Re: Citations to Listserv posts/Contraception mandate
... Let me present another view. Scholarship is not about vanity; it's about the ideas. Things that are relevant to an idea can come in many forms -- letters, songs, poems, conversations between spouses or a public speech. It could come from a diary or a movie. The trouble comes when we fail to be cognizant of the kind of source material that falls within our scholastic purview. What is said in an e-mail may not be the person's "considerate views" for a variety of reasons. We all know havoc that can come from the ease of the medium and from hip shooting in general. At the same time, we also know that relying only upon formally published material is too stuffy (formalistic). It betrays everything we know about the virtues of understanding premises and propositions by using historical context, biography, portrayal, social context and whatnot. And so, perhaps this is the answer: e-mails may indeed become scholarly relevant, but they only ever amount to a quick and cursory sort of thing. If someone were to cite to X's e-mailed position, it should never be regarded as his or her considerate view, without more, and it should always be dealt with by the person using it with qualification (apologetically). You should, in short, be able to apologetically use any e-mail, if it was truly relevant to the scholarly issue, and if, in text, you remind the reader of its inherent contingent value. One other nothing. I hope we all agree that "aristocrat ethics" should be avoided at all cost. Surely no one would propose a veil of secrecy around their emails because of a concern for vanity or for club status. Sometimes I think we misunderstand what the true ethic is here: the pursuit of truth/perspective and the need for intellectual discourse. So long as you use the email apologetically -- recognizing its contingent status -- it's okay to use it if doing so is relevant. Sent from my iPad On Aug 2, 2013, at 1:21 PM, "Scarberry, Mark" wrote: I'm the moderator only for conlawprof, and Eugene may have a different suggestion for the religionlaw list, but may I strongly recommend that list posts not be quoted, and positions taken on the list not be attributed, without permission of the poster. I think that is a matter of courtesy, and it's also been our custom. No one can control what non-members may do with the archives, but we are a kind of community. The poster also may have made the point somewhere in print; if you ask, they could give you the reference to cite, which provides multiple benefits. Sent from my iPad ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Can someone be legally obligated to have sex with people she's unwilling to have sex with?
Philosophically, I see two issues. First, a prostitute, by definition, is almost always "having sex with someone he or she doesn't want to," because, absent payment, he or she would not be doing that. I imagine the clients are of the worst that this sort of business can provide as far as attractiveness goes, so that adopting a racial preference would hardly be rational. One wants to say: they aren't having sex with the person, they are merely involved in a monetary transaction. It's just work. But at the same time, it is quite tempting to say that a person should have autonomy over his or her intimacy preferences. Otherwise, why not say that they would have to accept people of the same or different gender, else it would be "discrimination." I don't think discrimination could ever touch upon who you wanted to have sex with, even if it became monetarized and sold. But I confess that this issues seems best left to sociologists and to pragmatism, not to philosophers or lawyers. We would be the LAST to see the answer. Sent from my iPad > On Feb 14, 2015, at 12:19 PM, Volokh, Eugene wrote: > >Mark: So do I understand correctly that you think it's OK for the > government to say: > >As a condition of your being able to earn a living in your chosen > occupation [here, prostitution], you are legally obligated to have sex with > people you're unwilling to have sex with. > >That surprises me, but I'd love to hear more about it. > >Eugene > >> -Original Message- >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw- >> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Graber, Mark >> Sent: Saturday, February 14, 2015 2:49 AM >> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics >> Subject: RE: The racist prostitute hypothetical >> >> I confess that I get off at the second paragraph (or the first substantive >> paragraph). >> >> My spouse is an excellent breadbaker and therapist. For a while, she just >> bakes >> for friends and only comforts friends and does so for friendship. Turns out >> all >> our friends are of the same race, religion, sexual orientation, etc. I >> presume >> these choices are constitutionally protected. One day, after receiving >> numerous >> comments of the sort, "you really ought to go into business," she does. The >> first >> person who orders bread and asks for therapy is of a different race, >> religion, >> sexual orientation, etc. I take it this can be regulated. The first >> amendment >> does protect some activities, even when done commercially, but at the very >> least those activities cannot be described as Eugene does below as "just >> business." If it is "just business" (and that is not what a clergy person >> thinks they >> are doing when they marry someone), then it ought to be subject to anti- >> discrimination law. >> >> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] >> on behalf of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu] >> Sent: Saturday, February 14, 2015 12:01 AM >> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics (religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu) >> Subject: The racist prostitute hypothetical >> >> I've been thinking about a little thought experiment, and I >> thought I'd >> run it past this list to see whether people see it as helpful. >> >> Imagine a state in which prostitution is legalized. A >> prostitute offers her >> services to the general public (perhaps through a web site, which as I >> understand >> it is not uncommon). She is generally not very selective, because it's just >> business. But she doesn't like black people. A black would-be customer >> feels >> understandably insulted by this, so he sues her for discrimination in public >> accommodations. And the state law does cover all businesses, bricks and >> mortar or not, that provide goods or services to the general public. (That, >> after >> all, is the sort of law that covers bakers, wedding photographers, and >> perhaps >> ministers who charge for their services.) >> >> My inclination is that the prostitute should have an absolute >> right to >> discriminate on any basis she wants, whether it's race, religion, marital >> status, >> age, or whatever else. And that is true even though she charges money, and >> generally provides her services to everyone. (I say "she" and "he" in this >> example, but of course the same would apply regardless of the sex or sexual >> orientation of the parties.) The choice of whom to have sex with is a >> personal >> choice, even when done commercially, and no-one should have to have sex with >> someone they don't want to have sex with - on pain of either facing a fine or >> having to quit one's chosen line of business - no matter how many for-pay >> partners they might have. Are people on this list with me so far? >> >> Now the next step: I think that, while sexual conduct should >> involve
Re: The racist prostitute hypothetical
... thanks for that. It's an interesting distinction. Sent from my iPad > On Feb 15, 2015, at 8:26 PM, Graber, Mark wrote: > > Dear All: > > This goes back in time a bit, but I have had a busy weekend and wanted to > respond to those who wondered why I think the racist prostitute should be > subject to anti-discrimination laws. > > One feature of several rights is that we do not allow people to commodify > them, or at least commodify them in certain ways. So while people have the > right to vote, and may choose when exercising the right to vote may vote only > for persons of color (or white persons), we do not allow persons to sell > their right to vote. We think the reason people ought to have a right to > vote is justified by the same principle that supports forbidding the right to > sell the vote. > > Consider sex. One reason we think persons have a right to certain sexual > relationships is that we think government should not ban intimate > relationships. One reason many people think prostitution should be banned is > that intimacy is not the sort of good that should be bought and sold. But > now imagine we live in a world in which people have no problem commodifying > sex. The best reason for thinking this is that they do not regard commercial > sex as intimate behavior. They regard sex as more akin to back rubs, and or > ice cream, but of which are subject to anti-discrimination rights. But if > people do not think commercial sex is intimate behavior than the main reason > why we allow discrimination has been rejected. > > In short, my claim is that if sex is just business, then sex is not intimate, > and only intimate relationships and actions should enjoy immunity for > anti-discrimination rules. > > MAG > ___ > To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu > To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see > http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw > > Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as > private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; > people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) > forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Is the New Testament Against Gay Marriage?
Wanted to see if there were any takers on this. Sent from my iPad Begin forwarded message: Replying to this comment on conlawprof: "The Old Testament doesn't purport to reflect natural law principles on marriage. The New Testament does, though." --- One time I was teaching a Wittgenstein class. A student took the position that he believed in aliens. When I asked him why, he mentioned the sheer number of galaxies and other planets.The odds were too far in his favor. And so I replied, "you don't believe in aliens; you believe in probability." By the same token, when people say that the New Testament takes a position one way or another on same-sex marriage (if that is being said), one has to ask what they are really placing their faith upon. Matthew 19 speak of two issues: (a) divorcing a wife; and (b) men who would want to forego the male-female union that Jesus references. The people who would not find such a union attractive are: (1) Those who have devoted themselves to God; (2) Those who were born differently; and (3) those who were "of men." The term used is "eunuch." He doesn't mean castrated; he means those who are not predisposed to having the kind of commitment to wives that he just described when answering that specific question. See Matthew 19:12. . So, it is not at all clear to me that the New Testament takes a position on anything until human beings start superimposing what Wittgenstein called "pictures." It is THIS (the picture) that is the object of faith. This is same problem originalists have. They think "truth" is being defeated when they should see only that one arrangement of it (a mental picture) is being rejected for another. My reading of Matthew conjures up this picture. Jesus wasn't giving a sermon (the law); he was only answering a question about when it is okay to divorce your wife. When the answer seemed stern, he was asked point blank: why take a wife then? He then basically said that not everyone would, and listed some reasons why. Then this story gets repeated as social hearsay for decades. I don't see anything that addresses gay marriage in a negative way. Regards and thanks. Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq. Associate Professor Wright State University Website: http://seanwilson.org Blog: http://ludwig.squarespace.com Book: http://flexibleconstitution.squarespace.com/ ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Religious Objections to Gay Marriage
... If a judge recuses himself from performing a marriage ceremony, he does so under the ethics rules using a theory of bias, correct? In other words, this is the same legal device that is used for bailing out of cases involving family members, contributors or anything socially-provocative that judge admits has affected him or her. It seems to me that if anyone refuses to perform his or her official duties, the logic here has no choice but to be bias (recusal), not "religion." I think it would be commendable for a judge to admit that he had a deep-seeded problem with it, rather than insisting that his views about God make his belief "true for him." If a judge admitted he was prejudiced, but that it only affected his capacity in marriages or divorces, not litigation in general -- I don't know why we wouldn't pat the guy on the back for being honest and get him some counselling. This would be a far cry from those who claim no defect in themselves at all, and want to perpetuate the very same feelings because of "religion." I have never understood what this idea even means. Jesus never said anything against gay marriage. And so any religious view by Christians would have to be based upon Old Testament clauses that get elevated above Jesus' teachings or that rely upon some other construction. The devotion therefore is not to "God;" it is to the constructionary protocol. Indeed, presumably the clerk in Kentucky is denying marriage licenses to people of the same exact religion as her. This is where the line should be drawn. If you really believe that God is against gay marriage, such an idea could only be founded in your imagination (picture) of God. The faith doesn't run to God, it runs to this picture. The whole thing is becoming so empty-headed. If Christianity is in dispute about a social practice, that fact alone should void any person in love with a VERSION of it from having exemptions from the law. This is because the objection cannot, in truth, be based upon the Christian religion, but only to disputes about how to arrange it. It's the same thing with the Constitution and originalists: you aren't defending "the Constitution;" you are only defending your favorite way to socially construct it. That isn't "the Constitution" and it also isn't special. Sent from my iPad ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
