Good morning Matt Bell,
Thinking of this further, I observe that there are limits on the number of
operations in a SCRIPT (I believe 201 non-push operations, and maybe a smaller
number of CHECKSIG operations?).
This implies that the number of signatories of the sidechain funds in the
mainchain
Good mornint Peter,
> > > Wouldn’t a revealed private key for time locked funds create a race
> > > to spend? I imagine miners who are paying attention would have the
> > > advantage but it would still just be a race.
> >
> > If Bitcoin had implemented RBF "properly" (i.e. not have the silly
> >
On January 24, 2019 10:03:25 AM UTC, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
>Good morning Dustin,
>
>> Wouldn’t a revealed private key for time locked funds create a race
>to spend? I imagine miners who are paying attention would have the
>advantage but it would still just be a race.
>
>If Bitcoin had
It seems that miners would always claim the stake for themselves, why not
since the private key is public knowledge anyway? This is a nice security
property since it wouldn't make economical sense for a miner to take a
bribe from an attacker since it would have to be less than the stake amount.
It
Good morning Dustin,
> Wouldn’t a revealed private key for time locked funds create a race to spend?
> I imagine miners who are paying attention would have the advantage but it
> would still just be a race.
If Bitcoin had implemented RBF "properly" (i.e. not have the silly "opt-out"
rule) then
Brands credentials use this single show, and multiple show
credentials. It's based on the representation problem which is the
generalisation to multiple bases where Schnorr is one base, Pedersen
Commitments are two bases, Representation problem is n>2 bases.
The method used would work for Schnorr
How could you prove the private key is in the burning transaction?
On Tue, Jan 22, 2019 at 11:56 AM Satoshin via bitcoin-dev <
bitcoin-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org> wrote:
> This could could be a viable option. I think this is the right approach.
>
> Any downside to this and how much does this a
Wouldn’t a revealed private key for time locked funds create a race to
spend? I imagine miners who are paying attention would have the advantage
but it would still just be a race.
Would be nice to have the funds destroyed or sent somewhere specific. Like
if somehow the revealed key was actually it
This could could be a viable option. I think this is the right approach.
Any downside to this and how much does this add to the blockweight if anything
at all.
Anonymouse
> On Jan 22, 2019, at 4:19 AM, ZmnSCPxj via bitcoin-dev
> wrote:
>
> Good Morning Matt,
>
>> ### ZmnSCPxj,
>>
>> I'm in
Good Morning Matt,
> ### ZmnSCPxj,
>
> I'm intrigued by this mechanism of using fixed R values to prevent multiple
> signatures, but how do we derive the R values in a way where they are
unique for each blockheight but still can be used to create signatures or
verify?
One possibility is to deri
ZmnSCPxj,
I'm intrigued by this mechanism of using fixed R values to prevent multiple
signatures, but how do we derive the R values in a way where they are
unique for each blockheight but still can be used to create signatures or
verify?
Thanks,
Matt
On Sat, Jan 19, 2019 at 6:06 PM ZmnSCPxj wro
Good Morning Matt,
It seems to me that double signing can be punished by requiring that R be a
trivial function on the blockheight of the block being signed on the sidechain
network. Then a validator who signs multiple versions of history at a
particular blockheight reveals their privkey. Since
Hi ZmnSCPxj,
Just to clarify, my design does not specify the source of voting power, so
it is agnostic to whatever system you want to derive stake or valdiator set
membership from.
Your idea of timelocking Bitcoin is interesting, I am eager to find a
solution where holding Bitcoin is enough to ge
Good morning Matt,
It seems to me much more interesting if the stakes used to weigh voting power
are UTXOs on the Bitcoin blockchain.
This idea is what I call "mainstake"; rather than a blockchain having its own
token that is self-attesting (which is insecure).
It seems to me, naively, that the
I have been working on a design for Bitcoin sidechains using the Tendermint
BFT consensus protocol, which is commonly used to build proof-of-stake
networks (Cosmos is the notable one).
The design ends up being very similar to Blockstream's Liquid sidechain,
since Tendermint consensus is not far of
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