For appeal of the MPAA v. 2600 decision:
Brief Amici Curiae of Steven Bellovin, Matt Blaze, Dan Boneh,
Dave Del Torto, Ian Goldberg, Bruce Schneier, Frank Andrew
Stevenson, David Wagner:
http://www.2600.com/dvd/docs/2001/0126-crypto-amicus.txt
Brief Amicus Curiae of Arnold Reinhold:
We offer James Tyre's Brief of Amici Curiae on behalf of
17 cryptographers, professors and scientists, for appeal
of the MPAA v. 2600 judgment:
http://cryptome.org/mpaa-v-2600-bac.htm
The amici:
Harold Abelson
Andrew W. Appel
Dan Boneh
Edward W. Felten
Robert Harper
Andy Hertzfeld
Brian
NSA's "NACSEM 5112 NONSTOP Evaluation Techniques,"
Reprinted July 1987, released under FOIA:
http://cryptome.org/nacsem-5112.htm (196K, 3 images)
About half of the 100-page document has been redacted,
so brace for the mangle.
Joel McNamara first told me about NONSTOP and its commonly
associated classified codeword, HIJACK, both somehow related
to Tempest.
When you do a search on either of them you get hundreds
(or 1000s) of hits for the generic terms "non-stop" and "hi-jack"
but few entries for the codewords, and
Last summer, at a workshop on "Security Metrics," conducted
by NIST's Computer System Security and Privacy Advisory
Board, Landgrave Smith, Institute of Defense Analysis, reported
on a pilot study of "the metrics used for determining the
strength of cryptography."
NIST states on its Web site that a draft FIPS for AES would
be issued for comment "shortly after announcement of the
winner (probably in November 2000)." Anything scandalous
behind the delay?
Clive Feather wrote:
Calling this "NCIS carnivore" is misleading. It's concerned with
transaction logs (who logged in when, web site logs, the sort of thing
covered as "communications data" in RIP). Nothing to do with the contents
of phone calls or email.
I've been aware of these proposals for
We offer an HTML version of the Carnivore technical
review report released yesterday by the Department
of Justice (without appendices):
http://cryptome.org/carnivore.rev.htm (164KB text, 8 images)
One notable conclusion about Carnivore's shortcomings
and why its code should not be released
We offer the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act Final
Rule on Access Control Circumvention:
http://cryptome.org/dmca102700.txt (149KB)
An excerpt on why there will be no exemption for
circumventing access to DVDs by tools such
as DeCSS:
http://cryptome.org/dmca-dvd.htm (15KB)
The
The bibliography of an NSA reorganization report
released today lists several entries under "Unified
Cryptologic Architecture" as well as a "U.S. Cryptologic
Strategy - Preparing for the 21st Century."
There is also a citation of "SINEWS - GCHQ Modernization
and Change Program."
We would
Anrold Reinhold wrote:
How hard would it be to filter the public key servers for unsigned
ADKs and either notify the keyowner or just remove the unsigned ADKs?
It might be possible to filter the unsigned ADKs from key servers,
however, it is not clear if the bug discovered is all there is to
Cryptome offers the ADK bug-fixed PGP Freeware 6.5.8:
http://jya.com/pgpfree/PGPFW658Win32.zip (7.8MB)
http://jya.com/pgpfree/PGPFW658Mac_sit.bin (5.6MB)
Analyses of the ADK fix and any others most welcome.
In a 1992 Studies in Intelligence article, "America's First
Encrypted Cable," Ralph Weber refers to a "Monroe cypher:"
http://cryptome.org/us-cable1.htm
We would appreciate information on this cipher, and a
sample of its use with plaintext and ciphertext, or, a long
shot, a source for the
Yes, Kahn did footnote the Monroe cypher information,
attirubitng it to Edmund C. Burnett, in his "Letters of
Members of the Continental Congress."
I've also received two other citations for more on Monroe's
cypher from the mail list Intelligence Forum, a quite informative
source on crypto
Arnold Rheinhold wrote:
I'm afraid I don't find Mr. Fernandes' argument convincing. ...
To me the mystery is why Microsoft is unwilling to fully explain its
actions. Perhaps there are other details they do not wish to reveal.
For example, since each CAPI module to be signed would require BXA
Duncan Campbell sends along with permission of Andrew:
Additional comment from Andrew D. Fernandes of Cryptonym
Corporation (who discovered the NSA_KEY) on the MS/Campbell
exchange on the NSA_KEY http://cryptome.org/nsakey-ms-dc.htm:
Microsoft's insistence that the second key is there for
John Gilmore wrote:
There have been allegations that NSA influenced Microsoft's encryption
support (one reason that NSA could afford to relax export controls
could be that they've already subverted the highest volume US
products). It's pretty well acknowledged that NSA did this to Crypto
AG's
The National Security Agency had today published
"Hardware Performance Simulations of Round 2
Advanced Encryption Standard Algorithms," a 55-page
report:
http://csrc.nist.gov/encryption/aes/round2/NSA-AESfinalreport.pdf (165K)
Its abstract:
"The National Security Agency is providing
Cryptome/JYA are down due to a glitch in switching to a
new faster, absoutely never-fail server. Both should be back in
service today -- barring the Filipino factor.
Duncan Campbell has provided a recent exchange of
informative messages with Scott Culp at Microsoft on the
origin, function and purpose of NSA_KEY in Windows:
http://cryptome.org/nsakey-ms-dc.htm
Adi Shamir has provided "Real Time Cryptanalysis of A5/1 on a PC,"
an 18-page paper by Alex Biryukov, Adi Shamir and David Wagner
presented at the Fast Encryption Software Workshop in New York City
on April 10. It is an updated version of the December 1999 preliminary
draft by Biryukov and
Martin Garbus, an internationally distinguished New York
attorney, and his firm have been retained by the defense in
the New York MPAA DeCSS case. Two of the three defendants
have withdrawn under consent agreements, leaving only the
magazine 2600, which succeeds its publisher, Emmanuel
Cryptome is offering a daily list by e-mail of new items with URLs
added to the archive. Six to ten new items are added daily, some are
archived at Cryptome, some are available at other URLs. Most of the
items will show brief, salient excerpts as now done at the site.
To subscribe send a blank
Harald Koch wrote:
Do you have it registered with the PTO, or just in the DNS? If the
latter, their next move is probably to have the Internic take your
domain away from you under the current trademark infrigement policy.
Beware...
Good point. In fact, an inspired challenge. If the nouveau
Making history: the original source for the 1988
first Echelon report steps forward
London, Friday 25 February, 2000
By Duncan Campbell
In the circumstances of the extensive worldwide
political and media attention that is currently
focussed on the Echelon communications surveillance
What is current thinking of the AES finalists on NSA review
of the proposals. Will there be (or has there been), say, overtures
made to the developers to cooperate with national security and/or
law enforcement requirements.
Or is an alternate, parallel successor to DES underway for that
dual-
Dan Geer wrote:
I would place a bet that only traffic analysis will remain an
area of sustainable lead, that traffic analysis is the only
area where commercial interests will not naturally marshall
the resources to threaten the lead of the national agencies.
This may well be. However, a writer
Cryptome got a demand letter yesterday from the MPAA Anti-Piracy
Unit to remove DeCSS as well as to immediately perform other
unnatural acts:
http://cryptome.org/dvd-mpaa-ccd.htm
A number of responses to the letter have come in which
might be of interest here:
We ran across a claim that compromising emanations were
discovered in 1918:
http://www.tscm.com/TSCM101tempest.html
"TEMPEST was 'invented' in 1918 when Herbert Yardley and
his staff of the Black Chamber were engaged by the U.S. Army
to develop methods to detect, intercept, and exploit
Phil,
What happens to your court case when Commerce issues
its letter?
And for those of us who came late to crypto law, when did
you initiate your suit?
Which gives me a chance to say many thanks to you, and Dan
and Peter, for educating the rest of us not only in how to
effect crypto policy
Brad kemp wrote:
It was interesting to note that the judge stated that
'DeCSS, or some version of it, contain programmer's comments,
"which are non-executable appendages to lines of executable code"...
Such comments are protected by the First Amendment'
Does this mean the it is legal to post
Judge Kaplan has issued his Memorandum Opinion in
the DeCSS MPAA v. 3 suit in New York:
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/courtweb/pdf/00-01149.PDF
We offer an HTML version:
http://cryptome.org/dvd-mpaa-3-mo.htm
Judge Kaplan aims at settling the code as expression
dispute, citing Bernstein,
Up to 4 PM EST we've had no notice that the file has been "sealed."
There have been over 26,000 downloads and they are now going out at
600 per hour.
This is becoming picayune but:
I'm told that the court has now sealed Exhibits A and B of Hoy's
declaration. These are the DeCSS notes and the CSS scramble
code. However, the sealing applies only to the paper versions
and will prevent hardcopying.
Denying access to online versions will require
Your points are valid for the AIA document. However, in the
Navy document, Number 9, image 3, there is the phrase,
"Maintain and operate an ECHELON site."
Still, you may be right that none of this proves there is a program
by that name, and it may be only a way of indicating an activity
of a
Cindy Cohn, lead Bernstein counsel, has provided a January
16 letter to BXA asking for clarification of the new crypto export
regulations:
http://cryptome.org/bernstein-bxa.htm
The letter describes at length still unanswered questions
about compliance; requests a formal BXA Opinion -- in
Phil Karn wrote:
I believe the anti-Tempest provisions have been in the export regs
for some time.
Yes, but when did they appear? We're attempting to trace
Tempest's origin -- not easy because of classification of
so much stuff. One classified standard dates to 1967. A
French article on Tempest
Thanks to Will Rodger we offer the National Plan
for Information Systems Protection, Executive Summary,
released by the White House on January 7:
http://cryptome.org/cybersec-plan.htm (109K)
Zipped:
http://cryptome.org/cybersec-plan.zip (32K)
Stewart Baker offers a Revised Draft of Encryption Export
Regulations, dated December 17, which supecedes that
issued on November 19, and is being circulated among
industry groups for comments:
http://www.steptoe.com/webdoc.nsf/Files/regs/$file/regs.pdf
We offer an HTML version:
Adi Shamir has provided "Real-Time Cryptanalysis of
GSM's A5/1 on a PC, (Preliminary Draft)" by Alex Biryukov
and Adi Shamir, December 9, 1999:
http://cryptome.org/a5.ps (Postscript, 292K)
Title correction on the A5/1 paper:
"Real-Time Cryptanalysis of the Alleged A5/1 on a PC,
(Preliminary Draft)"
Note "the alleged' in lieu of "GSM's" used in Adi's initial
announcment.
http://cryptome.org/a5.ps (Postscript, 292K)
For those unable to read Postscript we offer the Biryukov-
Shamir A5/1 cryptanalysis paper in HTML:
http://cryptome.org/a51-bs.htm (text, 44K; six images, 163K)
On December 3 the Wassenaar members approved
changes to the cryptography provisions of the WA:
http://cryptome.org/wass120399.htm
And enhanced enforcement:
http://207.96.11.93/press/99/WassEnforce.html
Oops, you're right. Whatever changes were made on
December 3 this year apparently did not affect cryptography.
Sorry for antsy.
Ulf Möller wrote:
Did they really change anything now? This looks like the December 1998 (!)
list.
Here's Seymour Hersh's article in The New Yorker
of December 6 on NSA's troubles with the digital age:
http://cryptome.org/nsa-hersh.htm (36K)
Opening:
"The National Security Agency, whose Cold War
research into code breaking and electronic
eavesdropping spurred the American computer
For those in the NYC-area, Michael Anshel writes:
I'm scheduled to speak to my colleagues in the Physics Dept at
CCNY some of whom have co-taught with me Quantum Computing
and Cryptography. The announcement is below.
THE CITY COLLEGE OF
THE CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK
NEW YORK, NY 10031
We've completed an HTML version of Sarah Flannery's
paper, except for the Mathematica code; same URL:
http://cryptome.org/flannery-cp.htm (48KB with image)
William Whyte suggested that the successful attack on Flannery's
algorithm carried out by Purser, Flannery and 'Whyte, appended to
Thanks to Jean-Jacques Quisquater and Jean-François Misarsky
we offer Sarah Flannery's September 1999 paper on the Cayley-Purser
Algorithm and her comparison of it to the security and speed of RSA:
http://cryptome.org/flannery-cp.htm
She concludes that Cayley-Purser is as secure as RSA and
Thanks to Anonymous we offer the CAPSTONE (MYK-80)
Specifications, August, 1995, about 1/3 redacted of parts
still classified TOP SECRET UMBRA:
http://cryptome.org/capstone.htm (40K text and 13 images)
Or Zipped:
http://cryptome.org/capstone.zip (text and images: 298K)
This doc was
Thanks to Cindy Cohn we offer the USG's motion yesterday
to delay en banc reargument in Bernstein:
http://cryptome.org/bernstein-mot.htm
A quote:
"The revisions being implemented by the Department of
Commerce entail extensive changes in the existing terms
of the encryption export
The FCC issued yesterday its detailed definitions of what types of
services are and are not subject to CALEA requirements:
http://cryptome.org/fcc101299.txt
This was issued in an attempt is to answer questions from
respondents about what is a "telecommunications carrier."
Excerpts:
"5.
Date: Mon, 06 Sep 1999 23:01:46 -0700
From: "Paul E. Merrell" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Organization: Lawyer
To: "[EMAIL PROTECTED]" [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Does Microsoft's CryptoAPI key violate U.S. law?
:
:
What follows is a copy of my post to a U.S.-based listserv for law
office technical issues:
We offer the European Parliament-sponsored reports which
have been prepared as follow-up to the 1998 "Appraisal of
the Technologies of Political Control."
The four-part series is titled "Development of Surveillance
Technology and Risk of Abuse of Economic Information
(an appraisal of
John,
Have you heard about this PECSENC recommendation cited
by Dorothy Denning? I've written the PECSENC administrator
about getting the recommendation. That's Jason Gomberg
[EMAIL PROTECTED]. Could you try from your end?
Thanks, John
--
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 1999 13:49:07 -0400
From: [EMAIL
We offer Nick Ellsmore's exemplary paper, "Cryptology:
Law Enforcement National Security vs. Privacy, Security
The Future of E-Commerce":
http://cryptome.org/crypto97-ne.htm (196K)
It is also available in Zipped .DOC format:
http://cryptome.org/crypto97-ne.zip (76K)
For those who
Vin McLelland wrote:
Nice article in USAToday, Will!
You might find it useful to note -- and I'm open for correction on
this from anyone -- that the US Government's Bernstein brief is, I believe,
the first time the Govt has openly acknowledged that the export control
issue is all
Federal Register, 9 June 1999
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Bureau of Export Administration
President's Export Council Subcommittee on Encryption; Open Meeting
The President's Export Council Subcommittee on Encryption (PECSENC)
will meet on June 25, 1999, at the U.S. Department of Commerce,
Peter Haefner has provided an English translation of the full
German statement, "Cornerstones of German Encryption Policy":
http://jya.com/de-crypto-all.htm
The German cabinet today released a policy statement on
the unrestricted use of encryption (an English translation
would be welcome):
http://www.bmwi.de/presse/1999/0602prm1.html
It says, pardon my German, that for worldwide protection
against economic espionage and electronic interception
We offer Peter Junger's reply to the government's
brief in his appeal to the 6th Circuit:
http://jya.com/pdj-reply6th.htm
Here's a swell petard hoisting excerpt:
The government has introduced evidence that the use
of encryption "by foreign intelligence targets 'can have a
debilitating
A report on how 128-bit crypto was liberated in France.
http://jya.com/jospin-coup.htm
An outfoxed French spook warns, "Free crypto, it will be
the end of the State."
The author of the STOA report on Echelon, Duncan Campbell,
offers the report:
http://www.iptvreports.mcmail.com/stoa_cover.htm
We offer a zipped version Duncan provided:
http://jya.com/ic2000.zip (961K)
There are two others in the series which are now completed
of comparable interest,
We offer several documents from the PECSENC meeting
of February 14, 1999:
1. Agenda
2. Members of PECSENC
3. Memorandum on PECSENC Action Plan
4. Executive Summary, PECSENC Meeting Open Session, March 12, 1999
5. Candid Meeting Comments (backdoor algorithms)
http://jya.com/pecsenc051499.htm
That's docs from the PECSENC meeting of May 14, 1999.
http://jya.com/pecsenc051499.htm
An updated agenda for the May 14 meeting in DC of the
President's Export Council Subcommittee on Encryption
(PECSENC) has been provided by Lisa Ann Carpenter,
Committee Liaison Officer (202-482-2583):
Opening remarks by the new chairman, William Crowell
(ex-Deputy DIRNSA)
Encryption
"A Pedagogical Implementation of A5/1," by Marc Briceno,
Ian Goldberg, and David Wagner.
http://jya.com/a51-pi.htm
"With COMP128 broken and A5/1 published below, we will
now turn our attention to A5/2. The latter has been acknowledged
by the GSM community to have been specifically
Heeding Hugh Daniels' call today to set up 1,000 US crypto sites
free of unconstituional export restrictions as provided by the
Bernstein opinion, we invite contributions of unlimited-strengh
encryption programs and/or links to such programs for a new
US section for unrestricted cryptography
From: Adi Shamir [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 5 May 1999 09:57:33 +0300
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: TWINKLE
Hi,
The early version of the paper was quietly circulated to a small
number of factoring experts and colleagues to get their comments.
I'll probably write an expanded version
We offer the US Proof Brief arguing against Peter Junger's
appeal of the Ohio district court decision:
http://jya.com/pdj-usa-brief.htm (109K)
The French Prime Minister signed detailed decrees allowing
strong encyption on March 17 which were officially published
yesterday:
http://jya.com/decret031799.htm (34K)
They are in French, though brief, and an English version
would be appreciated.
We humbly ask for contributions for expenses of operating
Cryptome http://jya.com/crypto.htm. Checks made to
John Young:
John Young
JYA/Urban Deadline
251 West 89th Street, Suite 6E
New York, NY 10024
Thanks very much.
Jim Foti at NIST has put the Draft FIPS 46-3 at:
http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/dfips46-3.pdf (209K)
We offer an HTML version:
http://jya.com/dfips46-3.htm (49K + 35K images)
The French Prime Minister today announced that due to the threat of
espionage and invasion of privacy France will allow encryption
strength up to 128 bits:
http://www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/PM/D190199.HTM
[Excerpt; Babelfish English below.]
(c) Le troisième chantier législatif concerne la
Clive Feather asked about news of an Irish teenager
who has devised a fast crypto algo.
William Whyte at Baltimore Technologies in Dublin --
where Sarah Flannery worked recently and got a
boost from the cryptographers there -- gave a brief
rundown on her invention on mail list UKCrypto.
Thanks to Alan Barrett for pointing to the provocative
SA wiretap paper. And his critique is apt.
We offer it in HTML:
http://jya.com/za-esnoop.htm (364K)
The "Review of Security Legislation" looks at electronic
surveillance law in several countries -- South Africa, US, UK,
France,
This probably refers to the ANSI X9 financial standards
committee, whose X9F Subcommittee on Data and Information
Security devises cryptographic standards in cooperation with
the global financial services community and various standards
groups. See general info at the X9 home page:
A BXA spokesperson said today that the text of the recent
Wassenaar agreement had been received yesterday and it is
now being prepared for release on the BXA website
(www.bxa.doc.gov) maybe by the end of the week but maybe
not until next week. She said she expected the US to be the
first to
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 7 Dec 1998 16:58:49 +1000
Subject: Wassenaar changes
[OK to repost to crypto lists and Cryptome - dant]
I spoke this afternoon with one of the Australian delegates at the
Wassenaar meeting, an
The Secretariat of The Wassenaar Arrangement has issued
brief public docs on the recent meeting:
http://jya.com/wa-state98.htm
Only one brief mention of encryption:
"8. The WA agreed control list amendments to take into account
recent technological developments. The amendments to
Ron Rivest received on November 10 "US Patent 5835600:
Block encryption algorithm with data-dependent rotations:"
http://jya.com/rivest111098.htm (22K)
Senator Kyl has issued a long report, "Crime, Terror
War: National Security and Public Safety in the Information
Age," which recounts his Subcommittee's hearings and
recommendations on encryption, Y2K, terrorism, info war,
domestic preparedness, wiretap, and more:
http://jya.com/ctw.htm
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