RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

I appreciate Eric's points, and I think there's much truth to them.  
But I do think that it might be helpful to distinguish what the government as 
an institution should do, and what we as voters (who may try to influence 
Senators) should do.

I certainly don't quiz my doctors about their views on elephants and 
turtles, but if I learned that a doctor whom I was considering really, 
genuinely thought that the world did indeed rest on the elephants and turtles, 
I would probably find another doctor (even if I thought that the government 
shouldn't fire him for such beliefs).  Likewise, I probably wouldn't support 
someone for head of the NIH if he had this belief.  Again, if I thought that 
many educated devout Hindus today did believe this, then I might have a 
different view; but I assume that they don't believe it, which leads me to view 
the elephant/turtle guy much as we'd likely view a flat earther:  Someone who 
seems like a crank, and who's crankness might well apply to other aspects of 
his life.  Or is that a mistake?

Finally, I should note that my argument wasn't based on the perceived 
inconsistency between hypothetical people's current statements and past ones; 
I'm sorry if I wasn't clear about this.  Rather, it's that when we evaluate 
whether someone is likely to have good policy judgment on various issues, 
knowing that he accepts certain factual assertions that are deeply inconsistent 
with our understanding of how the world actually works may (or may not, 
depending on our experience with people who accept those particular assertions) 
lead us to doubt his judgment more broadly.

Eugene

> -Original Message-
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach
> Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 3:26 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
>
> I think the issue comes down to what epistemological assumptions the
> government is working from.  The scientific method accepts as true only those
> factual hypotheses that can be observed, tested, and repeated.  It remains
> agnostic as to other factual assertions.  Those other kinds of factual 
> assertions
> can't be observed, tested, or repeated, but can still be subject to reasoned 
> inquiry,
> especially inductive reasoning.
>
> Going back to Eugene's response email, there really is a difference between 
> the
> assertion of "turtles now" (subject to scientific inquiry) and the assertion 
> of "turtles
> at some unobservable point far in the past" (not subject to scientific 
> inquiry).  If
> the person responds to objections to a "turtles now" assertion by saying that 
> he
> still believes in the turtles but that they are in some way unobservable, 
> then the
> factual assertion he is making has changed (call it "ineffable turtles") and 
> the
> question is no longer within the realm of science.  As an example, I think 
> most
> scientists would agree that whether humans have "souls" simply is not a 
> scientific
> question.
>
> I take Eugene's earlier email to say that he would have "pretty negative 
> views" of
> someone who would not agree to have his factual assertions (based on 
> traditional
> Hindu beliefs) tested scientifically where those views were in fact amenable 
> to
> scientific investigation.  Holding "pretty negative views" of someone for that
> reason seems overly harsh to me, but a scientist's refusal to accept 
> scientific
> inquiry into scientific questions seems like a factor one could take into 
> account in
> hiring/appointing.
>
> The question is more difficult when you consider other, non-scientific factual
> assertions.  Sometimes the factual assertions would be clearly disqualifying
> because they are in fact "antithetical" to the purpose of the government 
> institution.
> No problem with the government not appointing a Holocaust denier as the head 
> of
> the Holocaust Museum.
>
> Most religious beliefs, however, (incl. non-monotheistic belief systems like
> Buddhism, Hinduism and Santeria) aren't in direct conflict with the purpose of
> government institutions.  And the factual assertions of those beliefs only 
> become
> problematic if the government chooses to adopt an epistemological approach 
> like
> Hume's in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  But I don't see why the
> government is compelled to adopt Hume's epistemology in evaluating religious
> officials and employees.  As long as the person does their job adequately,
> experience shows that the government should not care about the factual
> implications of a person's religious beliefs. And experience also shows that
> historically religious tests for office or state employment have often had
> pernicious effects.  So the wisest course is for the government to avoid 
> adopting a
> state epistemology that forces it to evaluate its citizens' religious beliefs.
>
> For the s

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Eric Rassbach]

I think the issue comes down to what epistemological assumptions the government 
is working from.  The scientific method accepts as true only those factual 
hypotheses that can be observed, tested, and repeated.  It remains agnostic as 
to other factual assertions.  Those other kinds of factual assertions can't be 
observed, tested, or repeated, but can still be subject to reasoned inquiry, 
especially inductive reasoning.

Going back to Eugene's response email, there really is a difference between the 
assertion of "turtles now" (subject to scientific inquiry) and the assertion of 
"turtles at some unobservable point far in the past" (not subject to scientific 
inquiry).  If the person responds to objections to a "turtles now" assertion by 
saying that he still believes in the turtles but that they are in some way 
unobservable, then the factual assertion he is making has changed (call it 
"ineffable turtles") and the question is no longer within the realm of science. 
 As an example, I think most scientists would agree that whether humans have 
"souls" simply is not a scientific question.

I take Eugene's earlier email to say that he would have "pretty negative views" 
of someone who would not agree to have his factual assertions (based on 
traditional Hindu beliefs) tested scientifically where those views were in fact 
amenable to scientific investigation.  Holding "pretty negative views" of 
someone for that reason seems overly harsh to me, but a scientist's refusal to 
accept scientific inquiry into scientific questions seems like a factor one 
could take into account in hiring/appointing.

The question is more difficult when you consider other, non-scientific factual 
assertions.  Sometimes the factual assertions would be clearly disqualifying 
because they are in fact "antithetical" to the purpose of the government 
institution.  No problem with the government not appointing a Holocaust denier 
as the head of the Holocaust Museum.

Most religious beliefs, however, (incl. non-monotheistic belief systems like 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Santeria) aren't in direct conflict with the purpose of 
government institutions.  And the factual assertions of those beliefs only 
become problematic if the government chooses to adopt an epistemological 
approach like Hume's in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  But I don't 
see why the government is compelled to adopt Hume's epistemology in evaluating 
religious officials and employees.  As long as the person does their job 
adequately, experience shows that the government should not care about the 
factual implications of a person's religious beliefs. And experience also shows 
that historically religious tests for office or state employment have often had 
pernicious effects.  So the wisest course is for the government to avoid 
adopting a state epistemology that forces it to evaluate its citizens' 
religious beliefs.

For the same reason, despite the example of the amusing werewolf-identifying 
doctor, I doubt Eugene systematically inquires into the religious beliefs of 
his doctors to determine whether he thinks they are foolish or not; he trusts 
in their credentials and his experiences with them.  I would also be surprised 
if Eugene dropped a doctor simply because he found out the doctor had 
traditional Hindu beliefs.  The reason the werewolf-identifying doctor is 
disturbing is precisely because he feels comfortable proclaiming his thoughts 
without explaining them using reason -- and he is unaware of the effects of his 
proclamation on others.  Similarly, the inconsistency of the person who first 
claims the turtles are there but then changes his story to claim "ineffable 
turtles" might cause one to doubt the person's sincerity, as Eugene pointed out 
in his email.  That goes not to the content of the beliefs, however, but 
whether they are truly held.  (I note that Eugene's reliance on consi!
 stency here is in some tension with what Eugene has said before about whether 
courts should use consistency to determine a religious plaintiff's sincerity.)

Regarding Collins himself I thought the list would be interested in this 
exchange he had with the Pew folks:  http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=217.  
I think the exchange demonstrates reasoned thought, applied to both religious 
and non-religious issues, though I can't claim to have read enough of what 
Collins has written to assess whether he typically uses reason to examine his 
faith.  But I think the onus is on others to show that he has "seemingly 
unsound *scientific* views."

Finally, I should mention that the musings in this string are mine alone, and 
not the Becket Fund's!

Eric


-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 10:33 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

Indeed, which is good rea

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Brownstein, Alan]

I agree with Art to the extent that his post is limited to specific beliefs 
that are in fact antithetical to the satisfactory performance of a particular 
job – that is, beliefs as to which there may be either secular or religious 
sources. But there are other variations of the problem.


1.   The contention that religious beliefs per se, that is, the belief that 
some things have happened or will happen that can’t be explained by science and 
have theological explanations, is itself a basis for disqualifying a person for 
a job requiring a commitment to, and expertise in, science.

2.   The contention that some unconventional and idiosyncratic religious 
beliefs disqualify a person for a leadership position, not because they are 
antithetical in some direct way to the requirements of the position, but 
because they cast doubt on the person’s judgment or on the way that they 
distinguish truth from falsehood.

This leaves open the question of exactly what it means for a belief to be 
antithetical to the performance of a particular job. On that issue I would 
think it is clear that common monotheistic beliefs are not antithetical to the 
satisfactory, indeed the exemplary, performance of high level positions in 
science and virtually every other field.

Alan Brownstein



From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of artspit...@aol.com
Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 7:42 AM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[I sent this last night but it doesn't seem to have reached the list so I'm 
trying again, slightly edited.]

The courts have told us that a statute that coincides with a religious belief, 
and that may have been enacted by legislators whose votes were influenced by 
their personal religious beliefs, is not thereby an establishment of religion.  
E.g., Harris v. McRae (no tax funding for abortions).  Why shouldn't the same 
principle apply here?  If a person's openly held beliefs or public statements 
are actually antithetical to the requirements of a particular job, then that 
person should not have to be hired or retained in that job.  Whether the 
beliefs or statements at issue arise from the person's religion or from some 
other source should be irrelevant.  If I won't defend someone's legal right to 
utter blasphemy, then the ACLU could reasonably refuse to hire me as a First 
Amendment litigator, regardless of whether my refusal to do so arises from my 
religious belief that blasphemy (and the defense of blasphemy) is a sin, or 
from my purely secular belief that the world would be a better place if people 
were legally prohibited from casting aspersions on other people's religious 
beliefs.

I therefore don't see how denying a job to a person who holds beliefs that are 
antithetical to the requirements of the job constitutes a religious test.

I think the argument that this is a religious test assumes that “no religious 
test shall ever be required as a qualification” includes the meaning “no 
secular test shall ever be required as a qualification if it would have a 
disparate impact on people of some religion,” which seems dubious to me.  Is it 
a “religious test” to require that a Public Health Service nurse be willing and 
able to give vaccinations, which (I'm assuming for the sake of making the 
point) means that a Christian Scientist can't get that job?

Whether a person's beliefs are actually antithetical to the requirements of a 
particular job depends a lot on the job.  I don't care if an NIH file clerk 
believes that the germ theory of disease is a false invention of Satan, 
intended to mislead people into vainly trying to cure illness with medicine 
rather than with prayer -- as long as that belief doesn't cause him to misfile 
charts.  But I think such a belief should disqualify a person from being the 
head of NIH, because such a belief is very likely to skew decisions that are 
within the power of that job.  (And this remains true even though it's possible 
that in 200 years the germ theory will have been displaced by a more 
sophisticated understanding of illness. We can't live 200 years in the future.)

Of course, it's the government's option whether to assert or to disregard such 
a disqualification.  There's nothing unlawful about appointing a person who 
doesn't believe in germs to be the head of NIH, any more than it's unlawful to 
appoint a person who doesn't believe in regulating Wall Street to be the head 
of the SEC, or unlawful to appoint a person who believes that “when the 
President does it, it's not against the law” to be the Attorney General.

Art Spitzer (speaking personally; I don't think the ACLU has expressed any view 
about the appointment of Dr. Collins)



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RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Will Linden]

I thought that "werewolves" were men who turn into wolves (or vice versa, 
according to Larry Niven and the Warlock). So what does it mean to "turn 
INTO a werewolf"?


At 09:09 PM 8/6/09 -0700, you wrote:
Many list members whose email programs block attachments may have 
wondered, as I did, what Will Linden's point was. If you let the 
attachment through you will see that it includes his photo, in which, in 
my view, he simply looks respectably hirsute. You may be able to see it below.


With appreciation for Will's attempt to lighten the mood,

Mark Scarberry

Pepperdine

At 04:35 PM 8/6/09 -0700, Will Linden wrote:


explains his belief on the grounds that there's a probability, 
however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into a werewolf, would you be 
satisfied about his qualities?




Turn INTO a werewolf?

 

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Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[ArtSpitzer]

[I sent this last night but it doesn't seem to have reached the list so I'm 
trying again, slightly edited.]

The courts have told us that a statute that coincides with a religious 
belief, and that may have been enacted by legislators whose votes were 
influenced by their personal religious beliefs, is not thereby an establishment 
of 
religion.  E.g., Harris v. McRae (no tax funding for abortions).  Why 
shouldn't the same principle apply here?  If a person's openly held beliefs or 
public statements are actually antithetical to the requirements of a particular 
job, then that person should not have to be hired or retained in that job.  
Whether the beliefs or statements at issue arise from the person's religion 
or from some other source should be irrelevant.  If I won't defend someone's 
legal right to utter blasphemy, then the ACLU could reasonably refuse to 
hire me as a First Amendment litigator, regardless of whether my refusal to do 
so arises from my religious belief that blasphemy (and the defense of 
blasphemy) is a sin, or from my purely secular belief that the world would be a 
better place if people were legally prohibited from casting aspersions on 
other people's religious beliefs.

I therefore don't see how denying a job to a person who holds beliefs that 
are antithetical to the requirements of the job constitutes a religious 
test. 

I think the argument that this is a religious test assumes that “no 
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification” includes the meaning 
“no 
secular test shall ever be required as a qualification if it would have a 
disparate impact on people of some religion,” which seems dubious to me.  Is 
it a “religious test” to require that a Public Health Service nurse be 
willing and able to give vaccinations, which (I'm assuming for the sake of 
making the point) means that a Christian Scientist can't get that job?

Whether a person's beliefs are actually antithetical to the requirements of 
a particular job depends a lot on the job.  I don't care if an NIH file 
clerk believes that the germ theory of disease is a false invention of Satan, 
intended to mislead people into vainly trying to cure illness with medicine 
rather than with prayer -- as long as that belief doesn't cause him to 
misfile charts.  But I think such a belief should disqualify a person from 
being 
the head of NIH, because such a belief is very likely to skew decisions that 
are within the power of that job.  (And this remains true even though it's 
possible that in 200 years the germ theory will have been displaced by a more 
sophisticated understanding of illness. We can't live 200 years in the 
future.)

Of course, it's the government's option whether to assert or to disregard 
such a disqualification.  There's nothing unlawful about appointing a person 
who doesn't believe in germs to be the head of NIH, any more than it's 
unlawful to appoint a person who doesn't believe in regulating Wall Street to 
be 
the head of the SEC, or unlawful to appoint a person who believes that “when 
the President does it, it's not against the law” to be the Attorney 
General.

Art Spitzer (speaking personally; I don't think the ACLU has expressed any 
view about the appointment of Dr. Collins)


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RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

   I think Mark's point is quite right, partly because it stresses 
"the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith" (which is quite 
relevant to scientists' "want[ing] public support") and partly because "there 
have been many very distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs" 
(including recently, and not just in the distant path).  But I think both the 
merit and the limitation of this argument is that it is indeed so constrained, 
and does distinguish the religions of sensible mainstream people from the 
religions of zany fringe people.  It works very well a prudential and pragmatic 
argument (albeit with some degree of moral consequences if the prudential and 
pragmatic predicates are fulfilled).  But I suspect it doesn't work as a 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional argument, and I'm not sure that it even 
works as a rule of political morality, though it is a good guide to sensible 
behavior.  Or am I not doing it enough justice?

   Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:07 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law 
Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one am 
happy to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise 
would be -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us 
to be fools. If belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith 
in the US disqualifies one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow 
shows that the person cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, 
in Dickens' phrase "a ass -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking 
not of science but of the law.) There have been many very distinguished 
scientists who have had such beliefs, and I think it is bigotry to disqualify 
such persons from scientific positions. Or perhaps we now should discard the 
results of the human genome project, because Francis Collins led the effort, 
and of course the results cannot be reliable.

A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would 
use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that 
Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for 
sloppy treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden 
biblical messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a 
method is far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require 
naturalism as a belief system is indeed to impose a religious test.

Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine


From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
I appreciate Eric's suggestion, but I wonder whether it works.  I 
take it that the response to "But all our instruments show that there's no 
elephant or turtle down there" would be the same as the response to "But all 
our experience with medicine tells us that there can't be a virgin birth or a 
resurrection" - "Well, this is a special miracle that can't be tested with your 
instruments / that doesn't fit with our experience."  I'm not sure one can 
easily distinguish the two.

But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the 
person says "The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on a turtle.  But not long ago that changed, and that's why our instruments 
can't perceive this now."  Would our view of the person's general 
trustworthiness really change, on the grounds that now he's saying something 
that isn't currently testable with current observations?

Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn't strike me as 
working, either.  If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves 
(perhaps with some religious explanation), and explains his belief on the 
grounds that there's a probability, however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into 
a werewolf, would you be satisfied about his qualities?  What if you heard this 
from a doctor that you were considering going to - wouldn't you think you might 
be safer in someone else's hands?

As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at the 
time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who disagreed would 
be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and that therefore people who 
rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and discriminated against.  That's 
surely bad.  Yet does our uncertainty about what's right, and our recognition 
that time has upset many fighting faiths, mean that we just have to 
categorically ignore a person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's 
being considered for 

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

I much appreciate Alan's point, which further illustrates the pragmatic 
and non-absolute nature of the inquiry.  But I wonder whether the entry-level / 
experienced distinction quite does all the work.  In some situations (perhaps 
including the one at NIH, though I should note that to my knowledge Collins 
would be very much on the mainstream belief side of the line), someone who has 
had a long career in implementation is being shifted for the first time to a 
high-level position that has lots of policy discretion.  (It's a bit like a 
circuit judge being appointed to the Supreme Court:  That the judge closely 
followed precedent at the circuit level might often not tell you much about how 
he or she will decide cases when the constraint of precedent is removed.)  
Would you be troubled about giving such policy discretion to someone who makes 
some very strange factual assertions about the world or the past of the world, 
even if he may done a great job as a geneticist in the!
  past?

Eugene

Alan Brownstein writes:

> I think Mark is clearly right when he talks about generally recognized 
> religious
> doctrines in part because we know as an empirical matter that individuals who
> hold these beliefs are capable of engaging in first rate scientific work, 
> practicing
> medicine with great skill, and doing all kinds of other work that requires 
> scientific
> knowledge and expertise.
>
> Eugene's question focuses on less conventional and less common religious
> beliefs, however. One answer to the problem of the individual who holds
> uncommon religious beliefs who is nominated to a position of authority is 
> that we
> can look at the individual's life and accomplishments as a check on our 
> concern
> about his religious beliefs being inconsistent with the position to which he 
> has
> been appointed. Typically leadership positions are offered to people with
> considerable experience and accomplishments in their field. If unconventional
> religious beliefs have not interfered with their professional 
> responsibilities and
> accomplishments for 25 years or so, there seems little reason to believe that 
> they
> would suddenly become inconsistent with their ability to preform their
> professional responsibilities when appointed to a leadership position.
>
> I think the harder question is whether unconventional religious beliefs should
> preclude an individual from entry level positions when the individual's 
> beliefs (in
> the abstract) may seem inconsistent with the responsibilities they would 
> assume
> in the position they are seeking and we have no track record to offset such
> concerns. The answer to that question may be contextual -- depending for
> example on the consequences of the individual's failure to perform his job in 
> a
> competent way.
>
> Alan Brownstein
> 
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
> On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark [mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu]
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:06 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law
> Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one 
> am happy
> to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise would 
> be
> -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us to be 
> fools. If
> belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith in the US 
> disqualifies
> one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow shows that the person
> cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, in Dickens' phrase 
> "a ass
> -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking not of science but of the 
> law.)
> There have been many very distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs,
> and I think it is bigotry to disqualify such persons from scientific 
> positions. Or
> perhaps we now should discard the results of the human genome project,
> because Francis Collins led the effort, and of course the results cannot be
> reliable.
>
> A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would
> use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that
> Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for 
> sloppy
> treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden 
> biblical
> messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a method is
> far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require naturalism as a 
> belief
> system is indeed to impose a religious test.
>
> Mark Scarberry
> Pepperdine
>
> 
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
> Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM
> To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
>  

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

Indeed, which is good reason not to try and convict those who wrongly 
reject the theories we view as sound.  But that doesn't tell us much, I think, 
about whether we should appoint them to head NIH.  In fact, it seems to me 
obviously true that we *should* consider people's scientific theories in 
deciding whether to appoint them heads of NIH (the closest analogy to Galileo). 
 The question is whether we should also consider their factual assertions that 
they say are merely matters of religious faith.

Eugene

> -Original Message-
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Lisa A. Runquist
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> Wasn't Galileo was tried and convicted by those who wrongly rejected his
> theories, as they conflicted with the scientific and religious beliefs
> of the day?
>
> Lisa
>
> Volokh, Eugene wrote:
>
> > As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at
> > the time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who
> > disagreed would be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and that
> > therefore people who rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and
> > discriminated against.  That's surely bad.  Yet does our uncertainty
> > about what's right, and our recognition that time has upset many
> > fighting faiths, mean that we just have to categorically ignore a
> > person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's being considered
> > for a high government post?  Remember, the question isn't whether to
> > throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles
> > (though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his
> > views as "delusions," for instance if the person really believes that
> > he's Napoleon) - it's whether we should consider the views in deciding
> > whether to trust the person with a great deal of discretionary authority.
> >
> >
> >
> > Eugene
> >
> >
> >
> > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Eric Rassbach
> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
> > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > *Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically
> > testable or not?   We can make scientific observations now about whether
> > the world rests upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.
> >
> >
> >
> > Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't
> > overly Newtonian in its assumptions.  Quantum mechanics allows us to
> > calculate the non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events
> > we might otherwise hold to be outside the standard rules of nature.
> >
> >
> >
> > Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19^th century
> > to take pretty negative views of someone who didn't buy into an aether
> > theory?  For the government to impose legal detriments on that person?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Volokh, Eugene
> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
> > *To:* 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
> > *Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> >
> >
> >
> > I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of
> > us who recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to
> > evaluate people's qualities for various purposes.  Say someone sincerely
> > tells us that he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four
> > elephants, which rest on the back of a turtle.  When told that this is
> > inconsistent with various facts about the world, elephants, and turtles,
> > he says that this is an artifact of some special treatment by divine
> > forces, which allows evasion of the normal rules of the universe.  I
> > take it that our first reaction would be to take a pretty negative view
> > of the person.
> >
> >
> >
> > And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't
> > displace our doubts, I think.  Even if we have reason to think that he's
> > been a perfectly good geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best
> > person to promote to a rather different job that involves a broad range
> > of choices about health science funding.  Maybe we have some sort of
> > ethical or constitutional obligation to set aside our worries, and draw
> > a sharp line between beliefs that a person says are "outside the natural
> > order" and those that he says relate to the natural order.  But it seems
> > to me that setting them aside at least runs against our first
> > common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound.
> >
> >
> >
> > >From there we can shift the hypotheti