[This is getting tiresome. Unless someone has something *new* to say,
this is the end of the thread. --pm]
On 3 Feb 2000, lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
>
> > > http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
> >
> > The one
7;s late. Second, I have to agree, reluctantly, that people
building diskless nodes should use the Intel RNG if they have it and
can't get anything better designed into their hardware. The software
alternatives are just not acceptable.
Anonymous asks what we want from Intel. OK, here is my
> What an extraordinary concept. We are supposed to thank manufacturers
> for telling us how to use stuff they want us to use?
Well, if we want to use it too, why not thank them for helping us?
Is help only help if the person giving it has absolutely nothing to
gain in doing so? Don't you than
lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> Note that
> no thanks have been offered to Intel for releasing the spec, clearly
> a step taken in order to facilitate open source development (drivers
> already existed for Windows). Apparently gratitude is too much to ask
> from the open source security community
On Thu, Feb 03, 2000 at 12:19:57AM -0800, Bill Stewart wrote:
> At 09:15 AM 02/02/2000 -0800, Eric Murray wrote:
> >Until Intel releases the design for the RNG, I would treat it the same
> >as any suspect source of entropy- assume that it can contain no
> >entropy. That mean
Lucky Green writes:
> Your post is the third or forth post I have seen in the last year that
> claims that Paul concluded that Intel's RNG outputs strong random numbers.
Such as when they said (http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf):
Cryptographically, we believe that the I
At 09:15 AM 02/02/2000 -0800, Eric Murray wrote:
>Until Intel releases the design for the RNG, I would treat it the same
>as any suspect source of entropy- assume that it can contain no
>entropy. That means that you whiten its output before mixing it
>together with your other ent
Anon wrote:
> As for the concerns about back doors, the best reference on
> the design of the RNG remains cryptography.com's analysis at
> http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf. Paul Kocher and his team
> concluded that the chip was well designed and that the random numbe
On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
> > http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
>
> The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
> analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
> only the stream after the "digital pos
-Original Message-
From: Arnold G. Reinhold [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
Sent: Wednesday, February 02, 2000 5:14 PM
To: lcs Mixmaster Remailer; [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [PGP]: PGP 6.5.2 Random Number Generator (RNG) support
> I respect Paul, but there is a matter of principle h
On Wed, 2 Feb 2000, Martin Minow wrote:
> > http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
>
> The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
> analysis, is that programmers cannot access the "raw" bitstream,
> only the stream after the "digital pos
At 9:00 PM + 2/2/2000, lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
>It may not have been mentioned here, but Intel has
>released the programmer interface specs to their RNG, at
>http://developer.intel.com/design/chipsets/manuals/298029.pdf.
>Nothing prevents the device from being used in Linux
lcs Mixmaster Remailer wrote:
> As for the concerns about back doors, the best reference on
> the design of the RNG remains cryptography.com's analysis at
> http://www.cryptography.com/intelRNG.pdf.
The one problem I have with the RNG, based on my reading of the
analysis, is th
It may not have been mentioned here, but Intel has
released the programmer interface specs to their RNG, at
http://developer.intel.com/design/chipsets/manuals/298029.pdf.
Nothing prevents the device from being used in Linux /dev/random now.
As for the concerns about back doors, the best
On Wed, Feb 02, 2000 at 03:24:53PM -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
> At 9:15 AM -0800 2/2/2000, Eric Murray wrote:
> >I've also received Intel security info under NDA (and nothing in
> >this post will violate same). I do not think that your point D is
> >fair- even i
, knowing what I do and having been told more by others,
>> (B) I strongly encourage the PGP engineering group to include and
>> explicit checkbook preference/option for disabling PGP's use
>> of the Intel RNG completely into v7.0,
>> (C) I'm troubled th
On Tue, Feb 01, 2000 at 09:00:33PM -0800, Dave Del Torto wrote:
> At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
> >Just in case anyone else is interested in my findings on whether I could
> >use the Intel RNG with my Celeron machine:
> >I needed help to find the driver ins
At 6:19 pm -0500 2000-01-26, Tom McCune wrote:
>Just in case anyone else is interested in my findings on whether I could
>use the Intel RNG with my Celeron machine:
>I needed help to find the driver installation file at the Dell site
>- I had searched for Intel RNG, but it can
make purely hardware PRNG obsolete.
Analog FPGAs might be even useful for true RNG.
Arnold Reinhold writes:
> I do not see anything "reasonable" in the excuses Anonymous
> attributes to Intel not allowing access to raw RNG bits. If Intel
> wants developers to use thei
I do not see anything "reasonable" in the excuses Anonymous
attributes to Intel not allowing access to raw RNG bits. If Intel
wants developers to use their RNG API they need only publish it.
Professional programmers these days respect APIs and realize they
risk future problems if
Bram writes:
> Paul Kocher has said the design looks sound, which I believe, but
> unforotunately the raw output of Intel's RNG just plain can't be accessed
> without it going through whitening first. Unsurprisingly, all the output
> passes all statistical tests. Wel
Perry Metzger wrote:
> As for their RNG hardware, Paul Kocher was invited to look inside the
> Kimono and has published a full report on it, and he didn't find
> anything odd...
Paul Kocher has said the design looks sound, which I believe, but
unforotunately the raw output of In
've decided that everthing's O.K. with your RNG
vendor & product, verification is a different problem.
Since I'm a small entity, I wasn't assuming that any of
my buyers were going to "take my word for it", thus I
encouraged customer validation. That worked good, be
Brad Martin:
>Doing the tests one's self - Doctor's advice
>even with a "fancy" RNG - this is NOT MEANT as
>a catty remark, but I REALLY THINK this is
>important. (you didn't trust us, did you? :-)
Statistical tests don't solve this problem. It's
Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
>
> You can see that Perry is right by a simple counting argument. Say the word
> size is m bits. There are 2**(3*m) cvombinations of seed, multiplier, and
> modulus and there are (2**m)! possible arangements of the values. The
> latter is much bigger for m > 2.
>
>
At 6:52 PM -0700 3/29/99, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>Is it possible to choose a seed, multiplier, and modulus for a linear
>congruential generator such that it duplicates any finite list of
>positive integers?
>
>[No, but I'll let others expand or do it in another message. --Perry]
>
>--
>Mike Stay
Is it possible to choose a seed, multiplier, and modulus for a linear
congruential generator such that it duplicates any finite list of
positive integers?
[No, but I'll let others expand or do it in another message. --Perry]
--
Mike Stay
Cryptographer / Programmer
AccessData Corp.
mailto:[EMAIL
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