RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Eric Rassbach]

I agree with Eugene that what government (including Senators acting in their 
official capacities) should do is different than individuals should or may do, 
and I would not want anyone to think that I believe there should be some sort 
of government restraint on individual expression of disapproval of any or all 
religious views.

That said, my personal feeling would be that the relevant guiding principle in 
dealing with others should be whether that person engages in reasoned dialogue. 
 In that respect, I thought Eugene's use of the word "crank" very appropriate.  
A crank is someone who doesn't engage others in reasoned argument--he either 
won't even speak to those who disagree, or when he does he will refuse to 
listen to counterarguments.  Someone who responds to the questions and 
arguments of others, even if he does not end up agreeing with the 
counterarguments, is not a crank.  Thus a firmly held belief, no matter how 
odd, is not sufficient to make someone a crank; failure to engage others in 
reasoned argument (including about one's religious beliefs) would be.

An example.  A lot of people, maybe most people, think my client Jose Merced in 
our Texas Santeria case is wrong-headed because he wants to sacrifice goats, 
turtles, chickens and other animals to orishas (household gods) in order to 
ensure that the orishas receive the life-force ashe and do not pass out of the 
world.  But I don't think many of those disagreeing with Jose would ever think 
him a "crank" if they met him and had a conversation with him.  He uses reason 
when talking with others and has some empathy for and insight into the views of 
others, including those who strongly disagree with his religious beliefs or 
practices.  The real distinguishing factor is again not the content of the 
beliefs, but the way in which Jose engages the rest of the world that disagrees 
with those beliefs.  I should think any of us would be happy to interact with 
him.

On a broader level, I think the level of public discourse in this country would 
be elevated if more people recognized philosophy's role as a kind of mediatory 
genre of thought between science and religion.  Right now there are people on 
both sides of the contentious social and religious questions of the day who 
seem to think that science and religion should be pitted one against the other, 
and there are some who have profited from sharpening the conflict.  I take it 
that Sam Harris's argument against Collins is that Collins is not skeptical 
enough of the claims of Christianity in non-scientific questions.  If one 
examines this argument, however, it is revealed as an essentially philosophical 
(and specifically epistemological) claim--knowledge is restricted to those 
things science can prove or disprove, and we should disbelieve other truth 
claims.  This argument is hardly dispositive if one situates it in the full 
spectrum and history of philosophical debate.  No philosopher !
 has "proven" that one must adopt this very specific form of skeptical 
philosophy.  Nor is there any evidence that having any particular philosophical 
approach automatically affects one's performance as a scientist (though a true 
Nietzschean might have issues with science's truth claims).  The fundamental 
problem with how Harris couches his argument is that it obscures the 
philosophical assumptions that underlie it, either through ignorance of those 
assumptions, or as part of a rhetorical strategy.  His argument would be 
clearer, and would lead to better dialogue, if those issues that are scientific 
were distinguished from those that are philosophical in nature.  Talking about 
the philosophical questions also has the advantage of creating common ground 
where those with religious beliefs and those without them can meet and reason 
together.  But creating common ground may not be Mr. Harris's goal.

Eric


From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene [vol...@law.ucla.edu]
Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 6:43 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

I appreciate Eric's points, and I think there's much truth to them.  
But I do think that it might be helpful to distinguish what the government as 
an institution should do, and what we as voters (who may try to influence 
Senators) should do.

I certainly don't quiz my doctors about their views on elephants and 
turtles, but if I learned that a doctor whom I was considering really, 
genuinely thought that the world did indeed rest on the elephants and turtles, 
I would probably find another doctor (even if I thought that the government 
shouldn't fire him for such beliefs).  Likewise, I probably wouldn't support 
someone for head of the NIH if

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

I appreciate Eric's points, and I think there's much truth to them.  
But I do think that it might be helpful to distinguish what the government as 
an institution should do, and what we as voters (who may try to influence 
Senators) should do.

I certainly don't quiz my doctors about their views on elephants and 
turtles, but if I learned that a doctor whom I was considering really, 
genuinely thought that the world did indeed rest on the elephants and turtles, 
I would probably find another doctor (even if I thought that the government 
shouldn't fire him for such beliefs).  Likewise, I probably wouldn't support 
someone for head of the NIH if he had this belief.  Again, if I thought that 
many educated devout Hindus today did believe this, then I might have a 
different view; but I assume that they don't believe it, which leads me to view 
the elephant/turtle guy much as we'd likely view a flat earther:  Someone who 
seems like a crank, and who's crankness might well apply to other aspects of 
his life.  Or is that a mistake?

Finally, I should note that my argument wasn't based on the perceived 
inconsistency between hypothetical people's current statements and past ones; 
I'm sorry if I wasn't clear about this.  Rather, it's that when we evaluate 
whether someone is likely to have good policy judgment on various issues, 
knowing that he accepts certain factual assertions that are deeply inconsistent 
with our understanding of how the world actually works may (or may not, 
depending on our experience with people who accept those particular assertions) 
lead us to doubt his judgment more broadly.

Eugene

> -Original Message-
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach
> Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 3:26 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
>
> I think the issue comes down to what epistemological assumptions the
> government is working from.  The scientific method accepts as true only those
> factual hypotheses that can be observed, tested, and repeated.  It remains
> agnostic as to other factual assertions.  Those other kinds of factual 
> assertions
> can't be observed, tested, or repeated, but can still be subject to reasoned 
> inquiry,
> especially inductive reasoning.
>
> Going back to Eugene's response email, there really is a difference between 
> the
> assertion of "turtles now" (subject to scientific inquiry) and the assertion 
> of "turtles
> at some unobservable point far in the past" (not subject to scientific 
> inquiry).  If
> the person responds to objections to a "turtles now" assertion by saying that 
> he
> still believes in the turtles but that they are in some way unobservable, 
> then the
> factual assertion he is making has changed (call it "ineffable turtles") and 
> the
> question is no longer within the realm of science.  As an example, I think 
> most
> scientists would agree that whether humans have "souls" simply is not a 
> scientific
> question.
>
> I take Eugene's earlier email to say that he would have "pretty negative 
> views" of
> someone who would not agree to have his factual assertions (based on 
> traditional
> Hindu beliefs) tested scientifically where those views were in fact amenable 
> to
> scientific investigation.  Holding "pretty negative views" of someone for that
> reason seems overly harsh to me, but a scientist's refusal to accept 
> scientific
> inquiry into scientific questions seems like a factor one could take into 
> account in
> hiring/appointing.
>
> The question is more difficult when you consider other, non-scientific factual
> assertions.  Sometimes the factual assertions would be clearly disqualifying
> because they are in fact "antithetical" to the purpose of the government 
> institution.
> No problem with the government not appointing a Holocaust denier as the head 
> of
> the Holocaust Museum.
>
> Most religious beliefs, however, (incl. non-monotheistic belief systems like
> Buddhism, Hinduism and Santeria) aren't in direct conflict with the purpose of
> government institutions.  And the factual assertions of those beliefs only 
> become
> problematic if the government chooses to adopt an epistemological approach 
> like
> Hume's in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  But I don't see why the
> government is compelled to adopt Hume's epistemology in evaluating religious
> officials and employees.  As long as the person does their job adequately,
> experience shows that

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Eric Rassbach]

I think the issue comes down to what epistemological assumptions the government 
is working from.  The scientific method accepts as true only those factual 
hypotheses that can be observed, tested, and repeated.  It remains agnostic as 
to other factual assertions.  Those other kinds of factual assertions can't be 
observed, tested, or repeated, but can still be subject to reasoned inquiry, 
especially inductive reasoning.

Going back to Eugene's response email, there really is a difference between the 
assertion of "turtles now" (subject to scientific inquiry) and the assertion of 
"turtles at some unobservable point far in the past" (not subject to scientific 
inquiry).  If the person responds to objections to a "turtles now" assertion by 
saying that he still believes in the turtles but that they are in some way 
unobservable, then the factual assertion he is making has changed (call it 
"ineffable turtles") and the question is no longer within the realm of science. 
 As an example, I think most scientists would agree that whether humans have 
"souls" simply is not a scientific question.

I take Eugene's earlier email to say that he would have "pretty negative views" 
of someone who would not agree to have his factual assertions (based on 
traditional Hindu beliefs) tested scientifically where those views were in fact 
amenable to scientific investigation.  Holding "pretty negative views" of 
someone for that reason seems overly harsh to me, but a scientist's refusal to 
accept scientific inquiry into scientific questions seems like a factor one 
could take into account in hiring/appointing.

The question is more difficult when you consider other, non-scientific factual 
assertions.  Sometimes the factual assertions would be clearly disqualifying 
because they are in fact "antithetical" to the purpose of the government 
institution.  No problem with the government not appointing a Holocaust denier 
as the head of the Holocaust Museum.

Most religious beliefs, however, (incl. non-monotheistic belief systems like 
Buddhism, Hinduism and Santeria) aren't in direct conflict with the purpose of 
government institutions.  And the factual assertions of those beliefs only 
become problematic if the government chooses to adopt an epistemological 
approach like Hume's in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding.  But I don't 
see why the government is compelled to adopt Hume's epistemology in evaluating 
religious officials and employees.  As long as the person does their job 
adequately, experience shows that the government should not care about the 
factual implications of a person's religious beliefs. And experience also shows 
that historically religious tests for office or state employment have often had 
pernicious effects.  So the wisest course is for the government to avoid 
adopting a state epistemology that forces it to evaluate its citizens' 
religious beliefs.

For the same reason, despite the example of the amusing werewolf-identifying 
doctor, I doubt Eugene systematically inquires into the religious beliefs of 
his doctors to determine whether he thinks they are foolish or not; he trusts 
in their credentials and his experiences with them.  I would also be surprised 
if Eugene dropped a doctor simply because he found out the doctor had 
traditional Hindu beliefs.  The reason the werewolf-identifying doctor is 
disturbing is precisely because he feels comfortable proclaiming his thoughts 
without explaining them using reason -- and he is unaware of the effects of his 
proclamation on others.  Similarly, the inconsistency of the person who first 
claims the turtles are there but then changes his story to claim "ineffable 
turtles" might cause one to doubt the person's sincerity, as Eugene pointed out 
in his email.  That goes not to the content of the beliefs, however, but 
whether they are truly held.  (I note that Eugene's reliance on consi!
 stency here is in some tension with what Eugene has said before about whether 
courts should use consistency to determine a religious plaintiff's sincerity.)

Regarding Collins himself I thought the list would be interested in this 
exchange he had with the Pew folks:  http://pewforum.org/events/?EventID=217.  
I think the exchange demonstrates reasoned thought, applied to both religious 
and non-religious issues, though I can't claim to have read enough of what 
Collins has written to assess whether he typically uses reason to examine his 
faith.  But I think the onus is on others to show that he has "seemingly 
unsound *scientific* views."

Finally, I should mention that the musings in this string are mine alone, and 
not the Becket Fund's!

Eric


-Original Message-
From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, 

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Brownstein, Alan]

I agree with Art to the extent that his post is limited to specific beliefs 
that are in fact antithetical to the satisfactory performance of a particular 
job – that is, beliefs as to which there may be either secular or religious 
sources. But there are other variations of the problem.


1.   The contention that religious beliefs per se, that is, the belief that 
some things have happened or will happen that can’t be explained by science and 
have theological explanations, is itself a basis for disqualifying a person for 
a job requiring a commitment to, and expertise in, science.

2.   The contention that some unconventional and idiosyncratic religious 
beliefs disqualify a person for a leadership position, not because they are 
antithetical in some direct way to the requirements of the position, but 
because they cast doubt on the person’s judgment or on the way that they 
distinguish truth from falsehood.

This leaves open the question of exactly what it means for a belief to be 
antithetical to the performance of a particular job. On that issue I would 
think it is clear that common monotheistic beliefs are not antithetical to the 
satisfactory, indeed the exemplary, performance of high level positions in 
science and virtually every other field.

Alan Brownstein



From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of artspit...@aol.com
Sent: Friday, August 07, 2009 7:42 AM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[I sent this last night but it doesn't seem to have reached the list so I'm 
trying again, slightly edited.]

The courts have told us that a statute that coincides with a religious belief, 
and that may have been enacted by legislators whose votes were influenced by 
their personal religious beliefs, is not thereby an establishment of religion.  
E.g., Harris v. McRae (no tax funding for abortions).  Why shouldn't the same 
principle apply here?  If a person's openly held beliefs or public statements 
are actually antithetical to the requirements of a particular job, then that 
person should not have to be hired or retained in that job.  Whether the 
beliefs or statements at issue arise from the person's religion or from some 
other source should be irrelevant.  If I won't defend someone's legal right to 
utter blasphemy, then the ACLU could reasonably refuse to hire me as a First 
Amendment litigator, regardless of whether my refusal to do so arises from my 
religious belief that blasphemy (and the defense of blasphemy) is a sin, or 
from my purely secular belief that the world would be a better place if people 
were legally prohibited from casting aspersions on other people's religious 
beliefs.

I therefore don't see how denying a job to a person who holds beliefs that are 
antithetical to the requirements of the job constitutes a religious test.

I think the argument that this is a religious test assumes that “no religious 
test shall ever be required as a qualification” includes the meaning “no 
secular test shall ever be required as a qualification if it would have a 
disparate impact on people of some religion,” which seems dubious to me.  Is it 
a “religious test” to require that a Public Health Service nurse be willing and 
able to give vaccinations, which (I'm assuming for the sake of making the 
point) means that a Christian Scientist can't get that job?

Whether a person's beliefs are actually antithetical to the requirements of a 
particular job depends a lot on the job.  I don't care if an NIH file clerk 
believes that the germ theory of disease is a false invention of Satan, 
intended to mislead people into vainly trying to cure illness with medicine 
rather than with prayer -- as long as that belief doesn't cause him to misfile 
charts.  But I think such a belief should disqualify a person from being the 
head of NIH, because such a belief is very likely to skew decisions that are 
within the power of that job.  (And this remains true even though it's possible 
that in 200 years the germ theory will have been displaced by a more 
sophisticated understanding of illness. We can't live 200 years in the future.)

Of course, it's the government's option whether to assert or to disregard such 
a disqualification.  There's nothing unlawful about appointing a person who 
doesn't believe in germs to be the head of NIH, any more than it's unlawful to 
appoint a person who doesn't believe in regulating Wall Street to be the head 
of the SEC, or unlawful to appoint a person who believes that “when the 
President does it, it's not against the law” to be the Attorney General.

Art Spitzer (speaking personally; I don't think the ACLU has expressed any view 
about the appointment of Dr. Collins)



___
To post, send message to R

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Will Linden]

I thought that "werewolves" were men who turn into wolves (or vice versa, 
according to Larry Niven and the Warlock). So what does it mean to "turn 
INTO a werewolf"?


At 09:09 PM 8/6/09 -0700, you wrote:
Many list members whose email programs block attachments may have 
wondered, as I did, what Will Linden's point was. If you let the 
attachment through you will see that it includes his photo, in which, in 
my view, he simply looks respectably hirsute. You may be able to see it below.


With appreciation for Will's attempt to lighten the mood,

Mark Scarberry

Pepperdine

At 04:35 PM 8/6/09 -0700, Will Linden wrote:


explains his belief on the grounds that there's a probability, 
however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into a werewolf, would you be 
satisfied about his qualities?




Turn INTO a werewolf?

 

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Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[ArtSpitzer]

[I sent this last night but it doesn't seem to have reached the list so I'm 
trying again, slightly edited.]

The courts have told us that a statute that coincides with a religious 
belief, and that may have been enacted by legislators whose votes were 
influenced by their personal religious beliefs, is not thereby an establishment 
of 
religion.  E.g., Harris v. McRae (no tax funding for abortions).  Why 
shouldn't the same principle apply here?  If a person's openly held beliefs or 
public statements are actually antithetical to the requirements of a particular 
job, then that person should not have to be hired or retained in that job.  
Whether the beliefs or statements at issue arise from the person's religion 
or from some other source should be irrelevant.  If I won't defend someone's 
legal right to utter blasphemy, then the ACLU could reasonably refuse to 
hire me as a First Amendment litigator, regardless of whether my refusal to do 
so arises from my religious belief that blasphemy (and the defense of 
blasphemy) is a sin, or from my purely secular belief that the world would be a 
better place if people were legally prohibited from casting aspersions on 
other people's religious beliefs.

I therefore don't see how denying a job to a person who holds beliefs that 
are antithetical to the requirements of the job constitutes a religious 
test. 

I think the argument that this is a religious test assumes that “no 
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification” includes the meaning 
“no 
secular test shall ever be required as a qualification if it would have a 
disparate impact on people of some religion,” which seems dubious to me.  Is 
it a “religious test” to require that a Public Health Service nurse be 
willing and able to give vaccinations, which (I'm assuming for the sake of 
making the point) means that a Christian Scientist can't get that job?

Whether a person's beliefs are actually antithetical to the requirements of 
a particular job depends a lot on the job.  I don't care if an NIH file 
clerk believes that the germ theory of disease is a false invention of Satan, 
intended to mislead people into vainly trying to cure illness with medicine 
rather than with prayer -- as long as that belief doesn't cause him to 
misfile charts.  But I think such a belief should disqualify a person from 
being 
the head of NIH, because such a belief is very likely to skew decisions that 
are within the power of that job.  (And this remains true even though it's 
possible that in 200 years the germ theory will have been displaced by a more 
sophisticated understanding of illness. We can't live 200 years in the 
future.)

Of course, it's the government's option whether to assert or to disregard 
such a disqualification.  There's nothing unlawful about appointing a person 
who doesn't believe in germs to be the head of NIH, any more than it's 
unlawful to appoint a person who doesn't believe in regulating Wall Street to 
be 
the head of the SEC, or unlawful to appoint a person who believes that “when 
the President does it, it's not against the law” to be the Attorney 
General.

Art Spitzer (speaking personally; I don't think the ACLU has expressed any 
view about the appointment of Dr. Collins)


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Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
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RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

   I think Mark's point is quite right, partly because it stresses 
"the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith" (which is quite 
relevant to scientists' "want[ing] public support") and partly because "there 
have been many very distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs" 
(including recently, and not just in the distant path).  But I think both the 
merit and the limitation of this argument is that it is indeed so constrained, 
and does distinguish the religions of sensible mainstream people from the 
religions of zany fringe people.  It works very well a prudential and pragmatic 
argument (albeit with some degree of moral consequences if the prudential and 
pragmatic predicates are fulfilled).  But I suspect it doesn't work as a 
constitutional or quasi-constitutional argument, and I'm not sure that it even 
works as a rule of political morality, though it is a good guide to sensible 
behavior.  Or am I not doing it enough justice?

   Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:07 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law 
Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one am 
happy to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise 
would be -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us 
to be fools. If belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith 
in the US disqualifies one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow 
shows that the person cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, 
in Dickens' phrase "a ass -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking 
not of science but of the law.) There have been many very distinguished 
scientists who have had such beliefs, and I think it is bigotry to disqualify 
such persons from scientific positions. Or perhaps we now should discard the 
results of the human genome project, because Francis Collins led the effort, 
and of course the results cannot be reliable.

A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would 
use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that 
Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for 
sloppy treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden 
biblical messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a 
method is far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require 
naturalism as a belief system is indeed to impose a religious test.

Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine


From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
I appreciate Eric's suggestion, but I wonder whether it works.  I 
take it that the response to "But all our instruments show that there's no 
elephant or turtle down there" would be the same as the response to "But all 
our experience with medicine tells us that there can't be a virgin birth or a 
resurrection" - "Well, this is a special miracle that can't be tested with your 
instruments / that doesn't fit with our experience."  I'm not sure one can 
easily distinguish the two.

But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the 
person says "The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on a turtle.  But not long ago that changed, and that's why our instruments 
can't perceive this now."  Would our view of the person's general 
trustworthiness really change, on the grounds that now he's saying something 
that isn't currently testable with current observations?

Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn't strike me as 
working, either.  If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves 
(perhaps with some religious explanation), and explains his belief on the 
grounds that there's a probability, however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into 
a werewolf, would you be satisfied about his qualities?  What if you heard this 
from a doctor that you were considering going to - wouldn't you think you might 
be safer in someone else's hands?

As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at the 
time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who disagreed would 
be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and that therefore people who 
rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and discriminated against.  That's 
surely bad.  Yet does ou

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

I much appreciate Alan's point, which further illustrates the pragmatic 
and non-absolute nature of the inquiry.  But I wonder whether the entry-level / 
experienced distinction quite does all the work.  In some situations (perhaps 
including the one at NIH, though I should note that to my knowledge Collins 
would be very much on the mainstream belief side of the line), someone who has 
had a long career in implementation is being shifted for the first time to a 
high-level position that has lots of policy discretion.  (It's a bit like a 
circuit judge being appointed to the Supreme Court:  That the judge closely 
followed precedent at the circuit level might often not tell you much about how 
he or she will decide cases when the constraint of precedent is removed.)  
Would you be troubled about giving such policy discretion to someone who makes 
some very strange factual assertions about the world or the past of the world, 
even if he may done a great job as a geneticist in the!
  past?

Eugene

Alan Brownstein writes:

> I think Mark is clearly right when he talks about generally recognized 
> religious
> doctrines in part because we know as an empirical matter that individuals who
> hold these beliefs are capable of engaging in first rate scientific work, 
> practicing
> medicine with great skill, and doing all kinds of other work that requires 
> scientific
> knowledge and expertise.
>
> Eugene's question focuses on less conventional and less common religious
> beliefs, however. One answer to the problem of the individual who holds
> uncommon religious beliefs who is nominated to a position of authority is 
> that we
> can look at the individual's life and accomplishments as a check on our 
> concern
> about his religious beliefs being inconsistent with the position to which he 
> has
> been appointed. Typically leadership positions are offered to people with
> considerable experience and accomplishments in their field. If unconventional
> religious beliefs have not interfered with their professional 
> responsibilities and
> accomplishments for 25 years or so, there seems little reason to believe that 
> they
> would suddenly become inconsistent with their ability to preform their
> professional responsibilities when appointed to a leadership position.
>
> I think the harder question is whether unconventional religious beliefs should
> preclude an individual from entry level positions when the individual's 
> beliefs (in
> the abstract) may seem inconsistent with the responsibilities they would 
> assume
> in the position they are seeking and we have no track record to offset such
> concerns. The answer to that question may be contextual -- depending for
> example on the consequences of the individual's failure to perform his job in 
> a
> competent way.
>
> Alan Brownstein
> 
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu]
> On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark [mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu]
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:06 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law
> Academics
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one 
> am happy
> to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise would 
> be
> -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us to be 
> fools. If
> belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith in the US 
> disqualifies
> one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow shows that the person
> cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, in Dickens' phrase 
> "a ass
> -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking not of science but of the 
> law.)
> There have been many very distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs,
> and I think it is bigotry to disqualify such persons from scientific 
> positions. Or
> perhaps we now should discard the results of the human genome project,
> because Francis Collins led the effort, and of course the results cannot be
> reliable.
>
> A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would
> use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that
> Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for 
> sloppy
> treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden 
> biblical
> messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a method is
> far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require naturalism as a 
> belief
> system is indeed to impose a religiou

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

Indeed, which is good reason not to try and convict those who wrongly 
reject the theories we view as sound.  But that doesn't tell us much, I think, 
about whether we should appoint them to head NIH.  In fact, it seems to me 
obviously true that we *should* consider people's scientific theories in 
deciding whether to appoint them heads of NIH (the closest analogy to Galileo). 
 The question is whether we should also consider their factual assertions that 
they say are merely matters of religious faith.

Eugene

> -Original Message-
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-
> boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Lisa A. Runquist
> Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
> To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
>
> Wasn't Galileo was tried and convicted by those who wrongly rejected his
> theories, as they conflicted with the scientific and religious beliefs
> of the day?
>
> Lisa
>
> Volokh, Eugene wrote:
>
> > As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at
> > the time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who
> > disagreed would be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and that
> > therefore people who rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and
> > discriminated against.  That's surely bad.  Yet does our uncertainty
> > about what's right, and our recognition that time has upset many
> > fighting faiths, mean that we just have to categorically ignore a
> > person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's being considered
> > for a high government post?  Remember, the question isn't whether to
> > throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles
> > (though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his
> > views as "delusions," for instance if the person really believes that
> > he's Napoleon) - it's whether we should consider the views in deciding
> > whether to trust the person with a great deal of discretionary authority.
> >
> >
> >
> > Eugene
> >
> >
> >
> > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Eric Rassbach
> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
> > *To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
> > *Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically
> > testable or not?   We can make scientific observations now about whether
> > the world rests upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.
> >
> >
> >
> > Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't
> > overly Newtonian in its assumptions.  Quantum mechanics allows us to
> > calculate the non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events
> > we might otherwise hold to be outside the standard rules of nature.
> >
> >
> >
> > Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19^th century
> > to take pretty negative views of someone who didn't buy into an aether
> > theory?  For the government to impose legal detriments on that person?
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > *From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
> > [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Volokh, Eugene
> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
> > *To:* 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
> > *Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
> >
> >
> >
> > I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of
> > us who recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to
> > evaluate people's qualities for various purposes.  Say someone sincerely
> > tells us that he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four
> > elephants, which rest on the back of a turtle.  When told that this is
> > inconsistent with various facts about the world, elephants, and turtles,
> > he says that this is an artifact of some special treatment by divine
> > forces, which allows evasion of the normal rules of the universe.  I
> > take it that our first reaction would be to take a pretty negative view
> > of the person.
> >
> >
> >
> > And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't
> > displace our doubts, I think.  Even if we have reason to th

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Brownstein, Alan]

I think Mark is clearly right when he talks about generally recognized 
religious doctrines in part because we know as an empirical matter that 
individuals who hold these beliefs are capable of engaging in first rate 
scientific work, practicing medicine with great skill, and doing all kinds of 
other work that requires scientific knowledge and expertise.

Eugene's question focuses on less conventional and less common religious 
beliefs, however. One answer to the problem of the individual who holds 
uncommon religious beliefs who is nominated to a position of authority is that 
we can look at the individual's life and accomplishments as a check on our 
concern about his religious beliefs being inconsistent with the position to 
which he has been appointed. Typically leadership positions are offered to 
people with considerable experience and accomplishments in their field. If 
unconventional religious beliefs have not interfered with their professional 
responsibilities and accomplishments for 25 years or so, there seems little 
reason to believe that they would suddenly become inconsistent with their 
ability to preform their professional responsibilities when appointed to a 
leadership position.

I think the harder question is whether unconventional religious beliefs should 
preclude an individual from entry level positions when the individual's beliefs 
(in the abstract) may seem inconsistent with the responsibilities they would 
assume in the position they are seeking and we have no track record to offset 
such concerns. The answer to that question may be contextual -- depending for 
example on the consequences of the individual's failure to perform his job in a 
competent way.

Alan Brownstein

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] 
On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark [mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu]
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:06 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics; Law & Religion issues for Law 
Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one am 
happy to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise 
would be -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us 
to be fools. If belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith 
in the US disqualifies one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow 
shows that the person cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, 
in Dickens' phrase "a ass -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking 
not of science but of the law.) There have been many very distinguished 
scientists who have had such beliefs, and I think it is bigotry to disqualify 
such persons from scientific positions. Or perhaps we now should discard the 
results of the human genome project, because Francis Collins led the effort, 
and of course the results cannot be reliable.

A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would 
use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that 
Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for 
sloppy treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden 
biblical messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a 
method is far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require 
naturalism as a belief system is indeed to impose a religious test.

Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine


From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

I appreciate Eric’s suggestion, but I wonder whether it works.  I 
take it that the response to “But all our instruments show that there’s no 
elephant or turtle down there” would be the same as the response to “But all 
our experience with medicine tells us that there can’t be a virgin birth or a 
resurrection” – “Well, this is a special miracle that can’t be tested with your 
instruments / that doesn’t fit with our experience.”  I’m not sure one can 
easily distinguish the two.

But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the 
person says “The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on a turtle.  But not long ago that changed, and that’s why our instruments 
can’t perceive this now.”  Would our view of the person’s general 
trustworthiness really change, on the grounds that now he’s saying something 
that isn’t currently testable with current observations?

Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn’t strike me as 
working, either.  If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves 
(perhaps with some religious explanation), and expla

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Scarberry, Mark]

Many list members whose email programs block attachments may have wondered, as 
I did, what Will Linden's point was. If you let the attachment through you will 
see that it includes his photo, in which, in my view, he simply looks 
respectably hirsute. You may be able to see it below.

With appreciation for Will's attempt to lighten the mood,

Mark Scarberry

Pepperdine

At 04:35 PM 8/6/09 -0700, Will Linden wrote:


explains his belief on the grounds that there's a probability, however 
infinitesimal, that he'll turn into a werewolf, would you be satisfied about 
his qualities?  



Turn INTO a werewolf?

   
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RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Will Linden]

At 04:35 PM 8/6/09 -0700, you wrote:
explains his belief on the grounds that there's a probability, however 
infinitesimal, that he'll turn into a werewolf, would you be satisfied 
about his qualities?



Turn INTO a werewolf?

 ___
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Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
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messages to others.

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Douglas Laycock]

Mark has stated much more precisely what I was trying to get it by 
distinguishing what Collins says about science from what he says about 
religion.  Collins has to be committed to methodological naturalism (roughly, 
the pursuit of exclusively natural causes and phenomena by exclusively natural 
methods) whenever he does science.  He doesn't have to believe that that's all 
there is.  

Quoting "Scarberry, Mark" : 

> If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I 
> for one am happy to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher 
> than they otherwise would be -- then scientists need to show that 
> they do not consider most of us to be fools. If belief in the basic 
> traditional doctrines of the majority faith in the US disqualifies 
> one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow shows that 
> the person cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, 
> in Dickens' phrase "a ass -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, 
> speaking not of science but of the law.) There have been many very 
> distinguished scientists who have had such beliefs, and I think it is 
> bigotry to disqualify such persons from scientific positions. Or 
> perhaps we now should discard the results of the human genome 
> project, because Francis Collins led the effort, and of course the 
> results cannot be reliable. 
> 
> A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a 
> position would use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or 
> her duties. I doubt that Francis Collins ever thought that God would 
> send a miracle to make up for sloppy treatment of DNA samples, or 
> that he set up a program to look for hidden biblical messages in the 
> base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a method is far 
> different from naturalism as a belief system; to require naturalism 
> as a belief system is indeed to impose a religious test. 
> 
> Mark Scarberry 
> Pepperdine 
> 
>  
> 
> From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene 
> Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM 
> To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics' 
> Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms 
> 
> 
> 
> I appreciate Eric's suggestion, but I wonder whether it 
> works.  I take it that the response to "But all our instruments show 
> that there's no elephant or turtle down there" would be the same as 
> the response to "But all our experience with medicine tells us that 
> there can't be a virgin birth or a resurrection" - "Well, this is a 
> special miracle that can't be tested with your instruments / that 
> doesn't fit with our experience."  I'm not sure one can easily 
> distinguish the two. 
> 
> 
> 
> But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, 
> say the person says "The world used to rest on the back of four 
> elephants, which rest on a turtle.  But not long ago that changed, 
> and that's why our instruments can't perceive this now."  Would our 
> view of the person's general trustworthiness really change, on the 
> grounds that now he's saying something that isn't currently testable 
> with current observations? 
> 
> 
> 
> Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn't strike 
> me as working, either.  If it turned out that an NIH candidate 
> believes in werewolves (perhaps with some religious explanation), and 
> explains his belief on the grounds that there's a probability, 
> however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into a werewolf, would you be 
> satisfied about his qualities?  What if you heard this from a doctor 
> that you were considering going to - wouldn't you think you might be 
> safer in someone else's hands? 
> 
> 
> 
> As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was 
> at the time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone 
> who disagreed would be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and 
> that therefore people who rejected the theory were wrongly condemned 
> and discriminated against.  That's surely bad.  Yet does our 
> uncertainty about what's right, and our recognition that time has 
> upset many fighting faiths, mean that we just have to categorically 
> ignore a person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's being 
> considered for a high government post?  Remember, the question isn't 
> whether to throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and 
> turtles (though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if 
> we see his views as "delusions,&q

Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Lisa A. Runquist]

Wasn't Galileo was tried and convicted by those who wrongly rejected his 
theories, as they conflicted with the scientific and religious beliefs 
of the day?


Lisa

Volokh, Eugene wrote:

As to the aether theory, I don’t know what the view was at 
the time; I suspect that it wasn’t viewed so firmly that anyone who 
disagreed would be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and that 
therefore people who rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and 
discriminated against.  That’s surely bad.  Yet does our uncertainty 
about what’s right, and our recognition that time has upset many 
fighting faiths, mean that we just have to categorically ignore a 
person’s seemingly unsound scientific views when he’s being considered 
for a high government post?  Remember, the question isn’t whether to 
throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles 
(though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his 
views as “delusions,” for instance if the person really believes that 
he’s Napoleon) – it’s whether we should consider the views in deciding 
whether to trust the person with a great deal of discretionary authority.


 


Eugene

 

*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Eric Rassbach

*Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
*To:* Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
*Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

 

 

Isn’t one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically 
testable or not?   We can make scientific observations now about whether 
the world rests upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.


 

Also query whether the “natural order” we’ve been discussing isn’t 
overly Newtonian in its assumptions.  Quantum mechanics allows us to 
calculate the non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events 
we might otherwise hold to be outside the standard rules of nature.


 

Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19^th century 
to take pretty negative views of someone who didn’t buy into an aether 
theory?  For the government to impose legal detriments on that person?


 

 

 

 

*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] *On Behalf Of *Volokh, Eugene

*Sent:* Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
*To:* 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
*Subject:* RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

 

I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of 
us who recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to 
evaluate people’s qualities for various purposes.  Say someone sincerely 
tells us that he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four 
elephants, which rest on the back of a turtle.  When told that this is 
inconsistent with various facts about the world, elephants, and turtles, 
he says that this is an artifact of some special treatment by divine 
forces, which allows evasion of the normal rules of the universe.  I 
take it that our first reaction would be to take a pretty negative view 
of the person. 

 

And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn’t 
displace our doubts, I think.  Even if we have reason to think that he’s 
been a perfectly good geneticist, we might wonder whether he’s the best 
person to promote to a rather different job that involves a broad range 
of choices about health science funding.  Maybe we have some sort of 
ethical or constitutional obligation to set aside our worries, and draw 
a sharp line between beliefs that a person says are “outside the natural 
order” and those that he says relate to the natural order.  But it seems 
to me that setting them aside at least runs against our first 
common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound.


 

>From there we can shift the hypothetical.  What if the 
person believes the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to 
live nearly 1000 years, and that all the contrary evidence is miracles 
produced by God to test our faith?  What if he doesn’t take such a view, 
but believes that there have been several departures from the standard 
rules of nature in the past several thousand years, such as a virgin 
birth, a resurrection, and the like?


 

My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these 
examples.  It is certainly significant to me that very many smart, 
thoughtful, and suitably scientific skeptical people are believing 
Christians, and that (I suspect) many fewer such smart, thoughtful, and 
skeptical people are Young-Earthers or people who literally accept 
certain Hindu creation myths.  But it’s not easy for me to figure out 
how to translate that sort of sensible distinction into a legal or 
constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable principle of political 
ethics.


 


Eugene

 

*From:* religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religion

Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[ArtSpitzer]

The courts have told us that a statute that coincides with a religious
belief, and that may have been enacted by legislators whose votes were
influenced by their personal religious beliefs, is not thereby an establishment 
of
religion.   E.g., Harris v. McRae (no tax funding for abortions).   Why
shouldn't the same principle apply here?   If a person's openly held beliefs or
public statements are actually antithetical to the requirements of a
particular job, then that person should not have to be hired or retained in 
that job.
  Whether the beliefs or statements at issue arise from the person's
religion or from some other source should be irrelevant.   If I won't defend
someone's legal right to utter blasphemy, then the ACLU could reasonably refuse
to hire me as a First Amendment litigator, regardless of whether my refusal
to do so arises from my religious belief that blasphemy (and the defense of
blasphemy) is a sin, or from my purely secular belief that the world would be
a better place if people were legally prohibited from casting aspersions on
other people's religious beliefs.

I therefore don't see how denying a job to a person who holds beliefs that
are antithetical to the requirements of the job constitutes a religious
test.

I think the argument that this is a religious test assumes that “no
religious test shall ever be required as a qualification” includes the meaning 
“no
secular test shall ever be require as a qualification,” which seems dubious
to me.   Is it a “religious test” to require that a Public Health Service
nurse be willing and able to give vaccinations, which (I'm assuming for the
sake of making the point) means that a Christian Scientist can't get that
job?

Whether a person's beliefs are actually antithetical to the requirements of
a particular job depends a lot on the job.   I don't care if an NIH file
clerk believes that the germ theory of disease is a false invention of Satan,
intended to mislead people into vainly trying to cure illness with medicine
rather than with prayer -- as long as that belief doesn't cause him to
misfile charts.   But such a belief should disqualify a person from being the
head of NIH, because such a belief is very likely to skew decisions that are
within the power of that job.   (And this remains true even though it's
possible that in 200 years the germ theory will have been displaced by a more
sophisticated understanding of illness. We can't live 200 years in the future.)

Of course, it's the government's option to assert or to disregard such a
disqualification.   There's nothing unlawful about appointing a person who
doesn't believe in germs to be the head of NIH, any more than it's unlawful to
appoint a person who doesn't believe in regulating Wall Street to be the
head of the SEC, or unlawful to appoint a person who believes that “when the
President does it, it's not against the law” to be the Attorney General.
Perhaps it should be, but its not.

Art Spitzer (speaking personally; I don't think the ACLU has expressed any
view about the appointment of Dr. Collins)


___
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Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Scarberry, Mark]

If scientists want public support for their effort -- support that I for one am 
happy to give even if it means taxes are somewhat higher than they otherwise 
would be -- then scientists need to show that they do not consider most of us 
to be fools. If belief in the basic traditional doctrines of the majority faith 
in the US disqualifies one from leading a scientific effort because it somehow 
shows that the person cannot be trusted to do honest science, then science is, 
in Dickens' phrase "a ass -- a idiot." (Mr. Bumble in Oliver Twist, speaking 
not of science but of the law.) There have been many very distinguished 
scientists who have had such beliefs, and I think it is bigotry to disqualify 
such persons from scientific positions. Or perhaps we now should discard the 
results of the human genome project, because Francis Collins led the effort, 
and of course the results cannot be reliable.
 
A scientist might reasonably ask whether a candidate for such a position would 
use methodological naturalism in carrying out his or her duties. I doubt that 
Francis Collins ever thought that God would send a miracle to make up for 
sloppy treatment of DNA samples, or that he set up a program to look for hidden 
biblical messages in the base sequences of human DNA. But naturalism as a 
method is far different from naturalism as a belief system; to require 
naturalism as a belief system is indeed to impose a religious test.
 
Mark Scarberry
Pepperdine



From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 4:35 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms



I appreciate Eric's suggestion, but I wonder whether it works.  I 
take it that the response to "But all our instruments show that there's no 
elephant or turtle down there" would be the same as the response to "But all 
our experience with medicine tells us that there can't be a virgin birth or a 
resurrection" - "Well, this is a special miracle that can't be tested with your 
instruments / that doesn't fit with our experience."  I'm not sure one can 
easily distinguish the two.

 

But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the 
person says "The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on a turtle.  But not long ago that changed, and that's why our instruments 
can't perceive this now."  Would our view of the person's general 
trustworthiness really change, on the grounds that now he's saying something 
that isn't currently testable with current observations?

 

Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn't strike me as 
working, either.  If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves 
(perhaps with some religious explanation), and explains his belief on the 
grounds that there's a probability, however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into 
a werewolf, would you be satisfied about his qualities?  What if you heard this 
from a doctor that you were considering going to - wouldn't you think you might 
be safer in someone else's hands?

 

As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at the 
time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who disagreed would 
be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and that therefore people who 
rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and discriminated against.  That's 
surely bad.  Yet does our uncertainty about what's right, and our recognition 
that time has upset many fighting faiths, mean that we just have to 
categorically ignore a person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's 
being considered for a high government post?  Remember, the question isn't 
whether to throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles 
(though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his views 
as "delusions," for instance if the person really believes that he's Napoleon) 
- it's whether we should consider the views in deciding whether to trust the 
person with a great deal of discretionary authority.

 

Eugene

 

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

 

 

Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically testable or 
not?   We can make scientific observations now about whether the world rests 
upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.

 

Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't overly 
Newtonian in its assumptions.  Quantum mechanic

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

I appreciate Eric's suggestion, but I wonder whether it works.  I 
take it that the response to "But all our instruments show that there's no 
elephant or turtle down there" would be the same as the response to "But all 
our experience with medicine tells us that there can't be a virgin birth or a 
resurrection" - "Well, this is a special miracle that can't be tested with your 
instruments / that doesn't fit with our experience."  I'm not sure one can 
easily distinguish the two.

But even if one does draw the line that Eric suggests, say the 
person says "The world used to rest on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on a turtle.  But not long ago that changed, and that's why our instruments 
can't perceive this now."  Would our view of the person's general 
trustworthiness really change, on the grounds that now he's saying something 
that isn't currently testable with current observations?

Likewise, the quantum mechanics rationale doesn't strike me as 
working, either.  If it turned out that an NIH candidate believes in werewolves 
(perhaps with some religious explanation), and explains his belief on the 
grounds that there's a probability, however infinitesimal, that he'll turn into 
a werewolf, would you be satisfied about his qualities?  What if you heard this 
from a doctor that you were considering going to - wouldn't you think you might 
be safer in someone else's hands?

As to the aether theory, I don't know what the view was at the 
time; I suspect that it wasn't viewed so firmly that anyone who disagreed would 
be seen as a crank.  But say that it was, and that therefore people who 
rejected the theory were wrongly condemned and discriminated against.  That's 
surely bad.  Yet does our uncertainty about what's right, and our recognition 
that time has upset many fighting faiths, mean that we just have to 
categorically ignore a person's seemingly unsound scientific views when he's 
being considered for a high government post?  Remember, the question isn't 
whether to throw someone in prison for his views about elephants and turtles 
(though in extreme cases, we do lock someone up as insane if we see his views 
as "delusions," for instance if the person really believes that he's Napoleon) 
- it's whether we should consider the views in deciding whether to trust the 
person with a great deal of discretionary authority.

Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Eric Rassbach
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 3:51 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms


Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically testable or 
not?   We can make scientific observations now about whether the world rests 
upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.

Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't overly 
Newtonian in its assumptions.  Quantum mechanics allows us to calculate the 
non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events we might otherwise 
hold to be outside the standard rules of nature.

Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19th century to take 
pretty negative views of someone who didn't buy into an aether theory?  For the 
government to impose legal detriments on that person?




From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of us who 
recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to evaluate 
people's qualities for various purposes.  Say someone sincerely tells us that 
he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on the back of a turtle.  When told that this is inconsistent with various 
facts about the world, elephants, and turtles, he says that this is an artifact 
of some special treatment by divine forces, which allows evasion of the normal 
rules of the universe.  I take it that our first reaction would be to take a 
pretty negative view of the person.

And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't displace our 
doubts, I think.  Even if we have reason to think that he's been a perfectly 
good geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best person to promote to a 
rather different job that involves a broad range of choices about health 
science funding.  Maybe we have some sort of ethical or constitutional 
obligation to set aside our worries, and 

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Michael R. Masinter]

I'm delighted to learn that we can count on the Becket Fund to assist  
the ACLU in our recurring litigation against public schools that use  
science classes to teach religious doctrine.


Michael R. Masinter  3305 College Avenue
Professor of Law Fort Lauderdale, FL 33314
Nova Southeastern University 954.262.6151 (voice)
masin...@nova.edu954.262.3835 (fax)
Chair, ACLUFL legal panel

Quoting Eric Rassbach :



Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically   
testable or not?   We can make scientific observations now about   
whether the world rests upon turtles, but we cannot observe the   
birth of Christ.





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RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Johnson Jr., Paul C. - OALJ]

Why do you hate elephants and turtles?



From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu on behalf of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thu 8/6/2009 5:53 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms



I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of us who 
recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to evaluate 
people's qualities for various purposes.  Say someone sincerely tells us that 
he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on the back of a turtle.  When told that this is inconsistent with various 
facts about the world, elephants, and turtles, he says that this is an artifact 
of some special treatment by divine forces, which allows evasion of the normal 
rules of the universe.  I take it that our first reaction would be to take a 
pretty negative view of the person.  

 

And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't displace our 
doubts, I think.  Even if we have reason to think that he's been a perfectly 
good geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best person to promote to a 
rather different job that involves a broad range of choices about health 
science funding.  Maybe we have some sort of ethical or constitutional 
obligation to set aside our worries, and draw a sharp line between beliefs that 
a person says are "outside the natural order" and those that he says relate to 
the natural order.  But it seems to me that setting them aside at least runs 
against our first common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound.

 

From there we can shift the hypothetical.  What if the person 
believes the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to live nearly 1000 
years, and that all the contrary evidence is miracles produced by God to test 
our faith?  What if he doesn't take such a view, but believes that there have 
been several departures from the standard rules of nature in the past several 
thousand years, such as a virgin birth, a resurrection, and the like?

 

My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these examples. 
 It is certainly significant to me that very many smart, thoughtful, and 
suitably scientific skeptical people are believing Christians, and that (I 
suspect) many fewer such smart, thoughtful, and skeptical people are 
Young-Earthers or people who literally accept certain Hindu creation myths.  
But it's not easy for me to figure out how to translate that sort of sensible 
distinction into a legal or constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable 
principle of political ethics. 

 

Eugene

 

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony Decinque
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 2:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

 

To be clear, I did not make that characterization.  I was repeating Mr. 
Harris's argument.  (My view would be different.)  

 

Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's the 
point of this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different:  Even if the 
virgin birth is outside the natural order, the question Mr. Harris pushes on is 
"how does Mr. Collins know that X event happened?"  In other words, since Mr. 
Collins is claiming that the natural order was suspended on a certain date at a 
certain place, he is the one who should have to provide evidence for that 
assertion.  I think that this the "failure of skepticism" Mr. Harris is 
referring to  I refer you to his piece for his arguments instead of my 
clumsy paraphrasing.

 

 

All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to the 
values underlying science," not just characterize them that way.  Assuming that 
they are, what result?  Is it discrimination to say that someone's religious 
views undercut values that are needed in a job?

 

 

I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't have the 
full flavor of the argument.  A faith-healer, I suppose, never accepts 
conventional medicine.  (Mr. Harris is arguing that) Mr. Collins is like a 
part-time faith healer.

 

The doctor-who-prays response is helpful.  What about a doctor who was 
excellent on the job, but sometimes denounced accepted fields of medicine off 
the job?

 

A

On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:03 PM, Douglas Laycock  wrote:

It is you who are begging the question.  The question is whether religious 
faith and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent.  You assumed the 
answer to that question when you characterized his views as antithetical to the 
values underlying science.

The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order.  Has any said 
or done anything uns

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Eric Rassbach]

Isn't one of the lines to draw whether the idea is scientifically testable or 
not?   We can make scientific observations now about whether the world rests 
upon turtles, but we cannot observe the birth of Christ.

Also query whether the "natural order" we've been discussing isn't overly 
Newtonian in its assumptions.  Quantum mechanics allows us to calculate the 
non-zero probabilities, however infinitesimal, of events we might otherwise 
hold to be outside the standard rules of nature.

Finally, would it have been right for someone in the late 19th century to take 
pretty negative views of someone who didn't buy into an aether theory?  For the 
government to impose legal detriments on that person?




From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 5:54 PM
To: 'Law & Religion issues for Law Academics'
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of us who 
recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to evaluate 
people's qualities for various purposes.  Say someone sincerely tells us that 
he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on the back of a turtle.  When told that this is inconsistent with various 
facts about the world, elephants, and turtles, he says that this is an artifact 
of some special treatment by divine forces, which allows evasion of the normal 
rules of the universe.  I take it that our first reaction would be to take a 
pretty negative view of the person.

And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't displace our 
doubts, I think.  Even if we have reason to think that he's been a perfectly 
good geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best person to promote to a 
rather different job that involves a broad range of choices about health 
science funding.  Maybe we have some sort of ethical or constitutional 
obligation to set aside our worries, and draw a sharp line between beliefs that 
a person says are "outside the natural order" and those that he says relate to 
the natural order.  But it seems to me that setting them aside at least runs 
against our first common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound.

From there we can shift the hypothetical.  What if the person 
believes the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to live nearly 1000 
years, and that all the contrary evidence is miracles produced by God to test 
our faith?  What if he doesn't take such a view, but believes that there have 
been several departures from the standard rules of nature in the past several 
thousand years, such as a virgin birth, a resurrection, and the like?

My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these examples. 
 It is certainly significant to me that very many smart, thoughtful, and 
suitably scientific skeptical people are believing Christians, and that (I 
suspect) many fewer such smart, thoughtful, and skeptical people are 
Young-Earthers or people who literally accept certain Hindu creation myths.  
But it's not easy for me to figure out how to translate that sort of sensible 
distinction into a legal or constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable 
principle of political ethics.

Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony Decinque
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 2:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

To be clear, I did not make that characterization.  I was repeating Mr. 
Harris's argument.  (My view would be different.)

Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's the 
point of this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different:  Even if the 
virgin birth is outside the natural order, the question Mr. Harris pushes on is 
"how does Mr. Collins know that X event happened?"  In other words, since Mr. 
Collins is claiming that the natural order was suspended on a certain date at a 
certain place, he is the one who should have to provide evidence for that 
assertion.  I think that this the "failure of skepticism" Mr. Harris is 
referring to  I refer you to his piece for his arguments instead of my 
clumsy paraphrasing.


All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to the 
values underlying science," not just characterize them that way.  Assuming that 
they are, what result?  Is it discrimination to say that someone's religious 
views undercut values that are needed in a job?


I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't have the 
full flavor of the argument.  A faith-healer, I suppose, never accepts 
c

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

I do think this raises a troublesome question for those of us who 
recognize the importance of religious toleration, and yet have to evaluate 
people's qualities for various purposes.  Say someone sincerely tells us that 
he thinks the world literally rests on the back of four elephants, which rest 
on the back of a turtle.  When told that this is inconsistent with various 
facts about the world, elephants, and turtles, he says that this is an artifact 
of some special treatment by divine forces, which allows evasion of the normal 
rules of the universe.  I take it that our first reaction would be to take a 
pretty negative view of the person.

And that the person believes this for religious reasons wouldn't displace our 
doubts, I think.  Even if we have reason to think that he's been a perfectly 
good geneticist, we might wonder whether he's the best person to promote to a 
rather different job that involves a broad range of choices about health 
science funding.  Maybe we have some sort of ethical or constitutional 
obligation to set aside our worries, and draw a sharp line between beliefs that 
a person says are "outside the natural order" and those that he says relate to 
the natural order.  But it seems to me that setting them aside at least runs 
against our first common-sense reactions, and might in fact not be sound.

From there we can shift the hypothetical.  What if the person 
believes the world is 6000 years old, and that people used to live nearly 1000 
years, and that all the contrary evidence is miracles produced by God to test 
our faith?  What if he doesn't take such a view, but believes that there have 
been several departures from the standard rules of nature in the past several 
thousand years, such as a virgin birth, a resurrection, and the like?

My sense is that we would indeed draw lines between these examples. 
 It is certainly significant to me that very many smart, thoughtful, and 
suitably scientific skeptical people are believing Christians, and that (I 
suspect) many fewer such smart, thoughtful, and skeptical people are 
Young-Earthers or people who literally accept certain Hindu creation myths.  
But it's not easy for me to figure out how to translate that sort of sensible 
distinction into a legal or constitutional rule, or even a broadly acceptable 
principle of political ethics.

Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony Decinque
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 2:26 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

To be clear, I did not make that characterization.  I was repeating Mr. 
Harris's argument.  (My view would be different.)

Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's the 
point of this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different:  Even if the 
virgin birth is outside the natural order, the question Mr. Harris pushes on is 
"how does Mr. Collins know that X event happened?"  In other words, since Mr. 
Collins is claiming that the natural order was suspended on a certain date at a 
certain place, he is the one who should have to provide evidence for that 
assertion.  I think that this the "failure of skepticism" Mr. Harris is 
referring to  I refer you to his piece for his arguments instead of my 
clumsy paraphrasing.


All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to the 
values underlying science," not just characterize them that way.  Assuming that 
they are, what result?  Is it discrimination to say that someone's religious 
views undercut values that are needed in a job?


I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't have the 
full flavor of the argument.  A faith-healer, I suppose, never accepts 
conventional medicine.  (Mr. Harris is arguing that) Mr. Collins is like a 
part-time faith healer.

The doctor-who-prays response is helpful.  What about a doctor who was 
excellent on the job, but sometimes denounced accepted fields of medicine off 
the job?

A
On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:03 PM, Douglas Laycock 
mailto:layco...@umich.edu>> wrote:

It is you who are begging the question.  The question is whether religious 
faith and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent.  You assumed the 
answer to that question when you characterized his views as antithetical to the 
values underlying science.

The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order.  Has any said 
or done anything unscientific in or about the course of his scientific work, 
when he is talking about things within the natural order?  Has he said or done 
anything allegedly anithetical to science other than state and promote his 
religious beliefs?

A faith healer who refuses medical treatment could not 

Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Anthony Decinque]

To be clear, I did not make that characterization.  I was repeating Mr.
Harris's argument.  (My view would be different.)

Again, I don't want to get into a religious argument (I don't think it's the
point of this list) but Mr. Harris's argument was different:  Even if the
virgin birth is outside the natural order, the question Mr. Harris pushes on
is "how does Mr. Collins know that X event happened?"  In other words, since
Mr. Collins is claiming that the natural order was suspended on a certain
date at a certain place, he is the one who should have to provide evidence
for that assertion.  I think that this the "failure of skepticism" Mr.
Harris is referring to  I refer you to his piece for his arguments
instead of my clumsy paraphrasing.


All that aside, I wanted to assume that "his views [are] antithetical to the
values underlying science," not just characterize them that way.  Assuming
that they are, what result?  Is it discrimination to say that someone's
religious views undercut values that are needed in a job?


I think the faith-healer hypothetical was more on target, but doesn't have
the full flavor of the argument.  A faith-healer, I suppose, never accepts
conventional medicine.  (Mr. Harris is arguing that) Mr. Collins is like a
part-time faith healer.

The doctor-who-prays response is helpful.  What about a doctor who was
excellent on the job, but sometimes denounced accepted fields of medicine
off the job?

A
On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 5:03 PM, Douglas Laycock  wrote:

> It is you who are begging the question.  The question is whether religious
> faith and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent.  You assumed
> the answer to that question when you characterized his views as antithetical
> to the values underlying science.
>
> The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order.  Has any
> said or done anything unscientific in or about the course of his scientific
> work, when he is talking about things within the natural order?  Has he said
> or done anything allegedly anithetical to science other than state and
> promote his religious beliefs?
>
> A faith healer who refuses medical treatment could not be Surgeon General.
> An excellent physician who does everything medically indicated, and also
> prays for cures and believes that God sometimes answers those prayers, could
> be Surgeon General.
>
>  Quoting Anthony Decinque :
>
> > I think that begs the question, in a sense.  You say, "If he has said
> > anything about science that is antithetical to sound science, that would
> be
> > a fair ground of criticism."  Mr. Collins states that he believes in the
> > virgin birth.  Is that antithetical to sound science?
> >
> > I don't really want to get into a religious debate or comment on the
> > validity of Mr. Collins's specific beleifs.  I want to know when
> someone's
> > advocacy of ideas that are antithetical to a profession can be used to
> > disqualify that person (legally).  You can change the hypothetical if you
> > want.  A faith-healer that is applying to be Surgeon General?
> >
> > A
> >
> > On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Douglas Laycock 
> wrote:
> >
> >> The alleged "ideas that are antithetical to the values underlying the
> job"
> >> are simply his religion.  Some consider his religion antithetical; he
> does
> >> not.  It is not antithetical unless you accept certain other assumptions
> >> about the relation between religion and science -- assumptions that his
> >> critics adopt but that he rejects.
> >>
> >> If he has said anything about science that is antithetical to sound
> >> science, that would be a fair ground of criticism.  But if he is sound
> when
> >> he talks about science, and the only evidence against him is the
> inferences
> >> people draw when he talks about religion, that is simply a religious
> >> disqualification.
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >>
> >> Quoting Anthony Decinque :
> >>
> >> > Francis Collins has been selected to be the head of NIH, where he will
> >> have
> >> > substantial authority to allocate the nation?s scientific research
> >> funding.
> >> > There are a few criticisms of Mr. Collins being made regarding his
> >> religion..
> >> >
> >> >
> >> > For this list, I wanted to set aside a specific criticism.
> Specifically,
> >> > let?s ignore criticisms based on Mr. Collins using his government
> >> position
> >> > to promote religion.  (For example, if Mr. Collins were to give a
> speech,
> >> as
> >> > head of the Human Genome Project, claiming that DNA is evidence for
> God.)
> >> >
> >> > Instead, I wanted to get the list?s opinion on a different criticism.
> >> This
> >> > criticism goes like this: (1) science is a product of another, deeper,
> >> more
> >> > important feature ? skeptical thinking; (2) Mr. Collins does not
> practice
> >> > skeptical thinking; (3) in fact, Mr. Collins has made many statements
> >> > undermining and contradicting skeptical thinking.  Therefore, the
> >> criticism
> >> > goes, Mr. Collins shoul

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Volokh, Eugene]

Are we sure this is so as a legal matter?  I don't support a 
Senator's voting against a nominee based on the nominee's religion, but it 
doesn't seem obvious to me that a Senator's so voting violates the Religious 
Test Clause - or is there some conclusive historical or doctrinal evidence to 
the contrary?

Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 1:59 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

As a legal matter, the claim that someone's religious views are disqualifying 
comes close to, if not actually constituting a prohibited religious test for 
public office especially as the NIH to which Collins was nominated is a federal 
institution subject to the tests clause directly.However there are cases in 
which the federal courts ahve upheld the discharge of political appointees who 
have made (hostile) religious statements about homosexuality.
Marc  Stern

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony Decinque
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 4:48 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms
I think that begs the question, in a sense.  You say, "If he has said anything 
about science that is antithetical to sound science, that would be a fair 
ground of criticism."  Mr. Collins states that he believes in the virgin birth. 
 Is that antithetical to sound science?

I don't really want to get into a religious debate or comment on the validity 
of Mr. Collins's specific beleifs.  I want to know when someone's advocacy of 
ideas that are antithetical to a profession can be used to disqualify that 
person (legally).  You can change the hypothetical if you want.  A faith-healer 
that is applying to be Surgeon General?

A
On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Douglas Laycock 
mailto:layco...@umich.edu>> wrote:

The alleged "ideas that are antithetical to the values underlying the job" are 
simply his religion.  Some consider his religion antithetical; he does not.  It 
is not antithetical unless you accept certain other assumptions about the 
relation between religion and science -- assumptions that his critics adopt but 
that he rejects.

If he has said anything about science that is antithetical to sound science, 
that would be a fair ground of criticism.  But if he is sound when he talks 
about science, and the only evidence against him is the inferences people draw 
when he talks about religion, that is simply a religious disqualification.




Quoting Anthony Decinque 
mailto:anthony.decin...@gmail.com>>:

> Francis Collins has been selected to be the head of NIH, where he will have
> substantial authority to allocate the nation?s scientific research funding.
> There are a few criticisms of Mr. Collins being made regarding his religion..
>
>
> For this list, I wanted to set aside a specific criticism.  Specifically,
> let?s ignore criticisms based on Mr. Collins using his government position
> to promote religion.  (For example, if Mr. Collins were to give a speech, as
> head of the Human Genome Project, claiming that DNA is evidence for God.)
>
> Instead, I wanted to get the list?s opinion on a different criticism.  This
> criticism goes like this: (1) science is a product of another, deeper, more
> important feature ? skeptical thinking; (2) Mr. Collins does not practice
> skeptical thinking; (3) in fact, Mr. Collins has made many statements
> undermining and contradicting skeptical thinking.  Therefore, the criticism
> goes, Mr. Collins should not be the head of NIH because he undermines what
> science is all about.
>
> To get a flavor of the criticism, you can read this
> piece<http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_collins2/>by<http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_collins2/%3Eby>

> Sam Harris.
> It is an elaboration of a NY Times editorial Mr. Harris recently
> authored.  In
> response, biologist Kenneth Miller wrote in the NY Times that Mr. Harris has
> ?deeply held prejudices against religion? and opposes Mr. Collins merely
> because ?he is a Christian.?
>
> What does the list think?  Should it be acceptable for an employer to
> discriminate against a job candidate on the grounds that the candidate
> believes, practices, and advocates for ideas that are antithetical to the
> values underlying the job?  (Again, assuming that the candidate would not
> otherwise abuse the post and would generally do a fine administrative job.)
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Anthony DeCinque
>



Douglas Laycock
Yale 

Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Douglas Laycock]

It is you who are begging the question.  The question is whether religious 
faith and scientific commitment are inherently inconsistent.  You assumed the 
answer to that question when you characterized his views as antithetical to the 
values underlying science. 

The virgin birth, if it happened, was outside the natural order.  Has any said 
or done anything unscientific in or about the course of his scientific work, 
when he is talking about things within the natural order?  Has he said or done 
anything allegedly anithetical to science other than state and promote his 
religious beliefs? 

A faith healer who refuses medical treatment could not be Surgeon General.  An 
excellent physician who does everything medically indicated, and also prays for 
cures and believes that God sometimes answers those prayers, could be Surgeon 
General. 

Quoting Anthony Decinque :

> I think that begs the question, in a sense.  You say, "If he has said
> anything about science that is antithetical to sound science, that would be
> a fair ground of criticism."  Mr. Collins states that he believes in the
> virgin birth.  Is that antithetical to sound science?
>
> I don't really want to get into a religious debate or comment on the
> validity of Mr. Collins's specific beleifs.  I want to know when someone's
> advocacy of ideas that are antithetical to a profession can be used to
> disqualify that person (legally).  You can change the hypothetical if you
> want.  A faith-healer that is applying to be Surgeon General?
>
> A
>
> On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Douglas Laycock  wrote:
>
>> The alleged "ideas that are antithetical to the values underlying the job"
>> are simply his religion.  Some consider his religion antithetical; he does
>> not.  It is not antithetical unless you accept certain other assumptions
>> about the relation between religion and science -- assumptions that his
>> critics adopt but that he rejects.
>>
>> If he has said anything about science that is antithetical to sound
>> science, that would be a fair ground of criticism.  But if he is sound when
>> he talks about science, and the only evidence against him is the inferences
>> people draw when he talks about religion, that is simply a religious
>> disqualification.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> Quoting Anthony Decinque :
>>
>> > Francis Collins has been selected to be the head of NIH, where he will
>> have
>> > substantial authority to allocate the nation?s scientific research
>> funding.
>> > There are a few criticisms of Mr. Collins being made regarding his
>> religion..
>> >
>> >
>> > For this list, I wanted to set aside a specific criticism.  Specifically,
>> > let?s ignore criticisms based on Mr. Collins using his government
>> position
>> > to promote religion.  (For example, if Mr. Collins were to give a speech,
>> as
>> > head of the Human Genome Project, claiming that DNA is evidence for God.)
>> >
>> > Instead, I wanted to get the list?s opinion on a different criticism.
>> This
>> > criticism goes like this: (1) science is a product of another, deeper,
>> more
>> > important feature ? skeptical thinking; (2) Mr. Collins does not practice
>> > skeptical thinking; (3) in fact, Mr. Collins has made many statements
>> > undermining and contradicting skeptical thinking.  Therefore, the
>> criticism
>> > goes, Mr. Collins should not be the head of NIH because he undermines
>> what
>> > science is all about.
>> >
>> > To get a flavor of the criticism, you can read this
>> > piece<
>> http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_collins2/>by[1]
>> > Sam Harris.
>> > It is an elaboration of a NY Times editorial Mr. Harris recently
>> > authored.  In
>> > response, biologist Kenneth Miller wrote in the NY Times that Mr. Harris
>> has
>> > ?deeply held prejudices against religion? and opposes Mr. Collins merely
>> > because ?he is a Christian.?
>> >
>> > What does the list think?  Should it be acceptable for an employer to
>> > discriminate against a job candidate on the grounds that the candidate
>> > believes, practices, and advocates for ideas that are antithetical to the
>> > values underlying the job?  (Again, assuming that the candidate would not
>> > otherwise abuse the post and would generally do a fine administrative
>> job.)
>> >
>> >
>> >
>> > Thanks,
>> >
>> > Anthony DeCinque
>> >
>>
>>
>>
>> Douglas Laycock
>> Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
>> University of Michigan Law School
>> 625 S. State St.
>> Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
>>   734-647-9713
>>
>> ___
>> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
>> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
>> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw[3]
>>
>> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
>> private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are

RE: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Marc Stern]

As a legal matter, the claim that someone's religious views are
disqualifying comes close to, if not actually constituting a prohibited
religious test for public office especially as the NIH to which Collins
was nominated is a federal institution subject to the tests clause
directly.However there are cases in which the federal courts ahve upheld
the discharge of political appointees who have made (hostile) religious
statements about homosexuality. 
Marc  Stern 


From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Anthony
Decinque
Sent: Thursday, August 06, 2009 4:48 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms


I think that begs the question, in a sense.  You say, "If he has said
anything about science that is antithetical to sound science, that would
be a fair ground of criticism."  Mr. Collins states that he believes in
the virgin birth.  Is that antithetical to sound science?
 
I don't really want to get into a religious debate or comment on the
validity of Mr. Collins's specific beleifs.  I want to know when
someone's advocacy of ideas that are antithetical to a profession can be
used to disqualify that person (legally).  You can change the
hypothetical if you want.  A faith-healer that is applying to be Surgeon
General?
 
A


On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Douglas Laycock 
wrote:


The alleged "ideas that are antithetical to the values
underlying the job" are simply his religion.  Some consider his religion
antithetical; he does not.  It is not antithetical unless you accept
certain other assumptions about the relation between religion and
science -- assumptions that his critics adopt but that he rejects.

If he has said anything about science that is antithetical to
sound science, that would be a fair ground of criticism.  But if he is
sound when he talks about science, and the only evidence against him is
the inferences people draw when he talks about religion, that is simply
a religious disqualification.

 

 


Quoting Anthony Decinque :

> Francis Collins has been selected to be the head of NIH, where
he will have
> substantial authority to allocate the nation?s scientific
research funding.
> There are a few criticisms of Mr. Collins being made regarding
his religion..
>
>
> For this list, I wanted to set aside a specific criticism.
Specifically,
> let?s ignore criticisms based on Mr. Collins using his
government position
> to promote religion.  (For example, if Mr. Collins were to
give a speech, as
> head of the Human Genome Project, claiming that DNA is
evidence for God.)
>
> Instead, I wanted to get the list?s opinion on a different
criticism.  This
> criticism goes like this: (1) science is a product of another,
deeper, more
> important feature ? skeptical thinking; (2) Mr. Collins does
not practice
> skeptical thinking; (3) in fact, Mr. Collins has made many
statements
> undermining and contradicting skeptical thinking.  Therefore,
the criticism
> goes, Mr. Collins should not be the head of NIH because he
undermines what
> science is all about.
>
> To get a flavor of the criticism, you can read this

>
piece<http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_fran
cis_collins2/>by
<http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_c
ollins2/%3Eby>  

> Sam Harris.
> It is an elaboration of a NY Times editorial Mr. Harris
recently 
> authored.  In
> response, biologist Kenneth Miller wrote in the NY Times that
Mr. Harris has
> ?deeply held prejudices against religion? and opposes Mr.
Collins merely
> because ?he is a Christian.?
>
> What does the list think?  Should it be acceptable for an
employer to
> discriminate against a job candidate on the grounds that the
candidate
> believes, practices, and advocates for ideas that are
antithetical to the
> values underlying the job?  (Again, assuming that the
candidate would not
> otherwise abuse the post and would generally do a fine
administrative job.)
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Anthony DeCinque
>




 

Douglas Laycock
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
University of Michigan Law School
625 S. State St.
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
  734-647-9713


___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu

Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Anthony Decinque]

I think that begs the question, in a sense.  You say, "If he has said
anything about science that is antithetical to sound science, that would be
a fair ground of criticism."  Mr. Collins states that he believes in the
virgin birth.  Is that antithetical to sound science?

I don't really want to get into a religious debate or comment on the
validity of Mr. Collins's specific beleifs.  I want to know when someone's
advocacy of ideas that are antithetical to a profession can be used to
disqualify that person (legally).  You can change the hypothetical if you
want.  A faith-healer that is applying to be Surgeon General?

A

On Thu, Aug 6, 2009 at 4:41 PM, Douglas Laycock  wrote:

> The alleged "ideas that are antithetical to the values underlying the job"
> are simply his religion.  Some consider his religion antithetical; he does
> not.  It is not antithetical unless you accept certain other assumptions
> about the relation between religion and science -- assumptions that his
> critics adopt but that he rejects.
>
> If he has said anything about science that is antithetical to sound
> science, that would be a fair ground of criticism.  But if he is sound when
> he talks about science, and the only evidence against him is the inferences
> people draw when he talks about religion, that is simply a religious
> disqualification.
>
>
>
>
>
> Quoting Anthony Decinque :
>
> > Francis Collins has been selected to be the head of NIH, where he will
> have
> > substantial authority to allocate the nation?s scientific research
> funding.
> > There are a few criticisms of Mr. Collins being made regarding his
> religion..
> >
> >
> > For this list, I wanted to set aside a specific criticism.  Specifically,
> > let?s ignore criticisms based on Mr. Collins using his government
> position
> > to promote religion.  (For example, if Mr. Collins were to give a speech,
> as
> > head of the Human Genome Project, claiming that DNA is evidence for God.)
> >
> > Instead, I wanted to get the list?s opinion on a different criticism.
> This
> > criticism goes like this: (1) science is a product of another, deeper,
> more
> > important feature ? skeptical thinking; (2) Mr. Collins does not practice
> > skeptical thinking; (3) in fact, Mr. Collins has made many statements
> > undermining and contradicting skeptical thinking.  Therefore, the
> criticism
> > goes, Mr. Collins should not be the head of NIH because he undermines
> what
> > science is all about.
> >
> > To get a flavor of the criticism, you can read this
> > piece<
> http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_collins2/>by
> > Sam Harris.
> > It is an elaboration of a NY Times editorial Mr. Harris recently
> > authored.  In
> > response, biologist Kenneth Miller wrote in the NY Times that Mr. Harris
> has
> > ?deeply held prejudices against religion? and opposes Mr. Collins merely
> > because ?he is a Christian.?
> >
> > What does the list think?  Should it be acceptable for an employer to
> > discriminate against a job candidate on the grounds that the candidate
> > believes, practices, and advocates for ideas that are antithetical to the
> > values underlying the job?  (Again, assuming that the candidate would not
> > otherwise abuse the post and would generally do a fine administrative
> job.)
> >
> >
> >
> > Thanks,
> >
> > Anthony DeCinque
> >
>
>
>
> Douglas Laycock
> Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
> University of Michigan Law School
> 625 S. State St.
> Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
>   734-647-9713
>
> ___
> To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
> To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see
> http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw
>
> Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as
> private.  Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are
> posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or
> wrongly) forward the messages to others.
>
___
To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see 
http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw

Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private.  
Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.

Re: Francis Collins and Acceptable Criticisms

[Douglas Laycock]

The alleged "ideas that are antithetical to the values underlying the job" are 
simply his religion.  Some consider his religion antithetical; he does not.  It 
is not antithetical unless you accept certain other assumptions about the 
relation between religion and science -- assumptions that his critics adopt but 
that he rejects. 

If he has said anything about science that is antithetical to sound science, 
that would be a fair ground of criticism.  But if he is sound when he talks 
about science, and the only evidence against him is the inferences people draw 
when he talks about religion, that is simply a religious disqualification. 

Quoting Anthony Decinque :

> Francis Collins has been selected to be the head of NIH, where he will have
> substantial authority to allocate the nation?s scientific research funding.
> There are a few criticisms of Mr. Collins being made regarding his religion..
>
>
> For this list, I wanted to set aside a specific criticism.  Specifically,
> let?s ignore criticisms based on Mr. Collins using his government position
> to promote religion.  (For example, if Mr. Collins were to give a speech, as
> head of the Human Genome Project, claiming that DNA is evidence for God.)
>
> Instead, I wanted to get the list?s opinion on a different criticism.  This
> criticism goes like this: (1) science is a product of another, deeper, more
> important feature ? skeptical thinking; (2) Mr. Collins does not practice
> skeptical thinking; (3) in fact, Mr. Collins has made many statements
> undermining and contradicting skeptical thinking.  Therefore, the criticism
> goes, Mr. Collins should not be the head of NIH because he undermines what
> science is all about.
>
> To get a flavor of the criticism, you can read this
> pieceby[1]
> Sam Harris.
> It is an elaboration of a NY Times editorial Mr. Harris recently 
> authored.  In
> response, biologist Kenneth Miller wrote in the NY Times that Mr. Harris has
> ?deeply held prejudices against religion? and opposes Mr. Collins merely
> because ?he is a Christian.?
>
> What does the list think?  Should it be acceptable for an employer to
> discriminate against a job candidate on the grounds that the candidate
> believes, practices, and advocates for ideas that are antithetical to the
> values underlying the job?  (Again, assuming that the candidate would not
> otherwise abuse the post and would generally do a fine administrative job.)
>
>
>
> Thanks,
>
> Anthony DeCinque
>

Douglas Laycock
Yale Kamisar Collegiate Professor of Law
University of Michigan Law School
625 S. State St.
Ann Arbor, MI  48109-1215
  734-647-9713

Links:
--
[1] 
http://www.reasonproject.org/archive/item/the_strange_case_of_francis_collins2/>by___
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Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.