On Sat, Dec 30, 2023 at 12:11 AM David A. Harding wrote:
>
> On 2023-12-29 15:17, Nagaev Boris wrote:
> > Feerate-Dependent Timelocks do create incentives to accept out-of-band
> > fees to decrease in-band fees and speed up mining of transactions
> > using FDT! Miners can make a 5% discount on
Hey David!
On Fri, Dec 29, 2023 at 9:37 PM David A. Harding via bitcoin-dev
wrote:
> We can't prevent people from paying out of band, but we can ensure that
> the easiest and most effective way to pay for a transaction is through
> in-band fees and transactions that are relayed to every miner
On 2023-12-29 15:17, Nagaev Boris wrote:
Feerate-Dependent Timelocks do create incentives to accept out-of-band
fees to decrease in-band fees and speed up mining of transactions
using FDT! Miners can make a 5% discount on fees paid out-of-band and
many people will use it. Observed fees decrease
On 2023-12-28 08:42, Eric Voskuil via bitcoin-dev wrote:
Assuming a “sufficient fraction” of
one of several economically rational behaviors is a design flaw.
The amount of effort it takes a user to pay additional miners out of
band is likely to increase much faster than probability that the
On 2023-12-28 08:06, jlspc via bitcoin-dev wrote:
On Friday, December 22nd, 2023 at 8:36 AM, Nagaev Boris
wrote:
To validate a transaction with FDT [...]
a light client would have to determine the median fee
rate of the recent blocks. To do that without involving trust, it has
to download the
Hi Eric,
I agree that users can pay miners offchain and miners can create blocks where
the difference between inputs and outputs exceeds the fees paid (by mining
their own transactions). I model that behavior as dishonest mining. Onchain
fees seem to reflect congestion for now, but it's true
Hi Boris,
Responses inline below:
Sent with Proton Mail secure email.
On Friday, December 22nd, 2023 at 8:36 AM, Nagaev Boris
wrote:
> Hi John!
>
> I have two questions regarding the window, which are related.
>
> 1. Why is the window aligned? IIUC, this means that the blocks mined
>
Hi John,Honest is a misnomer, which is underpinning the concept. There is nothing dishonest about such payments. The downside is that the payer forgoes anonymity relative to the miner, but this is not dishonest, nor is mining one’s own transactions (where the represented “fee” implies nothing).
Hi John!
I have two questions regarding the window, which are related.
1. Why is the window aligned? IIUC, this means that the blocks mined
since the latest block whose height is divisible by window_size do not
affect transaction's validity. So a recent change of fees does not
reflect if a
The fees paid to mine the set of transactions in a given block are known only to the miner that produced the block. Assuming that tx inputs less outputs represents an actual economic force is an error.eOn Dec 22, 2023, at 09:24, jlspc via bitcoin-dev wrote:Hi Antoine,
Thanks for your thoughtful
Hi Antoine,
Thanks for your thoughtful response.
Comments inline below:
> Hi John,
> While the idea of using sliding reaction window for blockchain congestion
> detection has been present in the "smart contract" space at large [0] and
> this has been discussed informally among Lightning devs
Hi John,
While the idea of using sliding reaction window for blockchain congestion
detection has been present in the "smart contract" space at large [0] and
this has been discussed informally among Lightning devs and covenant
designers few times [1] [2], this is the first and best formalization
TL;DR
=
* All known Lightning channel and factory protocols are susceptible to forced
expiration spam attacks, in which an attacker floods the blockchain with
transactions in order to prevent honest users from putting their transactions
onchain before timelocks expire.
* Feerate-Dependent
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