* James A. Donald:
> Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
> that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
> secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
> a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
> or which ones signed?
What about this?
Ch
"James A. Donald" writes:
-+---
| Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
| that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
| secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
| a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
| or whic
> Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
> that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
> secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
> a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
> or which ones signed?
Yes there are a number of ways. Usually t
Is there a way of constructing a digital signature so
that the signature proves that at least m possessors of
secret keys corresponding to n public keys signed, for n
a dozen or less, without revealing how many more than m,
or which ones signed?
---
On Mon, Aug 18, 2008 at 09:24:33AM -0700, Eric Rescorla wrote:
[...]
> Without directly addressing the question of the quality of Diebold's
> offerings, I actually don't think the criticism implied here is
> entirely fair. If you're going to have voting machines, even
7;re >just< talking about summing a few lists, that's true. But
of course, no one who doesn't work for a voting machine company is
just talking about summing a few lists.
The idea that after you factor in everything, it might actually be
cheaper to have people do it after all, is a v
ut the security of the voting system.
|
The keynote talk for the USENIX Security Symposium was
Dr. Strangevote or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying
and Love the Paper Ballot
Debra Bowen, California Secretary of State
and her talk had one slide only. I do not have the
slide,
At 9:24 AM -0700 8/18/08, Eric Rescorla wrote:
(and because of the complexity of US elections,
hand counting is quite expensive)
This is quite disputable. Further, hand vs. machine counting is core
to the way we think about the security of the voting system.
On a "complex" ballot,
At Fri, 15 Aug 2008 11:57:38 -0400,
John Ioannidis wrote:
>
> This just about sums it up: http://xkcd.com/463/
Without directly addressing the question of the quality of Diebold's
offerings, I actually don't think the criticism implied here is
entirely fair. If you're
On Fri, Aug 15, 2008 at 11:57 AM, John Ioannidis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> This just about sums it up: http://xkcd.com/463/
>
Only slightly better then suggested by the comic. McAfee anti-virus
software was on the servers, not the DRE voting machines themselves.
&
This just about sums it up: http://xkcd.com/463/
/ji
-
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Excerpt:
Bruce Haggard, an election commissioner in Faulkner County,
Arkansas, is baffled by a problem that occurred with two voting
machines in this month's state primary elections. The machines
allocated votes cast in one race to an entirely different race that
wasn'
The International Association for Cryptologic Research (http://www.iacr.org/
) is seeking presentations and demos of e-voting systems. For its next
meeting in August-17, 2008 (in Santa-Barbara, CA, USA), the IACR board
would like to invite presentations and demos of cryptographic e-voting
University of Illinois will hold a talk on "Electronic Voting: Danger
and Opportunity". Professor Edward W. Felten of Princeton University
will be speaking.See:
http://webtools.uiuc.edu/calendar/Calendar?calId=504&eventId=78090&ACTION=VIEW_EVENT
saqib
http://www.quan
I've attached below Rick's reply to this thread. Rick Carback is a member of
the PunchScan team.
- Taral
-- Forwarded message --
From: Rick Carback
Date: Dec 16, 2007 12:01 PM
Subject: Re: Fwd: Fwd: PunchScan voting protocol
I think there are some misconceptions/assu
On 12/13/2007 08:23 PM, Taral wrote:
> On 12/12/07, John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> Several important steps in the process must be carried out in
>> secret, and if there is any leakage, there is unbounded potential
>> for vote-buying and voter coercion.
>
> I've done quite a bit of work
On 12/12/07, John Denker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Several important steps in the process must be carried out in
> secret, and if there is any leakage, there is unbounded potential
> for vote-buying and voter coercion.
I've done quite a bit of work with this protocol. The protocol assumes
the e
Hi Folks --
I was wondering to what extent the folks on this list have taken
a look the PunchScan voting scheme:
http://punchscan.org/
The site makes the following claims:
>> End-to-end cryptographic independent verification, or E2E, is a
>> mechanism built into an election
I haven't seen this mentioned here:
Ben Adida did a Phd thesis on voting at MIT (ended this August)
http://ben.adida.net/research/phd-thesis.pdf
At his blog there is more material available such as conference slides,
paper etc.
http://benlog.com/ (end of page)
--
Mads Rasmusse
I am working on the implementation of a system which should fit your
requirements based on some work of mine and on
"A Protocol for Anonymous and Accurate E-Polling",
Danilo Bruschi, Igor Nai Fovino, Andrea Lanzi,
E-Government: Towards Electronic Democracy, International Conference,
TCGO
For non-commercial use, ZMAIL offers free voting software
and service. The secure ballot may have a Release Time (cannot
be read before) and an Expiration Time (cannot be read after),
defining when voting begins and ends. Verified voter
registration is included. Candidates and voters know that
nchscan, a design led by the
distinguished cryptographer David Chaum, e.g.
http://vote.cs.gwu.edu/vsrw2006/papers/9.pdf.
Apparently, their development project is aimed at educational votations
as an operational proof-of-concept.
Interesting project, cryptography application to voting syst
My department would like to conduct departmental votes in some automated way.
We're looking for free software, (or modestly-priced software) to do this.
Anyone know of such a thing? I've done some searching without any luck.
We don't have the usual requirements of a full-blown
...okay, not so much surprise.
[...]
Scientists said Diebold appeared to have opened the hole by making
it as
easy as possible to upgrade the software inside its machines. The
result,
said Iowa's Jones, is a violation of federal voting system rules.
"All of us who have
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/04/ireland_evoting_bill/print.html>
The Register
Biting the hand that feeds IT
The Register » Internet and Law » eGovernment »
Original URL: http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/02/04/ireland_evoting_bill/
Ireland faces ¤50m e-voting write-
Wherein Dieblod remembers, hey, presto, they're a cash-register company
after all...
Cheers,
RAH
---
<http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/evoting/2005-01-28-diebold-printout_x.htm>
USA Today
Diebold completes e-voting printer prototype
NORTH CANTON, Ohio (AP) - D
<http://sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/news/archive/2004/11/10/financial1831EST0118.DTL>
Ths San Francisco Chronicle
Calif. settles electronic voting suit against Diebold for $2.6M
RACHEL KONRAD, AP Technology Writer
Wednesday, November 10, 2004
(11-10) 15:31 PST SAN FRANCIS
<http://gcn.com/cgi-bin/udt/im.display.printable?client.id=gcndaily2&story.id=27861>
No mandate for e-voting, computer scientist says
11/09/04
By William Jackson,
GCN Staff
Despite wide use in last week's presidential election, direct-recording
electronic voting still is a f
2004
This is an interesting time for electronic voting. India,
the largest democracy in the world, went completely paper-
free for its general elections earlier this year. For the
first time, some 387 million people expressed their
electoral right electronically. Despite initial con
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/09/12/opinion/12sun2.html?th=&pagewanted=print&position=>
The New York Times
September 12, 2004
On the Voting Machine Makers' Tab
As doubts have grown about the reliability of electronic voting, some of
its loudest defenders have been state
<http://online.wsj.com/article_print/0,,SB109407788036007336,00.html>
The Wall Street Journal
September 2, 2004
DIGITS
States Continue to Debate
Merits of Paper Trail
For E-Voting Machines
September 2, 2004; Page B4
Paper or Plastic?
In the race to use electronic-voting machine
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/06/15/politics/15vote.html?pagewanted=print&position=>
The New York Times
June 15, 2004
He Pushed the Hot Button of Touch-Screen Voting
By KATHARINE Q. SEELYE
Kevin Shelley is a big and voluble Irish politician, the son of a former
San Francisco mayor, a
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/30/opinion/30SUN1.html?th=&pagewanted=print&position=>
The New York Times
May 30, 2004
MAKING VOTES COUNT
Who Tests Voting Machines?
henever questions are raised about the reliability of electronic voting
machines, election officials have a
*
DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice
May 26 - 27, 2004
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Ari Juels
<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,63349,00.html>
Wired News
E-Voting Commission Gets Earful
By Michael Grebb?
Story location: http://www.wired.com/news/evote/0,2645,63349,00.html
02:00 AM May. 06, 2004 PT
WASHINGTON -- Passions ran high Wednesday at the first public hearing
<http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/8580743.htm?template=contentModules/printstory.jsp>
The San Jose Mercury News
Posted on Mon, May. 03, 2004
Tiny new agency ill-equipped for e-voting oversight
SAN JOSE, Calif. (AP) - As alarm mounts over the integrity of the ATM-like
<http://news.yahoo.com/news?tmpl=story&cid=519&u=/ap/20040501/ap_on_re_us/electronic_voting&printer=1>
Yahoo!
Yahoo! News Sat, May 01, 2004
Calif. Official Bans Some Voting Machines
Fri Apr 30, 8:56 PM ET
Add U.S. National - AP to My Yahoo!
By JIM WASSERMAN, Assoc
On Apr 15, 2004, at 8:58 PM, Ed Gerck wrote:
Currently, voter privacy is absolute in the US and does not depend
even on the will of the courts. For example, there is no way for a
judge to assure that a voter under oath is telling the truth about how
they voted, or not.
For many years in the 90's
re known for each race, a
voter cannot be identified by recognizing a pre-defined,
unlikely voting pattern in each race of a ballot. This
exemplifies one reason why we need the 'second law' -- to
preserve unlinkability between ballots and voters.
> So there's a need to de
Ed Gerck <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> David Jablon wrote:
> >
> The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only
> vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends.
>
> > What I see in serious
> > voting
get paid... lose their jobs... not get a promotion... etc. Also
relevant is that voters may WANT to keep their receipts, for the same
reasons.
> It seems a legitimate priority for a voting system to be designed to
> assure voters that the system is working.
As long as this does not go against
I think Ed's criticism is off-target. Where is the "privacy problem" with
Chaum receipts when Ed and others still have the freedom to refuse
theirs or throw them away?
It seems a legitimate priority for a voting system to be designed to
assure voters that the system is working.
> Ed Gerck[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
> John Kelsey wrote:
> >
> > At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
> >
> > >1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to
> 'verify'
> > >that their vote was
John Kelsey wrote:
>
> At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
>
> >1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify'
> >that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter
> >coercion.
>
One area we are not addressing in voting security is absentee ballots. The
use of absentee ballots is rising in US elections, and is even being
advocated as a way for individuals to get a printed ballot in jurisdictions
which use electronic-only voting machines. Political parties are
encouraging
At 11:05 AM 4/9/04 -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
...
1. The use of receipts which a voter takes from the voting place to 'verify'
that their vote was correctly included in the total opens the way for voter
coercion.
I think the VoteHere scheme and David Chaum's scheme both claim to solv
*
DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice
May 26 - 27, 2004
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Ari Juels
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are
> simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard.
I fully agree, but there is a wide variety of voting schemes out there,
of varying complexity. In a ballot with only very few options
| "privacy" wrote:
| [good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
|
| > It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
| > and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
| > error and inco
On Fri, Apr 09, 2004 at 12:46:47PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
> I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure
> voting security miss the point entirely.
[...]
> I'm a technophile. I've loved technology all my life. I'm also a
> security prof
I think that those that advocate cryptographic protocols to ensure
voting security miss the point entirely.
They start with the assumption that something is "broken" about the
current voting system. I contend it is just fine.
For example, it takes a long time to count pieces of paper
"privacy" wrote:
[good points about weaknesses in adversarial system deleted]
> It's baffling that security experts today are clinging to the outmoded
> and insecure paper voting systems of the past, where evidence of fraud,
> error and incompetence is over
etc.
As to your other point, the clever protocols, Perry and other
KISS advocates have a very strong (albeit social) point. Joe
Sixpack can understand *and test* levers or Hollerith cards
or their optical counterparts. Good luck getting him to understand
number theory. It would be better in many
Having a paper ballot printed by machine (and checked by the votor) before
being dropped in a box may permit some additional cross-checks:
* Put serial numbers or something like them, on each ballot, so that
missing or added ballots can be detected.
* Put check digits on each ballot, so that alte
At 8:24 AM -0400 4/8/04, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
"Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that
the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens
the way for serial voting fraud.
The receipt should b
a counterpoint...
"Perry E. Metzger" wrote:
>
> I'm a believer in the KISS principle.
:-) that's one S too many. For true believers, KIS is enough.
> A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by
> machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you
> ver
<http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,62983,00.html>
Wired News
See-Through Voting Software
By Kim Zetter
02:00 AM Apr. 08, 2004 PT
VoteHere, an electronic voting systems company, released its source code
this week in a bid to let others examine how the machines work and help
peopl
"Trei, Peter" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that
> the voter should never have the receipt in his hand - that opens
> the way for serial voting fraud.
>
> The receipt should be exposed to the voter
> needed.
>
> Complicated systems are the bane of security. Systems like this are
> simple to understand, simple to audit, simple to guard.
>
> Perry E. Metzger [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
I think Perry has hit it on the head, with the one exception that
the voter sho
I'm a believer in the KISS principle.
A ballot that is both machine and human readable and is constructed by
machine seems ideal. You enter your votes, a card drops down, you
verify it and drop it in a slot. Ideally, the cards would be marked
with something like OCR-B so that the correspondence b
http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/6/35078.html
http://www.eetimes.com/at/news/OEG20040123S0036
=
All Internet voting is insecure: report
By electricnews.net
Posted: 23/01/2004 at 11:37 GMT
Get The Reg wherever you are, with The Mobile Register
*
DIMACS Workshop on Electronic Voting -- Theory and Practice
May 26 - 27, 2004
DIMACS Center, Rutgers University, Piscataway, NJ
Organizers:
Markus Jakobsson, RSA Laboratories, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Ari Juels
<http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/cgi-bin/PrintStory.pl?document_id=2001825724&zsection_id=268448455&slug=votehere300&date=20031230>
Tuesday, December 30, 2003, 12:00 A.M. Pacific
The Seattle Times:
Electronic-voting firm reveals hacker break-in
By Monica Soto Ouchi
Seattl
Joel Takvorian wrote:
how can we prevent a single person from voting multiple
times???
A clear summary of some voting protocols including the use of ANDOS for
voting with one central facility can be found at
http://csci.mrs.umn.edu/twiki/view/CSci4554f02/SethMattPresentation
If you compare
Hello,
This is my first post on this mailing-list since i'm new with
cryptographic problems. I also apologize in advance for any language mistake I'll
make.
I am currently interrested in programming a secured voting system using
ANDOS (All-or-Nothing Disclosure of Secrets) prot
> Schu stressed that several layers of security will prevent hackers from
> accessing the system. VeriSign will house the security servers in its own
> hosting centers. The company will ask military personnel to use their
> Common Access Cards--the latest form of ID for the military--to access
> th
On Wednesday 01 October 2003 19:53, Ian Grigg wrote:
> "Roy M. Silvernail" wrote:
> > On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded:
> > > VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting
> > >
> > > "The solution we are building will enab
"Roy M. Silvernail" wrote:
>
> On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded:
>
> > VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting
>
> > "The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise
> > their right to vote," sa
On Wednesday 01 October 2003 17:33, R. A. Hettinga forwarded:
> VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting
> "The solution we are building will enable absentee voters to exercise
> their right to vote," said George Schu, a vice president at VeriSign. "The
> sa
<http://msnbc-cnet.com.com/2102-1029_3-5083772.html?tag=3Dni_print>
VeriSign tapped to secure Internet voting=20
By Robert Lemos=20
Staff Writer, CNET News.com=20
http://news.com.com/2100-1029-5083772.html=20
VeriSign announced Monday that it will provide key components of a system d=
e
At 02:48 PM 9/24/03 -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
><http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=463>
>
>Cryptonomicon.Net -
>
>Talk: Analysis of an Electronic Voting System
Someone needs to inject a story about e-voting fraud into the popul
<http://www.cryptonomicon.net/modules.php?name=News&file=print&sid=463>
Cryptonomicon.Net -
DC Security Geeks Talk on September 24th
Date: Wednesday, September 24 @ 08:10:00 EDT
Topic: Events / Special Interest Groups
Talk: Analysis of an Electronic Voting System
Speaker: T
<http://www.americanfreepress.net/08_25_03/Concerns_Over/concerns_over.html>
American Free Press
Concerns Over 'Serious Flaws' in Electronic Voting Prompt New Examination by Members
of Congress
A recently published study documenting a host of security flaws in a leadi
<http://ajc.printthis.clickability.com/pt/cpt?action=cpt&expire=&urlID=7300348&fb=Y&partnerID=553>
[ The Atlanta Journal-Constitution: 8/23/03 ]
Dare accepted on electronic voting machines
Programmer says she can crack system
By JIM GALLOWAY
The Atlanta Journal-Con
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A48092-2003Jul25?language=printer>
washingtonpost.com
Voting Machine Study Divides Md. Officials, Experts
By Brigid Schulte
Washington Post Staff Writer
Saturday, July 26, 2003; Page B01
For some in Maryland, the report yesterday by Johns H
Some effort should be made to communicate the danger of e-ballots to the
various grassroots, political organizations interested in voting issues. We really
have to get a wider audience made aware of the tremendous danger.
And somebody should work on producing an alternative hybrid voting
et up stealdemocracy.com, a new voting machine
company. Sell machines that explicitly let you steal elections. Get
some press.
Adam
On Wed, Aug 06, 2003 at 11:08:38AM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
| Notice they did this to Chaum, too...
|
| Cheers,
| RAH
|
| --- begin forwarded text
|
|
| Status: U
ED]; contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 4 Aug 2003 23:31:49 -0400 (EDT)
Subject: [johnmacsgroup] Computer Voting Expert, Dr. Rebecca Mercuri, Ousted From
Elections
Conference
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Computer Voting Expert Ousted From Elections Conference
Lynn Landes
freelance journalist
www
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