Hi Daniele,
I don't think there is any contention over the idea that miners that control a
larger percentage of the hash rate, h / H, have a profitability advantage if
you hold all the other variables of the miner's profit equation constant. I
think this is important: it is a centralizing
However, that is outside the scope of the result that an individual
miner's profit per block is always maximized at a finite block size Q* if
Shannon Entropy about each transaction is communicated during the block
solution announcement. This result is important because it explains how a
minimum
Very interesting paper. When you talk about a market, what are you
referring to exactly? A market means that demand and supply are matched
continuously, and Bitcoin has no such mechanism. A lot of discussion has
been around fixing the supply of blocksize. A floating number would mean
that a
On 5 August 2015 at 09:33, Benjamin via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
A market means that demand and supply are matched continuously, and
Bitcoin has no such mechanism.
Not all markets need to have highly liquid trading outlets in order to be
thought of as such.
On 5 August 2015 at 11:18, Hector Chu via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
Miners would be uniquely placed to know how best to vary the block size to
maximize their
profit resulting from these two prices. [...]
In that respect a dynamic block size voted on by miners
Thank you for the feedback, Benjamin.
When you talk about a market, what are you referring to exactly?
I define what I mean by healthy, unhealthy, and non-existent markets in Section
7, and I show a figure to illustrate the supply and demand curves in each of
these three cases. A healthy
On 5 August 2015 at 10:57, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
You may find the flexcap idea summarised in outline by Greg Maxwell
and Mark Friedenbach a month or so back interesting in showing that
one can achieve such effects without handing over a free vote to
miners and hence avoid many
On 5 August 2015 at 12:51, Hector Chu hector...@gmail.com wrote:
The market I am thinking of would be open to all, not just miners. But
miners would probably be best placed to profit from such a market, as it is
their business to know about the revenue/costs tradeoff.
This prediction market in
On 5 August 2015 at 12:07, Adam Back a...@cypherspace.org wrote:
This prediction market in block-size seems like something extremely
complex to operate and keep secure in a decentralised fashion.
Why would it need to be decentralised? Bitcoin.org could run the exchange,
and the profits from
To put some flesh on the bones of this idea, imagine a hypothetical
security named BLK. Demand for bigger blocks should buy up BLK and demand
for smaller blocks should short BLK. The price of BLK in BTC is the ideal
block size.
Now imagine that there are futures contracts for the security BLK. On
Hi Dave,
Thank you for the feedback regarding my paper.
The paper is nicely done, but I'm concerned that there's a real problem with
equation 4. The orphan rate is not just a function of time; it's also a
function of the block maker's proportion of the network hash rate.
Fundamentally a
On 8/5/2015 3:44 PM, Dave Hudson via bitcoin-dev wrote:
I do suspect that if we were to model this more accurately we might be
able to infer the typical propagation characteristics by measuring
the deviation from the expected distribution.
The paper models propagation using a single time
On 5 Aug 2015, at 15:15, Peter R pete...@gmx.com wrote:
Hi Dave,
Thank you for the feedback regarding my paper.
The paper is nicely done, but I'm concerned that there's a real problem with
equation 4. The orphan rate is not just a function of time; it's also a
function of the
Dear Bitcoin-Dev Mailing list,
I’d like to share a research paper I’ve recently completed titled “A
Transaction Fee Market Exists Without a Block Size Limit.” In addition to
presenting some useful charts such as the cost to produce large spam blocks, I
think the paper convincingly
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On 4 August 2015 17:30:28 GMT-04:00, Gavin Andresen via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Dave Hudson via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
Fundamentally a block
On 4 Aug 2015, at 14:30, Gavin Andresen gavinandre...@gmail.com wrote:
On Tue, Aug 4, 2015 at 2:41 PM, Dave Hudson via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org
mailto:bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
Fundamentally a block maker (pool or aggregation of pools) does not
The paper is nicely done, but I'm concerned that there's a real problem with
equation 4. The orphan rate is not just a function of time; it's also a
function of the block maker's proportion of the network hash rate.
Fundamentally a block maker (pool or aggregation of pools) does not orphan its
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On 4 August 2015 14:41:53 GMT-04:00, Dave Hudson via bitcoin-dev
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org wrote:
The paper is nicely done, but I'm concerned that there's a real problem
with equation 4. The orphan rate is not just a function of time;
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