earlier period (on land tenure) and on the later period involving the shift from Can-GB economic dependency to Can-US dependency. I have not included those specifically on staples or on labour. Paul Phillips Books: Regional Disparities. (Toronto: Lorimer, 1978). (Revised edition, 1982). Labour and Capital in Canada: 16401860, by H.C. Pentland, edited and with an introduction by Paul Phillips. (Toronto: Lorimer, 1981). Essays in the Historical Political Economy of Canada (Winnipeg: Society of Socialist Studies Publications, 2001) Published Articles and Chapters: "Confederation and the Economy of British Columbia", British Columbia and Confederation, ed. by George Shelton. (Victoria: University of Victoria Press, 1967). "The National Policy and the Development of the Western Canadian Labour Movement", Prairie Perspectives 2, ed. by A.W. Rasporich and H.C. Klassen. (Toronto: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973). "Land Tenure and Development in Upper and Lower Canada", Journal of Canadian Studies,May, 1974. "The Mining Frontier in B.C. 18801920", Visual History Series. (National Museums of Canada and the National Film Board, 1975). "Vernon C. Fowke and the Hinterland Perspective", Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory, Vol. 2, No. 2, SpringSummer, 1979. "The National Policy Revisited", Journal of Canadian Studies, Autumn, 1979. "The Prairie Urban System, 19111961: Specialization and Change", Town and City: Aspects of Western Canadian Urban Development, ed. by A. Artibise. (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1980). "From Mobilization to Continentalism: The Canadian Economy 19391972", (with Stephen Watson), Modern Canada", ed. by G. Kealey and M. Cross, CanadianSocial History Series, Vol. 5. (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1984). "Unequal Exchange, Surplus Value and the CommercialIndustrial Question",Explorations in Economic History: Essays in Honour of Irene Spry, ed. by Duncan Cameron. (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1985). "Retrospection and Revisionism: Dependency and Class in Canadian Political Economy",Journal of Canadian Studies, October, 1987. "The Underground Economy: The Mining Frontier to 1920", Workers, Capital, and the State in British Columbia, ed. by Rennie Warburton and David Coburn (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1988). "Easternising Manitoba: The Changing Economy of the New West", London Journal of Canadian Studies, vol. 5, 1988. "Manitoba in the Agrarian Period: 18701940", The Political Economy of Manitoba, ed. by J. Silver and J. Hull (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1990). "The Canadian Prairies Once Economic Region or Two", The Constitutional Future of the Prairie and Atlantic Regions of Canada, ed. by James McCrorie and MarthaMacDonald (Regina: Canadian Plains Research Centre, 1992). "PostMortem for Canadian Regional Policy", Acadiensis, Summer 1992. Unpublished Papers: "The 'Great War' and Primitive Accumulation: War Finance and Class Formation in Canada 19141923", University of Manitoba Economics Department Seminar Series, November 14, 1997. "Canada and the West: Then and Now", Paper to the Territorial Grain Growers Association Centenary Symposium, Regina, November 245, 2001.
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
In other words, a ruling class based in domestic finance capital emerged in Canada (and Australia), and these coutnries became imperialist economies; this did not occur in Argentina. In the case of Canada this is easier to see if Armstrong's overstress on staples relative to the development of modern farming and manufacturing is corrected, and the bank-railway axis of finance capital is made explicit. Bill Burgess At 07:51 PM 11/04/02 -0400, Louis P. wrote: >Warwick Armstrong, "The Social Origins of Industrial Growth: Canada, >Argentina and Australia, 1870-1930", in "Argentina, Australia and >Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965", edited by D. >Platt & Guido di Tella: > >Yet, within the general pattern of similarity which gave them their >distinctiveness, there were also important differences. The key to >such differences can, again, be identified in the nature of the >social structures and relationships within the three. This, in turn, >affected the way in which the economy of each interacted with others >in the international system of trade and investment. The most obvious >variation is to be found between Argentina on the one hand, and >Canada and Australia on the other. In the latter two, the urban >elements in the ruling coalition were stronger, and earlier assumed a >dominance over the staples producers. By the 1880s and 1890s, the >Australian squatters had become, in many cases, subaltern members of >the coalition, indebted to, and dependent upon, the banking sector >for their continued viability. The power of Canadian capital, too, >was concentrated in the financial institutions and commercial >enterprises of Montreal and Toronto, which exercised a clear economic >hegemony over the staples producers, and especially over the grain >farmers of Ontario and the Prairies. This economic weight was >reflected also in political influence at federal level. In Argentina, >the dominance of the urban groups was less evident. The landed >oligarchy continued to wield much greater economic and political >influence, even after the Radical Party's triumph in 1916, and acted >as the principal arbiter of social, economic, and political change in >a way that its Australian equivalent had ceased to do after the late >nineteenth century. And in any serious confrontations, they could >call upon the ultimate weapon, the armed forces, which had retained a >special position in the administrative order ever since the >nineteenth century. > >One indicator of the relative capacities of the three ruling groups >may be seen in RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION. The railway networks, central to >the opening up of the staples-producing prairies of Canada, the >pampas of Argentina, and the outback of Australia, could be >considered economic elements of national importance to each country. >In Canada, the major part of the construction was carried out first >by private capital, heavily promoted and subsidised by the state. >Australia's federal government constructed its own system in the >separate colonies, and later, federal capital remained responsible >for construction and operation, although, as in Canada, it drew >heavily upon foreign loans and expertise. Argentina, however, the >principal lines (and most profitable) were built and run by European >companies, while the state was left with the task of undertaking the >peripheral and less profitable sections. > >The manufacturing sectors of the three societies reflected also the >distinct capacity of the ruling coalition to branch out into new and >innovative activity. In the 1850s Canada was already establishing a >range of small-scale, manufacturing activities associated with >agricultural production; these competed successfully with the later >influx of US branch plants. Similarly, the steel industry of Southern >Ontario remained essentially a Canadian national enterprise. By the >First World War, these groups had formed a modern corporate elite, >part of a powerful managerial structure. > >Australia diversified and industrialized later, and possibly more >slowly, but its manufacturing sector was, if anything, more firmly >based upon indigenous capital and entrepreneurship. The processing >industries and small-scale urban manufacturers were joined, after the >turn of the century, by large-scale corporate enterprises, especially >in the mining metals sector. As in Canada, enterprises such as BHP >and Collins House were no longer family-controlled; they were modern, >twentieth-century industrial conglomerates with vertical control from >mining to blast furnaces to wire-rope factories to shipping lines - >and with links to foreign capital through joint ventures. The >Australian state, like its Canadian counterpart, was
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Correction: this was the topic I intended for my last post, which went put under "The Collapse of Argentina, part one".
Re: Argentina, Australia and Canada
Hmmm. Yea, there is a lot of superficial truth in this account, at least as relative to Canada. But there is also a lot of overgeneralization and obfuscation in this account also. Since I have already published several hundreds of pages and articles on this subject, I am not about to begin a detailed rebuttle here, suffice it to say that Louis is perhaps right in general direction, though widely misinformed in detail, at least as far as Canada is concerned in the 1860-1920 period. From: Louis Proyect <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: m <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, psn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, pen-l <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, a-list <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, wsn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Copies to: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date sent: Thu, 11 Apr 2002 19:51:50 -0400 Subject: [PEN-L:24837] Argentina, Australia and Canada Send reply to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Warwick Armstrong, "The Social Origins of Industrial Growth: Canada, > Argentina and Australia, 1870-1930", in "Argentina, Australia and > Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965", edited by D. > Platt & Guido di Tella: > > Yet, within the general pattern of similarity which gave them their > distinctiveness, there were also important differences. The key to > such differences can, again, be identified in the nature of the > social structures and relationships within the three. This, in turn, > affected the way in which the economy of each interacted with others > in the international system of trade and investment. The most obvious > variation is to be found between Argentina on the one hand, and > Canada and Australia on the other. In the latter two, the urban > elements in the ruling coalition were stronger, and earlier assumed a > dominance over the staples producers. By the 1880s and 1890s, the > Australian squatters had become, in many cases, subaltern members of > the coalition, indebted to, and dependent upon, the banking sector > for their continued viability. The power of Canadian capital, too, > was concentrated in the financial institutions and commercial > enterprises of Montreal and Toronto, which exercised a clear economic > hegemony over the staples producers, and especially over the grain > farmers of Ontario and the Prairies. This economic weight was > reflected also in political influence at federal level. In Argentina, > the dominance of the urban groups was less evident. The landed > oligarchy continued to wield much greater economic and political > influence, even after the Radical Party's triumph in 1916, and acted > as the principal arbiter of social, economic, and political change in > a way that its Australian equivalent had ceased to do after the late > nineteenth century. And in any serious confrontations, they could > call upon the ultimate weapon, the armed forces, which had retained a > special position in the administrative order ever since the > nineteenth century. > > One indicator of the relative capacities of the three ruling groups > may be seen in RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION. The railway networks, central to > the opening up of the staples-producing prairies of Canada, the > pampas of Argentina, and the outback of Australia, could be > considered economic elements of national importance to each country. > In Canada, the major part of the construction was carried out first > by private capital, heavily promoted and subsidised by the state. > Australia's federal government constructed its own system in the > separate colonies, and later, federal capital remained responsible > for construction and operation, although, as in Canada, it drew > heavily upon foreign loans and expertise. Argentina, however, the > principal lines (and most profitable) were built and run by European > companies, while the state was left with the task of undertaking the > peripheral and less profitable sections. > > The manufacturing sectors of the three societies reflected also the > distinct capacity of the ruling coalition to branch out into new and > innovative activity. In the 1850s Canada was already establishing a > range of small-scale, manufacturing activities associated with > agricultural production; these competed successfully with the later > influx of US branch plants. Similarly, the steel industry of Southern > Ontario remained essentially a Canadian national enterprise. By the > First World War, these groups had formed a modern corporate elite, > part of a powerful managerial structure. > > Australia diversified and industrialized later, and possibly more > slowly, but its manufacturing sector was, if anything, more firmly > based upon
Argentina, Australia and Canada
Warwick Armstrong, "The Social Origins of Industrial Growth: Canada, Argentina and Australia, 1870-1930", in "Argentina, Australia and Canada: Studies in Comparative Development, 1870-1965", edited by D. Platt & Guido di Tella: Yet, within the general pattern of similarity which gave them their distinctiveness, there were also important differences. The key to such differences can, again, be identified in the nature of the social structures and relationships within the three. This, in turn, affected the way in which the economy of each interacted with others in the international system of trade and investment. The most obvious variation is to be found between Argentina on the one hand, and Canada and Australia on the other. In the latter two, the urban elements in the ruling coalition were stronger, and earlier assumed a dominance over the staples producers. By the 1880s and 1890s, the Australian squatters had become, in many cases, subaltern members of the coalition, indebted to, and dependent upon, the banking sector for their continued viability. The power of Canadian capital, too, was concentrated in the financial institutions and commercial enterprises of Montreal and Toronto, which exercised a clear economic hegemony over the staples producers, and especially over the grain farmers of Ontario and the Prairies. This economic weight was reflected also in political influence at federal level. In Argentina, the dominance of the urban groups was less evident. The landed oligarchy continued to wield much greater economic and political influence, even after the Radical Party's triumph in 1916, and acted as the principal arbiter of social, economic, and political change in a way that its Australian equivalent had ceased to do after the late nineteenth century. And in any serious confrontations, they could call upon the ultimate weapon, the armed forces, which had retained a special position in the administrative order ever since the nineteenth century. One indicator of the relative capacities of the three ruling groups may be seen in RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION. The railway networks, central to the opening up of the staples-producing prairies of Canada, the pampas of Argentina, and the outback of Australia, could be considered economic elements of national importance to each country. In Canada, the major part of the construction was carried out first by private capital, heavily promoted and subsidised by the state. Australia's federal government constructed its own system in the separate colonies, and later, federal capital remained responsible for construction and operation, although, as in Canada, it drew heavily upon foreign loans and expertise. Argentina, however, the principal lines (and most profitable) were built and run by European companies, while the state was left with the task of undertaking the peripheral and less profitable sections. The manufacturing sectors of the three societies reflected also the distinct capacity of the ruling coalition to branch out into new and innovative activity. In the 1850s Canada was already establishing a range of small-scale, manufacturing activities associated with agricultural production; these competed successfully with the later influx of US branch plants. Similarly, the steel industry of Southern Ontario remained essentially a Canadian national enterprise. By the First World War, these groups had formed a modern corporate elite, part of a powerful managerial structure. Australia diversified and industrialized later, and possibly more slowly, but its manufacturing sector was, if anything, more firmly based upon indigenous capital and entrepreneurship. The processing industries and small-scale urban manufacturers were joined, after the turn of the century, by large-scale corporate enterprises, especially in the mining metals sector. As in Canada, enterprises such as BHP and Collins House were no longer family-controlled; they were modern, twentieth-century industrial conglomerates with vertical control from mining to blast furnaces to wire-rope factories to shipping lines - and with links to foreign capital through joint ventures. The Australian state, like its Canadian counterpart, was concerned directly with this phase of large-scale, corporate manufacturing expansion. And, in both societies, the work force assumed the character of a modern industrial proletariat by contrast with the craft workers of the small-scale, urban factories of the past. It is rather more difficult to find an equivalent evolution taking place in Argentina during this period. The possibilities for backward linkages into agricultural machinery manufacture did not arise, and Australia, in fact, became one of the country's suppliers of such products. Staples processing was initiated by Argentine entrepreneurs, but fell rapidly into the hands of foreign firms. Consumer industries i
