Re: [qubes-devel] Timestamp canaries
On Friday, March 9, 2018 at 9:57:47 PM UTC-5, Andrew David Wong wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > On 2018-03-09 16:12, Peter Todd wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 12:19:47PM -0800, > > theinnovativeinven...@gmail.com wrote: > >> I was looking at the canaries, and I liked the idea of a proof of > >> freshness with the latest news headlines. While people can't > >> create canaries ahead of time, it is possible to conspire to > >> modify or backdate one of them after they have been published. To > >> prevent this, we could use a blockchain-based timestamp, where > >> the hashes of each canary are placed within the blockchain of a > >> powerful cryptocurrency. Something similar to these services: > >> > >> https://opentimestamps.org/ http://originstamp.org/home > >> > >> This way, if there ever is a interruption of canaries, followed > >> by a court order or something forcing you guys to backdate a > >> falsified canary or modify old ones, we will all be able to > >> check. > > > > The easiest way to do this is to simply use the OpenTimestamps > > (OTS) git integration. This blog post explains how: > > > > https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-git-integration > > > > Addiitionally, while not covered in that blog post, OTS also > > supports a mode where it rehashes the git tree in such a way that > > an efficient, SHA256-based, timestamp proof can be extracted later > > for each file. In the next release this will be done by default, > > but for now you have to add the --rehash-trees option where the > > ots-git-gpg-wrapper command is called. > > > > FWIW, as of this week, Bitcoin Core maintainer Wladimir J. van der > > Laan started using OTS to timestamp Bitcoin Core commits and tags. > > > > Related issue: > https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2847 > > - -- > Andrew David Wong (Axon) > Community Manager, Qubes OS > https://www.qubes-os.org > > -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- > > iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlqjSZoACgkQ203TvDlQ > MDDIihAAyu8mH1+bqRR/to4nEzEsVZGP9Y2EMx0JSc2KVN3iZ/nfsoDp1h3vbLDe > r79AZAJZVvjB6VEJCyMgqfa9ZirwT3Ri0g/9ozN9XFn3gdNt1rkz21lsW/nabtpV > P0lLoPOOcCaLWiHHXbRBa3RrntOYp1f3ReFRg0+He9QcmD8aATm43euaPZ+Y/OMb > jhskfSLu9jHh4Ef0R+wXYnjtN7FNwuccy+WuByTzmlT2BbLfjTljo4pahEaDqPKo > mkX330EhVYEXmNfTiV07MmFmYtd2/9zAWB2cZCYsv7S0dh5dc3MyGzQW+pscNyMU > JroXQOtC1JgqctQSkKVPNAiGjzrz5e+RL8K6E+xpCh8tvDNZtPbcCC5S91AsvdOj > N9cxyFFWZiOq7FVO0Wjg0Rvamm67uLFRyLYVPCNj6KeZ6wsPspU32OqCZtXkVTNW > BnGts+Ooo7Z8JW0vsHo/n3kcTYhMp40sBtl4dI1oKMrkoYR8LjM2H98wecdZKl9i > kArYv8WQzgGAFn0631Z3pPRw2g9kVkssH0vrOMuDxYCLiqFg8ImIbx0AhMtPlTEA > pGYsYrL/V2OgvjBGNFcfmtTtprY8SGUFAcIBrVZUcAH4lGntLJW8D2MSmhy+9bpy > 8cbbhdqeqHSI5meVyaVahL+7GCx4/gggivvd81WdY0lVkZTjpCE= > =Oc4Y > -END PGP SIGNATURE- Sounds good! I was thinking of manually doing each of the canaries for now by using this: https://github.com/opentimestamps/opentimestamps-client. Git integration can be done later. I just used the javascript opentimestamps client to stamp all the Qubes PGP keys, Qubes Security Bulletins, Qubes warrant canaries, and Qubes ISO digests along with the signatures at my fork of qubes-secpack: https://github.com/InnovativeInventor/qubes-secpack. Should I submit a pull request with these .ots files included? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/edcb8b7a-11b6-4d84-9266-2c1e8e2292a4%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-devel] Timestamp canaries
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 On 2018-03-09 16:12, Peter Todd wrote: > On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 12:19:47PM -0800, > theinnovativeinven...@gmail.com wrote: >> I was looking at the canaries, and I liked the idea of a proof of >> freshness with the latest news headlines. While people can't >> create canaries ahead of time, it is possible to conspire to >> modify or backdate one of them after they have been published. To >> prevent this, we could use a blockchain-based timestamp, where >> the hashes of each canary are placed within the blockchain of a >> powerful cryptocurrency. Something similar to these services: >> >> https://opentimestamps.org/ http://originstamp.org/home >> >> This way, if there ever is a interruption of canaries, followed >> by a court order or something forcing you guys to backdate a >> falsified canary or modify old ones, we will all be able to >> check. > > The easiest way to do this is to simply use the OpenTimestamps > (OTS) git integration. This blog post explains how: > > https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-git-integration > > Addiitionally, while not covered in that blog post, OTS also > supports a mode where it rehashes the git tree in such a way that > an efficient, SHA256-based, timestamp proof can be extracted later > for each file. In the next release this will be done by default, > but for now you have to add the --rehash-trees option where the > ots-git-gpg-wrapper command is called. > > FWIW, as of this week, Bitcoin Core maintainer Wladimir J. van der > Laan started using OTS to timestamp Bitcoin Core commits and tags. > Related issue: https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-issues/issues/2847 - -- Andrew David Wong (Axon) Community Manager, Qubes OS https://www.qubes-os.org -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCgAdFiEEZQ7rCYX0j3henGH1203TvDlQMDAFAlqjSZoACgkQ203TvDlQ MDDIihAAyu8mH1+bqRR/to4nEzEsVZGP9Y2EMx0JSc2KVN3iZ/nfsoDp1h3vbLDe r79AZAJZVvjB6VEJCyMgqfa9ZirwT3Ri0g/9ozN9XFn3gdNt1rkz21lsW/nabtpV P0lLoPOOcCaLWiHHXbRBa3RrntOYp1f3ReFRg0+He9QcmD8aATm43euaPZ+Y/OMb jhskfSLu9jHh4Ef0R+wXYnjtN7FNwuccy+WuByTzmlT2BbLfjTljo4pahEaDqPKo mkX330EhVYEXmNfTiV07MmFmYtd2/9zAWB2cZCYsv7S0dh5dc3MyGzQW+pscNyMU JroXQOtC1JgqctQSkKVPNAiGjzrz5e+RL8K6E+xpCh8tvDNZtPbcCC5S91AsvdOj N9cxyFFWZiOq7FVO0Wjg0Rvamm67uLFRyLYVPCNj6KeZ6wsPspU32OqCZtXkVTNW BnGts+Ooo7Z8JW0vsHo/n3kcTYhMp40sBtl4dI1oKMrkoYR8LjM2H98wecdZKl9i kArYv8WQzgGAFn0631Z3pPRw2g9kVkssH0vrOMuDxYCLiqFg8ImIbx0AhMtPlTEA pGYsYrL/V2OgvjBGNFcfmtTtprY8SGUFAcIBrVZUcAH4lGntLJW8D2MSmhy+9bpy 8cbbhdqeqHSI5meVyaVahL+7GCx4/gggivvd81WdY0lVkZTjpCE= =Oc4Y -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/298ba99b-eed0-73ec-3e4a-40fa604403aa%40qubes-os.org. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Firewall fixes not in 4.0rc5 stable repo
On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 05:04:57PM -0500, Chris Laprise wrote: > On 03/09/2018 04:43 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: > > On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 04:26:26PM -0500, Chris Laprise wrote: > > > Per issues #3260 and #3503. The commits are approaching one month old but > > > still in current-testing. I thought they'd make it to rc5 stable. > > > > Templates in rc4 have qubes-core-agent 4.0.24, which do contain those > > commits. > > > > I have a fedora-26-minimal template from 20171223. There is newer one: https://yum.qubes-os.org/r4.0/templates-itl/rpm/qubes-template-fedora-26-minimal-4.0.0-201802271926.noarch.rpm > Freshly installed it > updates to qubes-core-agent version 4.0.20-1. And debian-8 is updating to > the same version. debian-8 indeed hasn't been rebuilt for rc5. Packages in current-testing will be migrated to current at the beginning of next week. -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/2018030936.GG4063%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. signature.asc Description: PGP signature
Re: [qubes-devel] Timestamp canaries
On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 12:19:47PM -0800, theinnovativeinven...@gmail.com wrote: > I was looking at the canaries, and I liked the idea of a proof of freshness > with the latest news headlines. While people can't create canaries ahead of > time, it is possible to conspire to modify or backdate one of them after they > have been published. To prevent this, we could use a blockchain-based > timestamp, where the hashes of each canary are placed within the blockchain > of a powerful cryptocurrency. Something similar to these services: > > https://opentimestamps.org/ > http://originstamp.org/home > > This way, if there ever is a interruption of canaries, followed by a court > order or something forcing you guys to backdate a falsified canary or modify > old ones, we will all be able to check. The easiest way to do this is to simply use the OpenTimestamps (OTS) git integration. This blog post explains how: https://petertodd.org/2016/opentimestamps-git-integration Addiitionally, while not covered in that blog post, OTS also supports a mode where it rehashes the git tree in such a way that an efficient, SHA256-based, timestamp proof can be extracted later for each file. In the next release this will be done by default, but for now you have to add the --rehash-trees option where the ots-git-gpg-wrapper command is called. FWIW, as of this week, Bitcoin Core maintainer Wladimir J. van der Laan started using OTS to timestamp Bitcoin Core commits and tags. -- https://petertodd.org 'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/20180309221208.GA4487%40fedora-23-dvm. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [qubes-devel] Re: Firewall fixes not in 4.0rc5 stable repo
On 03/09/2018 04:43 PM, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki wrote: On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 04:26:26PM -0500, Chris Laprise wrote: Per issues #3260 and #3503. The commits are approaching one month old but still in current-testing. I thought they'd make it to rc5 stable. Templates in rc4 have qubes-core-agent 4.0.24, which do contain those commits. I have a fedora-26-minimal template from 20171223. Freshly installed it updates to qubes-core-agent version 4.0.20-1. And debian-8 is updating to the same version. -- Chris Laprise, tas...@posteo.net https://github.com/tasket https://twitter.com/ttaskett PGP: BEE2 20C5 356E 764A 73EB 4AB3 1DC4 D106 F07F 1886 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/0e4b4b65-68b0-866f-6a7b-d848af1333f0%40posteo.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-devel] Re: Firewall fixes not in 4.0rc5 stable repo
On Fri, Mar 09, 2018 at 04:26:26PM -0500, Chris Laprise wrote: > Per issues #3260 and #3503. The commits are approaching one month old but > still in current-testing. I thought they'd make it to rc5 stable. Templates in rc4 have qubes-core-agent 4.0.24, which do contain those commits. -- Best Regards, Marek Marczykowski-Górecki Invisible Things Lab A: Because it messes up the order in which people normally read text. Q: Why is top-posting such a bad thing? -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/20180309214338.GF4063%40mail-itl. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. signature.asc Description: PGP signature
[qubes-devel] Firewall fixes not in 4.0rc5 stable repo
Per issues #3260 and #3503. The commits are approaching one month old but still in current-testing. I thought they'd make it to rc5 stable. -- Chris Laprise, tas...@posteo.net https://github.com/tasket https://twitter.com/ttaskett PGP: BEE2 20C5 356E 764A 73EB 4AB3 1DC4 D106 F07F 1886 -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/cd643ed9-4997-5838-cd53-66945a2c8bc4%40posteo.net. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-devel] Timestamp canaries
I was looking at the canaries, and I liked the idea of a proof of freshness with the latest news headlines. While people can't create canaries ahead of time, it is possible to conspire to modify or backdate one of them after they have been published. To prevent this, we could use a blockchain-based timestamp, where the hashes of each canary are placed within the blockchain of a powerful cryptocurrency. Something similar to these services: https://opentimestamps.org/ http://originstamp.org/home This way, if there ever is a interruption of canaries, followed by a court order or something forcing you guys to backdate a falsified canary or modify old ones, we will all be able to check. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/f81fd61d-7cb4-42b6-ba99-b55f0734afbb%40googlegroups.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: [qubes-devel] GPG-split like application
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 > So I'm curious about the different options that exist for implementing this, > and if anyone can point me towards what resources I should read up on to > understand what I need to do to accomplish this. Do I need to build a > modified Qubes in order to put this together, or is it enough to allow RPC > interaction via rules? The best way is to use [0]. It's here for this purpose. So you need to write a server side software, a client side software and the policies. Essentially the server side software acts like an adapter for the wallet (you don't need either to modify the wallet's code). HTTP isn't a good idea for various reasons: - - *more* complexity - - 'signer' VM exposed to other VMs - - absence of Qubes OS RPC policy - - absence of OS's integration and so on... [0] = https://www.qubes-os.org/doc/qrexec3/ Best Regards, Raffaele. -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- iQIzBAEBCAAdFiEE9bU8N8AgwMcjiC1xjTxG+6f1ce4FAlqiW54ACgkQjTxG+6f1 ce4kOA//eMHrd6OnY/4ANuwlIgjVubjKirPrB0RPFIWnm6Vw9j7NH/LBBhfND6fy zU3ChuxXZlRrkxdDxzeHhpj+i1oVqL94JVd1c/RzH+hzo5zbvlAotppi2VeUrpmE KwxB6WKevtIp7lsP2GjeXbNWSBZNw8f9FRo+VxDijlJIG2tRmO18qLny4fQZCVik ln2CEKZB1f/Z1SyAeH/mSA20DL7KeBoYCAJLn2mPSsPQiD9QUVykzp1Op3yk5u14 WkNxl1CHIEFhAHxZC6HyetkpDa5QOAaTUzG30/AfSlZegWgjveFOGc0/N7ilJ/6V 81MqcOCYQm1IZogVbNU57EqKnaLy2WLiQZZrNLFcL7kOoCfXlrzwqn6z39XjkaGJ Y5lUaqZn80shbm5TTA0Y7o2hjRxzmSjN0c1+8fN097v71rCYX75+21T4pUw21Lpp askmXG3LQ7T1wjBjCpbHjSIPBUNslMJ994QOdIvSQS0Y7eCpkB4+k+wZkiuLRcUV Qk97RnfHCnkBybtxK9/1u0GWxVkz/Lqa/VvWTEarPAV1wwKSMbXqNP8wSR+fC+Vg zZPT//9/eZ1HK+Rx8TIWaYrY6q2z1CNvH2O5hmrTCpoVwEsgV5gah8hxnoUOltPW vQY/Lk+QNh/2kMqka/cnECrnlde7y/0+JNHlXArqLNr4MuKs3I4= =JHiG -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/v_uOAvRLBHYgiwS8YiEFQlSq3Y8Oxo4WC9lm_G33fsrM3TDvCrJfSqyYXvOYYnEgR8KCSg2ZFF8wM0V4g3jUNWR12jMNKD9v5JnROpy-_KY%3D%40protonmail.com. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
[qubes-devel] GPG-split like application
Hi, I would like to create an application that behaves very similar to how the GPG split works. I am developing a 'signer' for Ethereum (https://github.com/holiman/go-ethereum/tree/signer_mhs/cmd/signer), which is basically a wallet. The signer exposes an external API, which can be either RPC-based or HTTP-based. The external API is considered untrusted, and all requests to that API are handled via sign-what-you-see on the 'internal' side via a UI of the users choice. The user can either start the signer with a native CLI ui, or use a GUI to start the signer (in the trusted environment), e.g the proof-of-concept QT-based poc implementation at https://github.com/holiman/qtsigner. Now, I would like to use a similar mechanism as gpg-split uses, in order to have the signer running in a separate 'vault' which does not have external networking, but does expose either RPC or HTTP to other VM:s. So I'm curious about the different options that exist for implementing this, and if anyone can point me towards what resources I should read up on to understand what I need to do to accomplish this. Do I need to build a modified Qubes in order to put this together, or is it enough to allow RPC interaction via rules? Cheers, Martin Holst Swende -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "qubes-devel" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to qubes-devel+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to qubes-devel@googlegroups.com. To view this discussion on the web visit https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/qubes-devel/aed416f7-1225-c592-15f6-f2b492f59479%40swende.se. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. 0x05A5DDF0.asc Description: application/pgp-keys
