Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: executive committee
> And don't omit the $8 million that the U.S. spent--in part, thru the CIA, for the > trucker's strike and other mischief. Remember Kissinger's comment that if the > Chilean people were so "irresponsible" as to choose a socialist government in a > free election, appropriate measures would have to be taken? > Joel Blau Jim Devine's post that I was replying to referred to US and US-based multinational corporations role and I certainly didn't intend to ignore its multi-facted attack on UP government - symbolic threats, economic boycott, covert action, military credits, negotiations with Christian Democrats, close ties with right-wing, regional militarization, international credit embargo (except for military). US role was played out in 3 parts: attempting to prevent Allende's victory, attempting to discredit UP gov't producing future electoral defeat (but UP % of vote increased in 1973 elections), active participation in military overthrow. But my focus was on balance of class forces inside Chile that did not favor UP. Added to 'political' factors I noted in previous post were 'economic' ones - disinvestment, capital flight, middle/upper strata hoarding of goods, lands left idle, slaughtered farm animals. Opposition's decision to support most reactionary strategy resulted from inability of capitalist forces to provoke instititionalized collapse. UP's policy's of exproporation/nationalization without compensation convinced both Chilean & transnational capital that their interests would be best protected by permanent military-corporatist state. Michael Hoover
Re: Re: Re: Re: executive committee
And don't omit the $8 million that the U.S. spent--in part, thru the CIA, for the trucker's strike and other mischief. Remember Kissinger's comment that if the Chilean people were so "irresponsible" as to choose a socialist government in a free election, appropriate measures would have to be taken? Joel Blau Michael Hoover wrote: > > if the working class is well organized and class conscious (as in > > Chile in 1970), not only may the legislature but the executive may be > > subordinated to non-bourgeois forces. > > The problem, of course, is that in the Chilean case, the repressive > > component of the state (the armed forces) stepped in to suppressed the > > democratic component -- aided and abetted by the US and US-based > > multinational corporations -- so that capitalism and the international > > relationships of domination could be restored to their "normal" status. In > > the situation of Chile in 1973, either capitalism was going to be preserved > > by military force or there had to be a socialist break from capitalism. > > Jim Devine > > Chilean constitution called for presidential selection by legislature > if no electoral majority occurred. Constitutional transfer of power > took place in which Allende agreed to leave military & bureaucracy > intact. Popular Unity (UP) controlled only 36% of congressional > seats and had no appointments on Constitutional Court. Thus, many > disposed to preventing fundamental changes were situated in official > positions, often outside public accountability. Possession of limited > formal power was heavily outweighed by opposition control of key > economic, military, political sectors. Plus, opposition forces > controlled mass media and used it for purposes of political sabotage. > > Reproduction of capitalist relations was threatened in Chile in early > 1970s and context in which Allende government operated was historic - > concrete example of test of peaceful transition to socialism. > Fundamental contradiction within UP was between its stated intention - > abolishing capitalism - and adherence to constitutional means. Thus, > UP was not only restricted by power of opposition, it was limited by > its own character. Coalition contained several elements not > committed to working-class socialism and standard bearers - Socialists > and Communists - had long accepted constitutional path to socialism. > These factors limites popular mobilization, created conflict, > prevented development of alternative strategies for seizing state > power, and bought time for opposition.Michael Hoover
Re: Re: Re: executive committee
> if the working class is well organized and class conscious (as in > Chile in 1970), not only may the legislature but the executive may be > subordinated to non-bourgeois forces. > The problem, of course, is that in the Chilean case, the repressive > component of the state (the armed forces) stepped in to suppressed the > democratic component -- aided and abetted by the US and US-based > multinational corporations -- so that capitalism and the international > relationships of domination could be restored to their "normal" status. In > the situation of Chile in 1973, either capitalism was going to be preserved > by military force or there had to be a socialist break from capitalism. > Jim Devine Chilean constitution called for presidential selection by legislature if no electoral majority occurred. Constitutional transfer of power took place in which Allende agreed to leave military & bureaucracy intact. Popular Unity (UP) controlled only 36% of congressional seats and had no appointments on Constitutional Court. Thus, many disposed to preventing fundamental changes were situated in official positions, often outside public accountability. Possession of limited formal power was heavily outweighed by opposition control of key economic, military, political sectors. Plus, opposition forces controlled mass media and used it for purposes of political sabotage. Reproduction of capitalist relations was threatened in Chile in early 1970s and context in which Allende government operated was historic - concrete example of test of peaceful transition to socialism. Fundamental contradiction within UP was between its stated intention - abolishing capitalism - and adherence to constitutional means. Thus, UP was not only restricted by power of opposition, it was limited by its own character. Coalition contained several elements not committed to working-class socialism and standard bearers - Socialists and Communists - had long accepted constitutional path to socialism. These factors limites popular mobilization, created conflict, prevented development of alternative strategies for seizing state power, and bought time for opposition.Michael Hoover
Re: Re: executive committee
>>Max writes: >If you think the state is the executive committee of the >>bourgeoisie, than you are a public choice theorist too.< Brad sighs: >Marx did not write in the _Manifesto_ that the state is the executive >committee of the bourgeoisie. > >He wrote that the executive of the modern state is a committee for >managing the affairs of the bourgeoisie--suggesting that the >democratically-elected legislature of the modern state is something else. It is clear that the democratically-elected legislature in most countries is more representative of the people than is the executive branch, which is more likely to be beholden to the bourgeoisie. However, this depends on how well non-bourgeois forces are organized and class-conscious. If the working class is atomized and considers itself as "middle class" (only a slightly exaggerated picture of the US), then the legislature by-and-large represents capital, given the latter''s massive monetary resources for influencing politics. Politics is basically about debates within the bourgeoisie (Boy George Bush vs. McCain vs. Gore/Bradley). On the other hand, if the working class is well organized and class conscious (as in Chile in 1970), not only may the legislature but the executive may be subordinated to non-bourgeois forces. The problem, of course, is that in the Chilean case, the repressive component of the state (the armed forces) stepped in to suppressed the democratic component -- aided and abetted by the US and US-based multinational corporations -- so that capitalism and the international relationships of domination could be restored to their "normal" status. In the situation of Chile in 1973, either capitalism was going to be preserved by military force or there had to be a socialist break from capitalism. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://clawww.lmu.edu/~JDevine "Segui il tuo corso, e lascia dir le genti." (Go your own way and let people talk.) -- K. Marx, paraphrasing Dante A.
Re: Re: executive committee
Yeah, all the AMs are lefty pub choicers. See also Pzrzworski on social democracy. I am having been developing a version of the argument that Marx's state theory is a pub choice view for a paper I am working on about Marx and the rule of law, although admittedly my motive is partly to annoy the Chicago Econ & Law crowd that proliferates around here. --jks In a message dated Thu, 10 Feb 2000 1:02:40 PM Eastern Standard Time, Peter Dorman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes: > Actually, John Roemer's argument about the political-economic effects of > concentrated wealth is the sort of Marxoid public choice theory Max is talking > about. (See: A Future for Socialism.) > > Peter > > Jim Devine wrote: > > > Max writes: >If you think the state is the executive committee of the > > bourgeoisie, than you are a public choice theorist too.< > > > > The Virginia public choice school would not agree (even though they share > > the view that politics is endogenous with Marxian political economy). > > > > The Virginia school assumes that each voter's impact in the election is the > > same as each of the other voters (and emphasize how this process is less > > rational than a market). The "executive committee" theory, on the other > > hand, would be based on a one dollar/one vote theory (as a first > > approximation), so that those who have the bucks have more impact than > > those without. This recognizes that "voting" (in the sense of people having > > an impact on political decisions) takes place all the time, through > > lobbying, etc. Also, there are all sorts of government agencies -- notably > > the Federal Reserve in the US -- which are largely independent of control > > by democratically-elected officials, so that they can easily be "captured" > > by the industries they regulate (in the case of the Fed, banking and finance). > > > > BTW, when people, especially anti-Marxists, use the phrase "executive > > committee of the bourgeoisie," they often forget that such committees can > > make errors (from the point of view of the long-term class interests of the > > bourgeoisie), be indecisive, represent special interests within the > > bourgeoisie (or among state managers), etc. (Similarly, the boards of > > directors of corporations make mistakes, fiddle while the bottom line > > burns, represent special interests among stock-holders or managers...) > > > > In addition to the exec committee, we should remember that the state as > > such (in all class societies) is a coercive institution that maintains the > > class system. The executive committee theory is only one part of Marx's > > complete theory of the state (see, for example, Hal Draper's multi-volume > > book). > > > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: Re: executive committee
>Doesn't the Virginia school merge into the literature on rent seeking -- >although >the typical nasty rent seekers are labor unions and lawyers and the like? yes. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
RE: Re: RE: executive committee
I used a median voter model for my dissertation. The R-squares were beyond belief. I was more worried about them being too good than the contrary. In models "median voter" is represented by median income, which clearly could be influential for reasons outside the voting process. mbs -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Jim Devine Sent: Thursday, February 10, 2000 4:18 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [PEN-L:16212] Re: RE: executive committee At 03:54 PM 2/10/00 -0500, you wrote: >The Virginia school is not the beginning and end >of public choice theory. For instance, there is >a median voter theory that explains how, under >completely fantastical conditions, the median >voter is decisive in electoral matters in the Krugman column that Louis pointed us to read, PK talks as if the median voter actually is decisive! I'd say that the median dollar invested in a two-person race is decisive. Or at least that's a better first approximation than the median-voter rule. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: RE: executive committee
At 03:54 PM 2/10/00 -0500, you wrote: >The Virginia school is not the beginning and end >of public choice theory. For instance, there is >a median voter theory that explains how, under >completely fantastical conditions, the median >voter is decisive in electoral matters in the Krugman column that Louis pointed us to read, PK talks as if the median voter actually is decisive! I'd say that the median dollar invested in a two-person race is decisive. Or at least that's a better first approximation than the median-voter rule. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://liberalarts.lmu.edu/~jdevine
RE: RE: Re: RE: executive committee
> -Original Message- > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Max Sawicky > I used a median voter model for my dissertation. > The R-squares were beyond belief. I was more > worried about them being too good than the > contrary. Do tell Max. What was your dissertation about? -- Nathan Newman
