Re: game theory
Ted writes:>... I pointed to Marxâs idea of life in âthe realm of freedom,â i.e. life as the activity of appropriating and creating beauty and truth within relations of mutual recognition, as the ultimate criterion for judging âsuccess.â Individuals are more or less successful to the extent that they manage to live such lives. >Such a life requires the kind of development indicated in the idea of the âuniversally developed individual.â This is the ârationalâ individual; an idea of rationality very different from the idea of rationality in game theory. Rationality requires a capacity to perceive truly.< This is akin to Aristotle's vision of the (ultimate) ideal life within the ideal _polis_. Alas, under capitalism, success is defined differently. (Not by me, but by society.) But that's not "success" in any transhistorical sense of the word. Under capitalism, "succcess" involves alienation in Marx's sense of the word. >Psychopathology, in the sense Iâm using the term, always means irrationality of a greater or less degree, an irrationality characterized by an inability to perceive truly because of the influence of unconscious phantasy. It canât, therefore, be functional to âsuccessâ defined in the above way.< But it can be functional to specifically _capitalist_ success, at least if it's something like "anti-social personality disorder" (commonly termed "sociopathy" or "psychopathy"). >On these foundational assumptions, individuals can hold mistaken irrational beliefs about their self-interest. This will be the case, for instance, if they are greedy. Moreover, irrationality about ends is necessarily associated with some degree of irrationality about means. This isnât inconsistent with, for example, individuals being very successfully greedy e.g. making lots of money. Their psychopathology wonât have been functional to the achievement of this success, however. Had they been less psychopathological, they would have been more successful and, as part of this, less greedy.< these beliefs aren't always "mistaken" or "irrational" within the context of the social system (social formation) in which they live and work. For example, within the context of capitalism, self-centered greed is quite rational, despite the fact that it reflects one's alienated situation in society. On the other hand, within the context of capitalism, acting on one's ultimate or transhistorical rationality (as you use this term) could easily be dysfunctional or undermining of _capitalist_ success. It would be hard to get a job, for example. >This way of understanding individuals is inconsistent with understanding them as [having] utility functions.< No-one believes that people _are_ utility functions. For example, the NC economist instead believes that people _have_ them, as statements of their goals (preferences). The maximization of utility (of goal-attainment) is "rationality" in the sense of instrumental rationality. > Its understanding of rationality and psychopathology canât be expressed in terms of the latter. Its understanding of a psychopath, for instance, can't be expressed as a utility function without a conscience.< NC economists -- who see people as utility maximizers -- can't deal with psychopathology at all. They don't study psychology, except perhaps behaviorist crap. (One NC book I read [by Gandolfi, Gandolfi, and Barash] based its psychology in genetics. It went far beyond the normal NC standards of BS.) The NC conception of psychology is tautological or almost so. >As it understands psychopathology, the utility function conception of self and others is itself psychopathological. The conception splits self and others into externally related fragments (the "goods" that constitute the content of the function) and subjects them to obsessional control (the "mathematics"). Splitting, the attack on linking (that constitutes the fragments as externally related) and obsessional control are defences against persecutory anxiety.< I agree. >The idea of "the realm of freedom" that emerges from this is radically inconsistent with Marx's. Mirowski, for instance, locates Arrow's impossibility theorem within the socialist calculation debate and interprets it as demonstrating that "dictatorial or imposed regimes" would be better able than democratic voting to realize "the realm of freedom" interpreted in utility function terms as "the welfare optima."< I think Arrow's point is that _no_ method of social decision-making (including markets and dictators) works well. BTW, I don't see how this discussion is relevant to our discussion. So I'll drop the last paragraph. Jim Devine
Re: game theory
Jim Devine wrote: Ted writes: I think it's a mistake to see psychopathology as ever "functional." "Success" can't be furthered by unrealistic thinking.< unrealistic thinking -- e.g., schizophrenia -- usually doesn't further success in capitalist enterprise, on the level of practical reason. But it does in other circumstances. Economist Robert Barro has made a profession out of embracing unrealistic thinking and has gotten big bucks. Some religious leaders are extremely unrealistic (at least on the theological, theoretical level) but have convinced large numbers of disciples to follow them and to give them money. There are lots of other examples that suggest that unrealism can be quite lucrative as long as it doesn't spill over into the nuts and bolts of practical living (managing the books, etc.) or if there's some trusted individual who will take care of those. (Even so, sometimes unrealistic thinking as the stock market soars can pay off by luck (if one sells at the peak).) On the other hand, when I referred to "psychopathology" (or sociopathology or "antisocial personality disorder") I wasn't talking about psychopathology _in general_ but specifically about the lack of a conscience. That kind of psychopathology seems to be rewarded and thus encouraged by the structure of capitalist society. (As Ken noted, the corporation itself institutionalizes antisocial personality disorder.) The main problem for a psychopath of this sort is to keep others from knowing that he or she is one of those; this is called "public relations." In what you’ve cut out, I pointed to Marx’s idea of life in “the realm of freedom,” i.e. life as the activity of appropriating and creating beauty and truth within relations of mutual recognition, as the ultimate criterion for judging “success.” Individuals are more or less successful to the extent that they manage to live such lives. Such a life requires the kind of development indicated in the idea of the “universally developed individual.” This is the “rational” individual; an idea of rationality very different from the idea of rationality in game theory. Rationality requires a capacity to perceive truly. Psychopathology, in the sense I’m using the term, always means irrationality of a greater or less degree, an irrationality characterized by an inability to perceive truly because of the influence of unconscious phantasy. It can’t, therefore, be functional to “success” defined in the above way. On these foundational assumptions, individuals can hold mistaken irrational beliefs about their self-interest. This will be the case, for instance, if they are greedy. Moreover, irrationality about ends is necessarily associated with some degree of irrationality about means. This isn’t inconsistent with, for example, individuals being very successfully greedy e.g. making lots of money. Their psychopathology won’t have been functional to the achievement of this success, however. Had they been less psychopathological, they would have been more successful and, as part of this, less greedy. This way of understanding individuals is inconsistent with understanding them as utility functions. Its understanding of rationality and psychopathology can’t be expressed in terms of the latter. Its understanding of a psychopath, for instance, can't be expressed as a utility function without a conscience. As it understands psychopathology, the utility function conception of self and others is itself psychopathological. The conception splits self and others into externally related fragments (the "goods" that constitute the content of the function) and subjects them to obsessional control (the "mathematics"). Splitting, the attack on linking (that constitutes the fragments as externally related) and obsessional control are defences against persecutory anxiety. The idea of "the realm of freedom" that emerges from this is radically inconsistent with Marx's. Mirowski, for instance, locates Arrow's impossibility theorem within the socialist calculation debate and interprets it as demonstrating that "dictatorial or imposed regimes" would be better able than democratic voting to realize "the realm of freedom" interpreted in utility function terms as "the welfare optima." "For anyone steeped in the socialist calculation controversies of the 1930s, it is hard to see it [Arrow’s theorem] as anything other than a reprise of the Cowles theme that the Walrasian market is a computer sans commitment to any computational architecture or algorithmic specification; the novel departure came with the assertion that democratic voting is an inferior type of computer for calculating the welfare optima already putatively identified by the Walrasian computer." (Machine Dreams, pp. 303–04) Ted
Re: game theory
Ted writes: >I think it's a mistake to see psychopathology as ever "functional." >"Success" can't be furthered by unrealistic thinking.< unrealistic thinking -- e.g., schizophrenia -- usually doesn't further success in capitalist enterprise, on the level of practical reason. But it does in other circumstances. Economist Robert Barro has made a profession out of embracing unrealistic thinking and has gotten big bucks. Some religious leaders are extremely unrealistic (at least on the theological, theoretical level) but have convinced large numbers of disciples to follow them and to give them money. There are lots of other examples that suggest that unrealism can be quite lucrative as long as it doesn't spill over into the nuts and bolts of practical living (managing the books, etc.) or if there's some trusted individual who will take care of those. (Even so, sometimes unrealistic thinking as the stock market soars can pay off by luck (if one sells at the peak).) On the other hand, when I referred to "psychopathology" (or sociopathology or "antisocial personality disorder") I wasn't talking about psychopathology _in general_ but specifically about the lack of a conscience. That kind of psychopathology seems to be rewarded and thus encouraged by the structure of capitalist society. (As Ken noted, the corporation itself institutionalizes antisocial personality disorder.) The main problem for a psychopath of this sort is to keep others from knowing that he or she is one of those; this is called "public relations." Jim Devine
Re: game theory
I think it's a mistake to see psychopathology as ever "functional." "Success" can't be furthered by unrealistic thinking. Even if we interpret "success" as making money, psychopathological thinking will be less successful than rational thinking. In Keynes's analysis of financial markets, for instance, the "wisest" investors are understood to be those sufficiently free themselves from psychopathology to be able to understand and predict the psychopathological thought and behaviour of others. However, to treat money-making or "goods" in the utility function sense as the end of life is itself a mistake, a mistake expressing the same psychopathology as the unrealistic means adopted in their pursuit. This last point explains why the idea of willing as psychopathological is inconsistent with the idea of it as "evil." Individuals doing bad things are mistaken about what they ought to be doing, not evil. I've several times elaborated what I take to be Marx's conception of the "good" and of the means appropriate to its pursuit. According to him and to the tradition in thought to which he belongs, the "good" is the activity of creating and appropriating beauty and truth within relations of mutual recognition (an idea elaborated, for instance, in the account of true human production at the end of the Comments on James Mill <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/james-mill/ index.htm>). It's radically inconsistent with a "utility function" game theory approach. It isn't just the way greed enters into the conventional conception of the latter that creates the inconsistency. Ted
Re: game theory (thread 2)
Jim: > the "endogeneity of tastes" assumption in GT and neoclassical > theory does indeed reflect Western-style individualism > (what many Westerners might call the _only_ kind of > individualism). As I understand it, it is not the "endogeneity of tastes" but "heterogeneity in tastes" that plays some role in the neoclassical theory. "State dependence" plays some role as well. But I don't think the neoclassical theory would like the idea that tastes are also endogenous, that is, "internally determined". That would immensely complicate their problem. They have to deal with only two sides now: supply and demand. If tastes, that is, human behavior is also endogenous, than they have one more side to worry about. And they are having enough difficulty with dealing with the supply and demand sides already. By the way, thanks for the paper reference. I took a look at it and it sounded very interesting. I will definitely read it after the coming exams. Best, Sabri
Re: game theory
Ted W. writes:>What I had in mind was the misidentification of "reason" with reasoning in accordance with fixed routines, i.e. with reasoning that can be replicated by a machine. This kind of reasoning is only applicable where very restrictive assumptions hold. These are not usually satisfied in the case of human behaviour.< You don't have to identify human thinking with machine-like thinking to use GT. You just have to assume (as a first approximation) that this kind of thinking applies in certain types of situations. That doesn't mean you have to believe the results, however, since they are dependent on your assumption. Jim D.
Re: game theory
neither a game theoretic nor ir person, i nevertheless have some familiarity with both... given that force & economic instruments are major techniques states have to translate potential power into actual power, economic & military strategists point to ostensible advantages that game theory provides them in systematically analyzing choices states make and probable outcomes: game theory simplifies complex choices states make, it forces systematic examine assumptions, helping to clarify choices and offering possibilities that may have been ignored, it helps people see other positions... of course, game theory make some critical assumptions: it assumes unitary state in which internal factors play little role in determining preferences, it assumes unitary state act rationally (that states choose best option available), it gives arbitrary payoff structures in advance (in reality, of course, states do not know relative values attached to various choices or those of other side), it assumes that games occurs one time (actual international relations is extended set of games between same actors, thus, outcome of multiple iterations - in which knowing choice at one point in time helps each side to predict other's choice in subsequent period - may be quite different that one time encounter)... michael hoover
Re: game theory
I've always believed that genius involves the conversion of personal defects into strengths. That is why we tend to be disappointed with "great men." Eventually, people discover the defects. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu
Re: game theory
--- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > over the years, I've discovered that I have a hard > time getting mad at someone because of their > political opinions. If someone is a Malthusian > (say), I tend to pity them for not thinking clearly. > But when someone misinterprets what I say -- > especially when I write it down in clear prose that > I edit and re-edit (and I even spell-check) -- it > somehow rubs one of my neuroses the wrong way. And > then the critic makes many of the points I did! > > BTW, bringing up GT and Nash using a comic novel > does not inherently imply a critique of either. > Comic novels can be just as profound as tragic ones. > I've seen the house-of-mirrors analogy in GT books. > > While we're on the subject, I think it's worth > discussing the role of Nash's madness (paranoid > schizophrenia and, according to a shrink I know, > Asperger's Syndrome). One of the hats I wear is as > the father of a kid with mental problems (Asperger's > Syndrome, ADD, maybe bipolar (manic-depressive), > maybe psychosis (not otherwise specified)). One of > the things that comes out in the millieu that this > role has thrust me into is that _being crazy ain't > all bad and can actually be a good thing_ in some > situations. > > Some of the most brilliant people in the world have > been stark raving nuts. Einstein (maybe Asperger's > Syndrome, though those with other disorders also > claim him) was hardly a "normal" person. One's > madness can give one insights that so-called > "normal" people (neurotypicals) are _totally > incapable_ of achieving. People who live > well-adjusted lives in conjunction with others and > have no inner turmoil have a hard time "thinking > outside the box" the way Einstein or Nash did. > Einstein's Gedanken (sp?) experiments and Nash's > brilliant insight come from non-neurotypical > thinking. > > I do think that Nash's equilibrium concept was > brilliant. However, the concept has been reified, > worshiped and worse. It's the reification that's the > problem. That reflects a deeper problem, the > corruption of the social sciences. But I said this > before. > > Jim Devine > > -Original Message- > From: andie nachgeborenen > [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: Tue 5/18/2004 6:45 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Cc: > Subject: Re: [PEN-L] game theory > > > > > > > > Nash went mad, but you can't > > argue with his maths.< > > > > you can easily argue about the applicability of > the > > math. Math doesn't correspond to reality; it only > > represents the abstract dimension. > > > > By the way, Nash is currently deemed sane. And > his > > sanity or insanity has nothing to do with the > > validity of the Nash equilibrium concept or of > game > > theory. > > > > I actually knew Nash a bit when he was mad. The > math > majors at Tigetown called him the Ghost of Fine > Hall. > He would scrawl brilliant and bitingly hilarious > "formulae" on the blackboards -- not at all like > the > merely wacko stuff depicted in the movie, much > funnier. Political too. And not right wing. > Apparently > he hated Nixon. That wasn't hard, of course. My > friend > (at the time, haven't been in touch in years) Dave > Donoho, now a hotshot stat prof at Stanford, said > that > mathematically Nash's crazy "formulae" _almost_ > made > sense. > > Sorry I teed you off about your post on madness, > but > frankly I was surprised to read your remarks about > GT > in the context of the Westlake book and your > substantive post -- reread them yourself and see if > you can see how someone might understand the point > the > way I did. Of course I know it's easy to be > misconstrued, having had it happy to me a lot. But > as > a lawyer I've learned to assume that it's not > necessarily the other guy's fault -- something I > for > one at least didn't learn as an academic. Maybe you > have, but if so, given that you know how hard it to > be > clear and how easy it is to me misunderstood, maybe > it > would be helpful to be less uptight about being > misunderstood even if it is the other guy's fault. > > For instance, not that I am a shining examplar of > anything, I said about eight times in my post that > GT > was an abstraction, an idealization, and based on > false premises, and yet apparently I still wasn't > clear enough. Still, it's not worth getting mad > about > . . . . > > jks > > > > > __ > Do you Yahoo!? > SBC Yahoo! - Internet access at a great low price. > http://promo.yahoo.com/sbc/ > > > __ Do you Yahoo!? SBC Yahoo! - Internet access at a great low price. http://promo.yahoo.com/sbc/
game theory (thread 2)
[was: Islam and Democracy: The Lesson from Turkey] I wrote: > As I noted, GT doesn't (usually?) take individual > tastes, ideologies, etc. as endogenously determined > by the social structure or game. Sabri writes: Exactly. At least, the Nash Equilibrium Version of it does not. If someone asked me what the most important aspect/issue of/with economics/econometrics is, I would say without hesitation that it is "endogeneity". Heterogeneity among individuals and associated with that the so-called state-dependence (history as well as geography dependence) which are important dimensions of "endogeneity" are absent from the "classical" game theory, whatever "classical" means. I don't think if Michael Perelman and I played the Prisoners' Dilemma Game between the two of us, we would have ended up playing the Nash Equilibrium. Also, Nash was a paranoid-schizophrenic not because of Game Theory but Game Theory, at least, its Nash Version, is paranoid-schizophrenic because of Nash's psychology. --- the "endogeneity of tastes" assumption in GT and neoclassical theory does indeed reflect Western-style individualism (what many Westerners might call the _only_ kind of individualism). For some reason, no-one ever wants to drop the assumption. For one effort, see my paper at http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine/hlr/HLR.pdf. Jim Devine
Re: game theory
over the years, I've discovered that I have a hard time getting mad at someone because
of their political opinions. If someone is a Malthusian (say), I tend to pity them for
not thinking clearly. But when someone misinterprets what I say -- especially when I
write it down in clear prose that I edit and re-edit (and I even spell-check) -- it
somehow rubs one of my neuroses the wrong way. And then the critic makes many of the
points I did!
BTW, bringing up GT and Nash using a comic novel does not inherently imply a critique
of either. Comic novels can be just as profound as tragic ones. I've seen the
house-of-mirrors analogy in GT books.
While we're on the subject, I think it's worth discussing the role of Nash's madness
(paranoid schizophrenia and, according to a shrink I know, Asperger's Syndrome). One
of the hats I wear is as the father of a kid with mental problems (Asperger's
Syndrome, ADD, maybe bipolar (manic-depressive), maybe psychosis (not otherwise
specified)). One of the things that comes out in the millieu that this role has thrust
me into is that _being crazy ain't all bad and can actually be a good thing_ in some
situations.
Some of the most brilliant people in the world have been stark raving nuts. Einstein
(maybe Asperger's Syndrome, though those with other disorders also claim him) was
hardly a "normal" person. One's madness can give one insights that so-called "normal"
people (neurotypicals) are _totally incapable_ of achieving. People who live
well-adjusted lives in conjunction with others and have no inner turmoil have a hard
time "thinking outside the box" the way Einstein or Nash did. Einstein's Gedanken
(sp?) experiments and Nash's brilliant insight come from non-neurotypical thinking.
I do think that Nash's equilibrium concept was brilliant. However, the concept has
been reified, worshiped and worse. It's the reification that's the problem. That
reflects a deeper problem, the corruption of the social sciences. But I said this
before.
Jim Devine
-Original Message-
From: andie nachgeborenen [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tue 5/18/2004 6:45 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc:
Subject: Re: [PEN-L] game theory
>
> > Nash went mad, but you can't
> argue with his maths.<
>
> you can easily argue about the applicability of the
> math. Math doesn't correspond to reality; it only
> represents the abstract dimension.
>
> By the way, Nash is currently deemed sane. And his
> sanity or insanity has nothing to do with the
> validity of the Nash equilibrium concept or of game
> theory.
>
I actually knew Nash a bit when he was mad. The math
majors at Tigetown called him the Ghost of Fine Hall.
He would scrawl brilliant and bitingly hilarious
"formulae" on the blackboards -- not at all like the
merely wacko stuff depicted in the movie, much
funnier. Political too. And not right wing. Apparently
he hated Nixon. That wasn't hard, of course. My friend
(at the time, haven't been in touch in years) Dave
Donoho, now a hotshot stat prof at Stanford, said that
mathematically Nash's crazy "formulae" _almost_ made
sense.
Sorry I teed you off about your post on madness, but
frankly I was surprised to read your remarks about GT
in the context of the Westlake book and your
substantive post -- reread them yourself and see if
you can see how someone might understand the point the
way I did. Of course I know it's easy to be
misconstrued, having had it happy to me a lot. But as
a lawyer I've learned to assume that it's not
necessarily the other guy's fault -- something I for
one at least didn't learn as an academic. Maybe you
have, but if so, given that you know how hard it to be
clear and how easy it is to me misunderstood, maybe it
would be helpful to be less uptight about being
misunderstood even if it is the other guy's fault.
For instance, not that I am a shining examplar of
anything, I said about eight times in my post that GT
was an abstraction, an idealization, and based on
false premises, and yet apparently I still wasn't
clear enough. Still, it's not worth getting mad about
. . . .
jks
__
Do you Yahoo!?
SBC Yahoo! - Internet access at a great low price.
http://promo.yahoo.com/sbc/
Re: game theory/oops
The below was supposed to be off-list, sorry. jks --- andie nachgeborenen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > Nash went mad, but you can't > > argue with his maths.< > > > > you can easily argue about the applicability of > the > > math. Math doesn't correspond to reality; it only > > represents the abstract dimension. > > > > By the way, Nash is currently deemed sane. And his > > sanity or insanity has nothing to do with the > > validity of the Nash equilibrium concept or of > game > > theory. > > > > I actually knew Nash a bit when he was mad. The math > majors at Tigetown called him the Ghost of Fine > Hall. > He would scrawl brilliant and bitingly hilarious > "formulae" on the blackboards -- not at all like the > merely wacko stuff depicted in the movie, much > funnier. Political too. And not right wing. > Apparently > he hated Nixon. That wasn't hard, of course. My > friend > (at the time, haven't been in touch in years) Dave > Donoho, now a hotshot stat prof at Stanford, said > that > mathematically Nash's crazy "formulae" _almost_ made > sense. > > Sorry I teed you off about your post on madness, but > frankly I was surprised to read your remarks about > GT > in the context of the Westlake book and your > substantive post -- reread them yourself and see if > you can see how someone might understand the point > the > way I did. Of course I know it's easy to be > misconstrued, having had it happy to me a lot. But > as > a lawyer I've learned to assume that it's not > necessarily the other guy's fault -- something I for > one at least didn't learn as an academic. Maybe you > have, but if so, given that you know how hard it to > be > clear and how easy it is to me misunderstood, maybe > it > would be helpful to be less uptight about being > misunderstood even if it is the other guy's fault. > > For instance, not that I am a shining examplar of > anything, I said about eight times in my post that > GT > was an abstraction, an idealization, and based on > false premises, and yet apparently I still wasn't > clear enough. Still, it's not worth getting mad > about > . . . . > > jks > > > > > __ > Do you Yahoo!? > SBC Yahoo! - Internet access at a great low price. > http://promo.yahoo.com/sbc/ __ Do you Yahoo!? SBC Yahoo! - Internet access at a great low price. http://promo.yahoo.com/sbc/
Re: game theory
> > > Nash went mad, but you can't > argue with his maths.< > > you can easily argue about the applicability of the > math. Math doesn't correspond to reality; it only > represents the abstract dimension. > > By the way, Nash is currently deemed sane. And his > sanity or insanity has nothing to do with the > validity of the Nash equilibrium concept or of game > theory. > I actually knew Nash a bit when he was mad. The math majors at Tigetown called him the Ghost of Fine Hall. He would scrawl brilliant and bitingly hilarious "formulae" on the blackboards -- not at all like the merely wacko stuff depicted in the movie, much funnier. Political too. And not right wing. Apparently he hated Nixon. That wasn't hard, of course. My friend (at the time, haven't been in touch in years) Dave Donoho, now a hotshot stat prof at Stanford, said that mathematically Nash's crazy "formulae" _almost_ made sense. Sorry I teed you off about your post on madness, but frankly I was surprised to read your remarks about GT in the context of the Westlake book and your substantive post -- reread them yourself and see if you can see how someone might understand the point the way I did. Of course I know it's easy to be misconstrued, having had it happy to me a lot. But as a lawyer I've learned to assume that it's not necessarily the other guy's fault -- something I for one at least didn't learn as an academic. Maybe you have, but if so, given that you know how hard it to be clear and how easy it is to me misunderstood, maybe it would be helpful to be less uptight about being misunderstood even if it is the other guy's fault. For instance, not that I am a shining examplar of anything, I said about eight times in my post that GT was an abstraction, an idealization, and based on false premises, and yet apparently I still wasn't clear enough. Still, it's not worth getting mad about . . . . jks __ Do you Yahoo!? SBC Yahoo! - Internet access at a great low price. http://promo.yahoo.com/sbc/
Re: game theory
ecasting in chap. VI of Adventures of Ideas. This internal relations view of abstraction is the basis of Marx's criticism of classical political economy (in contrast to Benthamite economics which he dismisses as unrealistic, "vulgar" apologetics) for misplaced concreteness at the beginning of the Grundrisse <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm> and of his account of the relation between the "abstract" and the "concrete" in his discussion in the same text of The Method of Political Economy <http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ ch01.htm#3>. Whitehead makes the same methodological point about the relation between the abstract and the concrete at the end of chap. 7 of Modes of Thought (the chapter from which the passage pointing to the implications of internal relations for logical reasoning is taken). Game theory is based on a mistaken understanding of "rationality," ignores the fact that social relations are internal relations, and ignores the role of irrationality in human thought and behaviour. The psychology doesn't demonstrate these mistakes; it explains them. It explains, for instance, why a particular kind of mentality is largely immune to rational arguments demonstrating these mistakes. Ted
Re: game theory
> WHen I grow up I want to be like Barkley. > > dd For that you need to go back to some reasonable university. You cannot grow up to be like Barkley at a money management house you work now. Best, Sabri
Re: game theory
Barkley Rosser has a very very good paper indeed on this subject: http://cob.jmu.edu/rosserjb/MetroRevised%20LBS2.doc WHen I grow up I want to be like Barkley. dd On Mon, 17 May 2004 13:43:30 -0700, Michael Perelman wrote: > > from Williamson: > > Oskar Morgenstern tells a wonderful story that > illustrates how such second-guessing > can make the price system go haywire: > ##Sherlock Holmes, pursued by his opponent, > Moriarity, leaves Londonor the > intellectually weaker of the two would have surrendered > to the other in Victoria > Station, since the whole flight would have become > unnecessary. (Morgenstern 1935, > pp. 173-4) > Morgenstern continued, "Always .there is exhibited an > endless chain of reciprocally > conjectural reactions and counter-reactions. This > chain can never be broken." > (Morgenstern 1935, p. 174).
Title correction: Game Theory (Instead of Islam and Democracy: The Lesson from Turkey)
Game Theory should have been the title of my previous post. By the way, that I do not like Game Theory has nothing to do with that I am a Leftist. But it has a lot to do with that I am an Easterner. Best, Sabri
Re: game theory
JKS writes:>I think it is bizarre to ask whether game theory is
evil, or (as Jim Divine suggests) whether it makes you
crazy, or comes from paranoid schizophrenia, or
something like that.<
I never made such a suggestion and never would. Please quote me where I said anything
like that. (I thought I was giving a measured defense of game theory, which was meant
to be light-hearted. If you don't like my jokes, please tell me.) and it's dEvine.
excuse my bad mood. I _hate_ being misquoted and/or misunderstood. Let me repeat my
conclusions: game theory (GT) doesn't have to assume that people are inhuman machines
or ignore the role of culture. One has to be very careful applying it. Nash
equilibrium is useless except as an ideal standard to compare the world to.
> Nash went mad, but you can't
argue with his maths.<
you can easily argue about the applicability of the math. Math doesn't correspond to
reality; it only represents the abstract dimension.
By the way, Nash is currently deemed sane. And his sanity or insanity has nothing to
do with the validity of the Nash equilibrium concept or of game theory.
> The prisoner's dilemma and the
Nash equilibrium are two of the very greatest -- maybe
the very greatest -- results in social theory in the
20th century.<
these are assertions, not proof, counselor. But of course, when I was a juror the
judge told us that the opening statement was not evidence.
I would agree that the PD was an important innovation, though the related collective
("public") goods problem is more important empirically (since it corresponds to a
many-firmed market, etc.) I'm not going to prove that, since I lack the time, so I'll
leave it on the level of advertising sloganeering. There's a chapter or two in
Hargreaves Heap on it.
On the other hand, Nash equilibrium is an idealized state similar to Rational
Expectations equilibrium (as I said). Both are akin to the Platonic forms in terms of
empirical validity.
>GT is an extremely powerful and beautiful set of
mathematical tools that has a wide application in
thinking about society, particularly in competitive
situations, which of course is really important if you
are an economist whose job it is to understand
capitalism, or a political scientist who wants to
understand international/world politics. <
some would agree. some not. BTW, I don't think "beauty" is a very important criterion
in an effort to understand the world. After all, the world is pretty damned ugly.
> It involves
abstractions and idaelizations, of course,a nd people
are really like that -- duh -- in this theory, as
someone who used an important precursor of it once
said, men are mere bearers of social relations.<
I don't understand this. Are you saying that Marx was a precursor of the GTists? He
understood market competition pretty well, following Adam Smith, but that's different.
His emphasis was empirical, not with the building of abstract models. Though he too
abstract, it's clear in his theoretical work that he wanted to be as concrete
(empirical) as possible.
The idea that people are bearers of social relations should be understood as saying
that individual goals, ideologies, etc. and the effects of their actions are shaped by
their positions in the social structure. As I noted, GT doesn't (usually?) take
individual tastes, ideologies, etc. as endogenously determined by the social structure
or game. I do think that one can use GT to understand some stuff in Marx. But it would
be a mistake to reduce his though to GT, making him a minor pre-von Neumannian. Is
that what you're doing?
>People
are working are the complsxifications [???] with, in my
area, e.g., behavioral law and economics. But that it
still poorly understood and litle developed, and will
never have the elegant simplicity of game theory.<
part of the problem with GT for many is its elegant simplicity. The world ain't
elegant or simple, alas. How can one apply such a theory to the world? very carefully.
Unfortunately, care is scarce among social scientists at a theoretical level above the
technical, mathematical, details. Social scientists are pretty careful about using a
theory correctly in the purely logical sense but often not so about when it should be
applied in the empirical world. That's why you see very smart people like von Neumann
using GT to advocate preemptive attacks on the USSR during the 1950s.
>The theory, like most theories, rests on assumptions
taht are technically false. But it is powerful and
predictive theory, and <
it's not predictive if there are multiple equilibria, which is true of many if not
most games. Even if a game has a unique equilibrium, that is a result of the
assumption, including the equilibrium concept used. (Nash equilib. isn't the only
one.) So one can easily t
Re: game theory
Mirowski attributes (partially) Nash's approach to his mental state. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu
Re: game theory
I think it is bizarre to ask whether game theory is evil, or (as Jim Divine suggests) whether it makes you crazy, or comes from paranoid schizophrenia, or something like that. Nash went mad, but you can't argue with his maths. The prisoner's dilemma and the Nash equilibrium are two of the very greatest -- maybe the very greatest -- results in social theory in the 20th century. GT is an extremely powerful and beautiful set of mathematical tools that has a wide application in thinking about society, particularly in competitive situations, which of course is really important if you are an economist whose job it is to understand capitalism, or a political scientist who wants to understand international/world politics. It involves abstractions and idaelizations, of course,a nd people are really like that -- duh -- in this theory, as someone who used an important precursor of it once said, men are mere bearers of social relations. People are working are the complsxifications with, in my area, e.g., behavioral law and economics. But that it still poorly understood and litle developed, and will never have the elegant simplicity of game theory. The theory, like most theories, rests on assumptions taht are technically false. But it is powerful and predictive theory, and the problem with it from the left is just that it should be allowed to become ideology, that is assumed to be about invariant human nature in all times and places regardless of circumstances. Besides the theory is useful to the left in lots of ways. For example, the PD is a real kick in the teeth to the Panglossian assumptions of Gen Equil Theory, which says that rational self interested actors will give us The Best Of All Possible Worlds. vary the assumprions just a tad, from Arrow to von Neumann, and you can prove as a theorem that it aint so, that the resulst will be suboptimal, and you need to change the incentiveds truicture (that is, society) or human nature to make things come out right. How can the left not rejoice in this demonstration? jks --- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I wrote: > > this is an excellent statement of the > game-theoretic way of thinking, > > seen in its starkest way in the kind of paranoia > that characterized > > John Nash. It also points to the often-unnoted > psychic costs of > > thinking that way. > > Ted Winslow writes: > > The delusional aspect concerns a great deal more > than paranoid > delusions about the intentions of others e.g. the > conception of self > and others as calculating machines, the complete > inability to take > account of and understand cultural distinctiveness, > etc., etc.< > > I wouldn't say that game theory itself is > necessarily paranoid. Nor does it necessarily > involve conceiving people as calculating machines, > totally abstracting from cultural distinctiveness. > (Due to lack of time, I won't comment on the "etc." > or the other "etc.") Just as in mainstream > economics, there are differences of opinion among > game theory practitioners about what game theory is > and how it should be used. (I rely on > Hargreaves-Heap and > Varoufakis, _ > Game theory: a critical introduction_ (Routledge, > 1995), David Kreps, _Game Theory and Economic > Modeling_, and William Poundstone's _Prisoner's > Dilemma_). > > > I'm not an expert on game theory (and I've never > even played one on TV). But I think that the bad > stuff that Ted associates with game theory might > best be associated with John Nash, John Von Neumann, > and the Cold War RAND culture that decided that GT > was a cool tool. I've never found game theory to be > very useful in my research; nor does it seem very > harmful. A lot of it seems like an academic game. My > feeling is that its main harm comes when people > reify it and use it as an ideological weapon, as > some of the RANDites did. I'd blame this dark side > of the GT force much more on the Cold War than on GT > itself. And I blame the Cold War on... but I > digress. > > I would agree with Ted that we should reject Nash > equilibrium except as an abstract notion that might > (in some circumstances) provide a useful contrast > with reality. It's very similar to the macro (and > bogus) concept of "rational expectations": people > expect the economy to produce the results the model > predicts it will produce and so act on these > expectations. Thus, in equilibrium the model > produces what they expect (always assuming that the > economy = the model). (RatEx says people's > expectations work this way on average; Nash > equilibrium is _defined_ as having them work > exactly.) > > But the idea of Nash equilibrium and GT don't > nec
Re: game theory
I wrote: > this is an excellent statement of the game-theoretic way of thinking, > seen in its starkest way in the kind of paranoia that characterized > John Nash. It also points to the often-unnoted psychic costs of > thinking that way. Ted Winslow writes: > The delusional aspect concerns a great deal more than paranoid delusions about the intentions of others e.g. the conception of self and others as calculating machines, the complete inability to take account of and understand cultural distinctiveness, etc., etc.< I wouldn't say that game theory itself is necessarily paranoid. Nor does it necessarily involve conceiving people as calculating machines, totally abstracting from cultural distinctiveness. (Due to lack of time, I won't comment on the "etc." or the other "etc.") Just as in mainstream economics, there are differences of opinion among game theory practitioners about what game theory is and how it should be used. (I rely on Hargreaves-Heap and Varoufakis, _ Game theory: a critical introduction_ (Routledge, 1995), David Kreps, _Game Theory and Economic Modeling_, and William Poundstone's _Prisoner's Dilemma_). I'm not an expert on game theory (and I've never even played one on TV). But I think that the bad stuff that Ted associates with game theory might best be associated with John Nash, John Von Neumann, and the Cold War RAND culture that decided that GT was a cool tool. I've never found game theory to be very useful in my research; nor does it seem very harmful. A lot of it seems like an academic game. My feeling is that its main harm comes when people reify it and use it as an ideological weapon, as some of the RANDites did. I'd blame this dark side of the GT force much more on the Cold War than on GT itself. And I blame the Cold War on... but I digress. I would agree with Ted that we should reject Nash equilibrium except as an abstract notion that might (in some circumstances) provide a useful contrast with reality. It's very similar to the macro (and bogus) concept of "rational expectations": people expect the economy to produce the results the model predicts it will produce and so act on these expectations. Thus, in equilibrium the model produces what they expect (always assuming that the economy = the model). (RatEx says people's expectations work this way on average; Nash equilibrium is _defined_ as having them work exactly.) But the idea of Nash equilibrium and GT don't necessarily say that people are calculating machines. It could be interpreted as saying that in certain circumstances (in "games") people act _as if_ they were calculating machines -- or that people might be assumed to act this way as a first approximation to reality (simplifying reality in order to try to understand it). In certain oligopolistic market situations, profit-seeking firms[*] are pushed to act in this way. Similarly, the cops-and-robbers life inhabited by the fictional Tyrone Ten Eyck encourages this kind of behavior. The Cold War pushed the power elites to train and hire people who thought this way. On the other hand, a social situation like a family or a church congregation or an anarchists' convention might be very hard to understand by assuming that people are calculating machines. Part of a practitioner's job is to figure out when the use of GT is appropriate. Even if people are calculating machines (and they're not -- or at least I'm programmed to think that they're not), that doesn't mean that culture plays no role. The values to the participants of the rewards in the game matrix can and do reflect the culture that those people were brought up in. If a meat-eater and a vegetarian are each given a pork chop by the play of the game, each would assign different values to the reward. Thus, different numbers would show up in each individual's box. A major problem with GT, however, is that it (as far as I know) doesn't see culture as endogenous, something that develops from the societal "game." Playing a prisoners' dilemma game over and over again might cause one to become like Ten Eyck or a Hobbesian, valuing any marginal advantage over others, struggling to survive at any cost, even beginning to eat pork chops (and like them!) In a lot of circumstances, people in experimental prisoners' dilemmas actually learn how to cooperate with each other. What GT misses, I think, is that this learning process may actually change their utility functions -- ahem! -- I mean personalities, ethical values, and world-views. So the development of cooperation is more than a matter of learning to communicate with each other by their actions. Even if we assume that Nash equilibrium should rule the roost and that people all value the rewards equally and in the same way, that
Re: game theory
From: Doug Henwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Freud recounts an old Jewish joke in, I think, his book on jokes. The gist of it is that one guy runs into another in the Warsaw railroad station and says, "Why did you tell me you were going to Cracow the other day when you were really going to Cracow?" Hmm, I guess you need Dr. F's delivery. Carl _ Best Restaurant Giveaway Ever! Vote for your favorites for a chance to win $1 million! http://local.msn.com/special/giveaway.asp
Re: game theory
from Williamson: Oskar Morgenstern tells a wonderful story that illustrates how such second-guessing can make the price system go haywire: ##Sherlock Holmes, pursued by his opponent, Moriarity, leaves Londonor the intellectually weaker of the two would have surrendered to the other in Victoria Station, since the whole flight would have become unnecessary. (Morgenstern 1935, pp. 173-4) Morgenstern continued, "Always .there is exhibited an endless chain of reciprocally conjectural reactions and counter-reactions. This chain can never be broken." (Morgenstern 1935, p. 174). Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press). 34: "When a man loses his wife in a department store without any prior understanding on where to meet if they get separated, the chances are good that they will find each other. It is likely that each will think of some obvious place to meet, so obvious that each will be sure that the other is sure that it is "obvious" to both of them. One does not simply predict where the other will go, since the other will go where he predicts the first to go, which is wherever the first predicts the second to predict the first to go, and so on ad infinitum. Not "What would I do if I were she?" but "What would I do if I were she wondering what she would do if she were I wondering what I would do if I were she?" -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail michael at ecst.csuchico.edu
Re: game theory
Jim Devine wrote: this is an excellent statement of the game-theoretic way of thinking, seen in its starkest way in the kind of paranoia that characterized John Nash. It also points to the often-unnoted psychic costs of thinking that way. The delusional aspect concerns a great deal more than paranoid delusions about the intentions of others e.g. the conception of self and others as calculating machines, the complete inability to take account of and understand cultural distinctiveness, etc., etc. Isn't it true that, outside of economics, the main support for the development of game theory has come from the US military? This produces the more obvious Strangelove aspect, Herman Kahn etc. Markowitz is himself a Cowles, Rand person, isn't he? His company seems mostly to be involved with war gaming simulations for the military. Stephen Cambone appears to be connected to this Strangelove aspect. From an article by Savitri Hensman: In October 2001, when asked whether the use of tactical nuclear weapons against the caves where the Taliban were sheltering, suggested by Congressman Steve Buyer, was ruled out, Rumsfeld said, 'I don't rule out anything, but my answer very simply is, we are not having a problem in dealing with those tunnels in terms of the ordinance.' 83 This marked the major shift that was taking place in US policy from regarding nuclear weapons as a deterrent to nuclear attack by another state, hopefully never to be used, to treating them as one of a range of alternatives to be considered for battlefield use. Rumsfeld had for some time been a supporter of the Center for Security Policy, which strongly advocated investing in the development of a National Missile Defense (NMD) system (widely known as 'Star Wars'), when he was appointed by Congress to chair a Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. By applying a worst case scenario, for instance the transfer of a complete ballistic missile to a nation such as North Korea by China, he reached the conclusion in 1998 that such an attack could happen in the next few years, a possibility previously ruled out by US intelligence. 84 NMD is part of a 'New Triad' to the development of which the Pentagon is now committed - offensive strike weapons (nuclear and non-nuclear), strategic defenses and a revitalised defence infrastructure. Billions of dollars are being spent on the research, production and infrastructure involved. The Center for Security Policy was set up in 1988, and received funding from wealthy rightwingers such as the Coors family and Richard M Scaife as well as corporate donors such as Boeing, General Atomics, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and other weapons contractors. The election of George W Bush meant that the policies it had advocated now had a substantial chance of being put into practice. Over twenty of its close associates or advisory council members now held government positions, including Feith; JD Crouch, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy; Robert Joseph, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for Proliferation Strategy, Counter-Proliferation and Homeland Defense; Perle; Roche; and Zakheim. Several members of the Center's advisory council or board of directors were also on the board of directors of the National Institute of Public Policy. Its Chief Executive Officer, Keith Payne, had in 1980 co-authored with Colin S Gray an article entitled 'Victory is Possible', which urged the US military to make plans for fighting and winning a nuclear war: 'The West needs to devise ways in which it can employ strategic nuclear forces coercively , while minimizing the potentially paralyzing impact of self-deterrence.' In January 2001, the National Institute for Public Policy published a report, Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control, prepared by a study group including Stephen Cambone, now a special assistant to Rumsfeld; Stephen Hadley, Deputy National Security Adviser, and Joseph. Several members, in government after Bush came to power, were involved in conducting a Nuclear Posture Review. 85 Its secret report, presented to Congress in January 2002, said that the Pentagon should be prepared to use nuclear weapons against China, Russia, Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Libya and Syria; . Such weapons could be used in three types of situations: against targets able to sustain non-nuclear attack; in retaliation for attack with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons; or 'in the event of surprising military developments'. War between Arab nations and Israel or between China and Taiwan were among the scenarios where the USA should be prepared to launch a nuclear attack. While conventional nuclear weapons caused destruction on such a large scale that they were 'self-deterring', potential enemies of the USA would be more likely to believe that small
game theory
While sick in bed rereading the novel THE SPY IN THE OINTMENT (1966) by Donald Westlake I came upon the following passage. The hero, J. Eugene Raxford, a pacifist pretending to be a terrorist (acting as an undercover agent for the Feds) meets Tyrone Ten Eyck, a real terrorist who must keep his identity secret: "The briefest of silences fell. We met one another's eyes, both unblinking, both urbane, both well aware of at least one set of hidden truths. Ten Eyck had use of me, for the moment, but only the time would come when he would surely try to kill me, if only because I knew his real name. I knew this, and he knew I knew it, and I knew he knew I knew it, and so on through an infinity of facing mirrors, each of us aware of the receding levels of the other's knowledge, neither of us with any intention of voicing that knowledge aloud. "If I were actually the man Ten Eyck thought me, what would I do now? It seemed to me I would smile and appear to believe everything he had said, and plan to kill him myself as soon as I knew nothing more could be gained from him. And he of course, must even now be thinking that was what I would plan. "What a nerve-racking way to live! If I'd never found any other reason to advocate pacifism, this would be it; it is so much easier on the nerves not to be perpetually be circling your fellow man, hand warily on the hilt of your knife." this is an excellent statement of the game-theoretic way of thinking, seen in its starkest way in the kind of paranoia that characterized John Nash. It also points to the often-unnoted psychic costs of thinking that way. I hope I'm not giving anything away, but Ten Eyck does try to kill Raxford. Is that the solution that Nash would suggest? BTW, the book is a lot of fun. It's the best I've read by Westlake. Jim Devine
Can US elections be democratic at all ? A note on American game theory
Cde Macdonald Stainsby draw my attention to this site: http://www.bartcop.com/diebold.htm The Boomtown Rats were formed in Dun Laoghaire, near Dublin, Ireland, in 1975 by a former journalist Bob Geldof (vocals - born 5 Oct. 1954), Johnnie Fingers (keyboards - real name John Moylett, born 10, Sep. 1956), Gerry Cott (guitar), Garry Roberts (guitar - born 16 June 1954), Pete Briquette (bass - real name Patrick Cusack, born 2 July 1954), and Simon Crowe (drums). The name of the band was taken from Woody Guthrie's novel Bound for Glory. The group moved to London in October 1976 and signed to Ensign Records. Their debut single, Lookin' After No. 1, was released in August 1977. It was the first of nine straight singles to make the U.K. Top 15, reaching to 11. The first LP The Boomtown Rats, was released in next month. In November 1978 the band appeared on ITV's Get It Together and got their first number one hit; Rat Trap was taken from LP Tonic for the Troops. A Tonic for the Troops was released in the U.S. on Columbia Records in February 1979 with two tracks from The Boomtown Rats substituted for tracks on the U.K. version. In 1979 the band toured in USA from February to May and appeared at the California Music Festival with Ted Nugent, Aerosmith, Cheap Trick and Van Halen. The next single, I Don't Like Mondays was the big one for Boomtown Rats and their second number one hit in UK (July 28). This record was subjected to an unofficial ban by most US radio stations, who were wary of legal action from the parents of a schoolgirl (Brenda Spencer from San Diego) who shot her classmates 29th January 1979, explaining her reason as she that didn't like Mondays. The single was contained on the Rats' third album, The Fine Art of Surfacing, released in October 1979. The album also contained their next U.K. Top Ten hit, SSomeone's Looking at You. In the beginning of 1980 band sets off a lengthy world tour, covering Europe, USA, Japan and Australia. In May I Don't Like Mondays won the Best Pop Song and Outstanding British Lyric categories at the 25th annual Ivor Novello Award. The Boomtown Rats released their final U.K. Top Ten hit, Banana Republic, in November 1980, followed by their fourth album, Mondo Bongo in January 1981. At this point, guitarist Gerry Cott left the group and the band continue as quintet. The lyrics of Banana Republic went like this: BANANA REPUBLIC Banana Republic - septic isle Screaming in the suffering sea It sounds like die, die, die Everywhere I go now - everywhere I see The black and blue uniforms Police and freeze And I wonder do you wonder, When you're sleeping with your whore. Sharing beds with history Is like a lickin' running sores. Forty shades of green, yeah Sixty shades of red Heroes going cheap these days Price: A bullet in the head. Banana Republic - septic isle Suffer in the screaming sea . . . It sounds like cry, cry, cry Take your hand and lead you, Up a garden path. Let me stand aside here And watch you pass. Striking up a soldier's song, Another tune - It begs too many questions And answer too. Banana Republic - septic isle Suffer in the screaming sea It sounds like die, die, die The purple and the pinstripe Mutely shake their heads. A silence shrieking volumes A violence worse than they condemn. Stab you in the back, yeah Laughing in your face Glad to see the place again - It's a pity nothing's changed. Banana Republic - septic isle Suffer in the screaming sea It sounds like die, die, die Banana Republic - septic isle Suffer in the screaming sea It sounds like die, die, die Jurriaan
Re: Re: Re: query: Game Theory
For anyone interested in game theory, Phil Mirowski's Machine Dreams is great, but it is also about more than game theory. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: query: Game Theory
I like this book a lot, but it is not suitable for undergraduate students. It is not really an introduction, but a critical essay which gets a bit technical at times. I was persuaded by their general position, however. Peter Bill Lear wrote: On Tuesday, January 7, 2003 at 09:26:35 (-0800) Devine, James writes: I've been reading GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING by David M. Kreps. It's a useful survey because it doesn't get bogged down in the technical details (as textbooks do) and provides some philosophical reflection on the whole GT project. Most importantly, it's not a rah-rah book promoting GT but keeps its praise tempered while explaining GT's limitations (even within the narrow confines of the neoclassical world-view). The problem is that the book was published in 1990 and is thus out of date. Does anyone know of a more recent book in this vein? Shaun Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis Varoufakis published Game Theory: A Critical Introduction in 1995. Description from Amazon: In recent years game theory has swept through all of the social sciences. Its practi[ti]oners have great designs for it, claiming that it offers an opportunity to unify the social sciences and that it it the natural foundation of a rational theory of society. Game Theory is for those who are intrigued but baffled by these claims, and daunted by the technical demands of most introductions to the subject. Requiring no more than simple arithmetic, the book: * Traces the origins of Game Theory and its philosophical premises * Looks at its implications for the theory of bargaining and social contract theory * Gives a detailed exposition of all of the major `games' including the famous `prisoner's dilemma' * Analyses cooperative, non cooperative, repeated, evolutionary and experimental games. I liked Varoufakis' intro econ book a lot. Not sure if this is useful to you or not. Bill
Re: query: Game Theory
On Tuesday, January 7, 2003 at 09:26:35 (-0800) Devine, James writes: >I've been reading GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING by David M. Kreps. It's >a useful survey because it doesn't get bogged down in the technical details >(as textbooks do) and provides some philosophical reflection on the whole GT >project. Most importantly, it's not a rah-rah book promoting GT but keeps >its praise tempered while explaining GT's limitations (even within the >narrow confines of the neoclassical world-view). > >The problem is that the book was published in 1990 and is thus out of date. >Does anyone know of a more recent book in this vein? Shaun Hargreaves Heap and Yanis Varoufakis Varoufakis published Game Theory: A Critical Introduction in 1995. Description from Amazon: In recent years game theory has swept through all of the social sciences. Its practi[ti]oners have great designs for it, claiming that it offers an opportunity to unify the social sciences and that it it the natural foundation of a rational theory of society. Game Theory is for those who are intrigued but baffled by these claims, and daunted by the technical demands of most introductions to the subject. Requiring no more than simple arithmetic, the book: * Traces the origins of Game Theory and its philosophical premises * Looks at its implications for the theory of bargaining and social contract theory * Gives a detailed exposition of all of the major `games' including the famous `prisoner's dilemma' * Analyses cooperative, non cooperative, repeated, evolutionary and experimental games. I liked Varoufakis' intro econ book a lot. Not sure if this is useful to you or not. Bill
query: Game Theory
Title: query: Game Theory I've been reading GAME THEORY AND ECONOMIC MODELLING by David M. Kreps. It's a useful survey because it doesn't get bogged down in the technical details (as textbooks do) and provides some philosophical reflection on the whole GT project. Most importantly, it's not a rah-rah book promoting GT but keeps its praise tempered while explaining GT's limitations (even within the narrow confines of the neoclassical world-view). The problem is that the book was published in 1990 and is thus out of date. Does anyone know of a more recent book in this vein? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: RE: Re: Re: game theory ;communes
THEY WERE CERTAINLY PHASED OUT nearly two decades ago spelling out degredation and disaster for the country side. it is not known what is the true number of floating labour in china, some say 100 lillion others say more, and the governement keeps a close lid on things. now with wto accession in hand, he country side is likely to endure more hardship if and only if china abides by the rules. i think they will not do so and ther are big enough to outmanouvre the rules. as to the communes they must have had the hiererachical structure as the communist party and also varied in numbers depending on geography crop etc. it was B. Mcleod in the JPE --- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I, too, don't know much about this. But it's quite > possible that the > communes weren't run democratically. It's only if > they were run > democratically that the bit about 200 people > applies. (I wasn't thinking > straight -- if I had, I would have mentioned this.) > If they were run in a > top-down way like a corporation is, then the limit > on the number of people > employed before the company becomes unwieldy is much > higher. > > I used the past tense above: it's my impression that > the communes have been > almost completely phased out. > > Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & > http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine > > > > > -Original Message- > > From: ALI KADRI [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Sent: Friday, April 26, 2002 2:55 PM > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: [PEN-L:25456] Re: Re: game theory > ;communes > > > > > > I do not know enough about this, and the only > person I > > know that might know is the late arthur k. davis. > but > > i did hear much about the inefficiency of the > commune > > before privatization, yet once trade barriers were > > lifted i heard a businessman on a radio talk show > > saying: the communes produce a lot but the problem > is > > that they do not have the refrigiration technology > and > > of course he wants to sell fridges to the chinese. > > --- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > My impression is that actually-existing Chinese > > > communes had many more > > > than 200 people in them. However, family, > kinship, > > > and religious > > > obligations may have allowed a higher number. > > > However2, the CP of China > > > seems to have oppposed these kinds of > obligations. > > > JD > > > > > > -Original Message- > > > From: ALI KADRI > > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > Sent: 4/25/02 11:16 PM > > > Subject: [PEN-L:25447] Re: Re: Re: game theory > > > ;communes > > > > > > In a debate in the JPE some 15 years ago, a > Chinese > > > dissident showed using game theory that communes > > > were > > > ineffective as production units because of moral > > > hazard and shirking. the best use of that came > in a > > > rebuttal which says that when the number of > persons > > > working in a commune did not exceed 200, that is > > > when > > > everyone knew everyone else in a gemeinshaft, > then > > > no > > > one could shirk because of social > responsibility. > > > the > > > author gave an example of farming religious > > > communities in the US that survived the assault > on > > > small farms because of their cooperative nature. > in > > > a > > > way this guy showed through a topology of return > > > functions that medium size communes are > better.--- > > > Ian > > > Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > > > Baseball is a meaningless diversion?! How > > > > anti-American a heresy! > > > > > > > > :-> > > > > > > > > Ian > > > > > > > > > > > > > These are of course the same folks who > believe > > > > that iMacs deliver the word > > > > > of Satan. > > > > > > > > > > - Original Message - > > > > > From: "Gil Skillman" > > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > > Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:29 PM > > > > > Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game > theory > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A while back someone asked about the > > > usefulness > > > > of game theory. Below is > > > > > a > > > > > > site that should, um, restore your faith > in > > > the > > > > power of this analytical > > > > > > framework. Amazing! Gil > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > __ > > > Do You Yahoo!? > > > Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and > more > > > http://games.yahoo.com/ > > > > > > > > > __ > > Do You Yahoo!? > > Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and > more > > http://games.yahoo.com/ > > > __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Health - your guide to health and wellness http://health.yahoo.com
RE: Re: Re: game theory ;communes
I, too, don't know much about this. But it's quite possible that the communes weren't run democratically. It's only if they were run democratically that the bit about 200 people applies. (I wasn't thinking straight -- if I had, I would have mentioned this.) If they were run in a top-down way like a corporation is, then the limit on the number of people employed before the company becomes unwieldy is much higher. I used the past tense above: it's my impression that the communes have been almost completely phased out. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine > -Original Message- > From: ALI KADRI [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Friday, April 26, 2002 2:55 PM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [PEN-L:25456] Re: Re: game theory ;communes > > > I do not know enough about this, and the only person I > know that might know is the late arthur k. davis. but > i did hear much about the inefficiency of the commune > before privatization, yet once trade barriers were > lifted i heard a businessman on a radio talk show > saying: the communes produce a lot but the problem is > that they do not have the refrigiration technology and > of course he wants to sell fridges to the chinese. > --- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > My impression is that actually-existing Chinese > > communes had many more > > than 200 people in them. However, family, kinship, > > and religious > > obligations may have allowed a higher number. > > However2, the CP of China > > seems to have oppposed these kinds of obligations. > > JD > > > > -Original Message- > > From: ALI KADRI > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Sent: 4/25/02 11:16 PM > > Subject: [PEN-L:25447] Re: Re: Re: game theory > > ;communes > > > > In a debate in the JPE some 15 years ago, a Chinese > > dissident showed using game theory that communes > > were > > ineffective as production units because of moral > > hazard and shirking. the best use of that came in a > > rebuttal which says that when the number of persons > > working in a commune did not exceed 200, that is > > when > > everyone knew everyone else in a gemeinshaft, then > > no > > one could shirk because of social responsibility. > > the > > author gave an example of farming religious > > communities in the US that survived the assault on > > small farms because of their cooperative nature. in > > a > > way this guy showed through a topology of return > > functions that medium size communes are better.--- > > Ian > > Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > Baseball is a meaningless diversion?! How > > > anti-American a heresy! > > > > > > :-> > > > > > > Ian > > > > > > > > > > These are of course the same folks who believe > > > that iMacs deliver the word > > > > of Satan. > > > > > > > > - Original Message - > > > > From: "Gil Skillman" > > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:29 PM > > > > Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game theory > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A while back someone asked about the > > usefulness > > > of game theory. Below is > > > > a > > > > > site that should, um, restore your faith in > > the > > > power of this analytical > > > > > framework. Amazing! Gil > > > > > > > > > > > > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > __ > > Do You Yahoo!? > > Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and more > > http://games.yahoo.com/ > > > > > __ > Do You Yahoo!? > Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and more > http://games.yahoo.com/ >
Re: Re: game theory ;communes
I do not know enough about this, and the only person I know that might know is the late arthur k. davis. but i did hear much about the inefficiency of the commune before privatization, yet once trade barriers were lifted i heard a businessman on a radio talk show saying: the communes produce a lot but the problem is that they do not have the refrigiration technology and of course he wants to sell fridges to the chinese. --- "Devine, James" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > My impression is that actually-existing Chinese > communes had many more > than 200 people in them. However, family, kinship, > and religious > obligations may have allowed a higher number. > However2, the CP of China > seems to have oppposed these kinds of obligations. > JD > > -Original Message- > From: ALI KADRI > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sent: 4/25/02 11:16 PM > Subject: [PEN-L:25447] Re: Re: Re: game theory > ;communes > > In a debate in the JPE some 15 years ago, a Chinese > dissident showed using game theory that communes > were > ineffective as production units because of moral > hazard and shirking. the best use of that came in a > rebuttal which says that when the number of persons > working in a commune did not exceed 200, that is > when > everyone knew everyone else in a gemeinshaft, then > no > one could shirk because of social responsibility. > the > author gave an example of farming religious > communities in the US that survived the assault on > small farms because of their cooperative nature. in > a > way this guy showed through a topology of return > functions that medium size communes are better.--- > Ian > Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > Baseball is a meaningless diversion?! How > > anti-American a heresy! > > > > :-> > > > > Ian > > > > > > > These are of course the same folks who believe > > that iMacs deliver the word > > > of Satan. > > > > > > - Original Message - > > > From: "Gil Skillman" > <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:29 PM > > > Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game theory > > > > > > > > > > > > > > A while back someone asked about the > usefulness > > of game theory. Below is > > > a > > > > site that should, um, restore your faith in > the > > power of this analytical > > > > framework. Amazing! Gil > > > > > > > > > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> > > > > > > > > > > > > __ > Do You Yahoo!? > Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and more > http://games.yahoo.com/ > __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and more http://games.yahoo.com/
Re: game theory ;communes
My impression is that actually-existing Chinese communes had many more than 200 people in them. However, family, kinship, and religious obligations may have allowed a higher number. However2, the CP of China seems to have oppposed these kinds of obligations. JD -Original Message- From: ALI KADRI To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: 4/25/02 11:16 PM Subject: [PEN-L:25447] Re: Re: Re: game theory ;communes In a debate in the JPE some 15 years ago, a Chinese dissident showed using game theory that communes were ineffective as production units because of moral hazard and shirking. the best use of that came in a rebuttal which says that when the number of persons working in a commune did not exceed 200, that is when everyone knew everyone else in a gemeinshaft, then no one could shirk because of social responsibility. the author gave an example of farming religious communities in the US that survived the assault on small farms because of their cooperative nature. in a way this guy showed through a topology of return functions that medium size communes are better.--- Ian Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Baseball is a meaningless diversion?! How > anti-American a heresy! > > :-> > > Ian > > > > These are of course the same folks who believe > that iMacs deliver the word > > of Satan. > > > > - Original Message - > > From: "Gil Skillman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:29 PM > > Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game theory > > > > > > > > > > A while back someone asked about the usefulness > of game theory. Below is > > a > > > site that should, um, restore your faith in the > power of this analytical > > > framework. Amazing! Gil > > > > > > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> > > > > > > __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and more http://games.yahoo.com/
Re: Re: Re: game theory ;communes
In a debate in the JPE some 15 years ago, a Chinese dissident showed using game theory that communes were ineffective as production units because of moral hazard and shirking. the best use of that came in a rebuttal which says that when the number of persons working in a commune did not exceed 200, that is when everyone knew everyone else in a gemeinshaft, then no one could shirk because of social responsibility. the author gave an example of farming religious communities in the US that survived the assault on small farms because of their cooperative nature. in a way this guy showed through a topology of return functions that medium size communes are better.--- Ian Murray <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Baseball is a meaningless diversion?! How > anti-American a heresy! > > :-> > > Ian > > > > These are of course the same folks who believe > that iMacs deliver the word > > of Satan. > > > > - Original Message - > > From: "Gil Skillman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:29 PM > > Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game theory > > > > > > > > > > A while back someone asked about the usefulness > of game theory. Below is > > a > > > site that should, um, restore your faith in the > power of this analytical > > > framework. Amazing! Gil > > > > > > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> > > > > > > __ Do You Yahoo!? Yahoo! Games - play chess, backgammon, pool and more http://games.yahoo.com/
Re: Re: The uses of game theory
Baseball is a meaningless diversion?! How anti-American a heresy! :-> Ian > These are of course the same folks who believe that iMacs deliver the word > of Satan. > > - Original Message - > From: "Gil Skillman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:29 PM > Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game theory > > > > > > A while back someone asked about the usefulness of game theory. Below is > a > > site that should, um, restore your faith in the power of this analytical > > framework. Amazing! Gil > > > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> > > >
Re: The uses of game theory
These are of course the same folks who believe that iMacs deliver the word of Satan. - Original Message - From: "Gil Skillman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 1:29 PM Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game theory > > A while back someone asked about the usefulness of game theory. Below is a > site that should, um, restore your faith in the power of this analytical > framework. Amazing! Gil > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> >
RE: The uses of game theory
this reminds me of the way one former Catholic described the faith he abandoned, in terms of bargaining with God. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine > -Original Message- > From: Gil Skillman [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Thursday, April 25, 2002 10:29 AM > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [PEN-L:25419] The uses of game theory > > > > A while back someone asked about the usefulness of game > theory. Below is a > site that should, um, restore your faith in the power of this > analytical > framework. Amazing! Gil > > <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html> >
The uses of game theory
A while back someone asked about the usefulness of game theory. Below is a site that should, um, restore your faith in the power of this analytical framework. Amazing! Gil <http://207.67.219.101/objective/gametheory.html>
RE: Re: RE: Re: game theory
I wrote: >>yes, but do three- or four-person games ever produce useful results? << Gil answers:>... for the most part, analyses of games that generically feature several players are not limited to the "three- or four-person" case.< N-person games -- where N is large -- seem to produce relatively clear predictions (given their assumptions, natch). (General equilibrium can be seen as an N-person game, but that's hardly relevant empirically.) Do the games where N is close to two (but greater than two) make clear predictions that can be tested empirically? or do they produce results akin to those of the 3-body problem in Newtonian mechanics? BTW, in reference to abstract theory, by "useful" I mean empirically relevant. At UC Berkeley (where I went), on the other hand, "useful" is often used to mean "it allows me to get tenure or a publication under my belt because it involves fancy math and/or it's similar to models that prestigious people get published." They forget that mathematical models are at best internally-consistent metaphors for empirical reality. They are not ways of describing the ideal forms that Plato saw as being behind the messy phenomenal world, since those forms don't exist. (As with the question of god's existence, I'm an agnostic on this question: but my working hypothesis -- one that has worked so far -- is that the Platonic forms don't exist.) >>are other game metaphors used besides "I move" and "you move" of the standard prisoner's dilemma box?<< >... yes, abundantly. Game theory has provided the microfoundation for much, maybe most, of modern microeconomics, and as such has been developed way, way beyond its simple roots.< Since micro-theory is largely poor (i.e., highly ideological and utopian in its assumptions), that's nothing to brag about. The best stuff, to my mind, is the part on the limits of microeconmics, as with the critique of "microfoundations of macroeconmics." Cf. Alan P. Kirman, 1992. "Whom or What does the Representative Individual Represent?" _Journal of Economic Perspectives_. 6(2), Spring: 117-136. Another example is the classic "theory of the second best." Beyond this, the Walrasian stuff -- which meshes well with game theory and currently forms the heart and soul of the official orthodoxy -- seems a step backward from Marshall's more realistic partial equilibrium analysis. It's no accident that a genius like Keynes learned from Marshall rather than Walras and that Keynesian economics lost its coherence as people tried to force it into a Walrasian framework. --- Again, I ask: are there any games besides the standard "game theory" ones that provide usable metaphors for real-world processes? For example, I think the "dollar auction" is a pretty good metaphor for the cold-war-type arms race (as metaphors go). Or is that really just a version of the standard game theory? Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine
Re: RE: Re: game theory
Jim writes >yes, but do three- or four-person games ever produce useful results? are >other game metaphors used besides "I move" and "you move" of the standard >prisoner's dilemma box? Re the first question: for the most part, analyses of games that generically feature several players are not limited to the "three- or four-person" case. Re the second question, yes, abundantly. Game theory has provided the microfoundation for much, maybe most, of modern microeconomics, and as such has been developed way, way beyond its simple roots. >I know about games such as "the dollar auction," which probably can be >modelled using standard game-theory tools, but it's hardly ever mentioned >outside of books such as Poundstone's PRISONER'S DILEMMA. That book also >mentions various other games, including one invented by John Nash that >involved movement of pieces on boards divided into hexagonal spaces. (It was >sold commercially for awhile and seems the basis of Avalon-Hill-type war >games.) Are any of these various non-standard games given any kind of >attention? How about, as I mentioned in my original missive in this thread, >card games such as solitaire? >Am I right to say that game theorists concentrate only on the simplest >possible games, because those are the easiest to analyze? In general, no. They may start with the simplest cases, but usually extend the results to the most general case possible. For example, the analysis of "strategic bargaining" models started with the bilateral, 2-player case, but now has been extended to the n-player case. Grab any recent graduate text on game theory, Jim (Fudenberg and Tirole, and Myerson, are two good ones), you'll see how general the development has been. Gil
RE: Re: RE: Re: game theory
> >Am I right to say that game theorists concentrate only on > the simplest > >possible games, because those are the easiest to analyze? jks: > Yes, but so do physicists. Quantum mechanics is essentially the theory of > hydrogen atoms, helium at a stretch. No one has the faintest idea how to do > the math for anything as complicated as gold, much less uranium. yeah, there's an analogy with physics: the Newtonian two-body problem (with one object rotating about another) is easy, but the three-body problem is very difficult (unsolvable without special assumptions?) the four-body problem? But in economics, there are other ways analyze the world besides micro-theory (including game theory), e.g., institutional analysis (with endogenous tastes, etc.) where macro-phenomena shape and determine the nature of micro-phenomena. We don't need to stick to the physics analogy, micro-determinism, etc. Game theory should be treated as just one small tool, not as the be-all and end-all of economics -- the way it is these days, when it seems as if most orthodox economics Ph.D. dissertations are about game theory. Down with all orthodoxies! JD
Re: RE: Re: game theory
> >Am I right to say that game theorists concentrate only on the simplest >possible games, because those are the easiest to analyze? > > Yes, but so do physicists. Quantum mechanics is essentially the theory of hydrogen atoms, helium at a stretch. No one has the faintest idea how to do the math for anything as complicated as gold, much less uranium. jks _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
RE: Re: game theory
I wrote: >>Why is it that "game theory" focuses only on the 2x2 matrix type of game (or the N-person game)? << Gil answers: > (it doesn't) > >or am I wrong to think that it is so one-tracked in its > >mind? Gil again: > In a word, yes. The 2X2 games are primarily just used for > illustrative purposes. yes, but do three- or four-person games ever produce useful results? are other game metaphors used besides "I move" and "you move" of the standard prisoner's dilemma box? I know about games such as "the dollar auction," which probably can be modelled using standard game-theory tools, but it's hardly ever mentioned outside of books such as Poundstone's PRISONER'S DILEMMA. That book also mentions various other games, including one invented by John Nash that involved movement of pieces on boards divided into hexagonal spaces. (It was sold commercially for awhile and seems the basis of Avalon-Hill-type war games.) Are any of these various non-standard games given any kind of attention? How about, as I mentioned in my original missive in this thread, card games such as solitaire? Am I right to say that game theorists concentrate only on the simplest possible games, because those are the easiest to analyze? Jim Devine "think outside the box -- like our cats."
Re: game theory
Jim writes >Why is it that "game theory" focuses only on the 2x2 matrix type of game (or >the N-person game)? (it doesn't) >or am I wrong to think that it is so one-tracked in its >mind? In a word, yes. The 2X2 games are primarily just used for illustrative purposes.
game theory
[was: RE: [PEN-L:24200] RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: Re: Re: "Nobel" Prize] Why is it that "game theory" focuses only on the 2x2 matrix type of game (or the N-person game)? or am I wrong to think that it is so one-tracked in its mind? When I'm wasting my time (in other ways besides silly e-mail discussions), I wonder if a game of solitaire could be used as an analogy for real-world situations the way the 2x2 game is used as a metaphor for some specific social situations. Perhaps Lenin or some other social revolutionary could be modeled as playing "freecell," with the chances of victory depend on not only on what's "in the cards" (the situation created by the conflict of forces & relations of production) but also on strategy & skill. Maybe this analogy is a way of reconciling determinism and the role of individual leaders. Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] & http://bellarmine.lmu.edu/~jdevine > -Original Message- > From: Davies, Daniel [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Thursday, March 21, 2002 8:13 AM > To: '[EMAIL PROTECTED]' > Subject: [PEN-L:24200] RE: Re: RE: Re: RE: Re: Re: Re: "Nobel" Prize > > > > >Well maybe, take it up with the architects of the PD, > Taylor, Rapaport, vN > & > >M, all of whom insist on the noncom condition, frankly, > > Sorry mate; I'm clearly getting your back up here and I > didn't mean to. > > The fact that communication has to be more than "cheap talk" > if it is to be > more than a wheel which doesn't turn anything in the > mechanism, is pretty > well known in the literature, though it probably came later > than von Neumann > and Morgenstern. In fact a lot of it is the reason why > Harsanyi and Selten > shared the Nobel equally with Nash, although they didn't get > a film written > about them. > > I'd be wary of relying on Rapaport too heavily; as far as I > know, his main > contribution to game theory have been a fallacy (the Symmetry > Fallacy in the > one-shot PD) and joint responsibility for all the horrendous confusion > engendered by that book "The Evolution of Co-operation" (summarised at > http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/1/1/review1.html ). Thomas Schelling's > "Strategy of Conflict" is lumps better as a text on game theory from a > political science point of view. > > anyway, whatever. I suspect that diminishing returns has set > in on this by > now > > dd > > > ___ > Email Disclaimer > > This communication is for the attention of the > named recipient only and should not be passed > on to any other person. Information relating to > any company or security, is for information > purposes only and should not be interpreted as > a solicitation or offer to buy or sell any security. > The information on which this communication is based > has been obtained from sources we believe to be reliable, > but we do not guarantee its accuracy or completeness. > All expressions of opinion are subject to change > without notice. All e-mail messages, and associated attachments, > are subject to interception and monitoring for lawful > business purposes. > ___ >
Game theory (was Nobel Prize)
> > > > Is that what is meant by an n-person game? > >exactly. The "N-person game" The n-person game is a game that is an interaction where the behavior of each depends on the perceptions of each about each other's behavior) that involves more than two persons. The classic PD is a two person game, that is the kind that has been most studied. is just another way of talking about public >goods -- or more correctly, collective goods -- and the free-rider problem. These are the n-person applications of the PD. > >Of course, even the free-rider problem doesn't produce exact predictions >that work. If it did, people would listen the public radio and TV stations >for free, so that those stations wouldn't see any point in doing >fundraisers >on the air and would become fully commercial stations. > Well, it produces exact predictions, but they are only statistically true. jks _ Send and receive Hotmail on your mobile device: http://mobile.msn.com
Re: Re: Nash & game theory
- Original Message - From: "Peter Dorman" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2002 1:08 PM Subject: [PEN-L:24097] Re: Nash & game theory > I very much like the critique of Nash's approach in GAME THEORY: A > CRITICAL INTRODUCTION by Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis. > > As a very general statement, my main gripe with the mainstream economics > appropriation of game theory is its fixation with solutions. Game > theory is too abstract to have much value as a predictive machine, and > what value is there to assuming a very specific set of rules, payoffs > etc. just to get a particular outcome? I think the main point of game > theory is to present a syntax for analyzing complex strategic > interactions. > > Peter == For a brilliant exposition of how GT runs into Godelian problems: < http://www.sunysb.edu/philosophy/faculty/pgrim/SPA TIALP.HTM > Ian
RE: Re: Nash & game theory
> I very much like the critique of Nash's approach in GAME THEORY: A > CRITICAL INTRODUCTION by Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis. > > As a very general statement, my main gripe with the > mainstream economics > appropriation of game theory is its fixation with solutions. Game > theory is too abstract to have much value as a predictive machine, and > what value is there to assuming a very specific set of rules, payoffs > etc. just to get a particular outcome? I think the main point of game > theory is to present a syntax for analyzing complex strategic > interactions. > > Peter As usual, what you say makes a tremendous amount of sense, Peter. Jim
Re: Nash & game theory
I very much like the critique of Nash's approach in GAME THEORY: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION by Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis. As a very general statement, my main gripe with the mainstream economics appropriation of game theory is its fixation with solutions. Game theory is too abstract to have much value as a predictive machine, and what value is there to assuming a very specific set of rules, payoffs etc. just to get a particular outcome? I think the main point of game theory is to present a syntax for analyzing complex strategic interactions. Peter Ian Murray wrote: > - Original Message - > From: "Justin Schwartz" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > > > > But Nash & Harsanyi made real contributions to > economics. > > == > > For an excellent comparative critique of GT see > Wolfgang Balzer's "Game Theory and Power Theory: A > Critical Comparison" in Thomas Wartenberg ed. > "Rethinking Power."
Re: Re: Re: Game theory
It was all about figuring out how to buy weapons that don't exist. -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Re: Game theory
Relying on my admitted poor memory, game theory was considered something a novelty until about 1980, when interest started to grow. It became somewhat standard in graduate courses about 1990, and is now routinely taught at the undergraduate level. The reasons probably are both internal to game theory and external. I.e., some break through in the theory combined with the failure of the alternatives. But I don't know the details well enough to speculate. Did Mirowksi have anything to say on the break out from RAND? Rod Michael Perelman wrote: > I just attended a talk by Phil Mirowski. He says that game theory did not > exist except at RAND, where von Neuman convinced the boys that it would be > useful for military strategies. > > Chris Burford wrote: > > > Scanning the debate on game theory last month, I was not sure how much a > > historical materialist perspective came through. I mean by this, locating > > game theory in the current stage of development of the means of production. > > > > It seems to me that game theory is one of a number of theories which start > > from an individualist premise, and then lead inexorably to an examination > > of the overall social pattern produced by the interconnections between > > individuals. In the hands of more thoughtful people, it leads back to > > systems analysis and a questioning of its own reductionist assumptions. > > > > This mirrors the state of a global economy in which the circulation of > > individual commodities has never been more intense, but which is in urgent > > need of overall management and social foresight. > > > > Chris Burford > > > > London > > -- > > Michael Perelman > Economics Department > California State University > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Chico, CA 95929 > 530-898-5321 > fax 530-898-5901 -- Rod Hay [EMAIL PROTECTED] The History of Economic Thought Archive http://socserv2.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3ll3/index.html Batoche Books http://Batoche.co-ltd.net/ 52 Eby Street South Kitchener, Ontario N2G 3L1 Canada
Re: Game theory
I just attended a talk by Phil Mirowski. He says that game theory did not exist except at RAND, where von Neuman convinced the boys that it would be useful for military strategies. Chris Burford wrote: > Scanning the debate on game theory last month, I was not sure how much a > historical materialist perspective came through. I mean by this, locating > game theory in the current stage of development of the means of production. > > It seems to me that game theory is one of a number of theories which start > from an individualist premise, and then lead inexorably to an examination > of the overall social pattern produced by the interconnections between > individuals. In the hands of more thoughtful people, it leads back to > systems analysis and a questioning of its own reductionist assumptions. > > This mirrors the state of a global economy in which the circulation of > individual commodities has never been more intense, but which is in urgent > need of overall management and social foresight. > > Chris Burford > > London -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University [EMAIL PROTECTED] Chico, CA 95929 530-898-5321 fax 530-898-5901
Game theory
Scanning the debate on game theory last month, I was not sure how much a historical materialist perspective came through. I mean by this, locating game theory in the current stage of development of the means of production. It seems to me that game theory is one of a number of theories which start from an individualist premise, and then lead inexorably to an examination of the overall social pattern produced by the interconnections between individuals. In the hands of more thoughtful people, it leads back to systems analysis and a questioning of its own reductionist assumptions. This mirrors the state of a global economy in which the circulation of individual commodities has never been more intense, but which is in urgent need of overall management and social foresight. Chris Burford London
Elster:[Elster, Jon (1982), Marxism, Functionalism,and Game , Theory: The , Case for Methodological Individualism, Theory and ,(fwd)-- False , Distinction between functionalism and , game theory. , (fwd)
Elster further continues his misrepresentation and functionalist reading of Marx: >Elsewhere Marx states that "insofar as it is the coercion of capital >which >forces the great mass of society to this [surplus labour] beyond its >immediate needs, capital creates culture and exercises an historical and >social function."20 He also quotes one of his favorite verses from >Goethe: Sollte diese Qual uns quäen, Da sie unsre Lust vermehrt, Hat nicht Myriaden Seelen Timur's Herrschaft aufgezehrt?21 >It is difficult, although perhaps not impossible, to read these passages >otherwise than as statements of an objective teleology. >Marx, as all Hegelians, was obsessed with meaning. If class society and >exploitation are necessary for the creation of >communism, this lends them a significance that also has explanatory >power. In direct continuation, Marx can also argue that >various institutions of the capitalist era can be explained by their >functions for capitalism, as in this analysis of social mobility: Mine
[Elster, Jon (1982), Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The ,Case for Methodological Individualism, Theory and (fwd)-- False ,Distinction between functionalism and game theory.
http://home.sol.no/~hmelberg/els1b.htm [Elster, Jon (1982), Marxism, Functionalism, and Game Theory: The Case for Methodological Individualism, Theory and Society 11:453-482] http://home.sol.no/~hmelberg/ar82mfgt.htm MARXISM, FUNCTIONALISM, AND GAME THEORY The Case for Methodological Individualism [start of page 453] JON ELSTER How should Marxist social analysis relate to bourgeois social science? The obvious answer is: retain and develop what is valuable, criticize and reject what is worthless. Marxist social science has followed the opposite course, however. By assimilating the principles of functionalist sociology, reinforced by the Hegelian tradition, Marxist social analysis has acquired an apparently powerful theory that in fact encourages lazy and frictionless thinking. By contrast, virtually all Marxists have rejected rational-choice theory in general and game theory in particular. Yet game theory is invaluable to any analysis of the historical process that centers on exploitation, struggle, alliances, and revolution. This issue is related to the conflict over methodological individualism, rejected by many Marxists who wrongly link it with individualism in the ethical or political sense. By methodological individualism I mean the doctrine that all social phenomena (their structure and their change) are in principle explicable only in terms of individuals - their properties, goals, and beliefs. This doctrine is not incompatible with any of the following true statements. (a) Individuals often have goals that involve the welfare of other individuals. (b) They often have beliefs about supra-individual entities that are not reducible to beliefs about individuals. "The capitalists fear the working class" cannot be reduced to the feelings of capitalists concerning individual workers. By contrast, "The capitalists' profit is threatened by the working class" can be reduced to a complex statement about the consequences of the actions taken by individual workers.1 (c) Many properties of individuals, such as "powerful," are irreducibly relational, so that accurate description of one individual may require reference to other individuals.2 [end of page 453, start of page 454] The insistence on methodological individualism leads to a search for micro- foundations of Marxist social theory. The need for such foundations is by now widely, but far from universally, appreciated by writers on Marxist economic theory,3 The Marxist theory of the state or of ideologies is, by contrast, in a lamentable state. In particular, Marxists have not taken up the challenge of showing how ideological hegemony is created and entrenched at the level of the individual. What microeconomics is for Marxist economic theory, social psychology should be for the Marxist theory of ideology.9 Without a firm knowledge about the mechanisms that operate at the individual level, the grand Marxist claims about macrostructures and long-term change are condemned to remain at the level of speculation. The Poverty of Functionalist Marxism Functional analysis 5 in sociology has a long history. The origin of functionalist explanation is probably the Christian theodicies, which reach their summit in Leibniz: all is for the best in the best of all possible worlds; each apparent evil has good consequences in the larger view, and is to be explained by these consequences. The first secular proponent perhaps wasMandeville, whose slogan "Private Vices, Public Benefits" foreshadows Merton's concept of latent function. To Mandeville we owe the Weak Functional Paradigm: an institution or behavioral pattern often has consequences that are (a) beneficial for some dominant economic or political structure; (b) unintended by the actors; and (c) not recognized by the beneficiaries as owing to that behavior. This paradigm, which we may also call the invisible-hand paradigm, is ubiquitous in the social sciences. Observe that it provides no explanation of the institution or behavior that has these consequences. If we use "function" for consequences that satisfy condition (a) and "latent function" for consequences that satisfy all three conditions, we can go on to state the Main Functional Paradigm: the latent functions (if any) of an institution or behavior explain the presence of that institution or behavior. Finally, there is the Strong Functional Paradigm: all institutions or behavioral patterns have a function that explains their presence. Leibniz invoked the Strong Paradigm on a cosmic scale; Hegel applied it to society and history, but without the theological underpinning that alone could justify it. Althusser sees merit in Hegel's recognition that history is a "process without a subject," though for Hegel the process still has a goal. Indeed, this is a characteristic feature of both the main and strong paradigms: to postulate a purpose without a purposive a
[PEN-L:9795] Re: game theory & torture
Recently Devine writes as follows: The CIA's prescriptions, in sum, are to mess with the prisoners' minds (and, if need be, their bodies) in order to _create_ the textbook prisoners' dilemma, to encourage each prisoner to "defect," to turn in his or her comrades. The textbook treatment _assumes_ that the prisoners are already atomistic individuals and there is _no need_ to plumb the depths of their psyches in order to make them that way. In fact, the vast majority of economists reject the need to study the depths of psychology at all; instead, they simply assume that people "maximize utility," having no sense of honor or morality, solidarity or self-esteem. It treats the fact that many if not most prisoners do not defect as a "paradox" rather than as showing up the severe limitations of the theory. COMMENT: There are two competing views of the non-repeating PD. While there is a standard argument that concludes that the dominant and rational strategy is to defect,(the Dominance argument) there is a so-called symmetry argument that can be traced back at least to Anatol Rapoport in FIGHTS GAMES AND DEBATES (1960). This argument has been elaborated by L Davis in Prisoners, Paradox, and Rationality. AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 14: 319-27.) A somewhat different argument but equally critical of the standard argument is McClennen E. Prisoners Dilemma and Resolute Choice. In Campbell R. and Sowden L.(eds) PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND CO-operation UBC Press 1985. The basic idea behind the symmetry argument is that each prisoner being rational and in the same situation will see that the dominance argument leads to a sub-optimal result FOR BOTH as contrasted with their both remaining silent. THerefore as rational agents they will resolutely choose, to use McLennen's term, not to defect in order to improve the result for them both. This avoids the paradoxical result of the traditional argument in which allegedly rational choice leads to sub-optimal outcomes for both participants. I agree with Davis and McLennen but not with Rapoport because Rapoport thinks that somehow altruism is involved. ALtruism is not involved at all. The argument works even for rational egoists who have no interest per se in the welfare of others. However, when it is necessary to co-operate to maximize the welfare of each it is rational to do so. I have an unpublished (but presented) paper that argues against the dominance argument, and also Parfit's(REASONS AND PERSONS 1984) critique of ethical egoism as self-defeating as shown by the PD. I think the PD shows no such thing. I also think that Gauthier(MORALS BY AGREEMENT 1986) is incorrect in thinking that unconstrained maximisers would choose defection as the rational strategy in PD contexts. Of course many of the things discussed in the literature as PD's have nothing to do with PD's. For example the position of polluters who have no motive to install pollution devices in a competitive market even though this might advance the public welfare. In these cases all polluters defecting from the welfare producing policy does not on the whole hurt them, so there is nothing at all paradoxical involved. One case that is like that of the PD is that involving manufacture of aerosols without fluorocarbon propellants. If everyone did it, it would cheaper for all manufacturers, and in that sense in all their interests, but no one manufacturer will do it because they do not want to give up the market that still exists for the earlier propellant. Manufacturers did not oppose a ban on fluorocarbon propellants since it would provide assurance that no firm could defect and capture a market niche. CHeers, Ken Hanly Cheers, Ken Hanly
[PEN-L:9795] Re: game theory & torture
Recently Devine writes as follows: The CIA's prescriptions, in sum, are to mess with the prisoners' minds (and, if need be, their bodies) in order to _create_ the textbook prisoners' dilemma, to encourage each prisoner to "defect," to turn in his or her comrades. The textbook treatment _assumes_ that the prisoners are already atomistic individuals and there is _no need_ to plumb the depths of their psyches in order to make them that way. In fact, the vast majority of economists reject the need to study the depths of psychology at all; instead, they simply assume that people "maximize utility," having no sense of honor or morality, solidarity or self-esteem. It treats the fact that many if not most prisoners do not defect as a "paradox" rather than as showing up the severe limitations of the theory. COMMENT: There are two competing views of the non-repeating PD. While there is a standard argument that concludes that the dominant and rational strategy is to defect,(the Dominance argument) there is a so-called symmetry argument that can be traced back at least to Anatol Rapoport in FIGHTS GAMES AND DEBATES (1960). This argument has been elaborated by L Davis in Prisoners, Paradox, and Rationality. AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 14: 319-27.) A somewhat different argument but equally critical of the standard argument is McClennen E. Prisoners Dilemma and Resolute Choice. In Campbell R. and Sowden L.(eds) PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY AND CO-operation UBC Press 1985. The basic idea behind the symmetry argument is that each prisoner being rational and in the same situation will see that the dominance argument leads to a sub-optimal result FOR BOTH as contrasted with their both remaining silent. THerefore as rational agents they will resolutely choose, to use McLennen's term, not to defect in order to improve the result for them both. This avoids the paradoxical result of the traditional argument in which allegedly rational choice leads to sub-optimal outcomes for both participants. I agree with Davis and McLennen but not with Rapoport because Rapoport thinks that somehow altruism is involved. ALtruism is not involved at all. The argument works even for rational egoists who have no interest per se in the welfare of others. However, when it is necessary to co-operate to maximize the welfare of each it is rational to do so. I have an unpublished (but presented) paper that argues against the dominance argument, and also Parfit's(REASONS AND PERSONS 1984) critique of ethical egoism as self-defeating as shown by the PD. I think the PD shows no such thing. I also think that Gauthier(MORALS BY AGREEMENT 1986) is incorrect in thinking that unconstrained maximisers would choose defection as the rational strategy in PD contexts. Of course many of the things discussed in the literature as PD's have nothing to do with PD's. For example the position of polluters who have no motive to install pollution devices in a competitive market even though this might advance the public welfare. In these cases all polluters defecting from the welfare producing policy does not on the whole hurt them, so there is nothing at all paradoxical involved. One case that is like that of the PD is that involving manufacture of aerosols without fluorocarbon propellants. If everyone did it, it would cheaper for all manufacturers, and in that sense in all their interests, but no one manufacturer will do it because they do not want to give up the market that still exists for the earlier propellant. Manufacturers did not oppose a ban on fluorocarbon propellants since it would provide assurance that no firm could defect and capture a market niche. CHeers, Ken Hanly Cheers, Ken Hanly
[PEN-L:9783] game theory & torture
(apologies ahead of time for this: I also walked out of the Mel Gibson flick "Ransom" thinking about game theory.) The L.A. TIMES today (May 1, 1997) published exerpts from the CIA manual on how to torture prisoners (used at the notorious US Army School of the Americas). This book should not be rejected out of hand, and instead should be treated as serious social science, despite its moral depravity (and its violation of current rules about experiments with human subjects): it represents the thinking of bright people dealing with serious questions, based on empirical evidence; it was a secret document and thus shows little need to cover up what's being recommended with euphemisms.[*] It seems a compendium of age-old wisdom about torture, used by the "torture professionals" (the CIA, etc.) to enlighten the "torture amateurs" (a large number of Latin American military officers) on how to torture efficiently (e.g., holding actual physical torture in reserve rather than revealing one's cards right away). In addition to being disgusting, it sheds a lot of light on the standard textbook presentation of the "prisoners' dilemma" in economics, or rather on the key assumption usually made in PD discussions, i.e., that people are atomistic individuals with absolutely no psychological depth. The CIA's prescriptions, in sum, are to mess with the prisoners' minds (and, if need be, their bodies) in order to _create_ the textbook prisoners' dilemma, to encourage each prisoner to "defect," to turn in his or her comrades. The textbook treatment _assumes_ that the prisoners are already atomistic individuals and there is _no need_ to plumb the depths of their psyches in order to make them that way. In fact, the vast majority of economists reject the need to study the depths of psychology at all; instead, they simply assume that people "maximize utility," having no sense of honor or morality, solidarity or self-esteem. It treats the fact that many if not most prisoners do not defect as a "paradox" rather than as showing up the severe limitations of the theory. The CIA manual suggests that we reject the standard economics attitude toward people. Further, if the prisoners' dilemma is something that has to be _actively created_ by the captors (doing more than simply separating the prisoners, preventing them from communcating) that the a priori presumption in PD games should be that people do not "defect." Of course, just as with the experiments done at death camps by the Nazi doctors, the validity of the CIA wisdom should not be tested via replication. But I bet that experimental economics has already been done for more moderate cases, showing the limits of the textbook presentation. Of course, the power of ideology is such that such research does not show up in the textbooks, where it would have the most influence. Happy May Day, International Workers' Day! [*] Because of the way e-mail strips nuance from our prose, I must stress that I do not admire the "bright" CIA social scientists. Rather, this shows one of the big problems with social science. But maybe some of them will turn out to be Daniel Ellsbergs. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ. 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "It takes a busload of faith to get by." -- Lou Reed.
[PEN-L:9783] game theory & torture
(apologies ahead of time for this: I also walked out of the Mel Gibson flick "Ransom" thinking about game theory.) The L.A. TIMES today (May 1, 1997) published exerpts from the CIA manual on how to torture prisoners (used at the notorious US Army School of the Americas). This book should not be rejected out of hand, and instead should be treated as serious social science, despite its moral depravity (and its violation of current rules about experiments with human subjects): it represents the thinking of bright people dealing with serious questions, based on empirical evidence; it was a secret document and thus shows little need to cover up what's being recommended with euphemisms.[*] It seems a compendium of age-old wisdom about torture, used by the "torture professionals" (the CIA, etc.) to enlighten the "torture amateurs" (a large number of Latin American military officers) on how to torture efficiently (e.g., holding actual physical torture in reserve rather than revealing one's cards right away). In addition to being disgusting, it sheds a lot of light on the standard textbook presentation of the "prisoners' dilemma" in economics, or rather on the key assumption usually made in PD discussions, i.e., that people are atomistic individuals with absolutely no psychological depth. The CIA's prescriptions, in sum, are to mess with the prisoners' minds (and, if need be, their bodies) in order to _create_ the textbook prisoners' dilemma, to encourage each prisoner to "defect," to turn in his or her comrades. The textbook treatment _assumes_ that the prisoners are already atomistic individuals and there is _no need_ to plumb the depths of their psyches in order to make them that way. In fact, the vast majority of economists reject the need to study the depths of psychology at all; instead, they simply assume that people "maximize utility," having no sense of honor or morality, solidarity or self-esteem. It treats the fact that many if not most prisoners do not defect as a "paradox" rather than as showing up the severe limitations of the theory. The CIA manual suggests that we reject the standard economics attitude toward people. Further, if the prisoners' dilemma is something that has to be _actively created_ by the captors (doing more than simply separating the prisoners, preventing them from communcating) that the a priori presumption in PD games should be that people do not "defect." Of course, just as with the experiments done at death camps by the Nazi doctors, the validity of the CIA wisdom should not be tested via replication. But I bet that experimental economics has already been done for more moderate cases, showing the limits of the textbook presentation. Of course, the power of ideology is such that such research does not show up in the textbooks, where it would have the most influence. Happy May Day, International Workers' Day! [*] Because of the way e-mail strips nuance from our prose, I must stress that I do not admire the "bright" CIA social scientists. Rather, this shows one of the big problems with social science. But maybe some of them will turn out to be Daniel Ellsbergs. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ. 7900 Loyola Blvd., Los Angeles, CA 90045-8410 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950 "It takes a busload of faith to get by." -- Lou Reed.
[PEN-L:8991] Rahul on game theory
As usual, Rahul Mahajan has provided an informed and scholarly commentary on the question at hand, namely the relevance or lack thereof to socialism. A few points in response: 1) Payoffs can be variable, not just single values for given outcomes. 2) Cooperation involves the possibility of collaboration. John Nash assumed that this required communication, which is probably right. 3) Since the original Axelrod study showing the alleged superiority of the tit-for-tat strategy in extended prisoner's dilemma games, another strategy has been shown to beat it, a modified tit-for-tat. After all, if in tit-for-tat, if one defects they can easily get locked in that scenario. The modified version involves occasionaly efforts to cooperate if locked into a "defective" Nash equilibrium. 3) It is well known that there is nothing optimal about the Nash equilibrium. In neoclassical theory it need not correspond with a Pareto optimal competitive general equilibrium, and in general doesn't. It is a well known outcome, first actually shown by Cournot for duopolies back in the 1830s. It is a workhorse concept, but there are many others, such as the sub-game perfect equilibrium. 4) I fully agree that solidarity involves an issue of being conscious of some identity with others. What that consciousness is is clearly a fundamental issue. 5) This probably requires some selflessness not captured by the more simple-minded game theoretic formulations. It is also true that most leftists are that way out of some kind of idealism that "anti-selfish," to some degree. But to construct a society on such a basis is very difficult. Rahul has observed the problem of repression in actually existing socialisms to enforce "selflessness." A real problem. 6) I await with interest his comments on what is of value in game theory. Barkley Rosser -- Rosser Jr, John Barkley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
game theory & power
My impression (based on woefully inadequate knowledge) is that game theory can easily incorporate issues of power. For example, the result of one "player's" actions can a greater pay-off than another's exact same actions. Symmetry need not be assumed. Further, one can think of the standard "prisoner's dilemma" game as an example of power in action: the cops set up the game in a way that divides and conquers the prisoners, so that A rats on B (or vice-versa or both). The non-symmetry might represent instrumental power, while the prisoner case represents the power to set the rules. If the "game" is an institution inherited from history, one can think of structural power: the institutions of capitalism typically divide and conquer the workers, giving capitalists instrumental power based on their structural position in society. I don't know enough about game theory to know if the formalism (the math) contributes anything to intuition. I would guess that it does: the 2 by 2 boxes representing a two-person game helps clarify thought, if nothing else. As usual, one has to be careful with formalism, avoiding the trap of confusing the model with the reality one is trying to understand. (There are both costs and benefits to formalism.) Game theory tells me that the key issue that has to be addressed is the way in which the rules are determined. Game theorists have "meta- games" to determine the rules of the "sub" games. But then what determines the rules of the meta-games? I think history and non- game processes have a lot to say here. (Unless there are no non- game processes, in which case game theory nears the realm of tautology. But I think there are a lot of non-game processes, such as the simple accumulation of capital.) Three problems can arise that I can think of if one gets excessively obsessed with game theory. One is the reductionism, trying to explain all economics by micro-level games. (There are macro-level games, but they assume that groups or classes of people act or can act _as if_ they were individuals.) This can get you into the realm of Chicago-school fallacies, forgetting the macro- foundations of microeconomics. Of course, the Chicago school emphasizes n-person games (where n is very large) which are models of the perfectly competitive markets that they worship and believe are omnipresent, omnipotent, and omniscient. The authors who get into game theory typically emphasize 2-person games, which allow for relations of power, and allow for more "liberal" or leftist conclusions. But they may forget that macro-level phenomena can feed back and determine micro- level games, as when the reserve army of the unemployed biases the game book against workers in the workplace. Second, if I understand correctly, game theory has a really hard time with games involving more than 2 and less than n (a large number) of players. Third, as is common in economics, game theory (that I've seen) takes individual (or group) tastes as given. This for example would lead the theorist to over-emphasize one police tactic (the divide and conquering of two prisoners) at the expense of an equally common tactic: the hard cop/nice cop routine, in which the two cops manipulate the psychology of the prisoner, changing his or her tastes, perceptions, and sense of self-esteem, until the prisoner breaks. This tactic in inexplicable in terms of game theory as far as I know. These are not criticisms as much as statements of the limitations of game theory (or which I'll bet there are many more). They aim to prevent the Nobel prize from going to the head of any naive game theorists out there. I do not come to bury game theory but to qualify the praise of it. As usual, correct me if I'm wrong. in pen-l solidarity, Jim Devine [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] Econ. Dept., Loyola Marymount Univ., Los Angeles, CA 90045-2699 USA 310/338-2948 (daytime, during workweek); FAX: 310/338-1950
